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Abstract
This thesis focuses on the role and historical development of strategies of experimental 
domestication in scientific knowledge production, with a particular focus on the function of 
the laboratory strains known as 'wild types' in the model organism systems of classical 
genetics, where they play the role of standing in for the 'natural' instance of the species so that
variation may be measured. As part of establishing how lab wild types came to assume this 
role, I have situated them within a much longer historical trajectory that tracks how changes 
in the manner that European intellectual traditions conceptualised the domestic-wild divide 
were linked to the development of new forms of scientific domestication and knowledge 
production. These new developments required that existing domesticating practices be 
intensified, expanded and analogised in order to better control, capture and comprehend 'wild'
nature. My first two chapters introduce the domestic-wild divide  by discussing both 
contemporary and ancient interpretations of it. In my third and fourth chapter, I explore the 
roots of the knowledge regime of European scientific domestication. I highlight Francis 
Bacon's campaign to use knowledge of domesticating practices to restore human dominion, 
before showing how Linnaeus later re-conceptualised the natural economy as an autonomous 
order and original order, with domestication reinterpreted as an artful transformation of 
nature requiring human maintenance to prevent reversion to its wild 'natural state'. I identify 
this idea of the wild as original and the domestic as derivative and artificially maintained as 
the basis of the original wild type concept. In my fifth chapter, I discuss Darwin's attempt to 
unite the domestic and wild under common laws of variation and selection, including his 
argument that reversion was simply a product of a return to ancestral conditions of existence. 
I observe that Darwin's theory of variation was problematic for the effort to bring wild nature 
under controlled conditions for study, so in my sixth and seventh chapters discuss how this 
difficulty was resolved, first by experimental naturalists both before and after Darwin who 
utilised vivaria and microscopes to bring pieces of nature indoors, and then by Weismann and
Galton's sequestration of heredity, which helped persuade scientists that domestication was 
not in itself a cause of germinal variation. In my eighth and ninth chapter, I detail how 
sequestration led the early Mendelians de Vries and Bateson to assume that wild types could 
be brought into the lab from nature and purified into true-breeding strains. I discuss their 
differing atomist and interactionist perspectives on wild type, with de Vries favouring 
'elementary species' as units of nature, whereas Bateson held wild types and mutants to 
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represent normal and abnormal forms of the species respectively. In my last chapter, I cover 
the replacement of Bateson's interactionist genetics by the reductionist genetics of the 
Morgan group and argue that this led to a disintegration of wild types into their component 
genes. I conclude with a discussion of what wild type strains in classical genetics were meant 
to be representative of, and end by establishing that whilst these strains may not wholly be 
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Introduction – Introducing Wild Types and the Domestic-Wild Divide
What are Wild Types?
The term ‘wild type’ is generally used in genetics to describe individuals deemed ‘normal’ or 
typical of their species and also to refer to the ‘normal’ alleles of genes associated with these 
typical individuals. But more concretely wild type is what the standard lab strains of 
experimental organisms in genetics are commonly referred to as. The role these wild type 
strains play in model organism systems in genetics is one of acting as a control against which 
deviation is measured. As the philosopher Rachel Ankeny has observed, without first 
establishing a ‘wild type’ “it is not possible to have a ‘norm’ against which ‘abnormal’ (or 
more precisely, that which is variant) can be compared”. Selection of a wild type is therefore 
“the first step in the underlying strategy [of classical genetics]”.1 The necessity of 
undertaking this first step was recognised early on in genetics. A ‘Report of the Committee 
on Genetic form and Nomenclature’ from 1921, written up by the mouse geneticist C.C. 
Little, comments on how “In most animals and plants it is convenient to settle on a standard 
type, preferably the wild type, when this is known. The effects of the various genetic factors 
are in general to be measured by the departure from type which they bring about”. It was 
further noted that “This recommendation involves no real departure from the system now in 
use by most geneticists”.2 The importance of the wild type’s role as an instrument against 
which to measure variation in the laboratory has therefore been acknowledged both by early 
20th century geneticists and some of today’s philosophers of science. It has commonly been 
emphasised that the historical selection of original model organism species and stocks often 
had a strongly arbitrary element where the principle concern was readiness to hand, 
familiarity with life history and known tolerance of captive conditions. This is reflected in the
fact that most species used as model organisms in genetics have a prior history of 
domestication or commensal association with humans. The original stocks on which ‘wild 
type’ strains were founded were moreover usually locally sourced.3 But, as indicated by the 
1921 Committee’s statement that the standard selected for the lab should be “preferably the 
1 Rachel A. Ankeny, ‘Wormy Logic: Model Organisms as Case-based Reasoning’, In: Angela N.H. Creager, 
Elizabeth Lunbeck & M. Norton Wise (Eds.), Science Without Laws: Model Systems, Cases, Exemplary 
Narratives, Duke University Press Books, 2007, pp. 49-50. 
2 Clarence Cook Little, ‘Report of the Committee on Genetic form and Nomenclature’, The American 
Naturalist, Vol. 55, No. 637, 1921, p. 176. 
3 Rachel A. Ankeny and Sabina Leonelli, ‘What’s So Special About Model Organisms’, Studies in History 
and Philosophy of Science, Vol. 42, 2011, p. 314; & Robert E. Kohler, Lords of the Fly: Drosophila 
Genetics and the Experimental Life, The University of Chicago Press, 1994, pp. 19-28. 
Page -6-
wild type, when this is known”, there has also historically been a parallel effort to align the 
laboratory standard organism with some kind of natural standard. In many cases, I believe 
this appeal to nature reflected an underlying belief in the real existence of typical forms in 
nature, i.e. actually wild ‘wild types’. I believe that many researchers in early genetics 
thought inbred domesticated strains a means of studying these theorised natural typical forms 
under more tractable circumstances. This thesis will seek to establish the historical context of 
these beliefs by tracing developments in the long history of concepts of the domestic-wild 
divide. 
It should be emphasised that lab wild types are in truth anything but wild or typical. They 
constitute a specialised class of domesticated organisms, removed from free living in wild or 
commensal spaces into controlled and artificially uniform laboratory spaces. Here, they are 
isolated from the natural populations from which they were derived and are forced to adapt to
a manmade ecosystem of standardised nutriment, temperature and housing. Moreover, 
making lab strains useful for breeding experiments typically requires that they be selectively 
inbred and standardised, as the more homogeneous the strain, the more distinctly underlying 
recessive mutations are expressed and the easier these mutations are to spot against this 
standardised background. Given that all this has been known for some time, the claim that lab
strains can be representative of a natural and/or typical form of the species has been 
surprisingly enduring in genetics textbooks. For instance, Griffiths et al in the 1999 edition of
the still widely used Modern Genetic Analysis define the wild type as “the type observed in 
the wild, in other words, in nature”.4 Other genetics textbooks today do admittedly present a 
more sceptical account of wild type. Guttman et al’s Genetics: the Code of Life (2011) 
cautions that “the term [wild type] is useful only for certain experimental organisms: for 
ordinary human characteristics, such as eye color or blood type, no one allele can be 
considered the wild-type. And wild populations carry several alleles for many genes”.5 The 
problem of utilising standard varieties to represent the species in the lab is here outlined, 
namely that they cannot be properly representative of the full extent of variation in the wild. 
This has led to some overt criticism of the very use of the term ‘wild type’. Biologist Ken 
Weiss for example writes on the blog The Mermaid’s Tale that the use of the term ‘wild type’
4 Anthony J.F. Griffiths, William M. Gelbart, Jeffrey H. Miller, & Richard C. Lewontin, Modern Genetic 
Analysis, W.H. Freeman and Company, 1999, p. 15.
5 Burton Guttman, Anthony Griffiths, David Suzuki & Tara Cullis, Genetics: the Code of Life, New York: 
The Rosen Publishing Group, Inc., 2011, p. 128.
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in genetics originated out of “a very poor understanding of evolution” and that “If we really 
want to understand Nature, we should wean ourselves from habits that can be very, if subtly 
misleading”. These bad habits include what he regards as outmoded terminology that 
confuses students. Weiss suggests that other terms such as ‘reference’, ‘baseline’ or ‘control’ 
be preferred, concluding by stating that “to keep from being wildly misled, don’t walk on the 
wild-type side!”.6
My aim in writing this thesis is not to advocate terminological reform. Moreover, criticism of
using standardised lab strains as representatives of the ‘normal’ instance of the species is not 
new or unfashionable. Even those classical genetics researchers who endorsed the term 
commonly acknowledged that the lab environment was far from naturalistic and the 
selectively bred strains employed were imperfect representatives of the real wild types 
assumed to exist in nature. There was also discomfort about whether human interventions 
such as isolating inbred lineages were representative of evolutionary phenomena in natural 
populations. What interests me is that despite these known divergences between nature and 
the lab, classical geneticists generally believed themselves justified in extrapolating to nature 
knowledge produced in the lab. I believe this can only be understood by placing early 
genetics in the context of 19th and early 20th century evolutionary theory. What we see from 
looking back is that the term ‘wild type’ had a prior history before entering the laboratory, 
and that there has been a long history of using domestic organisms to stand in for the wild 
and natural, both in abstract argument and concrete experiment. I believe understanding this 
history can help us understand how it came to be that lab wild types played the role they did 
in classical genetics and what presumptions about the relationship between the domestic and 
wild, artificial and natural this research strategy depended on for epistemic legitimacy. 
The major purpose of this thesis will be to explain how the wild type concept originated and 
how it came to be applied as a label to domesticated strains of laboratory model organisms. In
order to pursue this goal, I must first establish the broader historical context within which the 
processes and practices responsible developed. I will be adopting a ‘funnelling’ model of the 
development of the wild type concept similar to the ‘hourglass’ model first applied by 
Barahona, Suárez and Rheinberger to the history of heredity and then further developed by 
6 Ken Weiss,  'Walk on the wild-type side', The Mermaid's Tale (Blog), Thursday, March 21st, 2013. 
http://ecodevoevo.blogspot.co.uk/2013/03/walk-on-wild-type-side.html. Accessed 24/07/2014.
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Müller-Wille and Rheinberger.7 As in the hourglass model, I will move from the disparate 
cultural and epistemic worlds from which the elements of and conditions for the wild type 
concept were drawn to the crystallisation of an idea of wild type itself and its concrete 
instantiation within the novel experimental systems of the genetics laboratory (“experimental 
system” is Rheinberger's term for “the smallest integral working units of research”). I will 
moreover show how in this development the wild type concept was modified to fit into new 
theoretical frameworks and experimental contexts. I will treat the wild type lab lineages as 
the end product of this process. They are, in Rheinberger's terminology, the “technical 
object” (a concrete part of the experimental conditions) which the wild type as “epistemic 
thing” (the vaguely defined material object of research) eventually condensed into, and it was
as a technical object which wild types survived as once the wild-type-as-epistemic-thing 
disintegrated into and was superseded by the gene-as-epistemic-thing.8 Whilst this will be the
end-point of my enquiry, it will be processes and practices of domestication which will 
provide the overriding theme and framework of the thesis.
Müller-Wille and Rheinberger speak of modern ideas of heredity as the product of a 
“knowledge regime” that produces and structures the “epistemic space” necessary to allow 
for conceptual development and is also in turn reproduced and restructured in its interactions 
with this space. I will argue that what I call 'scientific domestication' can be interpreted in 
similar terms (by 'scientific domestication', I mean the use of domesticating practices to 
discipline space and its inhabitants for the primary purpose of systematic naturalistic 
knowledge production). Müller-Wille and Rheinberger borrow the term 'knowledge regime' 
('regime de savoir' in the original French) from Dominic Pestre. A knowledge regime is 
defined as deriving from separate heterogeneous contexts and as characterised by an 
interaction, not a separation, between scientific knowledge production and other cultural 
domains, including politics, the arts and technology. Embracing this concept allows the 
historian to “move beyond disciplinary perspectives on science while continuing to focus on 
its long-term development”. Pestre's knowledge regime shares similarities with Michel 
Foucault's notion of the ‘power/knowledge regime’, which makes the bolder claim that 
7 Ana Barahona, Edna Suárez and Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, 'The Hereditary Hourglass: Narrowing and 
Expanding the Domain of Heredity', In: The Hereditary Hourglass, Genetics and Epigenetics, 1868-2000, 
Max Planck Preprint 392, 2010, pp. 5-12; & Staffan Müller-Wille and Hans Jörg Rheinberger, A Cultural 
History of Heredity, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2012, pp. ix-xii.
8 Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, Towards a History of Epistemic Things: Synthesizing Proteins in the Test Tube, 
Stanford University Press, 1997, pp. 24-31 & 219-220. 
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knowledge production and power politics not only interact but are furthermore 
interdependent, as seen in Foucault's assertion that “there is no power relation without the 
correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose 
and constitute at the same time power relations”.9 My understanding of scientific 
domestication as a knowledge regime embraces both Pestre's emphasis on multiple, 
heterogeneous and interacting sources (as will be apparent in the diverse range of actors and 
arenas I will call upon in my narrative) and Foucault's argument for the interdependence of 
knowledge production and power relations (as is vividly evident in the interdependence of 
human power over the wild on naturalistic knowledge). 
'Epistemic space' is a concept originating in Rheinberger's earlier writings, where it first 
appears as “space of representation”. He asserts that  “the experimental scientist... creates a 
space of representation through the graphematical concatenation which represents the 
epistemic thing as a kind of ‘writing’”, i.e. new epistemic space is opened up through the 
activity of representing epistemic things as inscriptions (what Rheinberger, following 
Derrida, calls “graphemes”), and may furthermore be expanded through the development of 
second-order representations such as models and theories.10 This space is material, not ideal, 
and is concretely produced by the processes and practices which shape the construction and 
operation of a particular experimental system. But because experimental systems are open-
ended, being in Rheinberger's words “vehicles for materializing questions” and not merely 
providing answers, the development of an epistemic space also feeds back to influence the 
differential reproduction of the knowledge regime that lies behind the processes and practices
of experimentation.11 
To extend Rheinberger's ideas to the present case, I argue that the numerous experimental 
systems which were associated with the knowledge regime of scientific domestication 
contributed to the opening of a new epistemic space allowing both for novel representations 
of the domestic-wild divide and for new forms of experimental systems to be devised. This 
9 Staffan Müller-Wille and Hans Jörg Rheinberger, A Cultural History of Heredity, Chicago and London: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2012, pp. x-xii; & Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the 
Prison, Alan Sheridan (Trans.), New York: Vintage Books, 1995, pp. 27-28. 
10 Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, 'Experiment, Difference and Writing: I. Tracing Protein Synthesis', Studies in 
History and Philosophy of Science, Vol. 23, No. 2, 1992, p. 308.
11 Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, Towards a History of Epistemic Things: Synthesizing Proteins in the Test Tube, 
Stanford University Press, 1997, p. 28. 
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growth in the epistemic space of scientific domestication was also correlated with a growth in
its ecological space, as technical developments in experimental systems opened up more and 
more of the world's wild and inaccessible spaces to intervention, disciplining and 
exploitation. In this manner the knowledge regime of scientific domestication expanded into 
geographical space as well as representational space. This growth in space was fundamental 
not only to the growth of knowledge but also of power, for as Foucault asserts space is 
“fundamental in... any exercise of power”.12 The expansion of scientific domestication would 
thus manifest as a form of colonial encroachment upon 'wild' territory, including both 
external 'wilds' (e.g. 'wildernesses' inhabited by non-European 'others') and internal 'wilds' 
(e.g. such partially domesticated places as gardens and fields, where intensification could be 
applied, and the previously unseen, untamed world of the microscopic).
In establishing how the knowledge regime of scientific domestication eventually produced 
the wild type, I will move from epistemic space (representations of the domestic and wild) 
via epistemic thing (the heterogeneous entities and processes called or associated with ‘wild 
type’ prior to the establishment of standardised lab lineages) to technical object (standardised 
lab lineages called ‘wild type’ that form part of the experimental infrastructure of genetic 
investigations). This necessitates moving back through history to a period in time (the late 
17th and 18th century) when ‘wild type’ had yet to make itself visible. This will enable me to 
show what initial practices and processes were at play in early modern scientific utilisation of
the sphere of domestication and what subsequent developments in the life sciences and in 
broader industrial Western society led to the extension and augmentation of domestication in 
both ecological and representational space, eventually producing the technical object known 
as ‘wild type’. My main focus will be the history of evolutionary theory and classical 
genetics. I do not cover events after c. 1950, including highly important developments in 
practices of scientific domestication such as the molecularisation of genetics, genetic 
modification and cloning technologies, and genomic sequencing. Nevertheless, I believe that 
much of what I discuss regarding the role of scientific domestication in the development of 
lab wild types as tools for knowledge production will remain relevant for more recent 
developments in the life sciences. One area I believe my historical study will have particular 
philosophical utility for is the study of contemporary model organism systems, especially 
12 Michel Foucault, 'Space, Knowledge, and Power', Christian Hubert (Trans.), In: The Foucault Reader, Paul 
Rabinow (Ed.), New York: Pantheon Books, 1984, p. 252. 
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those in genetics. Historical and philosophical research on model organisms has been 
pioneered by Kohler (Drosophila), Rader (Mus), Ankeny (C. elegans), Leonelli 
(Arabidopsis), etc., but whilst they have treated domestication as an important theme, 
attention to this topic has usually been ancillary to the main focus, namely exploring the 
representational role of model organisms in scientific knowledge production.13 By examining 
domestication in greater depth, I will seek to highlight the particular representational 
difficulties that it generates, particularly the problem of artifice and 'de-naturing', and how 
practitioners have sought to circumvent such obstacles through material and ideological 
practices. 
The principal claim of the thesis will be that lab ‘wild types’ were the outcome of a long-term
historical trajectory in the life sciences whereby scientific knowledge and technique was 
produced and extended through the expansion of the sphere of domestication into new 
physical and representational spaces, and through the intensification of domesticating 
disciplinary regimes within already extant domestic space. I will illustrate developments in 
practices and processes of domestication by focusing on strategies and technologies of 
intensification, encapsulation and analogy, which were utilised respectively to impose greater
domestic discipline in existing domesticated spaces, to capture and transfer fragments of wild
nature into the domestic sphere, and to apply the logic and language of domestication to 
‘wild’ spaces and in doing so make them more intelligible to human understanding and open 
to future expedient interventions (note the power of such domesticating metaphors such as 
'economy of nature' and 'natural selection'). 
Tied in to these developments were three key changes in conceptions of the domestic-wild 
divide which provide the foundation for the logic of the early 20th scientific strategy of using 
standardised laboratory strains as stand-ins for nature. The first of these was a move from 
viewing the domestic as original and wildness as a derived 'fallen' state, an idea associated 
with the Biblical Eden narrative, towards the growing acceptance among 18th and 19th century
natural historians that wildness was a primitive state and domestication an artful product of 
13 Robert E. Kohler, Lords of the Fly: Drosophila Genetics and the Experimental Life, The University of 
Chicago Press, 1994; Karen Ann Rader, Making Mice: Standardizing Animals for American Biomedical 
Research, 1900-1955, Princeton University Press, 2004; Rachel A. Ankeny, 'The Conqueror Worm: An 
Historical and Philosophical Examination of the Use of the Nematode C. elegans as a Model Organism', 
Thesis (PhD): The University of Pittsburgh, 1997; Sabina Leonelli, 'Weed for Thought: Using Arabidopsis 
thaliana to Understand Plant biology', Thesis (PhD): The University of Amsterdam, 2007. 
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human endeavour, an 'improving' of nature and not an Edenic restoration. As the 19th century 
progressed, new technologies of encapsulation such as the vivarium and microscope 
encouraged the idea that nature could be brought indoors, that wild behaviours and ecologies 
could be transplanted and maintained within conditions of domestic comfort and 
convenience. The idea that domestication could be a useful site for studying 'wild' processes 
usually hidden in nature's tumult and heterogeneity was also encouraged by Charles Darwin's 
drawing of analogies between gradual natural evolutionary processes and the artificial 
selection practiced by breeders. This assertion that human art paralleled natural processes, but
on a more accessible timescale, helped justify the use of domesticating practices in scientific 
knowledge production against the charge that they produced creatures and conditions not 
viable nor visible in wild nature. Finally, late in the 19th century scientific interpretations of 
inheritance and variation became more hereditarian, with less influence being attributed to 
the external environment in shaping organismic development and evolution. This would 
encourage the idea that organisms brought into the lab would not genetically degenerate 
despite the great change in conditions and that consequently lineages could be brought into 
the wild and purified into their component types so that in this way the 'normal' type of the 
species, the 'wild type', could be properly identified and analysed free from the environmental
disturbances and genetic intermingling found in wild nature.  
To summarise my thesis' structure: my first chapter will consist in a literature review of how 
the domestic-wild divide has been conceptualised in contemporary debates in the humanities 
and will seek to establish what the implications these various ways of interpreting 
domestication and the wild have for attempts to utilise domestication for scientific knowledge
production. I will then in my second chapter look at the long-term development of concepts 
of the domestic and wild from Aristotle to the 17th century 'Scientific Revolution'. My third 
chapter will focus on gardens and fields as hybrid zones between domestic and wild, and will 
discuss how this hybridity leant itself to exploitation for the purposes of scientific knowledge 
production. I in particular highlight the role gardens played in the thinking of Francis Bacon 
and in his proposed restorationist programme of scientific domestication for the purposes of 
extending human empire. In Chapter 4, I look at how the naturalist Carl Linnaeus sought to 
utilise experimental taxonomy as part of a Baconian programme of national improvement 
through scientific domestication. I furthermore highlight how Linnaeus demarcates the 
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natural and national economies as parallel states with their own particular order and means of
fulfilling their inhabitants' ends, but with the natural economy regarded as original. This 
would contribute to the idea of wild types as ancestors of domestic varieties and as the 
normative form of the species within the natural economy. Chapter 5 will begin by 
establishing when the term 'wild type' started to appear in English language scientific 
literature (the earliest I have found in 1823), before then establishing the three major notions 
of wild type – genealogical, comparative and normative – which are already evident in these 
early references. I will then concentrate on how Darwin helped overturn the assumption that 
variation under domestication and in the wild differed in kind by drawing analogies between 
the selective role of animate and inanimate forces in the natural economy and of human 
breeders in the domestic economy. My sixth chapter will then turn to exploring how the mid-
19th century growth in the laboratory life sciences was founded on the earlier success of 
utilising new inventions such as the Wardian case, aquarium and microscope in order to 
establish what I have called 'indoor natures'. These indoor natures represented the creation of 
a novel form of domestication that better enabled living specimens to be brought in from the 
wild and kept alive for study in the laboratory. I examine how problematic it actually was to 
emulate nature indoors and how this led to the establishment of conventional forms of 
practices that were held to be 'naturalistic'. I also look at how, with the professionalisation of 
the lab life sciences, there came to be an increasing demand for exactitude, which led to 
greater standardisation and the increased homogenisation of laboratory life into single-species
cultures. Chapter 7 returns to discussing evolutionary theory, in particular the late 19th 
century problem of variation, which Darwin attempted to resolve by assuming variation in the
conditions of existence would correlate with organismic variation. I discuss how this claim 
was problematised for lack of a mechanism of heredity and variation, and how it was rejected
by Galton and Weismann, who both more or less sequestered the germ-line from influence by
somatic changes. Galton and Weismann offered different solutions to how evolutionary 
novelty might arise, Galton favouring internally driven qualitative saltational variation, 
Weismann preferring a limited variability ultimately driven by external influences, out of 
which variation an all-mighty natural selection could arrange Darwin's 'endless forms most 
beautiful'. In my eighth chapter, I explore how de Vries and Bateson, assuming the 
sequestration of the germ-line, sought to determine the internal mechanisms that drove 
variation through a combination of experimental domestications and field studies, 
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culminating in de Vries' mutation theory and Bateson's adoption of Mendelism. In the 
following chapter, I examine how the rediscovered work of Mendel (whose connection to 
garden-based traditions of experimental scientific domestication I cover in Chapter 4) helped 
shape both de Vries and Bateson's conceptualisation of wild types (especially Bateson's). I 
furthermore investigate in both Chapter 8 and 9 how the assumptions and theories of heredity
and variation held by de Vries, Bateson and other 'early Mendelians' led to their concluding 
that wild types were natural entities which could be domesticated in the lab and purified 
without their capacity to stand-in for the natural form of the species being compromised. In 
Chapter 10, I discuss how the limitations of treating wild types as holistic products of genetic 
interaction would eventually lead to the Morgan group adopting a genocentric reductionism 
which would disintegrate wild types into their component wild type genes, at both 
considerable epistemic gain and representational cost. In my conclusion, I interrogate how it 
was that wild types in classical genetics were supposed to act as representatives of nature in 
the laboratory, how this was important for lab genetics' claim to produce knowledge that 
could be extrapolated to nature and what actions the Morgan group took to defend its role. 
Finally, I discuss Dobzhansky's challenge to the very validity of using any single 
domesticated lab strain as a representative for wild nature's bewildering diversity, before 
concluding with an assessment of how the 'wild type' scientific domesticating strategy both 
has serious limitations but has nonetheless been highly epistemically productive. 
In summary, the principal achievements of my thesis are to provide wild type with a 
previously undisclosed longue durée history and through establishing this narrative give 
needed context to the otherwise strange claims of early 20th century classical genetics 
regarding the use of laboratory strains as stand-ins for nature. I establish this context through 
outlining some of the major material, social and intellectual conditions, relations and 
practices which would contribute to the origin and development of the knowledge regime of 
scientific domestication, thus enabling the opening up of the epistemic space within which 
the wild type concept would crystallise. I furthermore show how scientific strategies for 
knowledge production developed novel domesticating practices to better capture and 
interrogate living nature but faced the continual difficulty of distinguishing natural 
characteristics from experiment artefacts. I discuss an array of both technical and theoretical 
strategies used by researchers to circumvent this problem of artifice, and in doing so show 
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how these innovations fed back into the development of new technologies and theories. I 
furthermore follow the broad development of ideas of wildness and domesticity in western 
natural science and show how these both obstructed and enabled efforts to bring the wild into 
controlled conditions and moreover that the interpretation of organisms as wild or domestic 
was often central to epistemic and social controversies among scientists. 
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Chapter 1 –  The Domestic and the Wild
Introducing Domestication
There is a rich literature on the subject of domestication in both the human sciences and the 
life sciences. In philosophy generally, debates regarding domestication have traditionally 
surfaced most prominently in ethics, especially bioethics, environmental ethics and rights 
theory. These have principally focused on the moral status of higher animals, i.e. whether 
humans have a right to use animals for food, clothing, scientific research (medical or 
otherwise), labour, etc., and what political protections, freedoms and privileges animals 
should be accorded in a just society (the moral status and rights of plants, other ‘non-sentient’
organisms, and of ecosystems and other superorganic assemblies have for the most part 
attained much less mainstream prominence). Much of the attention that the peculiar forms of 
domestication experimentally practiced in the life sciences have received has been linked to 
these debates on animal moral status and what ethical limitations should be imposed on 
research. I would argue that these ethical enquiries are mostly concerned with the conditions 
of domestication, i.e. with the nature of particular domestic regimes in a particular place and 
time, usually the here-and-now, and the quality of life experience of those organisms living 
under such cultures of domestication. I, on the other hand, am concerned in this thesis 
principally with how processes and practices of domestication have historically been 
conceived and how they have been conscripted and manipulated for the purposes of scientific
knowledge production. By processes of domestication I refer to the more or less individuated 
constituents/inhabitants of a region/space undergoing domestication, including individual 
organisms, lineages of organisms, landscapes, machines, etc., which are analysed in terms of 
their undergoing change through time (becoming more domestic, reverting towards the 
‘wild’, remaining in dynamic stasis, etc.), and also the human practitioners and their technical
assemblages and tools (including other symbiotic species that act as allies in domesticating 
practice, [an example would be the role of the sheepdog in the practice of domesticating 
sheep]), which also are altered through time by their interactions with the entities they 
attempt to order and control (and are therefore themselves also being domesticated). By 
practices of domestication, I refer to those activities which act to promote domestication, e.g. 
enclosure (the archetypal example being house-building), regulation (including standardising 
and streamlining as part of fitting an organism into a disciplinary schema), and manipulation 
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(including experimental intervention, physiological modification and behavioural 
manipulation). 
Defining and Delimiting Domestication – the Domus
A deceptively simple place to start when trying to arrive at a definition of domestication that 
can incorporate these different aspects is to look at its etymology. The English word 
‘domestication’ comes from the Latin ‘domesticus’, which is derivative of ‘domus’, the Latin
term for ‘house’.14 The domestic-wild dichotomy can here be connected to the pair indoor-
outdoor, which in the modern life sciences has come to be heavily associated with the 
distinction between lab and field. But it should be noted that the original Latin ‘domus’ 
included anything within the walls of the house, including gardens (horti) and unroofed 
courtyards.15 The domestic may therefore be open to the elements. Because the Roman 
‘domus’ typically referred to a town house, as opposed to the rural villa, an association 
between domestic-wild and town-country (urbs and rus) can also be drawn. But the current 
idea of there being a rigid demarcation between town and country is a thoroughly modern 
idea born out a combination of the ‘de-ruralization’ of towns in the industrial age and the 
accompanying romanticisation of the countryside as an unspoiled place of calm and 
innocence.16 Though the Romans too were guilty of idyllising country life (e.g. the pastoral 
poems of Horace), they did not draw a strict border between town and country. There was a 
clear core to the urbs, this being the continentia aedificia, the ‘built-up area’, or (as Nicholas 
Purcell translates), ‘buildings with no space in between’. But as Purcell explains “it would 
not… have occurred to [Roman] people to say, ‘Here is the edge of the continentia aedificia, 
the rus starts here”. The boundary was more a continuum characterised by the extreme 
between on the one hand the claustrophobic, constricted and busy spaces of the continentia 
aedificia and on the other the open and empty terrain of the countryside. The rus was 
moreover by no means necessarily ‘wild’ as we would imagine it, for it included the ‘tame’ 
countryside of farmers’ fields and pastures, areas we would associate with domestication. 
There was a wild rus of the ‘solitudines’ – woods, moutains and other uncivilised ‘empty 
spaces’. But places which merely evoked wild nature but were not truly wild, for instance 
14 James Donald (Ed.), Chamber's Etymological Dictionary of the English Language, London & Edinburgh: 
W. & R. Chambers, 1872, p. 138.
15 John R. Clarke, The Houses of the Roman Empire, 100 B.C.-A.D. 250: Ritual, Space, and Decoration, 
University of California Press, 1991, p. 12.
16 Keith Thomas, Man and the Natural World: Changing Attitudes in England 1500-1800, Allen Lane, 1983, 
pp. 249-250. 
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sacred groves, were also regarded as ‘solitudines’. Much of the Roman rus was therefore 
“much more cheery at least in its idealized form than the woods, stones, and swamps of the 
real wild”.17 The idea of a strictly demarcated domestic and wild is therefore modern and not 
inherent in the original Latin concept of ‘domesticus’, which furthermore could not be simply
equated with ideas of the indoor and the town as contrasted with the outdoor and the country. 
Part of the ambiguity in the Latin term ‘domesticus’ lies in ambiguities in its parent term, 
‘domus’. Whilst ‘domus’ could simply refer to the house, it could also be used as a synonym 
for the household – i.e. the family (familia), which for the Romans included live-in tenants 
and slaves (the word ‘familia’ indeed descends form the older ‘famulus’, ‘slave’) – and for 
the broader kinship group associated with the major household lineage. It was also used as a 
metonym for the (usually male) head of the household, the paterfamilaris, who was also often
referred to as the dominus, meaning ‘master’ or ‘slave-owner’. The dominus exercised control
over a dominium, which developed under the Empire into a legal meaning as absolute private 
property. ‘Domus’ was with some regularity used as a synonym for ‘dominium’. But as with 
the English word ‘property’, houses were only one of many things that could be regarded as 
part of a dominium. Indeed, it has been argued that, as with familia, the Roman notion of 
dominium derived from slave-keeping, i.e. from the social relations found in the household, 
and was therefore not directly related to the idea of the domus as a wall-bound space. The 
extension of dominium from its original application in master-slave social relations to its 
legal application to all things regarded ‘property’ was therefore a legal extension of the 
recognised authority of the dominus over the household familia to non-human organisms and 
inanimate objects. It did not, in other words, derive from the idea of the domus-as-physical-
house as a container of domestic things, and these things as being property on account of 
being part of the larger property of the house.  The extension of this logic from human-human
relations to human-animal/plant and human-object relations occurred, Graeber (after 
Patterson) notes, through the increasing treatment of human property, i.e. slaves, as res, 
‘things’. He thus observes that “In creating a notion of dominium… what Roman jurists were 
doing first of all was taking a principle of domestic authority, of absolute power over people, 
defining some of those people (slaves) as things, and then extending the logic that originally 
17 Nicholas Purcell, ‘Town in Country and Country in Town’, In: Ancient Roman Villa Gardens, Elisabeth 
Blair MacDougall (Ed.), Dumbarton Oaks Colloquium on the History of Landscape Architecture (10th: 
1984), 1987, pp. 189-202.
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applied to slaves to geese, chariots, barns, jewelry boxes, and so forth-that is, to every other 
sort of thing that the law had anything to do with”.18 
From what has been said, it can be seen that the domus, even in its original Latin meaning, 
was never a neutral space determined by simply being bounded by walls but rather a social 
space produced through human-human, human-animal/plant and human-object relations of 
hierarchy, domination and ownership. This observation that the walls of a house are less 
important in bounding space than the activities within those walls is supported by the analysis
of social space offered by the geographer Henri Lefebvre. Walls, he observes, are really 
“glorified screens”, and when stripped away it becomes apparent that what really constitutes 
a house is its acting as a nexus for the convergence of mobile energies. The identity of a 
household is as a “machine analogous to an active body”, not as ‘immovable property’.19 
Whilst the energies and information Lefebvre mainly invokes are facets of the modern age 
such as electricity, water, television signals, etc., I believe this treatment of the house as an 
active nexus for domestic activities rather than simply a passive container can be more 
broadly applied to households in non-industrial eras and places, not least as it enables one to 
distinguish between the ordered domesticity of an active inhabited household and the lack of 
such order or human activity found in an abandoned building. Further support for this view is
found in what Tim Ingold calls the ‘dwelling perspective’ in anthropology. This is contrasted 
with the older ‘building’ perspective, which argued that “worlds are made before they are 
lived in”. Ingold selects Peter Wilson’s 1988 Domestication of the Human Species as a 
typical statement of this view. Wilson argues the building of permanent houses to have 
marked the point in human social evolution when a sharp delineation was formed between 
hunter-gatherers, who “create for themselves only the flimsiest architectural context, and only
the faintest line divides their living space from nature”, and sedentary agriculturalists who 
permanently inhabit an “architecturally modified environment”. The dwelling perspective 
takes inspiration from the philosopher Martin Heidegger’s contrary claim that “Only if we 
are capable of dwelling, only then can we build”. Unlike the building perspective, the 
dwelling perspective does not assume the necessity of a rational design that is then executed 
18 Richard P. Saller, ‘Familia, Domus, and the Roman Conception of the Family’, Phoenix, Vol. 38, No. 4, 
1984, pp 342-343; & David Graeber, Debt: The First 5,000 Years, First Melville House Printing, 2011, pp. 
199-201.
19 Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space, Donald Nicholson-Smith (Trans.), Blackwell Publishing, 1991, 
pp. 92-93.
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to produce a house but instead stresses the continual activity of organisms, human and non-
human, to modify their environments in order to make themselves more at home. House-
building is therefore a derivative form of this generally organismic tendency to attempt to 
domesticate the environment, not an initial form. Ingold therefore concludes that the 
distinction between the use of a house by human beings and of a tree by woodland animals is 
a relative not an absolute one, for in both cases they act as a place of dwelling and are shaped 
by the interactions of the organisms which inhabit them. A house can therefore 
metaphorically be seen as an organism with a life history; the more dominated by human 
interactions, the more of a built domestic environment it is, but when non-human interactions 
predominate, it may be regarded as becoming an increasingly wild dwelling. I believe it to be 
a logical extension of Ingold’s arguments to see the domesticating tendency as ultimately an 
aspect of the more general evolutionary phenomenon of niche construction. This accords with
the fact that (a) the construction of houses better enables the perpetuation and spread of 
human lineages and culture by providing shelter from the elements including in climates 
often too hostile for continual outdoor existence, as well as storage of food and other 
resources for times of scarcity and defence against predation; (b) houses are part of the 
inherited environment of offspring and therefore continue to benefit survival and 
reproduction; (c) like all constructed environments, houses require continual maintenance to 
sustain and optimise their utility – this is one of the grounds of Ingold’s critique of the 
‘building perspective’, as it ignores the fact that building “is a process that is continually 
going on, for as long as people dwell in an environment. It does not begin here, with a pre-
formed plan, and end there, with a finished artefact”.20 Domestication is therefore not an 
established state but rather a continual dialogue and dialectic between the domus and the 
wild. 
Defining & Delimiting Domestication – Nature & the Wild
Having looked for clues to defining domestication in its etymological origins and its 
relationship with the house and household, the domus, I now turn to attempts to define 
domestication in terms of what it is to be contrasted with. In Western discourse, 
domestication is most typically contrasted with the ‘wild’, which is typically represented as 
20 Tim Ingold, ‘Building, Dwelling, Living: How Animals and People Make Themselves at Home in the 
World’, The Perception of the Environment: Essays on Livelihood, Dwelling and Skill, London and New 
York: Routledge, 2000, pp. 172-188.
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being prior to domestication and without domestic space. The ‘wild’ is also often conflated 
with ‘nature’, and as a consequence the domestic is widely associated with nature’s other 
many antonyms – e.g. society, culture, art, civilisation, technology, etc. The treatment of the 
domestic-wild and society-nature as synonymous has been especially widespread. It has, 
however, come under criticism from anthropologists studying some traditional non-Western 
cultures where it is claimed that a notion of a domestic-wild distinction exists without an 
associated and parallel society-nature dichotomy. The Mount Hageners of New Guinea, for 
instance, have conceptions of mbo and rømi that have certain parallels with society-nature but
do not denote a society carved out of nature but rather the distinction between what is inside 
and what is outside the limits of human concern and care. This distinction does not 
necessarily coincide with the limits of human physical transformation of the local 
landscape.21 
That ‘nature’ is one of Western epistemology’s most nebulous categories is further unhelpful 
if its meaning is to be used to clarify that of ‘wild’. The amorphous character of conceptions 
of 'nature' is long-standing – already in Aristotle, seven meanings of the Greek equivalent 
term ‘phusis’ are identified.22 In the 17th century, Robert Boyle attempted to clarify use of the 
word by rejecting those interpretations (eight identified in total) he believed leant themselves 
to pantheist or atheist cosmologies. His efforts, however, were largely in vain.23 There is far 
too little space here to go into detail regarding the many, many interpretations of nature 
identified by scholars. I will, however, highlight two philosophers' taxonomies of nature 
which are useful for the purposes of discussing the domestic-wild dichotomy. Neither of 
these taxonomies is especially detailed, unlike Aristotle and Boyle's, but they have the 
advantage of reducing the variety of conceptions into two contrasting classes and of 
demonstrating long-term continuities in ideas of art and nature. The first taxonomy I will 
introduce is that identified by R.G. Collingwood in his 1945 Idea of Nature. This is the 
distinction between phusis and kosmos, the two ideas of nature Collingwood claims to have 
been most prominent amongst the ancient Greeks. Of the two, phusis is the older idea of 
21 Marilyn Strathern, 'No Nature, No Culture: the Hagen Case', In: Nature, Culture and Gender, Carol 
MacCormack and Marilyn Strathern (Eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980, pp. 174-219. 
22 R.G. Collingwood, The Idea of Nature, Oxford University Press, 1945, pp. 80-82.
23 Ian Hacking, 'Almost Zero' (Review: 'The Veil of Isis: An Essay on the History of the Idea of Nature' by 
Pierre Hadot), The London Review of Books, Vol. 29, No. 9, 2007, pp. 29-30; & Robert Boyle, A Free 
Enquiry into the Vulgarly Received Notion of Nature, Edward B. Davis and Michael Hunter (Eds.), 
Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 3-4. 
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nature and denotes that which is “the internal source of a thing’s behaviour”, whereas the 
later kosmos refers to “the sum total or aggregate of natural things”.24 
I will return to kosmos shortly, but will first focus on phusis. Originally, phusis had quite a 
different meaning, Pierre Hadot asserting that it was only in the later 5th and 4th centuries BC 
that phusis became strongly associated with individual constitution and essence. Beforehand, 
phusis was principally used to refer to generative processes and also their productions. This 
idea of phusis was associated with a Pre-Socratic philosophy that saw nature and its beings as
mere composites of processes of generation and decay. This view is exemplified in 
Empedocles' assertion that “There is absolutely no birth [phusis] for all mortal things, nor 
end, in detested death, but there is only mixture and distinction of mixed-up things, and this is
what men call phusis”. It was the Sophists and Hippocratics who would later reinterpret 
phusis as primarily related to constitution, in the latter case particularly related to the 
constitution of the human body. Plato and Aristotle then abstracted as 'essence' this 
constitutive notion of phusis and attributed to this essence the generative power to produce 
specific forms and their natural behaviours.25 Phusis in this manner changed from principally 
referring to processes of growth to principally referring to that which lay behind growth and 
determined constitution and behaviour. Moreover, by distinguishing between processes and 
the power to produce them, philosophers such as Aristotle could also distinguish between 
'natural' behaviour/constitution (i.e. when an entity behaves only according to its internal 
source of behaviour) and 'forced' behaviour/constitution (i.e. when an entity's natural 
behaviour is constrained or compelled by external forces).26 Making this distinction, as shall 
be seen, was key to Aristotle's account of art and nature, and through this influenced his 
interpretation of the domestic and the wild. 
That phusis increasingly came to refer to individual inner natures, as opposed to collective 
processes of generation and corruption, may explain why kosmos emerged as an alternative 
term to capture the sense of nature as the sum of natural entities, which phusis originally had 
covered but had since diverged from. By adopting these two distinct notions of nature, 
Aristotelians were able to treat nature as both the totality of all processes (kosmos) and as a 
24 R.G. Collingwood, The Idea of Nature, Oxford University Press, 1945, pp. 43-45.
25 Pierre Hadot, The Veil of Isis: An Essay on the History of the Idea of Nature, Michael Chase (Trans.), The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006, pp. 7-19. 
26 R.G. Collingwood, The Idea of Nature, Oxford University Press, 1945, pp. 43-45.
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particular process/entity interacting with other natural influences. This twofold interpretation 
of nature as both external totality and internal inclination has remained highly influential in 
Western thought, despite efforts to reduce this dualistic picture to a uniform monism. It is for 
instance visible in the presentation of the wild both as everything spatially that lies beyond 
domestication and as the inherent natural instinct and constitution within organisms which 
must be modified in order to tame and control them even once they are brought into domestic
space (an inner wildness that may nonetheless remain latent awaiting reactivation). The idea 
of natural things as directed by an internal inclination would come to be challenged from the 
17th century onwards by mechanistic worldviews which denied nature an agency independent 
of God and instead presented motion as due to the inertial conservation of momentum and 
natural interactions as the mere transference of momentum between entities. But nonetheless 
the opposition between forced and natural behaviour found in the Greek idea of nature as 
phusis survived in the vast majority of mechanistic cosmologies in the form of an opposition 
between nature's order and the human capacity for intervention and artifice. The endurance of
this opposition between nature as all-encompassing and nature as distinct from art is apparent
in the second taxonomy of nature I have selected, that of John Stuart Mill. Mill identifies as 
nature's two principal meanings a first sense by which ‘nature’ means “all the powers existing
in either the outer or the inner world and everything which takes place by means of those 
powers”, and a second sense by which “it means, not everything which happens, but only 
what takes place without the agency, or without the voluntary and intentional agency, of 
man”.27 I thus contend that whilst much else about the concept of nature has been changeable 
between ancient and modern times, this twofold conception of nature as both containing and 
distinct from the world of human artifice has been remarkably enduring. And I believe that it 
is the ambiguous place of art within nature which has leant itself to the ambiguous status of 
domestication and domestic organisms. 
Controlling the Wild
Having established domestication's ambiguous place in nature, I now move on to examining 
the wild's ambiguous place within domestication. Whilst it is true that 'wildness' is often an 
admired personal characteristic, especially in association with male virility and creative lack 
of restraint, and is also occasionally sought as a trait in domestic animals, e.g. by some 
27 John Stuart Mill, 'On Nature’, Nature, The Utility of Religion and Theism, Watts & Co., 1904, p. 9.
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breeders of semi-feral horses such as the Icelandic breed, it otherwise largely has negative 
connotations in a domestic setting. In particular, the wild has associations with the ‘savage’, 
an English term that originates from the French word for ‘wild’, ‘sauvage' (the common 
translation of ‘wild type’ into French is incidentally ‘type sauvage’, which is moreover likely 
older than the English term).28 However, due to its applications to hostile animals and 
‘barbarian’ peoples encountered during European colonial expansion, it today has acquired 
strong associations with anti-social behaviour, e.g. violence, rudeness, lewdness and ferocity. 
This last association with ferocity is reflected in discourses on domestic organisms by the 
prevalence of the term ‘feral’. Derived from the Latin for ‘fierce’, ferox, 'feral' has come to be
applied to plants and (especially) animals which have moved from domestication back into 
nature, in the process reverting also to their ancestors’ fierce behaviour and unfriendly 
disposition to humans. The fierce and unfriendly behaviour of many wild organisms also 
contributes to another of the wild’s set of associations, namely with that which is untamed, 
unbounded and uncontrolled. The wild in this context is commonly conceived as representing
a threat to the social and moral order of domestication.
The idea of the wild as disturbing the domestic order appears to have been common 
throughout human history and across many cultures. It has been theorised to have deep roots 
in the origins of the domesticating process. The post-processualist archaeologist Ian Hodder 
has for instance  argued that the advent of sedentism and Neolithic agriculture in the Near 
East and south-east Europe was marked by the development of a symbolism of the house 
(domus), which was viewed as a site of structure, stability and history, reinforced by practices
such as the interring of the dead beneath the floors. This symbolism of the house was 
contrasted with a symbolism of the wild (agrios), which gave meaning to the security offered 
by the house by being presented as a region of danger and disorder. The power of the domus 
according to Hodder lay in its capacity to domesticate, either through the actual bringing in 
and taming of wild organisms or through symbolic taming, e.g. through placing 
representations of wild animals in alcoves. As Hodder summarises, “Domestication involved 
creating the wild as ‘other’, and establishing the domestic, the house as the structured, the 
stable, the long term. As wild plants and animals were brought in and domesticated according
28 E.g. see: Nouveau Cours Complet D'Agriculture: Théorique et Pratique (Tome Onzième), Paris: Chez 
Deterville, 1809, p. 355, where the sanglier (wild boar) is stated to be “C'est le type sauvage du cochon 
domestique” (wild type of the domestic pig). 
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to a practical logic, so symbols of the wild were created and tamed symbolically. The 
symbols of the wild were controlled within a cultural metaphor within the house”.29 Hodder 
thus here emphasises the role that the house can play as a disciplinary space, where animals 
and plants can be brought in and made to obey the moral and social order of the domus – 
‘house trained’ as it were. He furthermore allies his work with that of Foucault’s analysis of 
the prison in Discipline and Punish, describing the domus as “a power-knowledge-truth 
network” linking “idea, economy and social relations of dominance through the control of 
production, reproduction and exchange”, in the process “creating ‘docile’ bodies in settled 
villages”.30  
Hodder admits differences between the Neolithic domesticating process and the early modern
prison system as analysed by Foucault in that the former occurred through accidental 
historical circumstance rather than an intentional plot by dominant groups. But it appears 
clear that when he is speaking about the accidental as opposed to intentional production of 
‘docile bodies’, he is principally discussing human-human relations. His conception of 
human-animal/plant relations, on the other hand, is much more one of the intentional effort of
humans to subjugate non-human organisms within domestic space either physically or 
symbolically. Nevertheless, it is clear that the unwritten rules which shape the social space of 
a household, imposing domesticating discipline on a nexus of otherwise unstable relations, 
affect animals and plants just as they do people. Because non-humans do not normally 
comprehend these human-made conventions, their encounter with the domestic order is 
usually in the form of conflict. For this reason, non-humans are usually perceived by 
domestic inhabitants as a source of disorder requiring explusion to protect the domus. For a 
non-human to be accepted and successfully brought within the domus requires that they come
to learn their proper place within the household moral economy – they must be house trained.
It is no coincidence that the exemplary case of house training is teaching animals to defecate 
in a particular assigned place, for the effort to control dirt, as Mary Douglas observes in 
Purity and Danger, is a common manifestation of human efforts to impose a moral order on 
domestic space. Dirt, she quips, “is essentially disorder”, i.e. part of the 'wild' that must be 
kept out of the domus. There is, she continues, “no such thing as absolute dirt”, as dirt is 
29 Ian Hodder, 'The Domestication of Europe', In: Theory and Practice in Archaeology, London and New 
York: Routledge, 1995, pp. 208-210. 
30 Ian Hodder, 'Towards a Coherent Archaeology',  In: Theory and Practice in Archaeology, London and New 
York: Routledge, 1995, p. 151.
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“matter out of place” that therefore “offends against order”. Consequently “Eliminating [dirt] 
is not a negative movement, but a positive effort to organise the environment”, i.e. to enforce 
an underlying conceived moral order towards which all members of the household and 
community, be they human, animal, plant or mineral, must learn to accommodate their 
behaviour if they are to be tolerated.31 In Douglas as in Hodder, the ‘wild’, in this case ‘dirt’, 
is presented as a source of disorder which threatens to undermine the social and moral order 
of the domus.
Hodder notes that he does not “see the domus/agrios opposition as universal”, stating that his 
characterisation of it best fits the Neolithic Near East and south-east Europe, whereas 
different regimes of domestication were prevalent in central and northern Europe, where the 
domus was centred on megalithic monuments and tombs respectively. “The domus”, Hodder 
summarises, “was given different local meanings”.32 The particular hostility to the 
wild/agrios of the Near East/south-east European model of the domus, as well as its 
perceived power to domesticate through ‘bringing in’ the wild physically or symbolically, 
was therefore, the argument goes, also a local manifestation. But it seems clear to me that 
Hodder thinks this particular ancient model for demarcating wild and domestic was 
ultimately more successful than rival schemas and has down the line been more influential on
modern European perceptions. I believe that Hodder ties the spread of the domus-agrios 
opposition to the spread across Europe over millennia of the kind of agrarian economies that 
had originally appeared to its south-east. Hodder is thus treating the Neolithic Near East as a 
model of what Europe would become, and by inferring from the archaeological remains the 
kind of culture this society produced is attempting to trace the roots of ‘civilised’ European 
thought. There is certainly room to criticise Hodder’s overly speculative account. His 
treatment of the domestic as a feminine space and the wild as a masculine one depends, 
Tringham notes, on assuming generic gender relations, i.e. those found in mid-20th century 
industrial Europe and America, to hold across space and time in the Neolithic Near East.33 
Hodder himself has admitted that much of the logic of his own thinking about domestication 
31 Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo, London and New 
York: Routledge, 1984, pp. 2 & 36.
32 Ian Hodder, 'The Domestication of Europe', In: Theory and Practice in Archaeology, London and New 
York: Routledge, 1995, p. 216. 
33 Ruth E. Tringham, ‘Households with Faces: The Challenge of Gender in Prehistoric Architectural Remains’,
In: Engendering Archaeology: Women in Prehistory, Joan M. Gero and Margaret W. Conkey (Eds.), 
Blackwell Publishers: Oxford, 1991, pp. 93-131. 
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was led by terminological associations, stating that if he had focused on the Greek idea of the 
oikos instead of the Roman idea of the domus, then a host of different associated terms would
have likely come into consideration, e.g. economy, ecology, etc., and the domus-
agrios/domestic-wild distinction may have escaped attention.34 Davis picks up on this point, 
observing that what Hodder really seems to have in mind is not the domus-agrios distinction 
but rather the ancient Greek idea of the oikos-polis distinction, i.e. the contrast not between 
domestic and wild but rather between “two differing species of domesticity”.35 
It is probably the case that Hodder, in his effort to reconstruct past cultural norms, has 
imposed a 20th century idea of a sharp demarcation of the domestic-wild onto Neolithic 
peoples only recently transitioned into sedentism. Nonetheless, there is a broader lesson 
which can be drawn from archaeological and anthropological studies of prehistoric and 
‘primitive’ contemporary agrarian societies, namely that the idea of a sharp divide between 
domestic and wild is very much the creation of a domesticated mind. Nerissa Russell thus 
observes that “[W]hen ancient peoples domesticated plants and animals, among other things 
they created a category of the Wild. The Wild cannot exist until there is a Domestic”. She 
goes further to state that “Although not every society may stress the wild/domestic 
distinction, most with domestic animals regard this as important”.36 The extent to which a 
marked divide is observed between domestic and wild is therefore indicative of the socio-
economic mode of life predominant within a particular culture and, moreover, of the extent to
which processes and practices of domestication have advanced in that culture. More 
sedentary and technological cultures have long recognised the role of domestication in 
creating their societies, Kay Anderson observing that there is an extensive Western scholarly 
tradition which uses the capacity to domesticate as a benchmark distinguishing the 'civilised' 
world from that of 'wild' barbarism.37 Human domestication has moreover been suggested by 
Helen Leach to have been responsible for physiological changes analogous to those that 
occur in domesticated animals, e.g. gracialisation, initial decline in body size, and shortening 
34 Ian Hodder, 'Towards a Coherent Archaeology',  In: Theory and Practice in Archaeology, London and New 
York: Routledge, 1995, p. 151.
35 Whitney Davis, Replications: Archaeology, Art History, Psychoanalysis, The Pennsylvania State University 
Press, 1996, pp. 123-125.
36 Nerissa Russell, 'The Wild Side of Animal Domestication', Society & Animals, Vol. 10, No. 3, 2002, pp. 
295-296. 
37 Kay Anderson, 'A walk on the wild side: a critical geography of domestication', Progress in Human 
Geography, Vol. 21, No. 4, 1997, pp. 467-473.
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of the jaw.38 The domestic-wild divide has thus served to demarcate bodies as domestic as 
well as domesticate minds.
The sharpness of demarcation perceived between the domestic and wild (and more broadly 
between the artificial and natural) in our contemporary globalised society, compared even to 
the cultural perceptions of 17th century Europeans, is evidence of just how far such processes 
and practices of domestication have advanced in recent centuries. The perceived gap between
nature and culture, which has long dogged scientific efforts to study nature naturalistically, 
has therefore been widened with each successful scientific domestication, for the more 
scientific artifice and technique has advanced, the greater the apparent disparity between 
scientific technical assemblages and ‘free’ nature. But it has also been the social effects of 
this development of technology, e.g. the shift from dependence on animals to dependence on 
machines associated with the move from peasant economies to industrial ones, the mass 
urbanisation which accompanied it and the increasingly indoor and built-up nature of the 
work environment, which have also perhaps made the inhabitants of developed nations even 
more domesticated and removed from the wild than before, or at the very least made the 
demarcation appear much more radical and real.39 The history of the widening of the 
domestic-wild dichotomy is therefore in some ways the history of civilisation and its 
discontents.
Relations of Domestication
But it would be a mistake to conflate domestication with agrarian civilisation. Whilst the 
processes of domestication and related technological developments associated with sedentary 
agriculture and animal husbandry have tended to exacerbate the apparent divide between wild
and domestic, domesticating practices in themselves have deeper roots in human history. As 
we have noted above, if we adopt the ‘dwelling perspective’ advocated by Ingold, then 
domesticating looks increasingly like a form of niche construction based on ancestral 
practices which precede building. This implies that not only are domesticating practices not 
exclusively the preserve of sedentary peoples but also that they are shared in some form or 
another with non-human animals. Ingold for instance points to the tendency of the great apes 
38 Helen M. Leach, 'Human Domestication Reconsidered', Current Anthropology, Vol. 44, No. 3, 2003, pp. 
349-368.
39 Keith Thomas, Man and the Natural World: Changing Attitudes in England 1500-1800, Allen Lane, 1983, 
pp. 181-182 & 242-287.  
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to construct nightly ‘nests’ as an example of non-human relatives shaping the environment to 
better shelter themselves from the elements. There is admittedly a significant difference 
between these temporary manipulations of the immediate environment and human 
modifications. But the key technology to humanity’s greater capacity for niche construction 
is arguably not house-building but rather fire. The hearth played a central role in the majority 
of pre-industrial households as provider of light, heat and power (especially the power to 
process raw food). Given how long humanity has had some control of fire (estimated by some
archaeologists to date back 1,400,000 years), it could be argued that the house was built 
around the hearth rather than the hearth placed in the house. The domestication of fire may 
therefore be regarded as humanity’s original and most influential domestication, and one 
which preceded permanent settlements by hundreds of thousands of years. Johan Goudsblom 
has on this basis argued that the ‘dawn of civilization’ should be associated not with 
Neolithic agrarianisation or early modern industrialisation but rather with control of fire.40 
The use of fire for niche construction by pre-settled peoples is perhaps most conspicuous in 
the formation of the Great Plains of North America, large tracts of which are increasingly 
believed to have become established as a result of the deliberate burning by Native 
Americans of woodland and scrub, among other things in order to promote the grasslands 
favoured by their main food animal, the bison.41 
Treating domestication purely in terms of its spatial/social elements, its relations to the 
technologies of the hearth and of house-building and its development out of pre-existing 
evolutionary tendencies towards niche construction would be to ignore its most intriguing 
aspect, namely interspecies relations and symbiosis. Whilst fire certainly allowed humans to 
transform the landscape, better utilise food resources, defend themselves against hostile 
animals and colonise colder climates, the relation between humanity and fire, though 
certainly one where human projection of personality and supernatural power to this natural 
force has been historically important, has not had either the reciprocal emotive element 
commonly found between domestic animals and humans or the mutually altering co-
dependence found between humans and food plant and animals that has characterised 
agricultural and pastoral lifestyles. Fire certainly impacted on human evolution, but the brute 
40 Johan Goudsblom, 'The Civilizing Process and the Domestication of Fire', Journal of World History, Vol. 3, 
No. 1, 1992, p. 1-11.
41 Stephen J. Pyne, Fire in America: A Cultural History of Wildland and Rural Fire, Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1982, pp. 66-122.
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facts of its physics and chemistry have not evolved as a result of this interaction. On the other
hand, domestic and commensal species have over time undergone dramatic alterations 
compared to their known wild types, to the extent that some domestic varieties are 
completely dependent on human care for their existence. This is even truer of some 
experimental varieties, particularly those deliberately engineered as disease or deficiency 
models, e.g. gene ‘knockout’ mice. Equally, the vast majority of human beings alive today 
are dependent almost entirely on domesticated food sources, especially crops such as wheat 
and rice. Most animal protein is also sourced from domestic stock such as chickens, cattle, 
pigs, sheep and goats, and that proportion sourced from wild animal protein, e.g. fish and 
game, is decreasing per head as wild stocks are put under increasing pressure by exploitation.
Domestic human-animal/plant relations (and those with other life forms such as fungi, e.g. 
yeast, and microbes) have in this manner arguably shaped human evolution as much as 
technological advances such as control of fire. 
It should be emphasised that the origins and nature of interspecific relations under 
domestication are heterogeneous. The argument for an inherent connection between 
domestication and sedentary agriculture is, for instance, problematised by the fact that 
humanity's oldest animal partnership, namely with the wolf/dog, may pre-date the Neolithic 
agricultural revolution by tens of millennia (though domestication dates around 15,000 BP 
are generally considered more orthodox).42 It is similarly conceivable that the human 
domestication of herd animals such as cattle, sheep and goats may have been initiated prior to
the move to sedentism as part of nomadic practices of following and directing wild herds 
with the assistance of dogs.43 This may be one motivation for reforming the terminology of 
domestication, e.g. by adopting alternative terms that do not imply sedentism such as 'human-
animal relations' or 'cultural control'. Another strategy is to analyse domestication into more 
homogeneous categories, as Ingold does when he suggests that three distinct and independent
elements of animal domestication can be discerned, namely taming (bringing into household),
herding (treatment of animals as property) and breeding (control of reproduction).44 However,
I believe the domus an important enough site in scientific domesticating practices that I think 
it would not benefit my analysis to adopt this alternative terminology. I also believe the 
42 Mikhail V. Sablin and Gennady A. Khlopachev, 'The Earliest Ice Age Dogs: Evidence from Eliseevichi 1', 
Current Anthropology, Vol. 43, No. 5, 2002, pp. 795-799.
43 Nerissa Russell, 'The Wild Side of Animal Domestication', Society & Animals, Vol. 10, No. 3, 2002, p. 289.
44 Ibid., pp. 290-292.
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alternative terms have their limitations ('human-animal relations' neglects domestic relations 
between humans and plants, fungi, microbes, etc., whereas 'cultural control' slants too heavily
towards narratives of human domination). Additionally, whilst I find Ingold's analysis useful, 
not least because it is very true that the various forms of domestication do not necessarily 
coincide, it should nonetheless be kept in mind that all three elements are closely integrated 
in most 'typical' cases of domestication, as well as in the majority of those experimental 
forms of scientific domestication which are the focus of this thesis. 
Whilst human-dog relations certainly pre-date agriculture, for most other animal species the 
human move to sedentism was a definite condition enabling their domestication. This is 
particularly true of those species that originally entered the domestic sphere as commensals. 
These species were likely first lured into houses by left over human food waste, e.g. pigeons, 
or by the rodent prey this bounty also attracted, e.g. cats. Commensal rodents such as mice 
and rats themselves eventually became domesticates and came to play an important role in 
the story of scientific domestication. But other commensal animals, whilst strongly associated
with human habitations, have by and large not been truly domesticated due to their lack of 
perceived aesthetic appeal or utility when tamed, e.g. the house sparrow.45 There are also 
species which are part-time commensals, e.g. birds such as swallows and martins that have 
used human houses for summer nesting for thousands of years (in some cases, such as the 
American purple martin, a species has become heavily dependent for its survival on such 
commensal nesting) but which migrate to wilder regions in the winter.46 Whilst commensals 
commonly enter the domestic sphere voluntarily, other species more clearly require being 
forcibly introduced. This is especially evident in those species which may be tamed but 
which do not or rarely reproduce in captivity, e.g. elephants.47 For these species, adaptation to
domestic conditions is limited by the need to replenish each generation with new stock taken 
45 Robert E. Kohler, Lords of the Fly: Drosophila Genetics and the Experimental Life, The University of 
Chicago Press, 1994, pp. 9-10; & Carlos A. Driscoll, David W. Macdonald and Stephen J. O'Brien, 'From 
Wild Animals to Domestic Pets, an Evolutionary View of Domestication', Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, Vol. 106, Supplement 1: In the Light of Evolution III: 
Two Centuries of Darwin, 2009, pp. 9974-9977.
46 For details on the purple martin's heavy dependence on artificial nest sites in the eastern United States, see: 
Robin Doughty and Rob Fergus, The Purple Martin, University of Texas Press, 2002.
47 On elephants, see for instance: William Lawrence, Lectures on Comparative Anatomy, Physiology, Zoology,
and the Natural history of Man, London: John Taylor, 1840, pp. 178-9; & Carlos A. Driscoll, David W. 
Macdonald and Stephen J. O'Brien, 'From Wild Animals to Domestic Pets, an Evolutionary View of 
Domestication', Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, Vol. 106, 
Supplement 1: In the Light of Evolution III: Two Centuries of Darwin, 2009, p. 9972.  
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from the wild. Capture is, however, not always permanent, as seen in the example of semi-
feral breeds such as the Camargue horse and cattle, which traditionally were only rounded-up
up for recording and medical purposes or when their use for mounts, bullfighting or meat was
desired.48 Adding to the heterogeneity of animal domestication are zoo animals, originally 
captured from the wild for entertainment and aesthetic purposes but today increasingly re-
purposed (despite their common tameness) as ambassadors for wild nature. In the case of 
endangered species, zoo stock usually act as a breeding pool for the species, with the 
common intent of using them to repopulate areas of the wild where their species has been 
extirpated – necessitating, of course, the re-wilding of captive-bred stock, a process often as 
difficult as domestication.49 
Plants are in many ways even more amenable to domestication than animals as, rooted in 
place, their movements are more easily controlled. Furthermore, their embryos (seeds) can be
gathered and stored until needed or transported to where needed. Their sexual reproductive 
process, once understood, is relatively easy to intervene in, though, with the possible 
exception of date palms (based on a contested interpretation of Assyrian pictorial reliefs), it 
was not until the 18th century that artificial pollination became widely utilised.50 Plants also 
often reproduce asexually, which can be exploited by human breeders to perpetuate clonal 
lineages with desired features. Admittedly, there are problems faced domesticating plants that
do not apply to animal domestication, e.g. fertilisation of cultivars by wild pollen borne on 
the wind or by insects, as well as the difficulty of controlling competition from weeds. But 
for much of the history of human agriculture the problem of admixture was simply treated 
through 'roguing', i.e. selecting out undesirable strains and not perpetuating them.51 It was 
only with the 19th century turn towards attempting to create 'pure' pedigree strains that 
admixture became perceived as a significant obstacle to domestication. 
48 Bonnie L. Hendricks, International Encyclopedia of Horse Breeds, University of Oklahoma Press, 2007, pp. 
95-6. 
49 Virginia Morell, 'Into the Wild: Reintroduced Animals Face Daunting Odds', Science, Vol. 320, No. 5877, 
2008, pp. 742-743; & Katherine Ellison, 'Into the Wild', Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment, Vol. 6, 
No. 2, 2008, p. 112.  
50 For the claim that the ancient Assyrians practised artificial pollination of date palms see: Barbara Nevling 
Porter, 'Sacred Trees, Date Palms, and the Royal Persona of Ashurnasirpal II', Journal of Near Eastern 
Studies, Vol. 52, No. 2, 1993, pp. 129-139.
51 Berris Charnley, 'Agricultural Science, Plant Breeding and the Emergence of a Mendelian System in Britain,
1880-1930', Thesis (PhD): The University of Leeds, 2011, pp. 85-88.
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As with animals, there are many different degrees of domestication found in plants. 
Numerous species can be regarded as commensals which benefit from anthropogenically 
created environments. Grasses, for example, commonly take over areas cleared by fires 
started by humans. Some of these commensal grasses, e.g. wheat, became major human 
cultivars. But in other cereal species it appears that anthropogenic alteration of the landscape 
principally followed as opposed to preceded exploitation, e.g. rice, which to be fully 
domesticated required substantial modifications such as deliberate flooding of fields.52 Other 
grass species were originally domesticated unintentionally, e.g. rye and oats, which started as 
'weeds' in wheat and barley fields but through a process known as crop mimicry adapted to 
resemble cultivars (thus avoiding being weeded out), thereby acquiring desirable domestic 
properties, e.g. large seed heads, and eventually were selected as crops in themselves.53 
Whilst of enormous importance as a source of human nutrition, cereals compose only a 
fraction of domesticated food plants, other important groups including legumes, root and leaf 
vegetables, herbs, berries, and fruit and nut trees. Added to these are plants domesticated for 
pharmacological (including psychoactive), forage, clothing and ornamental purposes. Not to 
be forgotten are those species of domestic organism which are neither animal nor plant – 
fungi and microbes, some only recently deliberately co-opted for human utility, e.g. E. coli, 
others of which have a much longer history of cultivation and exploitation, e.g. baker's and 
brewer's yeast. 
Amongst this great variety of domesticated species is a vast diversity of histories and 
ecologies of domestication. Generally, it is much easier to make sense of this diversity if we 
treat domestication as a continuum that in many places intersects with the wild rather than 
being austerely demarcated from nature. At one end of this continuum are truly wild 
organisms living in 'natural environs'. At the boundaries of domestication are those organisms
which accidentally or occasionally associate with the human sphere, e.g. wild animals that 
sometimes venture into human settlements in search of food. Within the domestic zone but 
not deliberately domesticated are commensal species, some of which, e.g. the house sparrow, 
are now almost wholly adapted to living in built environments, whereas others have 
52 For comparison of the differing difficulties of domesticating rice, wheat and barley see: Dorian Q. Fuller and
Ling Qin, 'Water management and labour in the origins and dispersal of Asian rice', World Archaeology, 
Vol. 41, No. 1, 2009, pp. 88-111; & Dorian Q. Fuller, Robin G. Allaby and Chris Stevens 'Domestication as 
innovation: the entanglement of techniques, technology and chance in the domestication of cereal crops', 
World Archaeology, Vol. 42, No. 1, 2010, pp. 13-28.  
53 Spencer C.H. Barrett, 'Crop Mimicry in Weeds', Economic Botany, Vol. 37, 1983, pp. 255-282.
Page -34-
developed distinct urban and wild ecotypes, e.g. the European red fox, or, like the previously 
mentioned swallows and martins, periodically migrate between domestic and wild zones.54  
Further in are casual domesticates, such as those animals which are relatively tame and may 
elicit food and affection from their human hosts but which have freedom to wander from the 
domus and usually do not have their breeding controlled. This is for example the status of 
cats, dogs and pigs in some non-Western and traditional Western rural cultures. More 
domesticated are those animals and plants which are treated as property, for unlike the 
previous class they are considered by human society as tied to a particular domus. This does 
not necessitate restriction within the boundaries of that domus, for there are cases like the 
Camargue horses and cattle where, whilst they are allowed to live in a semi-feral state, 
individual animals are nonetheless considered to have particular owners (this is usually 
tracked through such forms of marking as branding and tagging). Where ownership coincides
with restriction of movement (or, in the case of plants, treatment as an extension of the 
physical property – as highlighted in neighbourhood disputes over overhanging trees), 
domestication is no doubt more complete (though restriction within the bounds of property 
can coincide with semi-natural lifestyles, as in the case of game animals restricted within 
spacious reserves). Domestication, however, has long been argued to be most complete when 
taming, ownership and restriction of movement coincide with human control over 
reproduction (this was particularly the view, as shall be shown, in Darwin's time). Again, 
control over reproduction does not necessitate these other aspects of domestication. For 
example, the reproduction of endangered species in the wild is today regularly manipulated, 
e.g. transplanting new stock into isolated areas to promote outbreeding, artificial animal 
insemination, manually fertilising wild specimens of plant individuals too isolated to 
naturally cross, etc.55  These techniques, however, represent technologies first mastered on 
more familiar domestic organisms that have since been extended to work with free-living 
species. In the case of these familiar domestic organisms, reproductive control was typically 
preceded by prior taming and restriction of movement and/or establishment of ownership. 
54 P. Wandeler, S.M. Funk, C.R. Largiadèr, S. Gloor and U. Breitenmoser, 'The city-fox phenomenon: genetic 
consequences of a recent colonization of urban habitat', Molecular Ecology, Vol. 12, No. 3, 2003, pp. 647-
656. 
55 See, for example: S. Shivaji, S.D. Kholkute, S.K. Verma, et al., 'Conservation of wild animals by assisted 
reproduction and molecular marker technology', Indian Journal of Experimental Biology, Vol. 41, 2003, pp. 
710-723, & University Of Arizona, 'Arizona Biologists Help Restore Mauna Kea Silversword, One Of 
Hawaii's Most Critically Endangered Plants', Science Daily, 10 March 1998. 
<www.sciencedaily.com/releases/1998/03/980310080030.htm>.   
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The form of reproductive control classically envisaged as completing domestication by 19th 
century theorists such as Darwin was methodical selection. As we shall see, however, 
developments in genetics would in the 20th century led to even more stringent and meticulous 
means of control over breeding, e.g. Mendelian lineage breeding, and later discoveries in 
molecular genetics would initiate a new biotechnological age in which direct manipulation of 
the genome, e.g. the insertion or deletion of specific genes, became commonplace and 
precise. The 20th century thus saw a novel extension of the scope of domestication beyond its 
previous bounds. I will not be discussing all of these developments, but will dwell on the 
particular quandary of how the highly domesticated lab 'wild types' in classical genetics were 
still believed useful stand-ins for nature. 
That domestication is a continuum does not imply we should abandon the domestic-wild 
dichotomy. Domestication, for one thing, does track real changes in the physiology, heredity 
and behaviour of organisms that causes them to differ from ancestors and relatives living in 
'wild' (i.e. negligibly anthropogenic) ecologies. It is moreover far too culturally embedded as 
a means of making value demarcations between organisms to be easily abandoned. One 
strategy for accommodating this lack of boundedness between domestic and wild is to 
recognise it not as a stark and static contrast but rather an interactive dialectic. This approach 
is supported by the anthropologist Laura Rival, who maintains that domestication should be 
understood as “a historical and ecological process involving the dialectical interaction of 
humans and other species over long periods of time”.56 I think this an attractive approach, 
especially as it allows us to recognise that domestication shapes both the domesticated and 
the domesticator. This still leaves open whether demarcating the domestic from the wild 
should be a matter of subjective judgement or if there are salient markers that can serve as 
more objective criteria. Nerissa Russell has advocated treating the transformation of animals 
into property as representing “a quantum shift in human-animal relations that we cannot 
ignore, a difference not only of degree but also of kind”. This distinction does not, however, 
directly relate to practices of control, but instead more to changes in human social relations, 
namely the move from treating commensal organisms as a common resource to that of 
regarding particular individuals or groups as owned by particular individuals.57 This accords 
56 Laura M. Rival, 'Introduction: South America', In: The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Hunters and Gatherers, 
Richard B. Lee and Richard Daly (Eds.), Cambridge University press, 1999, p. 80.
57 Nerissa Russell, 'The Wild Side of Animal Domestication', Society & Animals, Vol. 10, No. 3, 2002, pp. 291
& 294.
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with Lefebvre's account whereby the organisation of social space is determined by relations 
of production and property, and that therefore the establishment of domestic space and its 
imposition on wild nature can be understood as corresponding to a move from the treatment 
of nature, wild and tame, as a communal resource to that of treating nature as a resource to be
divided up and demarcated in space according to socially determined property claims.58 
Whilst this socio-economic account of the origins of domestication has definite merit, it faces
the difficulty, as Russell admits, that the move from a communal to a property-based 
economic model “is unlikely to correspond with the appearance of morphological change in 
animals”, i.e. it does not leave obvious traces in the archaeological record, and this limits the 
use of this criterion for determining historical points of domestication.59  
It may further be objected that Russell's socio-economic definition of domestication is overly 
anthropocentric, as it does not take into account the impact of domestication on other 
organisms, only human social treatment of these non-human domesticates. This tendency of 
many accounts of domestication to be 'one-sided' has been criticised by those who wish to 
present domestication as more a form of symbiosis than a human domination of nature. 
Donna Haraway for instance condemns the tendency of many analysts to treat humans as the 
only actors in domestic interspecies relations, complaining that this attitude “reduce[s] other 
organisms to the lived status of being merely raw material or tools”. By presenting 
domestication as animal instrumentalisation, a false picture is drawn whereby only wild 
animals can be ends in themselves – even pets are assumed to be “affectional slaves” 
wrenched out of their original nature. Haraway particularly protests the presentation of 
domestication by animal advocates as an “original sin separating human beings from nature”, 
instead preferring the view that domestication is a form of engagement with nature, a 
“multispecies sociality”. Recognising that domestic non-humans often benefit from these 
interrelations is, she believes, not only truer to history but more useful a set of background 
assumptions when determining how to counter human brutality to animals.60 Terence O' 
Connor has in parallel argued for a move away from models of domestication which 
emphasise human intentional domination to ones which instead treat it as “a form of 
58 Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space, Donald Nicholson-Smith (Trans.), Blackwell Publishing, 1991, p. 
83.
59 Nerissa Russell, 'The Wild Side of Animal Domestication', Society & Animals, Vol. 10, No. 3, 2002, p. 294.
60 Donna J. Haraway, When Species Meet, Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2008, pp. 
206-207.
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behavioural coevolution, by which mutualistic and commensal relationships developed 
between people and other species, either because the interaction was to the benefit of both 
species, or because it was beneficial to one and neutral (or at least not strongly detrimental) to
the other”. He believes it was natural selection, not some inherent human will to dominate, 
which was responsible for the success of these relationships, and that human-animal relations 
parallel animal-animal relations such as those between ants and aphids.61 Even human 
domination in human-plant relations may be overstated. Laura Rival points to the fact that 
domestication usually “presupposes dependence on [organisms] whose growth is much faster 
relative to human growth and maturation processes”, and that the term is therefore difficult to
apply to long-lived plants, e.g. fruit trees.62 Ingold on this basis remarks that in the case of an 
ancient tree utilised by generations of humans it seems “more appropriate to say that it has 
played its part in the domestication of humans rather than having been domesticated by 
them”. Ingold furthermore critiques the argument that domestication is rooted in the human 
imposition of socio-economic norms of production and property on nature as “embedded in a 
grand narrative of the human transcendence of nature” based on the equation of production 
with 'making', an idea which in its modern form he traces to Marx and Engel's theory of 
labour. Against this narrative, Ingold asserts that “the farmer or herdsman does not make 
crops or livestock, but rather serves to set up certain conditions of development within which 
plants and animals take on their particular forms and behavioural dispositions. We are 
dealing, in a word, with processes of growth”. He overall concludes that what is represented 
“under the rubric of domestication, as a transcendence and transformation of nature may be 
more a reflection of an increasing reliance on plants and animals that, by comparison with 
humans, are relatively fast-growing and short-lived”.63 
Additional support against the claim that domestication is a one-sided human transcendence 
of nature, as opposed to a symmetrical interaction, has come from environmental ethics, 
specifically with the turn towards critical assessment of the 'wilderness' concept in the 1990s. 
The notion of wildernesses as pristine natural landscapes which require the absence of human
beings in order to survive has been a pivotal idea in modern conservation biology, especially 
61 Terence P. O' Connor, 'Working at Relationships: Another Look at Animal Domestication', Antiquity, Vol. 
71, No. 271, 1997, pp. 149-156. 
62 Laura Rival, 'The Growth of Family Trees: Understanding Huaorani Perceptions of the Forest ', Man, New 
Series, Vol. 28, No. 4, 1993, p. 648.
63 Tim Ingold, 'Making things, growing plants, raising animals and bringing up children', The Perception of the
Environment: Essays on Livelihood, Dwelling and Skill, London and New York: Routledge, 2000, pp. 77-86.
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in the United States. Critics such as William Cronon have however pointed out that many so-
called American wildernesses, e.g. Yellowstone National Park, have in fact been strongly 
shaped by human influences for thousands of years. Indeed, in order for many US National 
Parks to be created, it was first necessary to expel and bar from them the Native American 
tribes which had traditionally lived, hunted or foraged in the area. Other 'undesirable' species,
such as wolves, were exterminated by ecologically naïve park managers keen to promote the 
numbers of iconic herbivores such as bison and moose. These wildernesses are therefore not 
unaltered natural landscapes but have rather been a deliberate creation of one human cultural 
and political order (the America of European settlers) destroying another (Native American 
societies) and reshaping the local environment according to its own perceived needs 
(identified by Cronon as a mixture of nostalgic desire to preserve a 'vanishing frontier' and a 
Romantic belief in nature as the home of the sublime). The 'wilderness experience' has 
moreover long been carefully stage-managed so as to best ensure the impression of nature's 
awesome power without the dangers and disappointments of unmanaged nature (hidden 
fences keep animals and visitors apart, whilst feeding stations keep animals in view). 
Additionally, even though wolves were reintroduced to Yellowstone in the 1990s, the park's 
displaced Native Americans tribes remain unwelcome. Cronon ultimately concludes that 
behind their 'beguiling' mask of naturalness, wildernesses are essentially unnatural, tamed and
impoverished ecosystems which represent not a pristine nature but rather “the reflection of 
our own unexamined longings and desires”.64
Cronon believes the troubling character of wilderness reflects problematic assumptions about 
nature and culture, the wild and the domestic. He emphasises that it is a mistake to think that 
“wilderness can be the solution to our culture’s problematic relationships with the nonhuman 
world”, because wilderness takes us back to 'the wrong nature', i.e. an imagined and idealised 
nature that ignores the anthropogenic character of the pre-Columbian American environment.
Cronon caustically comments that “The dream of an unworked natural landscape is very 
much the fantasy of people who have never themselves had to work the land to make a 
living... Only people whose relation to the land was already alienated could hold up 
wilderness as a model for human life in nature, for the romantic ideology of wilderness leaves
64 William Cronon, 'The Trouble with Wilderness; or, getting Back to the Wrong Nature', In: Uncommon 
Ground: Rethinking the Human Place in Nature, William Cronon (Ed.), New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1995,
pp. 69-90.
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precisely nowhere for human beings actually to make their living from the land”. By 
positioning humankind outside of nature, the wilderness ideal denies the legitimacy, however 
benevolent and mutually beneficial, of the domestic interspecies symbiosis which has been 
necessary for the development of civilisation, and prevents humanity from finding a home in 
nature. This desire for wilderness nature to be 'unpeopled' has not only had tragic 
consequences for those disempowered peoples who traditionally used 'wild' lands but has also
removed the keystone species in those ecosystems with anthropogenic origins. A wilderness 
without human inhabitants is therefore not only one with a false history but also a 
dramatically altered ecology. Cronon believes that recognising the positive role of traditional 
land-users in maintaining 'natural' habitats can help lead us away from the unhelpful dualism 
of pristine vs. degraded towards embracing “the full continuum of a natural landscape that is 
also cultural”. Additionally, he dismisses the claim that wildness is inherently fragile, 
asserting that it can “can be found anywhere”, for it is not passive and withdrawing from 
human contact but is rather an active aspect of nature in continual dialogue with human art 
and culture.65 Robert E. Kohler, following Cronon, has similarly spoken of the need to 
recognise ambiguity and interpenetration between domestic and wild. Instead of an abrupt 
divide between domestic and wild, civilisation and wilderness, we must instead recognise that
“Landscapes are technologies”, and “technological workplaces have natural histories”.66 By 
recognising the heterogeneity and hybridity of many 'wild' and 'domestic' spaces, we are 
better able to understand both how these differing orders interact and how organisms may 
move between and be affected by them. Furthermore, if we accept Cronon and Kohler's 
assertion that wildness is found even under the most exactingly domestic conditions, this 
offers significant insight into how it is that domestic spaces and domesticating practices can 
be used for naturalistic knowledge production, a subject I will now discuss. 
Domestication and Scientific Knowledge Production
This issue of whether domestication is an aspect of human domination of nature or rather of 
human symbiosis with nature is not just one for animal and environmental ethics. There are 
highly divergent implications for the use of domestication for scientific knowledge 
production depending on whether we interpret non-human organisms are mere passive 
65 Ibid. 
66 Robert E. Kohler, Lords of the Fly: Drosophila Genetics and the Experimental Life, The University of 
Chicago Press, 1994, pp. 9-11.
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subjects or active collaborators in experimentation. Experimental organisms are often spoken 
of as 'tools' or 'instruments' manipulated by scientists much in the same way as inanimate 
apparatuses are. This language is particularly applied to selectively inbred laboratory strains 
and transgenic organisms.67  Taken literally, such terminology denies agency to the laboratory
organism. This suggests either that human art has reduced them to slaves robbed of their wild
instincts or else that that they are so restricted within the parameters of the experiments as to 
be allowed no freedom of action. But a contrary tradition has emerged in some of the 
literature on experimental organisms which emphasises the co-evolution of experimental 
organisms and their experimenters. One of the best known examples is Kohler's study of the 
use of Drosophila in classical genetics. Fruit flies, he maintains, were “active players in the 
relationship with experimental biologists”; they were “not just molded like putty... and put 
through their paces”, for even once domesticated and thoroughly standardised, “they had the 
capacity to change and frustrate drosophilists' plans and change the purposes for which they 
had originally been brought into the lab”. He therefore concludes that the relationship 
between Drosophila and 'drosophilists' should be seen not as one of scientific domination 
over nature but rather as “an interactive and evolving symbiosis within the special ecological 
spaces of experimental laboratories”. Kohler's argument is that the success of Drosophila as 
an experimental model cannot be made sense of if we assume that it was the intentions of 
experimenters which were the leading influence in knowledge production. Instead, Kohler 
maintains, it is often the experimental organism which leads the researcher through its 
combination of useful attributes and its readiness to adapt to the unnatural laboratory 
ecosystem. The experimental organism is therefore effectively a collaborator in successful 
scientific knowledge production in an manner in which a purpose-built machine is not.68  
Kohler was not the first to make such arguments. One study he drew on was Bruno Latour's 
1988 Pasteurization of France. In this book, the traditional narrative of Louis Pasteur as a 
man of genius utilising the new science of microbiology to eradicate such threats to public 
health as anthrax and rabies is reinterpreted in terms of Pasteur being merely the head of an 
army of allies he recruited. These allies included both human agents such as hygienists, stock 
farmers and government ministers, and non-human agents, including the microbes 
67 Marcel Weber, Philosophy of Experimental Biology, Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 170-172. 
68 Robert E. Kohler, Lords of the Fly: Drosophila Genetics and the Experimental Life, The University of 
Chicago Press, 1994, p. 19. 
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themselves. It was only by offering microbes a salubrious arena for growth in the lab that 
they could be cultured and therefore made visible, and it was this capacity to reveal the role 
of microbes in social interrelations and offer strategies for removing their interference that 
gave the Pasteurians power through appearing indispensable.69 Latour thus insisted that even 
such lowly organisms as bacteria must be treated as active agents which human researchers 
must recruit and mollify if they are to be co-operative experimental participants, and which 
moreover play an active role as allies in the success of experimental research programmes. 
Questions may be raised as to whether we can apply symbiotic models in which we treat 
human researchers and experimental organisms as collaborators operating on a level plane of 
agency. Can we really, for instance apply Ingold's model of production as the promotion of 
processes of growth to transgenic lab organisms, e.g. if we paraphrase Ingold to say that “the 
work of the [scientific investigator] does not make [transgenic organisms]”, it merely “serves 
to set up certain conditions of development within which plants and animals take on their 
particular forms and behavioural dispositions”. Surely there is a difference here between 
manipulating or regulating the environmental conditions necessary for development and 
intervening in the germ-line so as to produce novel potentialities of development? Yes, these 
interventions do not make organisms into literal tools – as Marcel Weber observes “Even a 
Drosophila that has been bred for hundreds of generations, or a genetically engineered fly, is 
not an artifact – it is still a living creature”.70 But on the other hand the power of the modern 
scientific investigator to deliberately alter both an organism's conditions of existence and its 
constitution surely in such cases outweighs the power of experimental organisms to make 
demands of experimenters. The organism, it is true, can be 'uncooperative', e.g. by failing to 
mate in captivity, being inclined to sickness or dying prematurely. But whilst such non-
compliance may frustrate the experimenter, at the end of the day they can always select or 
manufacture another stock which will better meet their demands, whereas the experimental 
organism usually cannot choose to select a different custodian. There is therefore good reason
to believe that whilst lab organisms should not be unduly denied agency, this does not imply 
their agency operates on a level playing field with the experimenter, and moreover that the 
laboratory is commonly more an arena of human domination that of mutual symbiosis. This 
69 Bruno Latour, The Pasteurization of France, Alan Sheridan and John Law (Trans.), Harvard University 
Press, 1988, pp. 38-39, 71-72 & 82.
70 Marcel Weber, Philosophy of Experimental Biology, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 171.
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would, nevertheless, be to ignore one of Latour's major claims, which is precisely that the 
power of the laboratory is that it is a site where the human investigator is stronger than 
nature, and that outside of this controlled environment it is usually nature which has the upper
hand. Microbes in 'wild' conditions are invisible, uncooperative and dangerous; only in the 
lab can they be made visible, compliant and harmless.71 The laboratory, and domestication 
more broadly, are therefore special instances of human domination as opposed to indicative 
of our general relationship with nature (which in many cases domineers over us), and this 
domination is never total (despite efforts at closure, the lab remains an entropic system that 
must be continually reinforced against the decay of order, the intrusion of the wild and the 
reversion of the domesticated). Moreover, it is only once nature is made to co-operate, 
whether through carrot or stick, that it can become part of an experimental system productive 
of scientific knowledge. 
That nature needs to be made co-operative does not imply that the nature of this co-operation 
(including co-operation in knowledge production) cannot have a strong element of 
mutualism. This is particularly true in multi-generational experiments such as were carried 
out in classical genetics, which required that organisms flourish enough under lab conditions 
to reproduce and remain viable over the generations so that the potentially debilitating effects
of inbreeding and interventions such as irradiation would not lead to die-offs distorting the 
Mendelian ratios required to track genetic ratios. This demand for flourishing, for example, 
led the Morgan group to abandon its original method of mass culturing fruit flies, which 
decreased survival rates (especially for sought-after deleterious mutants) due to competition 
for food and overcrowding, and to instead breed pairs of flies in separate jars.72 So whilst 
these Drosophila, like Pasteur's microbes, were essentially prisoners of the lab, they 
nevertheless exercised a power over their human masters in that they failed to prove 
especially useful for detailed knowledge production if their demands for space and food were 
not met. There are certainly therefore benefits for a species that can adapt to domestication in 
the lab, as  experimentalists will not only shield them from predation and the vicissitudes of 
nature but also provide them with food and space to flourish and perpetuate their kind. The 
penalties of loss of freedom of movement, growing dependency on human intervention and 
71 Bruno Latour, The Pasteurization of France, Alan Sheridan and John Law (Trans.), Harvard University 
Press, 1988, pp. 73-74.
72 Robert E. Kohler, Lords of the Fly: Drosophila Genetics and the Experimental Life, The University of 
Chicago Press, 1994, p. 77. 
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vulnerability to a researcher's experimental whims are real but only likely to be fatal to a 
whole lab lineage if the research programme is a failure, is therefore junked and the stocks 
euthanised, or if the defensive boundaries of the experiment are compromised (drosophilists, 
Kohler records, lost numerous lab stocks through heating failures in winter and predation by 
mites and mice).73 Otherwise, the lab is an excellent ecological niche that allows an adaptive 
species free rein to feed and reproduce without competition from other species or fluctuations
in conditions and resources.
Kohler's major claim, however, is not just that laboratory organisms can enjoy privileges if 
they are able to adapt to the initially austere laboratory environment, but rather that they can 
also direct research through their utility (or lack of it) for particular experiments, their having 
unusual  biological features that lend themselves to particular modes of enquiry and through 
their greater or lesser tolerance to being introduced into new experimental set-ups. That 
avenues for scientific research are constrained or enabled by the particular features of a 
laboratory species is widely acknowledged. But there is a dispute between those who claim 
the utility of an organism in a particular experimental system is determined principally by 
shrewd selection by practitioners and those who would instead argue that the epistemic 
productivity of particular model systems is in the main an outcome of interactions between 
experimenter and experimental subject. Is it, Weber poses, a matter of selecting the right 
tools for the right job or of co-construction of the experimental system by organism and 
practitioner?74 Certainly, the selection of specific species for lab work is commonly directed 
by particular requirements of experiment. In some cases, model organisms have been 
deliberately selected as major foci of research based on specific attributes lending themselves
to a pre-planned research programme. The nematode C. elegans , for instance, was 
deliberately selected by Sydney Brenner as a model for the study of neuronal development 
due to its possessing such salient features as a small fixed number of adult neurons (302, 
compared to c. 100,000 in Drosophila) and the capacity to reproduce both through 
hermaphroditic self-fertilisation and sexually (allowing both the establishment of clonal 
lineages and their modification through crossing).75 But choice for a particular purpose does 
not guarantee a species any longevity as an experimental organism, for as Richard Burian 
73 Ibid., pp . 82-83. 
74 Marcel Weber, Philosophy of Experimental Biology, Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 176-179. 
75 Sydney Brenner, 'The Genetics of Caenorhabditis elegans', Genetics, Vol. 77, No. 1, 1974, p. 72.
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comments “even when some organism is "the" right one for a theoretical job, its rightness is 
temporary and more or less local or regional”. Moreover, when the choice of organism is not 
correct, it has a clear impact on the direction of research. Burian points to examples such as  
Hugo de Vries' selection of Oenothera, which provided plentiful data for his theory of 
mutationism but ultimately turned out to be misleading, and Theodor Boveri's choice of 
Ascaris, a nematode which appeared to show chromosomal disintegration in somatic cells, 
lending support to August Weismann's erroneous mosaic theory of development. Therefore it 
is not simply a matter of a researcher making an astute original choice, for an organism will 
often have hidden features that may aid or hinder research that are only revealed once it has 
been experimentalised.76 Drosophila is a classic case of an experimental organism with useful
hidden traits that were not discovered until long after its domestication in the lab. These 
include, for example, the banding of its giant larval salivary chromosomes, utilised in 
cytological mapping of genes, which was only discovered by Theophilus Painter as late as 
1933.77 This capacity of experimental organisms to surprise and direct researchers down 
fruitful (and less fruitful) avenues supports a significant role for co-construction, as opposed 
to top-down design, as determining the epistemic productivity of organisms in experimental 
systems. If knowledge production using experimental organisms is regarded as co-
construction, I believe this offers corroboration for the view that scientific domestication can 
be symbiotic as well as dominating. If we view symbiosis as the dynamic and productive 
interaction of two natures, human and non-human, as opposed to the domineering imposition 
on passive nature of human art, this may offer conceptual support for the naturalistic nature 
of knowledge produced through domestication. 
That the value of an organism for a particular job is not inherently obvious or indicative of its
long term experimental value should not preclude us from observing that there are 
nonetheless a number of more general demands of laboratory life that have affected the kinds 
of organisms laboratory biologists have tended to select, leading to inherent biases in life 
science experimental systems. Weber lists five such general characteristics affecting model 
organism suitability: inclination to breed in captivity; generation time; visibility and viability 
of mutations if used for genetic analysis; “peculiar features” the biologist may exploit (e.g. 
76 Richard M. Burian, 'How the Choice of Experimental Organism Matters: Epistemological Reflections on an 
Aspect of Biological Practice', Journal of the History of Biology, Vol. 26, No. 2, 1993, pp. 352-353.
77 William Wimsatt, ‘False Models as Means to Truer Theories’, Re-engineering Philosophy for Limited 
Beings: Piecewise Approximations to Reality, Harvard University Press, 2007, p. 113.
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the large size of squid nerve cells, which make neurophysiological measurement much 
easier); and the pre-existence of established experimental resources and knowledge which 
allow researchers to overcome the disadvantages of a particular model.78 Bolker adds to this 
list the features of high developmental rate and uniformity (canalisation) as important for 
developmental biologists.79 Ankeny and Leonelli also note that most model organisms in 
genetics share features such as “small physical and genomic sizes... high fertility rates, and 
often high mutation rates or high susceptibility to simple techniques for genetic 
modification”.80 That these general demands of laboratory domestication can be problematic 
is highlighted particularly by Bolker. She points, for instance, to the fact that the very 
properties that make C. elegans an excellent model system, e.g. early determination of cell 
lineages, are precisely what make it atypical as a nematode. Selection for developmental 
canalisation has moreover been responsible for “a disproportionately deterministic view of 
development”, and choosing organisms with short generation times and rapid life cycles 
introduces other biases into model systems, such as a predisposition towards paedomorphism,
progenesis, loss of larval stages, miniaturisation, morphological and genetic simplifications 
or losses, and novel evolutionary adaptations to this faster and usually smaller-scale mode of 
existence.81 There are therefore systematic issues with the kinds of organisms that large-scale 
laboratory experimentation usually selects for, as the resulting model species are less than 
representative of the diversity found in nature. 
I wish to introduce a further constraint that the demands of the laboratory place on the 
selection of experimental organisms, namely the requirement that they can be domesticated. 
Some attributes relevant to laboratory domestication have already been discussed, namely, 
ability to breed prolifically in captivity, speedy development and early sexual maturation 
(especially in genetics, which favours a rapid turnover of generations), and small size 
(important given most laboratories are not roomy spaces). To these may be added: a lack of 
dietary specialism (meaning biologists can maintain stocks using cheap, readily available 
food stuffs; furthermore, difficulties determining diet have been a major obstacle to 
domesticating most microbes); a sociable or socially adaptive behavioural phenotype (this 
78 Marcel Weber, Philosophy of Experimental Biology, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 177. 
79 Jessica Bolker, 'Model systems in developmental biology', BioEssays, Vol. 17, No. 5, 1995, pp. 451-452. 
80 Rachel A. Ankeny and Sabina Leonelli, ‘What’s So Special About Model Organisms’, Studies in History 
and Philosophy of Science, Vol. 42, 2011, p. 314; & Robert E. Kohler, Lords of the Fly: Drosophila 
Genetics and the Experimental Life, The University of Chicago Press, 1994, p. 316.  
81 Jessica Bolker, 'Model systems in developmental biology', BioEssays, Vol. 17, No. 5, 1995, pp. 451-452. 
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allows for mass culturing without violent competition, and therefore more stock per unit of 
lab space); robustness in health and disease resistance even when inbred and mass cultured; 
the ability to tolerate the otherwise egregious interventions imposed by experimentation, e.g.  
e.g. amputations, transplantations, heating, freezing, irradiation; ease of control of 
reproduction (both to prevent unsupervised crossing within the lab and admixture from 
without, e.g. by wind-borne pollen); preferably not to be dangerous to researchers (compare 
lab strains of E. coli used for pure genetics with pathogenic ones); and a lack of fear or 
awareness of their human retainers (this allows for 'natural' behaviour). Many of these pre-
adaptations to lab life are the same or similar to the pre-adaptations necessary for general 
commensal life, and this is one reason why the vast majority of organisms chosen for 
experimental purposes have had some prior history of domestication or commensalism 
(Drosophila melanogaster, as Kohler establishes, is a highly commensal species).82 This 
leads us to ask to what extent these laboratory pre-adapted species can act as representatives 
for nature in general given their shared unusual characteristics. Furthermore, the restrictions 
and modifications imposed on lab organisms are often extreme even compared to those 
constraints placed on traditional domesticates. Factory farming can be considered a similarly 
intense form of domestication but its purpose, the maximal production of meat, eggs and 
dairy at minimal cost, is usually starkly distinct from the primary aims of lab work, namely 
the production of naturalistic knowledge. How much, it may be asked, can commensal 
species tell us about wild species adapted to minimally anthropogenic ecosystems, and 
further still how much can hyper-domesticated lab strains particularly selected for their 
adaptivity to the lab environment tell us about their free-living commensal relatives, never 
mind relatives and other species in 'wild' nature?     
I am not here suggesting that lab strains, including those called 'wild type', cannot act as 
stand-ins for nature. The fact is that they have proven highly epistemically productive 
precisely through taking on this role, and much of the earlier knowledge generated in the lab 
has ultimately been vindicated by later studies in the field. But domestication is nonetheless 
selective in the kind of nature it can allow to enter its space, and once within it, that nature is  
to a greater or lesser degree 'de-natured' and 'de-wilded'. This transformation is far from total 
–  it is the subtlety of many changes that tends to mislead observers into thinking such 
82 Robert E. Kohler, Lords of the Fly: Drosophila Genetics and the Experimental Life, The University of 
Chicago Press, 1994, p. 19-22.
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alterations 'natural'. Researchers must therefore determine which features of the organism are 
altered by domestication, which 'wild' elements remain stable throughout and whether their 
experimental interventions have natural analogies in order to establish which aspects of lab 
produced knowledge may be extrapolated to nature at large and which must be treated as 
likely artefacts of the laboratory ecosystem (this task has parallels with that of determining 
which characteristics of a model organism are broadly homologous and which are 
idiosyncratic, see Kellogg and Shaffer for details).83 
The overall goal of domesticating the wild in the laboratory is to integrate it into an 
epistemically productive experimental system but to still retain enough 'wildness' to ensure 
the knowledge produced is naturalistic. By 'wildness' I do not mean some esoteric essential 
property but rather refer to those very real behavioural, physiological and constitutional 
differences that exist between 'wild types' in nature and their domesticated relations. These 
differences have been recognised for a long time and have generally been assumed to have 
something to do with human art and custodianship. A major question for natural historians 
has therefore been how to subject wild nature to art without compromising its integrity. 
Differing strategies of scientifically addressing nature have developed based on varying 
assumptions regarding how to study the wild, some emphasising passive observation, others 
active intervention, others steering a middle course. In the following chapters, I will examine 
some of the history of Western ideas about the domestic-wild divide and show how different 
interpretations of this distinction were linked to differing epistemologies of nature. I will 
furthermore show how these differing epistemologies privileged particular domestic spaces as
sites of scientific knowledge production, but also how the development of new sites and 
techniques of domestication influenced changes in epistemology and the understanding of 
wild nature. Following historical trajectories, I will show how the idea of wild type developed
first as contrastive to domestic types and then how it later became perceived as transferable 
into the domestic sphere, an idea that grew in strength as heredity became increasingly 
conceived as dominated by internal processes shielded from outside environmental 
influences. This apparently contradictory transposition of wild into the domestic realm of the 
lab was not, however, without its critics. I will conclude by discussing the representative role 
'wild types' played once domesticated within the classical genetics laboratory, specifically to 
83 Elizabeth A. Kellogg and H. Bradley Shaffer, 'Model Organisms in Evolutionary Studies', Systematic 
Biology, Vol. 42, No. 4, 1993, pp. 409-414. 
Page -48-
what extent they could be considered to 'stand in' for nature and whether the strategy of 
laboratory domestication has led to a distorted interpretation of wild nature. 
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Chapter 2 – The Domestic-Wild Divide in Pre-Modern & Early Modern Western
Thought
Aristotle on the Domestic-Wild Divide
I now move to looking at historical interpretations of the domestic-wild distinction in 
Western thought in detail. I will begin with our earliest major source, Aristotle, not with the 
purpose of complete comprehensiveness but rather as a useful means of establishing a 
baseline theory of the domestic and wild against which the differential development of later 
conceptions can be tracked. Aristotle’s main contributions to Western discourse on the 
domestic and wild are found in his later 4th century BC work History of Animals. Aristotle did
not treat the dichotomy of domestic-wild as absolute, noting that there was a great deal of 
variation in how wild or tameable animals were – “some creatures are tame and some are 
wild: some are at all times tame, as man and the mule; others are at all times savage, as the 
leopard and the wolf; and some creatures can be rapidly tamed, as the elephant”. He further 
observed that domestic-wild was not useful for the taxonomic purpose of categorising species
of animal as “whenever a race of animals is found domesticated, the same is always to be 
found in a wild condition; as we find to be the case with horses, kine, swine, (men), sheep, 
goats, and dogs”.84 Aristotle therefore recognised that domesticated species necessarily had 
wild types from which they were descended and did not originally come into being as 
domestic (with the exception of mules).85 This has importance for the origins of the wild type 
concept in that Aristotle rejected the common tendency of folk taxonomies to use the 
domestic-wild dichotomy as a means to distinguish species.86 Aristotle’s contribution was 
thus to recognise that domestication was a process whereby originally wild animals and 
plants entered into the domus, either by force or of their own accord, and became tame. This 
can be contrasted with the later views of many medieval and early modern Christian 
naturalists who held that all creatures had originally been created tame and subservient to 
Adam, and that the fierce nature of wild animals, the existence of pests and parasites and the 
fecundity of thorn and thistle were all punitive effects of the Fall.87 
84 Aristotle, ‘History of Animals’, D’Arcy Wentworth Thomas (Trans.),  In: The Works of Aristotle, William 
David Ross and J.A. Smith (Eds.), Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1908-1931, p. 1395.
85 This claim is supported by Isager and Skydsgaard (“Domestic animals were originally wild species tamed by
man. Aristotle is fully aware of this”). See: Signe Isager and Jens Erik Skydsgaard, Ancient Greek 
Agriculture: An Introduction, London and New York: Routledge, 1995, p. 85.
86 Keith Thomas, Man and the Natural World: Changing Attitudes in England 1500-1800, Allen Lane, 1983, p.
56.
87 Ibid., pp. 17-18.
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Aristotle used one main term, ‘agrios’, to refer to ‘wild’ animals (he also applied it to the 
‘savage’ cannibal human tribes held to exist in the far corners of the world).88 By contrast, he 
used two quite distinct Greek terms to refer to domestic animals. The more inclusive 
‘synanthropeuómena’ is translated by Dalby as ‘animals symbiotic with man’.89 Isager and 
Skydsgaard caution that it “should probably not be taken to indicate domesticated animals in 
general… but as a designation for animals which live together with man”, noting that it 
includes not only traditional domesticates such as pigs and dogs but also birds that breed in 
human dwellings and insects that winter in them. They believe Aristotle’s ‘hemeros’ 
(translated as ‘tame’) better fits our modern notion of ‘domesticated’; this term was also 
applied by Aristotle’s student and successor Theophrastus to cultivated plants.90 But it should 
be noted that Aristotle attributed most of the important behavioural and physiological 
differences between wild and domestic stock not to the effects of taming but rather to the 
conditions of synanthropeuómena, i.e. of what would now be termed commensalism. One 
particular effect of commensalism that Aristotle noted was on reproductive behaviour. He 
observed that “Many animals time the season of intercourse with a view to the right nurture 
subsequently of their young”. This had the effect that in the wild most land animals tended to 
breed in spring, when the scarcity of winter was giving way to the greater abundance of food 
found in summer. He contrasted the behaviour of wild animals with that of human beings and
domestic animals, which paired and bred “at all seasons… owing to the shelter and good 
feeding they enjoy”. This change in reproductive behaviour was found not only in traditional 
domesticates such as dogs and pigs but also in “those birds that breed frequently” (e.g. the 
pigeons, fowls and songbirds that sheltered in human houses and fed on domestic grain and 
leftovers).91 
88 Helen M. Leach, ‘Selection and the Unforeseen Consequences of Domestication’, In: Where the Wild Things
Are Now: Domestication Reconsidered, Rebecca Cassidy and Molly Mullin (Eds.), Oxford/New York: Berg,
2007, p. 94.
89 Andrew Dalby, Siren Feasts: A History of Food and Gastronomy in Greece, Routledge, 1996, p. 60.
90 Signe Isager and Jens Erik Skydsgaard, Ancient Greek Agriculture: An Introduction, London and New York:
Routledge, 1995, p. 85; & Helen M. Leach, ‘Selection and the Unforeseen Consequences of Domestication’, 
In: Where the Wild Things Are Now: Domestication Reconsidered, Rebecca Cassidy and Molly Mullin 
(Eds.), Oxford/New York: Berg, 2007, p. 94.
91 Aristotle, ‘History of Animals’, D’Arcy Wentworth Thomas (Trans.),  In: The Works of Aristotle, William 
David Ross and J.A. Smith (Eds.), Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1908-1931, p. 1547.
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Aristotle was well aware of the effects that taming (‘hemeros’) could also have on shaping 
the domestic organism. He makes many comments, for instance, on how the control of 
breeding can be used to ensure the production of healthy desirable offspring. He discourages, 
for instance, the use of fat individuals as breeding stock, believing that they “whether male or
female, are more or less unfitted for breeding purposes” (this was due to his belief that 
seminal fluids were converted into fat in overweight individuals, resulting in a loss of 
vigour).92 Among his other advice on the care and characteristics of domestic animals, 
Aristotle also discusses what ages they are best bred at (e.g. “the Laconian hound of either 
sex is fit for breeding purposes when eight months old”, how to strategically promote fruitful 
copulation (“The boar is most capable after a good feed, and with the first sow it mounts”), 
how to accelerate maturity (“The breeding faculties of the younger horses may be stimulated 
beyond their years if they be supplied with good feeding in abundance”), what seasons 
produce the best offspring (“with regard to the seasons of the year, the litter [of piglets] is the 
best that comes at the beginning of winter; and the summer litter the poorest”), and even how 
to influence the sex of offspring (“if [ewes] submit to the male when north winds are 
blowing, they are apt to bear males; if when south winds are blowing, females”.93 
The main empirical source for Aristotle’s advice on breeding was likely the testimony of 
local farmers and pastoralists. It is not clear to what extent Aristotle himself observed the 
reproductive behaviour of domestic animals but he was evidentally less than critical 
regarding some of the more folkloric breeding customs he recorded. But what is evident in all
these examples is the idea that whatever efforts were made by the breeder to ensure the 
production of the best possible stock, there was no believed means to improve stock beyond 
the existing standard. Human taming could only maximise potential, never improve on 
nature, and in order to effect optimal stock realisation breeders were often dependent on 
harnessing largely uncontrollable natural forces such as winds and seasons. Much of this 
attitude could be traced to the limitations to breeding knowledge and technique in this period.
But Aristotle also incorporated this idea of species, whether domestic or wild, as generally 
unchanging in optimal form and range of variation into his theories of generation and of 
technology. Regarding the former, he believed the developmental process to consist in the 
92 Ibid., pp. 1490 & 1557; & Aristotle, ‘On the Generation of Animals’, Arthur Platt (Trans.),  In: The Works of
Aristotle, William David Ross and J.A. Smith (Eds.), Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1908-1931, p. 2038.
93 Aristotle, ‘History of Animals’, D’Arcy Wentworth Thomas (Trans.),  In: The Works of Aristotle, William 
David Ross and J.A. Smith (Eds.), Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1908-1931, pp. 1557-8 & 1629-1635.
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male seed’s actively forming the embryo out of passive matter provided by the female. The 
male seed thus acts as the efficient cause and the female womb as the material. The seed is 
able to act in an orderly manner because it contains something of the male's essence. This 
essence provides the formal cause, directing the male seed to attempt to replicate the father 
out of the material of the mother.94 Variation was therefore conceived by Aristotle as a 
consequence of the failure of the efficient cause (the male seed) to meet the demands of the 
formal cause (the essence), this often being attributed to the inadequacy of the material cause 
(the female womb) or due to environmental perturbations. The best a breeder could therefore 
do would be to choose good parents, provide good food and shelter, and protect against 
undesirable environmental perturbations during copulation and pregnancy, with the hope that 
offspring would therefore be of the father's quality. Improvement beyond optimal realisation 
of the father’s essence was not expected. 
Aristotle’s ideas on generation were heavily linked to his ideas on technology. His view of 
the relationship between art (‘techné’) and nature was that art best attained its results by 
helping nature achieve its own ends, as opposed to trying to go against nature. Aristotle held 
all things in the universe to operate under a final cause, or ‘telos’, that they tend towards as an
end, and when no other force is acting upon them apart from their own nature, things will 
move towards this end. He for example explained the upward movement of fire and the 
downward movement of stones in terms of their having separate natures with contrary states 
of rest, the final end of stones being the centre of the earth, that of fire being the heavens.95 
For Aristotle, art operated through either mimicking nature, i.e. by following its course, or 
through perfecting it, i.e. removing obstacles in its course. An example of mimetic art is 
theatre, which imitates aspects of real life but exaggerates them either for tragic or comic 
effect.96 An example of perfective art is medicine, which seeks to remove obstacles to health 
when nature cannot do so on its own (in Galen’s later words, art acts as the servant of 
nature).97 These two strategies of art were not viewed as exclusive, as seen in Aristotle’s 
94 Staffan Müller-Wille and Hans Jörg Rheinberger, A Cultural History of Heredity, Chicago and London: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2012, pp. 24-5 & Aristotle, ‘On the Generation of Animals’, In: The Works of 
Aristotle, William David Ross and J.A. Smith (Eds.), Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1908-1931, p. 2009. 
95 Aristotle, ‘Physics’, R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye (Trans.),  In: The Works of Aristotle, William David Ross 
and J.A. Smith (Eds.), Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1908-1931, pp. 677 & 742.
96 Aristotle, ‘Poetics’, S.H. Butcher (Trans.),  In: The Works of Aristotle, William David Ross and J.A. Smith 
(Eds.), Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1908-1931, pp. 3308-3322.
97 William R. Newman, Promethean Ambitions: Alchemy and the Quest to Perfect Nature, Chicago and 
London: The University of Chicago Press, 2004, p. 17.
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stating that “generally art partly completes what nature cannot bring to a finish, and partly 
imitates her”.98 Overall, Aristotle was not of the view that all artful or experimental 
intervention went against nature, a frequent misinterpretation that William R. Newman has 
called the ‘noninterventionist fallacy’.99 That intervention could be natural in Aristotle’s 
worldview can be seen from his statement that “when fire or earth is moved by something the
motion is violent when it is unnatural, and natural when it brings to actuality the proper 
activities that they potentially possess” [emphasis mine].100 Nevertheless, it must be 
recognised that Aristotle did place significant limitations on artifice by holding the view that 
it must either follow or clear nature's course to succeed. Artifice which attempted to go 
against nature was inherently fragile in that once human intervention was removed, nature 
would once more take its course and the artefact would rapidly decay back into its natural 
state. This model of the natural behaviour of things has been dubbed by Elliott Sober “the 
Natural State Model”, based as it is on the notion that all things have a natural state or 
trajectory from which they only deviate if under the influence of other bodies and to which 
they revert when this external influence is removed.101 
The relevant question with regards to domestication is whether Aristotle believed it to be a 
perfective process or rather one which was contrary to nature. As identified before, he does 
not suggest domestication to be an original non-derived state for any non-hybrid species. 
Before humans tamed them, all animals were wild. Nonetheless, as previously noted, 
Aristotle does observe some animals to be much more easily tamed than others, suggesting he
made a distinction between the eminently tameable and the incorrigibly wild. This suggestion
is further supported by statements in the Politics. Here Aristotle appears to claim that the 
extent to which animals are tameable or remain wild relates to something in their original 
nature and to their natural purpose. In particular, he affirms that “other animals exist for the 
sake of man, the tame for use and food, the wild, if not all at least the greater part of them, for
98 Aristotle, ‘Physics’, R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye (Trans.),  In: The Works of Aristotle, William David Ross 
and J.A. Smith (Eds.), Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1908-1931, p. 648; & William R. Newman, 
Promethean Ambitions: Alchemy and the Quest to Perfect Nature, Chicago and London: The University of 
Chicago Press, 2004, p. 17.
99 William R. Newman, Promethean Ambitions: Alchemy and the Quest to Perfect Nature, Chicago and 
London: The University of Chicago Press, 2004, p. 238.
100 Aristotle, ‘Physics’, R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye (Trans.),  In: The Works of Aristotle, William David Ross 
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101 Elliot Sober, ‘Evolution, population thinking, and essentialism’, Philosophy of Science, Vol. 47, No. 3, 
1980, p. 360.
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food, and for the provision of clothing and various instruments”. Where evidence of human 
utility is not obvious, he maintains that “if nature makes nothing incomplete, and nothing in 
vain, the inference must be that she has made all animals for the sake of man”. The natural 
purpose of animal life is thus assumed to be to serve human needs. All non-human life must 
in some way serve human interests, for if it were otherwise, it would be without purpose, and 
in Aristotle’s view nothing in nature is without purpose, ergo there are no non-human species
which do not exist for humanity’s sake. As to domestication, Aristotle states that “tame 
animals have a better nature than wild”, and are also “are better off when they are ruled by 
man; for then they are preserved”.102 The implication is that whilst all animals were originally
wild, they have come into being only in order that they might one day provide utility to 
humankind, and therefore domestication is a perfective art that completes nature’s ends and 
fulfils the purpose for which tameable animals have come into existence for. 
The radical anthropocentrism displayed here is difficult to understand without being placed in
the context of what Aristotle is principally arguing for in the Politics, namely the existence of
natural slavery. Specifically, Aristotle draws an analogy between the human use of animals 
and the use of slaves by their masters, observing that “the use made of slaves and of tame 
animals is not very different; for both with their bodies minister to the needs of life”. Indeed, 
he goes as far as to refer to the ox as “the poor man’s slave”. Moreover, just as he argues that 
there are tameable animals made better by domestication, he asserts there to be humans 
(namely non-Greek barbarians) who are naturally servile and therefore best flourish as slaves 
(the servile character in moreover hereditary, thus justifying lineage slavery).103 Along with 
aligning the naturalness of animal and slave domesticity, Aristotle also justifies the practice 
of capturing slaves by analogy with the exploitation of wild animals. “The art of acquiring 
slaves” is stated to be “a species of hunting or war”, and the art of war is argued to be “a 
natural art of acquisition”, as just as wild animals ought to be hunted for human benefit, so 
should “men… intended by nature to be governed” be forced to submit, Aristotle going as far
as to state that “war of such a kind is naturally just”.104 Aristotle’s justification of natural 
slavery thus rests on an analogy with the claimed natural right of humankind to domesticate 
102 Aristotle, ‘Politics’, Benjamin Jowett (Trans.), In: The Works of Aristotle, William David Ross and J.A. 
Smith (Eds.), Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1908-1931, pp. 2796-2802.
103 Pierre Pellegrin, ‘Natural Slavery’, E. Zoli Filotas (Trans.), In: The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s 
Politics, Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (Eds.), Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 100-7.
104 Aristotle, ‘Politics’, Benjamin Jowett (Trans.),  In: The Works of Aristotle, William David Ross and J.A. 
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and exploit animals. He sought to equate those who would question the naturalness of slavery
with those who would question the naturalness of human dominion over nature. 
That Aristotle sought to bolster the institution of slavery by arguing it to be analogous to 
‘natural’ human-animal relations reflects the fact that whilst slavery was ubiquitous in his 
time it was not without its critics. The sophist Alcidamas had argued against the Spartan 
oppression of their serfs that “Nature has made no man a slave”.105 In his play Hecuba, the 
tragedian Euripides had described slavery as “an evil” based on force and violence which 
“endures what is not right”.106 By comparison, the idea of a natural human right of dominion 
over other species appears to have been taken as given by most Mediterranean ancients. 
There were dissenting voices. The Pythagoreans, believing in metempsychosis, considered all
living things kindred and refused to eat fellow ensouled beings.107  Porphyry, a 3rd century AD
Neoplatonist, would later advocate Pythagorean-style vegetarianism, ridiculing 
anthropocentric claims of human dominion by asserted that if pigs were created to be eaten 
by men, then men must equally be made for the repast of crocodiles. Porphyry's arguments 
would later be drawn on by early modern critics of the notion of natural human dominion 
such as Thomas Hobbes and Bernard Mandeville.108 Atomism was another ancient 
philosophical movement which denied human dominion, although in their case it was based 
on a rejection of the idea of a world created for human benefit. The 1st century BC Roman 
writer Lucretius would thus assert that to say “the gods designed to arrange all this noble 
fabric of the world for the sake of men… is to be guilty of the utmost folly”, not least as 
nature was full of “a terrible brood of wild beasts and monsters, hostile to the human race”.109
Lucretius thus rejected the Aristotelian claim that animals were ‘intended by nature to be 
governed’, and therefore also the argument for domestication as a perfective art. Porphyry 
and Lucretius' views on the domestic and wild were, however, minority opinions in the 
ancient world, and whilst their arguments would be resurrected in the late medieval period 
105 G.B. Kerford, The Sophistic Movement, Cambridge University Press, 1981, p. 156. 
106 Stephen G. Daitz, ‘Concepts of Freedom and Slavery in Euripides' Hecuba’, Hermes, 99. Bd., H. 2, 1971, p. 
225.
107 W.K.C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, Volume I: The Earlier Presocratics and the Pythagoreans, 
Cambridge University Press, 1962, p. 186-187.
108 Keith Thomas, Man and the Natural World: Changing Attitudes in England 1500-1800, Allen Lane, 1983, 
pp. 166 & 171; & Bernard de Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees: or Private Virtues, Publick Benefits, 3rd 
Ed., London: J. Tonson, 1724, pp. 190-197.
109 Lucretius, On the Nature of Things, John Selby Watson (Trans.), London: Henry G. Bohn, York Street, 
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they would until then be largely neglected by a generally anthropocentric Christian 
orthodoxy. It is probably a fair assessment therefore that a belief in an inherent dominion of 
humankind over nature was the majority view among philosophers in the ancient and early 
medieval world.  
Scholastic Aristotelianism, Human Dominion & the Theological Debate over Final Causes
Aristotle’s oeuvre came back into wide circulation in Western Europe in the 12th and 13th 
century. His works encountered initial difficulties due to the perceived paganism of the views
found in them but eventually came to dominate university curricula and late medieval 
scholastic philosophy, not least thanks to Thomas Aquinas’ work reconciling Aristotle with 
Christian doctrine. However, despite Aristotelianism’s domination of pedagogy, there 
remained a divide in the Church between the supporters of Thomism (e.g. the Dominicans 
and later the Jesuits) and opponents such as the Franciscans.110 In the 14th century, 
nominalism emerged as the major theological opposition to Aristotelianism. This philosophy 
had its roots in translations of the Islamic Mutakallimun scholars such as the 11th century 
writer Al-Ghazali. These Muslim thinkers had initiated an earlier critique of Aristotle, 
rejecting his doctrine of independently existing essences and necessary causal relations on the
grounds that it imposed unwarranted restrictions on the omnipotence of God. In its place they
adopted an occasionalist atomist metaphysics which held God to be responsible for the 
creation and continued existence of each atom. The Mutakallimun thus insisted that all 
natural relations were contingent on the will of God and that therefore no final ends of nature 
could be inferred from observation, as to know nature’s final ends would require knowledge 
of the mind of God.111 The arguments of these Arab and Persian philosophers were taken up 
and further developed by Christian scholastics such as John Duns Scotus and William of 
Ockham, both of whom held that the uniformities of nature were dependent on the will of 
God and could be circumvented should He choose. They also thus denied the independent 
reality of essences and the necessity of natural phenomena. Duns Scotus in particular held 
that only ‘aptitudinal unions’ of phenomena not necessary relations of truth – i.e. that x can 
110 Ralph McInerny and John O' Callaghan, ‘Saint Thomas Aquinas’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Summer 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL= 
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be y, but not x must be y – could be inferred from observation.112 The nominalists, like the 
Mutakallimun, thus insisted on the contingency of nature and therefore denied that the final 
ends of natural entities could be inductively determined. Challenges to Aristotle’s teleological
method and cosmology therefore considerably predated the 17th century repudiation of 
scholastic Aristotelianism by experimental and mechanist natural philosophers. 
Given these doubts about the capability of human beings to infer the ends of nature through 
observation alone, Christian natural philosophers often preferred to turn to scripture for clues 
as to God’s intentions for the world. The main Biblical book relevant to discussion of 
domestication was Genesis, which gave an account of the Creation in which Eden was a 
garden paradise purposefully made for Adam and Eve, in which all species of animal and 
plant were originally found.  These creatures had been created by God not for themselves but 
rather for the use and service of human beings. In origin, all animals had been tame and co-
existed with humans harmoniously. It was only after the Fall that they became wild and 
unwilling to serve, although God had allowed those animals most useful to humans – e.g,. the
ox, ass and horse – to remain tameable. Their tendency toward obedience was consequently 
treated as a natural, not acquired, instinct.113 Domestication was therefore according to the 
scriptural Christian worldview a restorative art whereby organisms were returned towards 
their original ends, as opposed to the Aristotelian view that animals and plants were 
originally wild but could through domestication be perfected if this accorded with their 
nature. The scriptural view of human dominion also differed from Aristotle’s, being if 
anything even more anthropocentric. Aristotle believed nature to serve humankind on the 
grounds that nature does nothing in vain. But whilst humanity was nature’s crowning glory, 
humankind also owed its existence to nature. By contrast, the Christian view held that nature 
had been co-created by God alongside human beings and deliberately fashioned with their 
ends in mind. Adam was moreover held to have been granted dominion and stewardship over 
all creatures by divine decree, whereas for Aristotle such human dominion was instead 
implicit in the order of nature. In summary, there was an inherent conflict between Aristotle 
and Christian scripture regarding the nature of domestication, the former viewing it as a 
perfecting art, the latter as a restorative one. As in most cases when scriptural doctrine 
112 John Losee, A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, 3rd Ed., Oxford/New York: Oxford 
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conflicted with pagan philosophy, the Christian view of domestication tended to win out 
amongst most medieval Aristotelians. 
The 17th Century Challenge to Aristotelianism
From what has been said, it can be seen that the ‘Aristotelianism’ challenged by 17th century 
mechanist and experimental philosophers was a hybrid set of worldviews synthesising Greek 
texts arguing that knowledge of final causes could be attained through observation of nature 
with Abrahamic scriptures that tended to promote the view that nature’s ends could only truly
be known through scriptural revelation. In the resolution of this conflict, the scriptural view 
of non-human organisms as originally domestic and domestication as restorative tended to 
win out over Aristotle’s own view of wildness as original but domestication as perfective. 
The Aristotelian view of nature was also one already challenged from within scholasticism by
nominalist doubts concerning the possibility of inferring final causes. The principal novelty 
of many of the 17th century attacks on Aristotelianism was their use of arguments from 
sciences such as mechanics and astronomy to critique teleological speculations. The 
empirical and theoretical grounds for these arguments were not themselves wholly novel. As 
observed by McLaughlin, Aristotle’s demarcation between forced and natural motions had 
been overcome in practical mechanics long before theoreticians provided justification for the 
elimination of the distinction.114 There also existed the long-standing issue for ‘Natural State’ 
style Aristotelian physics of the problem of projectiles, namely what it was that resisted the 
natural inclination of a stone to move towards the centre of the Earth when thrown. To 
resolve this problem, the 14th century scholastics Jean Buridan and Nicole Oresme developed 
a theory of impetus, whereby projectiles continue to move because they have an internal 
power imparted to them by their mover. It was this paradigm through which Galileo 
interpreted physical phenomena.115 
Galileo’s significant modification was to suggest that impetus was the principal form of 
motion, in opposition to Aristotle’s view of a distinction between internal natural sources of 
motion and external interfering ones. The motive for this move was largely practical. 
External sources of motion could be subjected to mathematical analysis and prediction; 
114 Peter McLaughlin, ‘Mechanism and the Clockwork Universe’ [Draft], 2010, pp. 11-14.
115 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1996, pp. 119-120.
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internal sources could not. When Galileo found that he could make accurate predictions 
concerning the trajectory of falling bodies such as cannonballs and pendulums without 
needing to postulate the effects of internal sources of motion, this led him to believe it to be 
unnecessary to take such hypothetical forces into account. He did not completely abandon the
Aristotelian doctrine of final ends but he rejected the explanatory utility of postulating 
them.116 Galileo thus sought to explain the trajectories of natural motion without speculating 
on the internal natures of entities and their final ends. To do so required rejecting the idea that
it was important to distinguish between natural and forced motions to make accurate 
predictions. The implication was that natural entities could be treated as if they did not have 
internal sources of motion or final ends towards which they moved. It was a short step from 
this ‘as if’ position to one rejecting internal sources of motion and final causes. The 
downstream effect of this teleological agnosticism would be a practical move from thinking 
about whether domestication was perfective or restorative to investigating whether 
domesticated organisms could be improved. 
I shall not go into detail regarding the Copernican challenge to the Aristotelian Ptolemaic 
system, as this only relates indirectly to the issue of domestic and wild nature. I will, 
however, note that the downfall of both Ptolemy's original geocentric system and Tycho 
Brahe's geoheliocentric system significantly undermined confidence in the Aristotelian 
cosmology, its teleology-based theories of elemental behaviour and its demarcation between 
incorruptible celestial and mutable earthly realms. This opened the way for alternative 
materialist theories of universal composition whilst simultaneously reinforcing the suspicion 
against postulating final causes as a means of explaining natural phenomena.117
A final contributing factor to the rejection of teleological methods of explanation were 
theological arguments, which continued to play a central role in 17th century anti-Aristotelian 
reasoning as they had in previous scholastic disputes. For instance, Francis Bacon’s famed 
denouncement of final causes as 'barren virgins' should not be taken to imply he denied their 
existence. Rather, he believed Aristotle’s error was to think that such final ends could be 
determined through logic as opposed to theology. Bacon by contrast held that God, not 
116 John Losee, A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, 3rd Ed., Oxford/New York: Oxford 
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nature, was “the fountain of final causes”, and that only revelation can teach us the true ends 
of nature.118 Similarly, René Descartes, like Bacon a critic of teleological supposition, 
criticised Aristotelians for being “so arrogant as to suppose that we can share in God’s plans”.
There is some continuity between the arguments of scholastic anti-Aristotelians and of 17th 
century natural philosophers, namely the shared belief that final causes exist but the denial 
that they could be known without divine help. Theology, however, also remained a tool for 
those who wished to defend the human ability to infer final causes from observation and 
experiment. Robert Boyle, for example, held that “all Consideration of Final Causes is not to 
be Banish’d from Natural Philosophy: but that ’tis rather Allowable, and in some Cases 
Commendable, to Observe and Argue from the Manifest Uses of Things, that the Author of 
Nature Pre-ordain’d those ends and uses”.119 Boyle's disagreement with Bacon and Descartes 
on teleology related to his differing views on how to attain knowledge of God. Descartes had 
insisted that knowledge of God’s existence and power could only be attained through abstract
rational introspection on clear and distinct ideas, which unlike the observations of the senses 
were not subject to doubt. Bacon, on the other hand, held that human knowledge, whilst vast 
in potential, was limited to created things and could not apprehend the transcendent uncreated
essence of God and his true will.120 In contrast to these views, Boyle held that knowledge of 
God’s intentions could be derived both from traditional scripture, the Book of Revelation, 
and the ‘Book of Nature’.121 
The ‘two books’ argument not only defended teleological supposition but also supplied a 
means to justify experimental philosophy as a form of natural theology. It thus offered a 
defence against criticisms from those who, like Margaret Cavendish, accused Boyle and his 
colleagues in the Royal Society of being addicted to “unprofitable arts” and of acting like 
“boys that play with watery bubbles or fling dust into each other’s eyes”.122 This physico-
theological argument would also be used by Boyle and his supporters to argue for human 
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dominion and to justify the experimental use of animals. A professed believer in “the empire 
of man over the inferior creatures”, Boyle, like most of his contemporaries, believed the 
Book of God to have in Genesis sanctioned the stewardship of humankind over the rest of 
nature.123 But Boyle also believed the Book of Nature to demonstrate human dominion over 
nature, as can be seen from his stating that it would be “no great presumption to conceive, 
that the rest of the creatures were made for man, since he alone of the visible world is able to 
enjoy, use, and relish many of the other creatures, and to discern the omniscience, 
almightiness, and goodness of their author in them”.124 To reject human dominion was 
therefore not only to challenge scriptural authority but also to turn away from the revelation 
of God's work in nature. Boyle believed it imperative that a good Christian natural 
philosopher be prepared to take all reasonable measures to interpret nature, for this was not 
only in the interest of humankind’s betterment but was moreover part of God's plan for 
human fulfilment and salvation. As animals had been placed in the world for humanity's sake 
and not their own, experimenting on them, whether by starving them of air or vivisecting 
them, was justified so long as it was in line with the greater cause of bringing humankind 
closer to God. Boyle did recognise animal suffering and did not approve of unwarranted 
cruelty, not least as to misuse animals was to misuse God's creation and was therefore 
blasphemous.125 But in practice he endorsed animal experimentation so long as it was 
purposeful. For Boyle, therefore, the use of severe domesticating practices and extreme 
organismic interventions had a twofold justification of not only being within the right of 
humankind as granted in Genesis but also as a responsibility of Christians as a means of 
approaching God through knowledge of His creation. Wild nature, as what was yet to be 
made useful or understood, was thus doubly repugnant as evidence of both humankind's 
wasteful disuse of its dominion and ignorance and distance from God.
Hobbes' Rejection of Dominion & Domestication as Natural
Boyle's defence of animal experimentation on the basis of divinely gifted dominion did not 
go unchallenged. Thomas Hobbes' hostility to Boyle's experimental programme is well-
known and has been discussed in detail elsewhere. Most focus, however, has centred on the 
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conflict between Boyle's believed experimental demonstration of the vacuum and Hobbes' 
plenist critique of this claim. Equally stark differences, though, existed between Boyle and 
Hobbes' interpretations of human dominion and of the domestic-wild relationship. These 
differences arose out of the same initial disagreements on nature and politics which Shapin 
and Schaffer have shown to have driven the dispute over the existence of the vacuum.126 
At the root of these differences was Hobbes' heterodox interpretation of human nature, 
natural ontology and scriptural authority. Genesis would have it, as we have seen, that the 
first humans were horticulturalists already inclined towards the habits and morals of civilised 
life. This claim was reinforced by the belief, promoted by Francis Bacon and theologians 
such as Lancelot Andrewes, that Adam was a natural philosopher with an inherent knowledge
of agriculture and husbandry (as will be discussed in more detail later on).127 The Fall was 
assumed to have clouded some of this original knowledge of nature but it was usually 
assumed that humanity had retained its knowledge of agriculture and its inclination for 
sedentism (Adam and Eve were thrown out to work the land, not to hunt and gather, and their
son Cain was a farmer). Hobbes, however, was led to question this claim of an original 
(relatively) civil and settled human nature on the basis of claims that there existed 'savage 
peoples', such as those found in the Americas, that had “no government at all” and lived in a 
“brutish manner”, lacking all social ties save those of kinship. Hobbes' perception of an 
underlying human inclination to barbarism was reinforced by the descent of the Three 
Kingdoms of England, Scotland and Ireland into civil war, which forced him into exile in 
Paris in 1640. In 1651, Hobbes published  Leviathan, a political tract both responding to the 
past dozen years' political crises and presenting a theory of governance aimed at negating the 
factors that Hobbes saw as responsible for the conflict. As part of this, Hobbes introduced the
claim that human culture and civilisation had not directly descended from Eden but instead 
emerged from a barbaric ‘state of nature’ in which life was “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and
short”. Humankind was not born civilised but had instead needed to be forcibly domesticated.
This had required the imposition on men of “a common power to keep them all in awe”, 
namely the disciplining authority of an absolute sovereign.128 
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Hobbes suggested that such sovereigns had first been put in place not by God but through the 
formation of commonwealths by diverse tribal parties making covenant, who then selected 
one of their number to act as leader. Such covenants formed when individuals recognised that
the best means for ensuring peace and the preservation of life was to establish a civil society, 
which required a sovereign as lawmaker and enforcer. These comings together were not due 
to natural human inclination or inherent capacity to recognise civil society as a good. Hobbes 
thus rejected the Biblical claim that humans have an intrinsic ability to distinguish good from 
evil. Instead, he claimed that only ‘the right of nature’ could be recognised by moral reason, 
namely “the liberty each man hath to use his own power as he will himself for the 
preservation of his own nature; that is to say, of his own life; and consequently, of doing 
anything which, in his own judgement and reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means 
thereunto”. Conflict thus ensued because of the overlapping needs and desires of different 
individuals, passions Hobbes saw as “in themselves no sin”. The 'state of nature' was not one 
of fallen grace nor due to inherent human evil but rather a product of the absence of earthly 
law-giving. Earthly law was necessary, Hobbes believed, to establish a moral order, as even 
avaricious human desires and acts were not sinful “till they know a law that forbids them; 
which till laws be made they cannot know, nor can any law be made till they have agreed 
upon the person that shall make it”.129 Hobbes further insisted that this law must be unitary. 
The populace must for instance be protected against the clergy's use of 'priestcraft', the 
manipulation of doctrine to pursue power, by granting the sovereign sole authority over 
establishing the correct interpretation of scripture.130 Permitting another power space to grow 
would threaten sedition against the sovereign and descent into civil war.131 
In sum, human 'savagery' was for Hobbes the natural state and civil society an artefact 
derived not from innate moral capabilities but rather through  narrow but rational human self-
interest. Hobbes' commonwealth, his Leviathan or “artificial man”, was therefore a unified 
“body politic” only so much as it was held together by the weak ties of covenant and forcibly 
by the power of the sovereign, the artificial man’s “artificial soul”.132 Hobbes further 
129 Ibid.
130 Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and the Airpump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life, 
Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2011, pp. 103-104.
131Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, J.C.A. Gaskin (Ed.), Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 7.
132 Ibid.
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extended his naturalistic account of morality and civil society to incorporate an alternative 
account of the domestication of non-human animals which rejected the idea that they were 
created tame. This too was motivated by his rejection of a differentiation between spiritual 
and temporal government, as embodied in institutions of church and state, in favour of a 
unitary sovereignty, for the religious argument that human control over domestic creatures 
rested on a divine mandate was for Hobbes another example of churchmen deceiving people 
into ‘seeing double’ as a means of defending their claim to spiritual government.133 Just as 
Hobbes denied the legitimacy of a spiritual government independent of temporal government,
so he also denied a theological source for human dominion over nature. Against those who 
insisted on human dominion over nature as God-given, Hobbes asked “what consisteth the 
dominion of man over a lion or a bear?” It could not be an obligation of promise or debt, as 
such beasts had no sense of debt or duty, nor could it be based on a divine command to obey, 
as beasts lacked the reason to comprehend the word of God. In lieu of a theological argument 
for human dominion over nature, Hobbes offered a naturalistic account. Humans had 
dominion over bears and lions because whilst the latter were individually physically stronger,
humans were more powerful due to their great artifice and intellect. But this was a relative 
rather than absolute dominion; whilst humans usually had dominion over beasts, in such 
circumstances as when a hungry lion met an unarmed man in the desert, then the lion had 
dominion (Hobbes here echoes Porphyry). Based on this relativity, Hobbes argued that 
relations between man and beast could not properly be considered relations of dominion, 
which were absolute and based on covenant, e.g. the dominion of God over Man (established 
originally through the Jewish covenant and then extended to all humankind by Christ) and the
dominion of Sovereign over Society. Instead, he regarded these as relations of “hostility”, and
applied this logic even to the keeping of livestock, “for we keep them only to labour, and to 
be killed and devoured by us; so that lions and bears would be as good masters to them as we 
are”. Relations of hostility had no base in a divinely granted right of dominion or a natural 
state of domestication, the implication being that animals had originally existed wild in a 
state of nature prior to domestication. In the state of nature, only the right of nature applied, 
so animals therefore owed humanity no subjugation. Hobbes did however allow that humans 
could justify their hostile domination over animals based on the right of nature, i.e. 
domesticating useful animals to provide sustenance and clothing, and killing pests and 
133 Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and the Airpump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life, 
Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2011, pp. 92-99.
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predators to preserve and protect their own lives.134 But humans could never have true 
dominion over other animals as “To make covenants with brute beasts is impossible, because 
not understanding our speech, they understand not, nor accept of any translation of right, nor 
can translate any right to another: and without mutual acceptation, there is no covenant”.135 
The Dividing Line of Reason – New Secular Accounts of Dominion
By holding domestication to be a hostile as opposed to divinely sanctioned relationship, 
Hobbes contradicted Boyle's belief that scientific domestication was both a right and a 
responsibility of Christian natural philosophers. If the suffering of non-human organisms 
were to be justified, it could only be on grounds of the right of nature, i.e. on material human 
need. Furthermore, because Hobbes denied the possibility of using nature as a second book, 
maintaining that only scripture offered access to knowledge of God, there was subsequently 
no justification for animal suffering as a means to religious knowledge.136 Hobbes would 
therefore, in rejecting the two books' argument, restrict scientific domestication's legitimate 
remit to more narrowly utilitarian projects. But whilst Hobbes's deflationary account of 
dominion both naturalised domestication and undermined theological justifications for its 
crueller applications, he continued to see human mentality and society as comprehensively 
differing from that of other animals in a number of important ways. Like most of his 
contemporaries, Hobbes distinguished humans from beasts by their possession of reason, an 
idea that went back to Aristotle. Hobbes did not, however, consider the mental divide 
between man and beast to be wholly drastic and discrete, arguing for animals to possess some
basic imagination and understanding and even going as far as to state that beasts were 
commonly superior in their prudence compared to human children.137 Hobbes moreover 
emphasised that the possession of reason was as troublesome as it was helpful for humans, 
asserting that “whereas by the benefit of words and ratiocination they exceed brute beasts in 
knowledge; by the incommodities that accompany the same they exceed them also in errors. 
For true and false are things not incident to beasts, because they adhere to propositions and 
language; nor have they ratiocination, whereby to multiply one untruth by another, as men 
134 Thomas Hobbes, The English Works of Thomas Hobbes, Volume 5, William Molesworth (Ed.), London: 
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have”.138 The ‘war of all against all’ was not, Hobbes believed, inherent in a state of nature – 
he did not anticipate Darwin’s ‘struggle for life’. Instead, Hobbes interpreted the fact that 
many animals, e.g. bees and ants, were able to live sociably as evidence for the existence of 
‘natural agreement’ among such species, i.e. that they were instinctually co-operative. He 
also did not see animals as driven to competition in the same manner as humans since “men 
are continually in competition for honour and dignity, which these creatures are not”. 
Furthermore, the fact that animals lacked reason was to their benefit in the sense that they “do
not see… any fault in the administration of their common business: whereas amongst men 
there are very many that think themselves wiser and abler to govern the public better than the 
rest, and these strive to reform and innovate, one this way, another that way; and thereby 
bring it into distraction and civil war”.139 Because animals lacked reason, they thus also 
lacked politics, the great source of dissension which made the imposition of sovereignty 
necessary. Animals therefore co-operated as they could not find cause to do otherwise, and 
animal sociability was thus by nature harmonious. But the converse deficiency animals 
suffered due to their lack of reason was their inability to act artfully including, importantly, 
an inability to form artificial covenants and so establish civil societies. Whilst reason brought 
men to strife, it also allowed them to see the benefits of allegiance and of submission to a 
sovereign, and by this means they were able to unite their strength and exercise far greater 
power over nature than any other animal. It was thus this capacity for artful civilisation, for 
what might be viewed in the context of this thesis as the human capability for self-
domestication, which set human beings apart from the rest of nature. 
Other philosophers saw the divide in rationality between humankind and nature to be far 
more stark. Mechanistic philosophy had already concluded, contra to Aristotelian doctrine, 
that the activity of non-living things such as stones and fire was non-purposive. Hobbes was 
part of this revolutionary new worldview. But he did not extend this anti-teleological 
perspective on nature to the behaviour of non-human organisms. Other mechanists however 
did make this step, the most influential of whom was René Descartes. It should be 
emphasised that Descartes did not make this move towards mechanising living nature blindly.
As Gideon Manning has shown, Descartes, whilst better known for his theoretical and 
138 Thomas Hobbes, Elements of Law, Natural and Politic, J.C.A. Gaskin (Ed.), Oxford University Press, 1994,
pp. 38-39.
139 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, J.C.A. Gaskin (Ed.), Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 113.
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mathematical labours, also engaged in physiological studies, including dissecting animal 
brains.140 Descartes was also influenced by William Harvey's De Motu Cordis, a work which 
rejected earlier ideas of the heart as imbuing blood with immaterial animal spirits in favour of
the view that it was a mere 'pump' for its circulation.141 Under the influence both of Harvey 
and his own experience, Descartes came to see the animal body as essentially a mechanistic 
contraption of pumps and cables. Knowing that automata could be crafted which simulated 
purposeful behaviour yet were lifeless, he further claimed that the activities of the 'beast 
machine' similarly did not require animation by an underlying intelligence. Organic bodies 
were only differentiated from manmade machines by their complexity, which was enabled by
their being crafted by an infinitely more talented designer, namely God. Treating organism as
machines and denying animal mentality, Descartes presented non-human nature as uniformly 
material, composed solely of res extensa, a corporeal substance the essence of which was its 
being extended in space. Human beings were set apart from nature by being uniquely 
composed of both an extended body and an incorporeal mind composed of a second 
substance, the res cogitans or ‘thinking thing’. This rendered them sole possessors of reason 
in the mortal world and also the only living beings able to feel pain, Descartes believing pain 
required understanding to be felt. This claim was taken by many of Descartes’ followers to 
imply that humans had no cause for qualms about animal experimentation and similar such 
interventions, the screams of vivisected animals being equated with the noises made by 
malfunctioning machines.142 
Descartes' substance dualism offered a new secular justification of human dominion, for if 
material nature was essentially mindless and unfeeling, then there was no cause not to treat 
the rest of living nature in purely instrumental terms. As John Ray observed, “those 
philosophers indeed, who hold man to be the only creature in this sublunary world, endued 
with sense and perception, and that all other animals are mere machines or puppets, have 
some reason to think that all things here below were made for man”. This shows that whilst 
140 Gideon Manning, 'Descartes and the Bologna Affair', The British Journal for the History of Science, Vol. 
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much has been made of how the 17th century's 'scientific revolution' de-centred the Earth and 
humankind within the universe, the rejection of Aristotelianism and scriptural authority did 
not significantly alter broad perceptions of the relationship between humanity and other 
species. If anything, the gradual replacement of scripturally grounded accounts of dominion 
with secular ones based on the distinctiveness of human reason tended to lend itself to a more
aggressively exploitative attitude to nature. For whereas Christian tradition held that God-
given dominion also necessitated responsibilities of stewardship over created nature, secular 
accounts stressed that since nature was not ensouled, human instrumental reason was free to 
do as it desired without moral qualms. Ray himself rejected this implicit anthropocentrism 
and sought to use natural theology to prove that other creatures not only behaved 
purposefully but also had independent ends which circumscribed ethical limits to the human 
right of dominion (see my later discussion of Ray's influence on Linnaeus' idea of the 
economy of nature).143 
Ray has often been seen as part of a losing cause ultimately subsumed by a mechanistic and 
instrumentalising rationalist interpretation of nature. The 17th century 'scientific revolution' 
therefore in the 20th century became a target for critics of modernity who traced its genesis 
back to this era and its thinking. The German philosopher Martin Heidegger for instance saw 
in the rejection of Aristotelianism and subsequent expansion of human technologies of 
domestication a move towards treating nature as a mere 'standing-reserve' having no more 
worth than as reserve potential for future industrial consumption.144 The feminist philosopher 
Carolyn Merchant has moreover interpreted the shift from an organic to a mechanistic view 
of nature as being a move from treating nature as a nurturing mother, and therefore being 
culturally constrained not to slay, wound or mutilate her, to treating nature as “a system of 
dead, inert particles moved by external... forces”. This “death of nature” enabled its rational 
control by allowing it to be treated in instrumental terms as if it were a lifeless machine. To 
domesticate nature through domination therefore according to Merchant required first to 'kill' 
nature and reduce it into malleable fragments. This attitude has, she argues, persisted in 20th 
143 John Hedley Brooke, ''Wise Men Nowadays Think Otherwise': John Ray, Natural Theology and the 
Meanings of Anthropocentrism', Notes and Records of the Royal Society of London, Vol. 54, No. 2, 2000, 
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century physics, which “still views the world in terms of fundamental particles”, rather than 
as an animated whole.145 
The control extended over nature by 17th century natural philosophy was also extended over 
human society, which was increasingly seen, as posited by Hobbes, as a mechanistic artefact 
decomposable into human individuals, who themselves were re-conceived in economic terms 
as components pieces of the societal machine. This social aspect of mechanistic modernity 
was highlighted by Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno of the Frankfurt school of critical 
theory, who traced the roots of mid-20th century totalitarianism to this 17th century embrace of
instrumental rationality and its emphasis on controlling society through rational planning and 
instrumental hierarchies. “The history of man's efforts to subjugate nature”, Horkheimer 
observes, “is also the history of man's subjugation by man”.146 This argument would therefore
have it that advances in human dominion over nature through the extension of technologies of
domestication have also further contributed to a stultifying and alienating human 
domestication characterised by disenchantment, commodification of human productive 
capabilities and restricted freedom. 
These modern critical accounts of the wider impact of 17th century mechanistic and rationalist
philosophies and their associated justifications of dominion over nature and society are by 
and large grounded in an interpretation of domestication, both non-human and human, as 
characterised by domination by human art and technology. As discussed above, whilst I 
certainly accept the argument that many particular cases of domestication are characterised 
by human dominance over other organisms (and over other humans, if we are going to 
consider human slavery a particularly egregious instance of domestication), I nonetheless 
argued that the picture is more complex in that many cases of domestication are more 
characterised by relations of symbiosis, and that in some cases it is humans that follow non-
human actors into establishing such relations rather than vice versa. These specific instances 
of symbiosis do not in any way excuse the destructive impact of the instrumental treatment of
nature on the wild environment or on domestic organism welfare. It also does not negate the 
negative effects of technological controls on human liberty. But acknowledging the 
145 Carolyn Merchant, 'The Death of Nature', Environmental Philosophy: From Animal Rights to Radical 
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coexistence in the domestic sphere of relations of domination and symbiosis allows us to 
recognise the importance of interspecies relations in the development of modern human 
enterprises such as the sciences. It also allows us to recognise that artifice and technology is 
as much part of our evolving human nature that enables new capacities for action (in doing so
disrupting previous dominant social structures), as it is a restrictive force binding individuals 
in place in the social fabric. So much as the domestic-wild dichotomy is best treated as a 
dialectic, so too should domination-symbiosis and technology-nature. Acknowledging the 
dynamism of these relations allows us to move away from the view of modern human-
nature/art-nature relations as characterised by the destruction or neutralising of nature and the
forcible imprinting of human intentions and artifice on its yielding dead surface towards a 
perspective which acknowledges that such domineering and destructive relations are 
sometimes the case but that more symbiotic and mutually beneficial relationships are equally 
often prevalent. In scientific knowledge production there has particularly been a tension 
between more crudely interventionist approaches to the study of nature and those dependent 
on mutualist relations between the investigator and their object. This tension has been 
especially visible in the life sciences. My argument shall be that hybrid domestic zones where
human-nature relations have been neither wholly characterised by an effort to bracket a 
disinterested observer from observed wild nature or an effort to strictly impose human order 
on nature have been key sites for such symbiotic and epistemically productive relations. I will
now move to investigating such sites by beginning with what I consider were the original 
hybrid zones where the intermingling of domestic and wild was exploited by natural 
philosophers as a means of accessing nature under relatively controlled conditions, namely 
the garden and the field. 
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Chapter 3 – Gardens and Fields: Baconian Natural Philosophy and the Role of
Hybrid Spaces for Scientific Knowledge Production & the Restoration of Human
Dominion
Gardens and Fields as Important Sites of Early Modern Natural Historical Research & 
Knowledge Production
In his Novum Organum, Francis Bacon sought to promote a hybrid natural philosophy. He 
claimed that “Those who have handled sciences have been either men of experiment or men 
of dogmas”. He compared the men of experiment to the ant, for “they only collect and use”, 
whereas “the reasoners resemble spiders, who make cobwebs out of their own substance”. 
Bacon advocated “a middle course”, that of the bee which “gathers its material from the 
flowers of the garden and of the field, but transforms and digests it by a power of its own”. 
True philosophy, Bacon remarked, “neither relies solely or chiefly on the powers of the mind,
nor does it take the matter which it gathers from natural history and mechanical experiments 
and lay it up in the memory whole, as it finds it, but lays it up in the understanding altered 
and digested”.147 Most philosophical analysis of Bacon’s statement has focused on his desire 
to develop a hybrid mode of enquiry joining together the power of the experimental and 
rational faculties.148 I wish, however, to direct attention not so much to the mode of enquiry 
Bacon champions as the sites suggested, i.e. the garden and field (by ‘field’ I take to be 
implied the cultivated farm field or the managed pastoral meadow). The reference to these 
sites of enquiry may be taken as simply part of Bacon’s metaphorical analogy between the 
bee and natural philosopher’s modes of existence. But this would be to ignore the importance 
already ascribed in Bacon’s time to gardens and fields as spaces for natural historical enquiry 
and knowledge production, as I will now attempt to show.
I will shortly return to considering Bacon's specific ideas about gardens and fields. But first I 
will ask: what might be the specific attraction of gardens and fields as sites of scientific 
enquiry? One element was certainly their ease of access (‘nature on the doorstep’) for 
147 Francis Bacon, 'Novum Organum', The Philosophical Works of Francis Bacon, Vol. I, Robert Leslie Ellis 
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naturalists operating in an era when travel aboard to wilder natures was often limited, 
expensive and dangerous. Even more proximate European 'wildernesses', such as mountains, 
forests and tundras, were widely feared as dismal abodes of savage animals, uncultured 
tribes, outlaws, and hostile elemental and spiritual forces.149 Scientific investigation within 
the domestic-wild milieu of garden and field was not hampered by the dangers, real and 
imagined, of the wilderness, and the natural entities within it, being partly or wholly 
domesticated, were easier to control than the unfriendly beasts of the wild. This is not to deny
the importance of expeditionary naturalism in this period. Abroad, three of the most 
substantial scientific projects of the 16th and 17th centuries were the colonial surveys of 'wild' 
Brazil, Mexico and Virginia.150 Closer to home, botanists climbed mountains in search of new
plant species (as Edward Llwyd did in Snowdonia), and exhorted medical students to enter 
deep into the forest in their search for nature's remedies (as Caspar Hoffmann did in his and 
Ludwig Jungermann's 1615 Catalogus Plantarum, quae circa Altorfium Noricum).151 
The attraction of gardens and fields was thus not simply one of mere proximity. It was rather 
their capacity as hybrid spaces to bring exotic species fetched from the far-off 'wild' Indies by
explorers and traders into a familiar and local European domesticity. As Daniela Bleichmar 
comments, “The great majority of Europeans came into contact with the New World in 
Europe: colonial science was often enacted at home, not abroad”.152 It was in European 
botanical gardens and aristocratic menageries that many exotic plant and animal species were
first properly studied as living beings as opposed to preserved specimens. These institutions 
acted as nurseries in which foreign species could be contained and kept alive so that their 
possible utility as a source of food, materials, beauty or entertainment could be determined, 
either experimentally or based on reports of their use by the inhabitants of their place of 
origin. Once processed, the newly domesticated exotics could then be disseminated to other 
gardens and fields based on their discovered uses. Pharmaceutical plants went to physic 
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gardens, aesthetically pleasing ones to ornamental gardens; some exotic animals became 
popular household pets, e.g. parrots and guinea pigs, whereas others went to the farm, e.g. 
turkeys, where they joined a growing bonanza of new European crops, e.g. potatoes, 
tomatoes, maize and tobacco. All in all, there was plenty of material to keep a institutionally 
well-connected naturalist very busy even if they were restricted to their home country. The 
extent of this influx of new species was immense, especially in terms of plants species – 
Thomas notes that in the years between 1500 and 1839 the number of kinds of cultivated 
plant in Britain increased from around 200 to 18,000, much of it driven by the exponential 
growth in imports of exotic ornamental flower species.153 
Gardens and fields not only acted as processing points for incoming new species but also 
played a significant role as sites of metonymy where the global order of nature was 
catalogued through the collection and ordering of living specimens. This effort to create a 
microcosm of world nature within the garden was most evident in the physic gardens attached
to university medical faculties. These research institutions were first established in mid-16th 
century Italy as living repositories of medicinally valuable species for medical students to 
study and use. They were originally organised on the basis of usage classifications such as 
that developed in the 1st century physician Dioscorides' De materia medica. But the continual 
influx of new species from the Indies that had no place in these classical taxonomies led to a 
perceived need for a change in organisation, so that from the 1590s onward plants were 
increasingly ordered on the basis of geographical origin. When, for instance, Carolus Clusius 
reorganised the Leiden garden (founded in 1577), he divided it into four quadrants, each 
representing the four continents, and planted them with corresponding species. This new 
schema was better able to incorporate the continual intrusion of new species. But, as Paula 
Findlen observes, it also contributed towards the move to organising physic gardens “as a 
microcosm of the world”.154 Gardens became maps of phytogeography, with individual 
species as representatives of their continent's floral diversity. The physic garden in this way 
came to represent one of the many means by which domestic spaces have been utilised as 
means of bringing the wild under controlled conditions, imposing an artificial order upon it 
153 Keith Thomas, Man and the Natural World: Changing Attitudes in England 1500-1800, Allen Lane, 1983, 
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and reducing its variability whilst retaining and in some cases magnifying the representative 
quality of domestic specimens as stand-ins for 'nature'. The metonymic use of exotic 
specimens to stand in for newly encountered or conquered territories was not limited to plants
– Harriet Ritvo, for instance, has noted that there was a long tradition of using wild animals 
captured from outlying lands as “tokens of political submission”. Originally kept in private 
menageries, from the late 17th century these animals were increasingly made available for 
public view, where they operated as stand-ins for “the spread of [European] commercial 
influence throughout the globe”. It moreover became common to demonstrate the penetration
of European power and intellect into virgin territories by bringing back a novel exotic 
specimen by which to awe spectators back home.155 
As well as offering accommodation for and access to exotic species, gardens and fields were 
also of considerable value due to the ingress they offered to local natures. Many amateur 
naturalists lacked expeditionary or institutional access to the exotic, so instead sought to 
study nature in more familiar places, collecting specimens in such domesticated or half-wild 
spaces as pastoral fields, coppiced forests, orchards, deer parks, seashores, streams and rivers,
and even in their own backyards.  By mass collecting oddities and anecdotes, non-elite 
naturalists were able to emulate the aristocratic culture of curiosity despite their lack of 
access to the exotic and far-fetched.156 They were aided in this exploration of local nature by 
the existence of an extensive corpus of folk knowledge, practices and traditions which could 
be gathered and conscripted for the purposes of natural history. Skilled lay husbandry and 
cultivation was often far better informed regarding particular facets of domesticated nature 
than ancient writers and educated scholars – regarding apiculture, one Jacobean authority 
remarked that “every silly woman” was ready to deride the “learned ignorance” of those who 
had learnt of bee-keeping through reading Aristotle and Pliny.157 Through conversing with 
and learning from these lay practitioners, enterprising naturalists who lacked institutional 
affiliations and could not afford travel overseas were nonetheless able to pursue the study of 
nature and claim to add to novel erudition by documenting and rigorously testing such folk 
knowledge. Gardens and fields additionally were important sources of material for the kinds 
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of experimental enquiry Bacon and his followers were promoting, there being an ample 
supply of domestic and commensal animals and plants which could be brought indoors and 
subjected to dissection, vivisection, temperature changes, chemical treatments, etc., so as to 
further the understanding of the effects of art on living nature. The near outdoors also 
furnished much of the material for later 17th century microscopic investigations into the 
previously invisible world of tissue structures, insect anatomy and animalcules. Furthermore, 
as shall be discussed in detail later, the garden and field were the central sites for 
experimental interventions in animal and plant reproduction, be they experimental 
hybridisations (both between different breeds and different species), experimental selection 
for particular characteristics, experimental inbreeding, or other empirical efforts to influence 
offspring type, e.g. experiments in provision of different animal forage and accommodation. 
The local nature of garden and field ultimately proved as important an exotic frontier for 
scientific enquiry as the 'wildernesses' of the Indies, despite being otherwise highly familiar 
and domesticated. Alix Cooper observes there to have been an increased interest in local 
nature in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, which was marked by the growth in 
popularity of local natural histories and handbooks documenting the uses of indigenous flora 
and fauna.158 There is moreover a significant parallel between how European explorers and 
colonialists utilised non-European folk knowledge to better control and understand the exotic 
natures of the New World and how scholarly Europeans exploited the wisdom of their own 
lay countrymen/women to extend knowledge of local natures. Londa Schiebinger for instance
notes that “The process of collecting information from women 'root cutters', old women, or a 
particularly successful woman healer was strikingly similar to that of prospecting abroad [e.g.
in the West Indies]”.159 This gender dynamic of men conscripting knowledge from female 
practitioners has also been observed to have occurred in other areas science, e.g. reproductive
medicine.160 We may thus speak of an internally directed scientific exploration and 
colonisation of domestic European nature, principally focused on gardens and fields, which 
responded to and complemented the externally directed secular and scientific exploration and 
158 Alix Cooper, Inventing the Indigenous: Local Knowledge and Natural History in Early Modern Europe, pp.
Cambridge University Press, 2007, pAlix Cooper, Inventing the Indigenous: Local Knowledge and Natural 
History in Early Modern Europe, pp. Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 21-22. 
159 Londa L. Schiebinger, Plants and Empire: Colonial Bioprospecting in the Atlantic World, Harvard 
University Press, 2007, pp. 96-97. 
160 Carolyn Merchant, 'The Scientific Revolution and The Death of Nature', Isis, Vol. 97, No. 3, 2006, pp. 514-
515.
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colonisation of 'wild' nature in the New World (as well as those wilderness regions at 
Europe's edges, e.g. Lapland and Siberia). Of course, much of the New World was not truly 
wild and much of folk knowledge about domestic natures (whether European or non-
European, male or female) was detailed and accurate enough to suit its particular practical 
purposes without requiring significant embellishment. What the New World lacked was 'the 
right kind' of domestication (Christian European civilisation), and what the practitioners of 
folk knowledges lacked was the credibility of being part of and knowing the social niceties 
necessary to negotiate the gentlemanly circles within which 'proper' natural historical 
discourse was carried out.161 Women particularly, even those of a gentrified upbringing, were 
excluded from these circles, typically on the grounds of sexist claims that they lacked the 
necessary intelligence or objectivity for scientific pursuits (though there were a few notable 
instances, such as the natural philosopher Margaret Cavendish, of early modern women who 
did manage to enter such male scientific spaces as the Royal Society).162 
To further discredit folk knowledge, much emphasis was also placed on the 'vulgar errors' 
and godless superstitions that natural historians perceived it as shot through with. Such 
calumny was utilised to discredit folk knowers and therefore allowed the useful parts of their 
knowledge to be conscripted by scholarly naturalists without risking the accusation that such 
naturalists were dependent on external expertise. One means by which naturalists claimed 
superior expertise, especially those following Bacon's hybrid epistemology, was through 
experimentally testing folk wisdoms. The proof or disproof of such beliefs was claimed as 
contributing to scientific knowledge (whereas the original folk assertion, whether true or not, 
was not a contribution so long as it was 'untested'). Another self-ascribed source of expertise 
was the claimed objectivity of naturalists, for unlike folk knowers who supposedly learnt 
about nature almost accidentally whilst pursuing other practical ends, e.g. agriculture, it was 
claimed that true naturalists pursued nature for its own sake and therefore the knowledge they
produced was not compromised by the influence of extraneous interests. Through this 
'boundary work', as Thomas Gieryn calls it, the early modern natural scientific community 
was able to establish firm boundaries between its 'tested' knowledge and associated expertise 
161 Steven Shapin, Never Pure: Historical Studies of Science as if It Was Produced by People with Bodies, 
Situated in Time, Space, Culture, and Society, and Struggling for Credibility and Authority, John Hopkins 
University Press, 2010, pp. 17-31.
162 Londa Schiebinger, The Mind Has No Sex?: Women in the Origins of Modern Science, Harvard University 
Press, 1991, pp. 37-65; & Naomi Oreskes, 'Objectivity or Heroism? On the Invisibility of Women in Science
' Osiris, Vol. 11, Science in the Field, 1996, pp. 87-113.
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and the 'unreliable' folk knowledges of women, laypeople and non-Europeans.163 In particular,
it was the experimental and apparently disinterested nature of the domesticating practices 
employed by naturalists which set them apart and provided grounds for their unique 
credibility. One of the first places where such practices were employed was in the sphere of 
the already domesticated, for whilst gardens and fields had already been brought under 
human stewardship, they had yet to be brought under the stewardship of science for the 
purpose of scientific knowledge production. 
Gardens and Fields as Hybrid Spaces
As I have shown, gardens and fields were important sites for 17th century natural historical 
research, providing both local access to the more familiar, more domesticated nature of 
Europe and places for taming and ordering exotic specimens transplanted from the 'wilder' 
natures of the Indies. The utility of these sites was thus that they contained enough of the wild
to provide access to nature and enough of the domestic to allow control and study of the 
untamed and unknown. I therefore assert that it is the inherent hybridity of gardens and fields 
as spaces where the wild and the domestic border and intermingle which made them 
particularly suitable for early modern scientific investigations into nature. They are 
exemplary instances of what Michel Foucault has described as a 'milieu', a heterogeneous 
space where a conjunction of the natural and artificial is formed by the attempts of human 
governmental reason to impose order on (and domesticate) unstable geographies and 
populations. Whilst Foucault principally applied this concept to biopolitical efforts to control 
civil populaces, it can equally be applied to human efforts to order and control nature in 
spaces such as gardens and fields, spaces, as we will see below, that Foucault recognised as 
exhibiting hybridity/heterogeneity.164 
As I will discuss, Bacon and other 17th century philosophers differed from us in their 
interpretation of the heterogeneous nature of gardens due to differing presumptions about the 
domestic-wild relationship, much of which was grounded in their understanding of scripture. 
This does not, however, detract from the argument I am making that the material (as opposed 
163 Thomas F. Gieryn, Cultural Boundaries of Science: Credibility on the Line, Chicago & London: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1999, pp. 15-18.
164 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977-78, Michel 
Senellart (Ed.), Graham Burchell (Trans.), Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, pp. 35-36; & Marco Altamirano, 
‘Three Concepts for Crossing the Nature-Artifice Divide: Technology, Milieu, and Machine’, Foucault 
Studies, No. 17, 2014, pp. 17-18.
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to conceptual) hybridity of gardens and fields significantly leant titself to natural historical 
investigations. These particular milieus were not alone in making such a contribution to 
science. For example, the lagoon at Lesbos which formed a major site for many of Aristotle’s
natural historical investigations can certainly be seen as such a milieu, where human efforts 
to control and harvest the sea meet with the continual influx of new water and new life 
through the lagoon’s opening to the Mediterranean. But as it would be significantly beyond 
the bounds of this chapter to consider the role of domestic-wild milieus other than gardens 
and fields in early modern natural historical enquiry, and as it was from gardens and fields 
that breeding experiments moved into the laboratory, leading eventually to genetics and lab 
'wild types', I will not here consider these other hybrid spaces in detail. 
It may be contested that there is nothing special about the heterogeneous character of gardens
and fields as sites of scientific investigation. Hybridity, it has been contended by Latour, has 
been a ubiquitous consequence of what he labels 'the Modern Constitution', this being the 
idea that developed around the time of the 'Scientific Revolution' that nature and society are 
distinct spheres of existence. Latour contends that any attempt to discern a 'pure' nature or 
culture inevitably results in the proliferation of hybrid nature-cultures that are 'impure' and 
take of both worldly aspects.165 I have already discussed in detail one facet of this ascribed 
division between the natural and social, namely that between wild and domestic, and have 
concluded that it is best to treat these as an interpenetrating continuum or as a dialectic. I 
nevertheless maintained that it is still useful to treat domestic and wild as distinct categories 
because the differences between organisms lying at either extreme of the continuum are stark 
and significantly impact on their tractability/co-operability as participants in scientific 
knowledge production. Similarly, I will maintain that whilst Latour is correct that the idea of 
pure nature or pure society is fatuous, there are nonetheless spaces which are more hybrid and
heterogeneous than others, and one of their characteristics is the ease they offer of movement 
between domestic and wild. This claim finds support in Foucault's assertion of the garden as 
“perhaps the oldest example” of the species of heterotopia he terms the 'contradictory site'. 
'Heterotopia' is Foucault's term for sites which exhibit non-hegemonic conditions, i.e. which 
lack the uniform order of a utopia or dystopia and are instead characterised by the 
coexistence and interaction of different orders and beings. A 'contradictory site' is a 
165 Bruno Latour, We Have Never been Modern, Catherine Porter (Trans.), Harvard University Press, 1993, pp.
1-48. 
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heterotopia which “juxtapos[es] in a single real place several spaces, several sites that are in 
themselves incompatible”. Foucault here cites the traditional Persian design of the garden as a
sacred rectangular enclosure that is at once “the smallest parcel of the world” and also stands 
in for the four quarters of the world.166 
By emphasising that the garden can be both a self-contained fragment of the world and stand 
in for the world beyond, Foucault here points to the simultaneous closure and openness of 
gardens (and also enclosed fields). Their openness is exploited by commensal species to 
move from and between wild and domestic but their enclosure at the same time keeps out 
much of wild nature beyond. The extent of openness and closure is also something humans 
can manipulate – a garden can be allowed to 'run wild', even 'return to nature', but it can also 
be rigorously ordered and maintained through effort and design. The garden is therefore a 
bounded space that is at least partially open to the wild but the extent of this openness can be 
increased or diminished depending on the intensity of domesticating practices within it. This 
partial exposure to the wild can be conceived in terms of gardens as lying along the 
domestic's frontier with nature. The frontier, as Sarah Franklin notes, is “a familiar but 
strange concept” encompassing in it both the character of being a border between states and 
also “open-ended, unknown terrain”. The frontier, in other words, is both a barrier to 
movement from one disciplinary regime to another, representing as it does the transition into 
an often hostile world of different rules and actors, and an opening to possible freedom from 
the rules and relations of one's home sphere. Crossing frontiers therefore offers both adversity
and opportunity. Crossing the domestic-wild frontier is, for example, fatal to many animals 
and plants, especially those which are either seen as pests or as food. But those which survive
culling and predation can do very well in this particular niche. The dual open/closed  nature 
of the frontier is, I maintain, related to its heterogeneity. That the edge of frontiers are 
heterogeneous regions is noted by Franklin, who describes them as “zone[s[ of hybridity, in 
which settlement and domestication are entangled with the unknown or wild elements—a mix
of agencies, entities, and forces”.167 It is this heterotopic entanglement which allows wild 
organisms to enter frontier spaces and transition into the domestic, for there is enough 
wildness in these hybrid spaces for wild organisms to survive but enough also of the domestic
166 Michel Foucault, 'Of Other Spaces: Utopias and Heterotopias', Jay Miskowiec (Trans.), Diacritics, Vol. 16, 
No. 1, 1986, pp. 22-27.
167Sarah Franklin, Biological Relatives: IVF, Stem Cells, and the Future of Kinship, Duke University Press, 
2013, pp. 259. 
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to allow for familiarisation, adaptation (e.g. the loss of fear of humans) and enticement 
deeper into the domestic zone by resource opportunities. 
Returning now to consideration of the early 17th century, was this hybridity of gardens and 
fields properly recognised at this time? The idea of a stark divide between nature and society 
that Latour sees as characterising the modern mindset, and which is pre-requisite for 
recognising hybridity, certainly did not exist in the same form in this period. This is not least 
due to the subsequent distancing of the domestic from the wild in Western society effected 
through the advance of technologies and practices of domestication, which has sharpened the 
perceived divide between art and nature, technology and biology, town and country, etc.168 In 
a pre-industrial age in which human technical power over nature was not as advanced, the 
wild appeared closer at hand and the domestic more fragile to incursions from without. The 
perceived boundary between domestic and wild was therefore fuzzier and more mobile. But 
the differing perception of this boundary was also conditioned by a difference in worldview. 
Contemporary Christian theology believed the human world and nature as principally 
interacting not through material relations but rather through spiritual and symbolic ones. 
Animals and plants were embodiments and exemplars of human virtues and vices, created by 
God to reinforce in nature the messages of correct and false conduct found in the Bible. This 
allegorical value of nature had been celebrated in medieval bestiaries, which claimed, for 
example, that the burden-carrying camel “signifies the humility of Christ, who bears all our 
sins” whereas the 'blind' and burrowing mole was “the symbol of heretics and false Christians
who... lack the light of true knowledge and devote themselves to earthly deeds”.169 Early 
modern folk beliefs and superstitions were also based on a supposition that nature was a 
mirror of the human world, in which portents of human events and fortunes could be read. 
The two worlds were connected by analogical and symbolic relations of sympathy and 
antipathy, systems of resemblance Foucault has described as “the prose of the world”.170 
Whilst wild nature and organisms could offer good fortune or moral lessons, more often it 
was seen as a source or sign of physical or moral danger. The invasion of towns by wild 
168 Keith Thomas, Man and the Natural World: Changing Attitudes in England 1500-1800, Allen Lane, 1983, 
pp. 242-286. 
169 Richard Barber (Trans.), Bestiary: Being an English Version of the Bodleian Library, Oxford M.S. Bodley 
764, The Folio Society, 1992, pp. 96-111. 
170 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, Routledge Classics, 2002, 
pp. 19-33.
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birds, for instance, was seen as a sign of ill omen, and the bringing of certain wild plants into 
households was thought a source of mortal danger. Both superstitions reflect fear of the 
incursion of a chaotic nature into domestic order.171 As William Cronon reminds us, wild 
nature was originally regarded as Satan's Home, a place of adversity and exile, long before 
late 18th century romantics re-conceived it as God's Temple.172 Christian orthodoxy, after all, 
held that whilst Eden, the original Garden, had been a place of harmony, nature had since 
fallen into corruption as a consequence of human sin. Nature was not alone in being 
tarnished, for the battle to tame and purify the animal ferocity and elemental hostility of the 
wild was for Christians a mere external manifestation of a more fundamental interior conflict,
that of taming sinful urges and purifying the soul. The domestic and wild, society and nature, 
were therefore connected in that they were both arenas for the battle between God and Satan. 
From what I have discussed, it can be seen that the modern idea of a distinct nature and 
society was difficult to fit into a Christian and folk religious worldview wherein both wild 
nature and human society were thought corrupted by sin and both were considered connected 
by symbols and analogies built into the world by God. If a 'pure' nature or society could exist,
it would not be concurrently – a pure nature had existed in Eden at the beginning of time and 
a pure society would exist in Jerusalem at its end, but through the course of history the 
external vicissitudes of nature would be thoroughly entangled with the internal struggles of 
the human soul between the rule of God and Satan. It would require the stripping back of this 
system of symbolic associations and the development of the idea of nature and society as 
independent orders in order for the domestic-wild divide to harden. This would begin to 
happen in the 17th century as the old scholastic natural history, grounded in reverence for 
Biblical and classical text, came into increasing disfavour among those naturalists favouring 
alternative forms of investigation into nature. Francis Bacon would be among those leading 
calls for renewed naturalistic enquiry, and as I will show the garden and field would prove 
key sites in his philosophical programme for scientific knowledge production. 
171 Keith Thomas, Man and the Natural World: Changing Attitudes in England 1500-1800, Allen Lane, 1983, 
pp. 56-57 & 73-81.
172 William Cronon, 'The Trouble with Wilderness; or, getting Back to the Wrong Nature', In: Uncommon 
Ground: Rethinking the Human Place in Nature, William Cronon (Ed.), New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 
1995, pp. 71-72. 
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Francis Bacon in the Garden
Francis Bacon was a great enthusiast of gardens. He inherited from his father Nicholas both 
an extensive garden at Gorhambury House extending to nearly twenty seven acres and a 
passion for garden design. The latter he would put into practice at neighbouring Verulam 
House, where he designed a  renowned water garden in 1608.173 Bacon furthermore later 
addressed garden design theoretically in his 1625 essay 'Of Gardens'. This was a companion 
to his piece on architecture, 'Of Building', and the two essays can together be interpreted as 
Bacon's manifesto on the ideal aristocratic domus.174 One use of formal gardens was as a form
of conspicuous consumption allowing aristocrats to show off the resources at their disposal, 
and this was likely one of the purposes of Bacon's gardens. This use of gardens for display is 
apparent in his description of their offering 'embellishment' to the “gross handy-works” of 
buildings. But Bacon also believed his gardens to serve a higher purpose, namely that of 
providing “refreshment to the spirits of man”. This refreshment was for Bacon at once 
aesthetic, therapeutic and moral. The production of refreshment was dependent on the 
judicious design of a garden and appropriate maintenance. Bacon speaks of how through a 
“royal ordering” there may be gardens “for all the months in the year, in which severally 
things of beauty may be then in season”. This ordering consisted in the prudent selection and 
planting of species with differing seasons of flowering and fruiting so as to ensure that at 
every time of the year there  were some plants perfuming and prettifying the garden. Bacon 
similarly saw judicious design and domestic maintenance as a means to prevent ugliness, 
repulsion and disease. He insists, for instance, that aviaries “have living plants and bushes set 
in them... [so] that no foulness appear in the floor of the aviary”, and lambasts pools as “full 
of flies and frogs” and so making gardens “unwholesome”. Fountains, he asserts, “are a great 
beauty and refreshment”, but must be designed so that their water “be never by rest 
discoloured, green or red or the like, or gather any mossiness or putrefaction”. He further 
recommended they “be cleaned every day by hand”.175 Bacon's horror of the unsightly and 
unwholesome was not just aesthetic – it was widely believed in his time that dirt and bad air 
173 Hassell Smith, 'The gardens of Sir Nicholas and Sir Francis Bacon: an enigma resolved and a mind 
explored', In: Religion, Culture and Society in Early Modern Britain: Essays in Honour of Patrick Collinson,
Anthony Fletcher and Peter Roberts (Eds.), Cambridge University Press, 1994, pp. 125-139. 
174 Paula Henderson, 'Sir Francis Bacon's Essay 'Of Gardens' in Context', Garden History, Vol. 36, No. 1, 
2008, p. 64.
175 Francis Bacon, 'Of Gardens', The Essayes or Councils, Civill and Morall, London: John Haviland, 1625, pp.
266-279.
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were responsible for sickness.176 But we can also make sense of Bacon's attitude to these 
forms of contamination and corruption in terms of his treating them as manifestations of 
disorder (see my earlier discussion of Douglas' analysis of 'dirt'), as a threatening incursion 
by the wild into into the sanctuary of the domus. I suggest Bacon's attempts to control 
ugliness and decay can therefore be interpreted as an effort to keep out or contain the wild. 
However, Bacon was not wholly opposed to wildness in his garden. This can be seen in Of 
Gardens, where he asserts that one particular area of his ideal garden, the heath or 'desert', is 
“to be framed, as much as may be, to a natural wildness”.177 This suggests that whilst Bacon 
wanted to keep out those elements of the wild deleterious to the domestic order of the garden,
he also saw there to be aspects of the wild that were useful and/or delightful, and which 
therefore he sought to safely incorporate into his horticultural idyll. This duality of the 
Baconian garden, which is both a space for disciplining nature into domestic usefulness and 
for cultivating desirable wild aspects, suggests that he recognised something of the hybrid 
nature of gardens as sites lying on the frontier of wild and domestic, with the role of the 
human gardener being to monitor and control traffic between these two realms through the 
greater or lesser imposition of practices of opening and closure. But it is perhaps worthwhile 
not getting too carried away with the claim of Bacon as a friend of the wild. Whilst less 
rigorously disciplined than the rest of the garden, the heath was still a purposely planted patch
sown with domesticated species of flower, berry and herb. It was not created to be admired at 
a distance, and otherwise left to its own devices, but rather developed to produce saleable 
goods and thus serve the direct economic interests of the master of the domus. Indeed, Bacon 
is recorded in 1608 as ascertaining that the sale of rose petals, fruit and herbs harvested from 
his Gorhambury heath would prove a useful source of revenue for helping alleviate his long-
term money problems.178 Furthermore, whatever the extent to which Bacon aspired to emulate
the wild in his garden, he continued to desire strict control over it, and the end result was a 
rather tame wildness, one whose bushes were “kept with cutting, that they grow not out of 
176 Richard Serjeantson, 'Natural Knowledge in the New Atlantis', In: Francis Bacon's New Atlantis: New 
Interdisciplinary Essays, Bronwen Price (Ed.), Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 
2002, p. 91. 
177 Francis Bacon, 'Of Gardens', The Essayes or Councils, Civill and Morall, London: John Haviland, 1625, p. 
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course”.179 The heath can therefore in a sense be seen as something of a 'folly' version of 
wildness, with the appearance of free-ranging growth but any real possibility of disorder 
being constrained to protect the overall orderly beauty, utility and moral economy of the 
garden. 
Bacon's ambivalent attitude to wildness in his garden can be traced to the placing of gardens 
within his broader philosophical and religious worldview. As I have already discussed, 
gardens have a long history of symbolic importance in the Abrahamic religions as metonymic
stand-ins for a lost Paradise. Because gardens were believed to have this residual connection 
to Eden, they were perceived as sites of special access to the divine. Bacon consciously refers
to this idea of gardens as containing something of Eden when he begins Of Gardens by 
stating that “God Almighty first planted a garden”, implicitly linking the refreshment offered 
by gardens with the spiritual renewal engendered by divine contact.180 But Bacon's reverence 
of gardens likely also had roots in his family as well as his religion. His father Nicholas had 
been a great believer in the spiritually edifying power of gardens, and it was he who 
originally developed Gorhambury's grounds. Nicholas' fancy for garden design stemmed 
particularly from an interest in ancient pagan philosophy, especially the writings of Stoics 
such as Seneca the Younger. Seneca had argued for the garden as not only a means to self-
sufficiency but as also a place where one could live virtuously according to God's law as 
embodied in the natural order. Hassell Smith sees Nicholas' Gorhambury as a manifestation 
of his Christianised Neo-Stoicism, as is visible in the integration of gardening, horticulture 
and agriculture so as to offer the full range of activities required for Stoic intellectual, moral 
and physical refreshment.181 Father and son thus shared a common interest in garden design 
and horticulture. Both moreover appear to have agreed that the general end of gardening was 
to promote beauty, health and moral order. There were, however, significant differences of 
opinion between Nicholas and Francis as to the specific purposes of gardens. For Nicholas 
the Neo-Stoic, the gardener attained the aesthetic, therapeutic and moral ends of their activity 
through obedience to nature, and thus obedience to God. This attitude was grounded in the 
Stoic belief in nature as created in perfect harmony with human needs, with the attendant 
179 Francis Bacon, 'Of Gardens', The Essayes or Councils, Civill and Morall, London: John Haviland, 1625, p. 
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claim that it was only failure to live according to nature due to human delusion and greed 
which caused it to rebel against human domestication.182 Francis, on the other hand, attributed
such “reluctation”, as he termed it, to the effects of the Fall and did not think merely 
following nature would better humanity's lot. Instead, he believed scientific knowledge and 
artifice must be utilised in order to not only understand nature but also to manipulate it and 
exploit it for the ends of human empire. It was this active technical manipulation of natural 
law, not mere passive obedience, which would best secure human happiness and prosperity. 
Nature, Francis insisted, was to be obeyed only so that it could be commanded.183 
Francis Bacon's differing attitude towards reverence for nature is best explained in terms of 
his beliefs concerning human dominion (I here base my account largely on Steven Matthews' 
excellent analysis of Bacon's theological ideas). Like most Western Christians, he believed 
that the 'reluctation' of nature (its resistance to human efforts to control it) was part of the 
punishment dealt humankind as a result of original sin. But whereas orthodox views of sin 
and sacred history professed that the full obedience of nature would only be restored with the 
full restoration of grace at the end of time, Bacon instead maintained the unusual belief that 
just as Christians could work their way back towards grace through faith and piety, so natural 
philosophers could work towards restoring nature's obedience through knowledge and art. As 
part of this claim, he asserted that just as Adam had possessed full grace in the Garden, so he 
had also possessed all the requisite knowledge to dominate nature. This was in keeping with 
humanity's original ascribed role in the garden, namely to mediate between God and his 
creation through contemplating nature and experimentally intervening in it. Humankind, in 
other words, was created as a means of God's engagement and apprehension of his own 
creation – Bacon speaks of God as having “framed the mind of man as a glass capable of the 
image of the universal world, joyning to receive the signature thereof as the eye is of light” – 
and were granted the necessary art and wisdom to pursue this role. Adam was in Bacon's 
view the first natural philosopher, and his work was that of knowledge production. In 
particular Bacon comments that Adam's first act performed in Paradise “consisted of the two 
summary parts of knowledge: the view of creatures, and the imposition of names”. Through 
observation, Adam determined the proclivities of creatures and by naming them identified 
182 Dirk Baltzly, "Stoicism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta 
(ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/stoicism/>. 
183 Steven Matthews, Theology and Science in the Thought of Francis Bacon, Great Britain: Ashgate, 2008, pp.
57-58; & Peter McLaughlin, ‘Mechanism and the Clockwork Universe’ [Draft], 2010, p. 11.
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and assigned them their place in nature's hierarchy. This original identification and 
assignment was perfect due to Adam's perfect knowledge of creation given by God. What 
was lost in the Fall was not only nature's submission to human dominion, which necessitated 
that humankind labour for its existence, but also this original perfect knowledge, without 
which human ability to exercise dominion over nature was also much reduced.184 
The idea of Adam as a working natural philosopher, whilst perhaps seeming odd to us 
contemporaries, influenced as we are by later Enlightenment discourses which equated 
Paradise with the primitive, e.g. Rousseau's interpretation of the State of Nature, had 
precedent in the writings of Church fathers such as Basil the Great and Gregory of Nyssa, for 
whom the designated role of humanity was to behold, comprehend and help order God's 
creation. Where Bacon proved more heterodox was in his espousing the idea that the 
knowledge lost in the Fall could be recovered and used to restore human dominion. This 
contravened the common feeling that humankind and nature had continued to decline after 
the Fall (as evidenced, for instance, by the decreasing longevity of humankind after 
Methuselah), and that grace and dominion could only be restored through faith and the 
intervention of God through the medium of Christ. There was also the issue of knowledge 
being thought more part of the problem than the solution, since the Fall was often attributed 
to human acquisition of knowledge of good and evil through the eating of forbidden fruit. 
The two claims that only faith and divine aid could reverse the Fall and that original sin had 
principally consisted in an over-reaching for knowledge were moreover both endorsed by a 
majority of contemporary English divines, especially those of a Calvinist stripe. Bacon, who 
had himself grown up under his mother's Puritanical Calvinism, had in his 20s moved 
towards less radical forms of English Protestantism that maintained a more conciliatory 
attitude towards Church tradition. He particularly objected to Calvin's doctrines of 
predestination and total depravity, which maintained that after the Fall humanity no longer 
possessed free will and was incapable of incorrupt thought and knowledge. Against these 
doctrines, which precluded the possibility of naturalistic knowledge being used to restore 
human dominion, Bacon employed the writings of Church Fathers such as Augustine and 
Irenaeus in order to support his claim that humans had free will and could therefore re-
approach God through faith and reason. He furthermore argued that the original sin had not 
184 Steven Matthews, Theology and Science in the Thought of Francis Bacon, Great Britain: Ashgate, 2008, pp.
58-63. 
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been desire for knowledge but prideful disobedience of God. In this he followed Lancelot 
Andrewes, a proto-High Anglican theologian and friend of Bacon, the two of whom 
Matthews has shown to have undoubtedly mutually influenced each other. Andrewes, like 
Bacon, maintained that Adam had been given all requisite natural knowledge in the beginning
and therefore did not lack knowledge of good and evil, but that Satan had deceived Eve and 
himself into thinking that in forbidding them the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge God was 
hiding additional knowledge from them, and that it was their hubris in disobeying this divine 
diktat which saw them expelled from the Garden and this original knowledge lost.185 
In place of pessimistic narratives of decline, Bacon presented his own optimistic restoration 
myth. As mentioned, the traditional Christian 'Restoration Narrative' (as Merchant refers to 
such Western cultural myths) stressed that only a combination of human faith and divine 
providence could restore humanity to an Edenic state (domesticating practices, whilst praised 
as restoring nature to its proper place, were thought incapable of undoing the damage of the 
Fall).186 Bacon challenged this by claiming that knowledge was a necessary accompaniment 
to faith, for it was only through knowledge that Adam's dominion over nature could be 
recovered. He for instance comments in Novum Organum that “man by the fall fell at the 
same time from his state of innocency and from his dominion over creation. Both of these 
losses however can even in this life be in some part repaired; the former by religion and faith,
the latter by arts and sciences”. Bacon furthermore maintained that God had ordained the 
means so that humankind could re-attain its lost dominion, and that the time for such a 
recovery was now at hand. To evidence the first claim, he pointed to Genesis 3:19 – “In the 
sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread”. Whilst ordinarily interpreted as part of the curse of the
Fall, Bacon alternatively suggested that this passage's meaning was that “creation was not by 
the curse made altogether and forever a rebel” but rather that God had granted as a 'charter' 
the provision that humankind could better their existence and proximity to the divine through 
the twin means of religious faith and scientific art. To back his assertion that the restoration of
Adam's knowledge was imminent, Bacon interpreted Daniel 12:4 – “Many shall go to and 
fro, and knowledge shall be increased” – as a prophecy establishing that towards the end of 
the secular age there would be a great growth in scientific knowledge, and he moreover 
185 Steven Matthews, Theology and Science in the Thought of Francis Bacon, Great Britain: Ashgate, 2008, pp.
61-8. 
186 Carolyn Merchant, Reinventing Eden: The Fate of Nature in Western Culture, New York/London: 
Routledge, 2003, pp. 10-61. 
Page -88-
inferred that the advent of the Age of European Exploration had signalled the beginning of 
this process. Bacon can here be seen as reinterpreting existing millenarian Protestant ideas 
that the Reformation signalled the beginning of the sacred millennium of saintly rule on Earth
prophesised in Revelations in order to claim the coming of a similarly prefigured sacred 
millennium of scientific knowledge. He believed that for this millennium to come to pass 
would require a grand reform of education and scientific learning, an Instauratio Magna , or 
'Great Instauration'. Through rejecting unworldly scholasticism and undirected fact-collecting
in favour of a hybrid and rigorously inductive natural philosophy, Bacon believed human 
dominion could be reattained and humanity returned to, or even possibly made to surpass, its 
prelapsarian exalted state.187  
Evidence of how Bacon believed the arts and science could help restore human dominion is 
found in his depiction of the scientific utopia of Bensalem in his late work The New Atlantis. 
The guide to Salomon's House describes how: 
“We have... large and various orchards and gardens... And we make (by art) in the 
same orchards and gardens trees and flowers to come earlier or later than their 
seasons, and to come up and bear more speedily than by their natural course they do. 
We make them also by art greater much than their nature, and their fruit greater and 
sweeter and of differing taste, smell, colour and figure, from their nature... We have 
also parks and enclosures of all sorts of beasts and birds... By art likewise we make 
them greater or taller than their kind is, and contrariwise dwarf them, and stay their 
growth; we make them more fruitful and bearing than their kind is, and contrariwise 
barren and not generative. Also we make them differ in colour, shape, activity, many 
ways”.188
 
Scientific knowledge and art is here shown as restoring dominion by allowing for greater 
control and modification of useful animals and plants. Enclosed gardens and fields operate as 
a principal site for such artful interventions and experiments. The major difference between 
Bensalem and Bacon's own society was not that different kinds of site or organism were 
187 Steven Matthews, Theology and Science in the Thought of Francis Bacon, Great Britain: Ashgate, 2008, pp.
1-99. 
188 Francis Bacon, 'The New Atlantis', In: The Works of Lord Bacon: Vol. I, London: William Ball, 1838, pp. 
213.
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incorporated into domesticating knowledge/power regimes but principally that greater 
knowledge of artifice allowed for an intensification of domesticating practices to allow for 
the fine-tuned manipulation of nature and “the relief of man’s estate”.189 Whilst the fulfilment
of much of Bensalem's promise awaited scientific advances that would yet be centuries in the 
making, the basic foundation for its establishment would be already existing gardening and 
farming design and practice. What the new inductive natural philosophy would allow, Bacon 
hoped, was the development of knowledge and practices that would enable a tightening of 
disciplinary controls on nature, which he believed could counteract the 'reluctation' of a 
natural world rendered rebellious by the corruption of sin.190 
Bacon's Influence on Conceptions of Domestication: Long and Short-Term
Overall, what is distinctive in Bacon's natural philosophy is this idea of the improvement of 
nature through rationalisation, control and intensification via the means of expanding and 
systematising useful naturalistic knowledge. This notion is not found in traditional Christian 
recovery narratives, which stressed that only providence could directly better the lot of the 
faithful as only God could undo the wilding of nature and the fall from grace. Against this, 
Bacon maintained that God had provided the means for humanity to help raise itself back to 
an uplifted state. This would require the practical development and application of human 
knowledge and art towards the end of subduing and domesticating nature's wildness. Rather 
than await Christ's return to see nature made to bend to human need, an experimental natural 
philosophy would enable humankind to accommodate nature to its requirements without 
direct divine assistance. This innovative element of Bacon's philosophy has not always been 
appreciated, perhaps because, unlike his illustrious contemporaries Galileo and Descartes, 
Bacon did not make any significant scientific discoveries or inventions. He has subsequently 
been portrayed more as propagandist than direct contributor to the sciences, and his 
philosophical contributions have been downplayed by such influential historians as 
Alexander Koyré and Thomas Kuhn.191 Where Bacon has generally received credit has been 
for his call for natural philosophers to collaborate in order to advance knowledge and human 
189 Carolyn Merchant, Reinventing Eden: The Fate of Nature in Western Culture, New York/London: 
Routledge, 2003, p. 72.
190 Steven Matthews, Theology and Science in the Thought of Francis Bacon, Great Britain: Ashgate, 2008, p. 
61.
191 John Losee, A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, 3rd Ed., Oxford/New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1993, pp. 64-65; & Thomas, Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago and 
London: The University of Chicago Press, 1996, p. 16.
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empire, as opposed to practising the petty one-upmanship of traditional scholars. This idea of 
large-scale collaboration, as modelled on the governing scientific society of Bensalem, is 
broadly recognised as relatively novel and as a founding inspiration for the Royal Society and
other early modern European scientific circles.192 
Bacon's contribution to philosophy of domestication has been less recognised in general 
history of science, but has received considerable negative attention from those philosophers 
and historians critical of modernity and its treatment of nature. Most notably, the ecofeminist 
Carolyn Merchant presents Bacon in her 1980 Death of Nature as having “fashioned a new 
ethic sanctioning the exploitation of nature”, asserting that he “treats nature as a female to be 
tortured through mechanical inventions, strongly suggest[ing] the interrogations of the witch 
trials and the mechanical devices used to torture witches”. She here points to a statement 
where Bacon approvingly compares the enquiry into nature's secrets with his master James I's
interrogation of witches, particularly noting the ugly sexual connotations of a passage where 
Bacon states that a man should not “make scruple of entering and penetrating into these holes
and corners, when the inquisition of truth is his whole objective”.193 From this and other 
passages, Merchant concludes that Bacon's epistemic project constitutes a rape of a female 
nature for the purpose of advancing male knowledge. She sees the production of “docile” 
new domestic forms of beast and bud at Bensalem as part of this assault, their creation being 
based on the brute reordering of matter to create a subservient, artificial and ultimately dead 
nature.194 The natural world is not the only victim of this domestication by brute force – 
women and the lower classes are also in Bensalem forced to conform to the domesticating 
regime of the House of Salomon, without significantly sharing in its fruits.195 
Merchant offers necessary qualification to the supposed universal aims of the Baconian 
project of scientific domestication, namely by showing that what was purported to be for the 
192 Edgar Zilsel, 'The Sociological Roots of Science', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 30, No. 6, 2000, pp. 944-
945; Lorraine Daston and Katherine Park, Wonders and the Order of Nature: 1150-1750, New York: Zone 
Books, 1998, pp. 220-231; & Steven Shapin, Never Pure: Historical Studies of Science as if It Was 
Produced by People with Bodies, Situated in Time, Space, Culture, and Society, and Struggling for 
Credibility and Authority, John Hopkins University Press, 2010, pp. 160-164.
193 Carolyn Merchant, The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology and the Scientific Revolution, HarperOne 
(Reprint), 1990, pp. 164-168. 
194 Carolyn Merchant, Reinventing Eden: The Fate of Nature in Western Culture, New York/London: 
Routledge, 2003, p. 72.
195 Carolyn Merchant, The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology and the Scientific Revolution, HarperOne 
(Reprint), 1990, pp. 172-178. 
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advancement of human empire was too often skewed towards the advancement of Protestant 
male mercantile and aristocratic interests. She is also persuasive in her argument that Bacon's 
instrumentalism at times encouraged a domineering and destructive attitude towards wild 
nature. The more general claim for the knowledge regime of scientific domestication as 
animated by a Baconian spirit of hostile domination towards nature is, however, more 
difficult to sustain. This is not least because Bacon does not always speak of the natural 
philosopher's relationship with nature as one of domination. He for instance argues for the 
need to establish “a chaste and lawful marriage between Mind and Nature” and describes man
as “but the servant and interpreter of nature”. Science must therefore be responsive to and 
engage with nature as well as seek to control it. Evelyn Fox Keller interprets this as evidence 
in Bacon's thought of a “sexual dialectic” between aggressive and erotic science, rape and 
seductive conquest.196 She does not see this dialectic as peculiar to Bacon, asserting that the 
differences between ideas of science as “dominating” and as “conversing with” nature are not
primarily differences between epochs or the sexes, but rather represent “a dual theme played 
out in the work of all scientists, in all ages” (emphasis mine). Keller regards Bacon's 
ideological contributions to science as contributing to dominating tendencies, but she believes
“neither science nor individuals are totally bound by ideology”, finding the history of science 
characterised by “thematic pluralism”. It is notable that her favourite example of a scientist 
engaged in a conversant approach to nature is the maize geneticist Barbara McClintock, i.e. a 
researcher working in a field of stringent scientific domestication, who speaks of a need in 
her work for “a feeling for the organism”.197 This acknowledgement of the openness of 
scientific domestication to conversational and symbiotic approaches to nature better fits my 
own impression that knowledge production under scientific domestication is broadly 
characterised by co-construction than does Merchant's claim that Bacon's 'new ethic of 
exploitation' initiated a unswerving turn towards domineering and destructive scientific 
approaches to nature. I furthermore believe the knowledge regime of scientific domestication 
too heterogeneous in its range of contributing historical practices, processes and discourses 
for its trajectory to be deduced by merely tracking the influence of the Baconian recovery 
narrative, which whilst influential has been just one of many threads. I therefore conclude 
that whatever Bacon's ideological influence on attitudes to nature (which was not 
196 Evelyn Fox Keller, Reflections on Gender and Science: Tenth Anniversary Edition, Yale University Press, 
1995, pp. 33-42. 
197 Evelyn Fox Keller, 'Feminism and Science', Signs, Vol. 7, No. 3, 1982, pp. 599-602.
Page -92-
inconsiderable), it has certainly not been enough to foreclose the co-construction of 
naturalistic knowledge through sympathetic and symbiotic approaches to non-human 
organisms under scientific domestication. 
Bacon's more proximate influence on 17th century thinking concerning domestication has 
been less appreciated than his contribution to medium and longer term trends. This is in part a
result of historians of early modern English science concentrating on achievements in the 
physical and mathematical sciences, especially those attained after the founding of the Royal 
Society in 1660 by members such as Boyle, Hooke and Newton (as Müller-Wille notes “It is 
the mathematical and experimental sciences, rather than natural history, that are usually seen 
in connection with Francis Bacon’s methodological reform of science, in particular, and the 
Scientific Revolution in general”).198 But a survey of one of the Royal Society's precursors, 
the Hartlib Circle, reveals a widespread and explicitly Baconian interest in improved 
technologies of domestication and rationalisation of current practice in both Britain and 
Continental Europe. The Circle was an international correspondence network established by 
the London-based German intelligencer Samuel Hartlib for the purposes of promoting 
scientific enquiry, Protestant religion and educational reform.199 Hartlib himself had many 
interests but one of the most prominent was agricultural reform, and in this he appears to 
have been directly inspired by the Baconian utopia of Bensalem. Scientific knowledge would,
Hartlib believed, unlock the inherent wealth of nature set there by providence. He for instance
asserts that “our Native Countrey, hath in its bowels an (even almost) infinite, and 
inexhaustible treasure”, which required only ingenuity, industry and God's benevolent will to 
uncover.200 Among his more concrete proposals, Hartlib forwarded that exhausted soils could 
be enriched without need of manure by determining which grasses best helped barren land 
recover and sowing them, a project he thought would be aided by the importation of new 
species from abroad, especially from the New World. He furthermore believed that English 
agriculture could be improved through learning from the practices of other cultures, and to 
198 Staffan Müller-Wille, 'History Redoubled: The Synthesis of Facts in Linnaean Natural History', 
Philosophies of Technology: Francis Bacon and his Contemporaries, Claus Zittel, Gisela Engel, Romano 
Nanni and Nicole C. Karafyllis (Eds.), Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2008, p. 515.
199 Oana Matei, 'Gabriel Plattes, Hartlib Circle and the Interest for Husbandry in the Seventeenth Century 
England ', Prolegomena, Vol. 11, No. 2 2012, pp. 209-210.
200 Carl Wennerlind, 'Money: Hartlibian Political Economy and the New Culture of Credit', In: Mercantilism 
Reimagined: Political Economy in Early Modern Britain and its Empire, Philip J. Stern & Carl Wennerlind 
(Eds.), Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 78.
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this end implored “Ingenious Gentlemen and Merchants, who travel beyond the Sea, to take 
notice of the Husbandry of those parts”.201 Hartlib also from his own observations 
recommended that English farmers move from the use of generalist cattle stock to the model 
of specialist dairy and beef stock predominant in the Netherlands.202 Hartlib was not alone in 
this Baconian enthusiasm for improvement, or in his belief in the providential restoration of 
human mastery of nature's spoils. His colleague Gabriel Plattes echoed Bacon's restoration 
narrative when he spoke of making “this Countrey the Paradise of the World”, and another 
Hartlibian, William Petty, asserted England to be underpopulated, and that with the 
appropriate reform of husbandry (such as the enclosure of common land) it could support 
twice its current populace.203 Other Harlibians, such as John Beale and Ralph Austen, wrote 
works on such matters of domestication as improving orchard care, forestry and 
beekeeping.204 
This wealth of interest shows us that not only were Bacon's proposals concerning the 
intensification of practices of domestication widely and well received, but also that there 
were early serious and programmatic attempts to emulate the ideal of Bensalem established in
the New Atlantis. These early efforts at improvement have not received anything of the 
attention given to the similar efforts a century later of improvers such as Thomas Coke, 
Arthur Young, William Marshall and Robert Bakewell. In part this may be put down to the 
failure of most Hartlibian improvers to move beyond words and attain permanent 
achievements in the field. But their efforts have also been overshadowed due to the early 20th 
century identification of the mid-18th century as the beginning of an 'Agricultural Revolution',
with the aforementioned improvers being depicted as the “Great Men” responsible by such 
historians as Lord Ernle and W.H.R. Curtler. Subsequent scholarship has shown that this 
declaration of a revolutionary break in British agriculture is over-egged, with practices such 
201 Fredrik Albritton Jonsson, 'Natural History and Improvement: The Case of Tobacco', In: Mercantilism 
Reimagined: Political Economy in Early Modern Britain and its Empire, Philip J. Stern & Carl Wennerlind 
(Eds.), Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 120. 
202 Nicholas Russell, Like Engend’ring Like: Heredity and Animal Breeding in Early Modern England, 
Cambridge University Press, 1986, p. 132.
203 Fredrik Albritton Jonsson, 'Natural History and Improvement: The Case of Tobacco', In: Mercantilism 
Reimagined: Political Economy in Early Modern Britain and its Empire, Philip J. Stern & Carl Wennerlind 
(Eds.), Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 120.; & David McNally, Political Economy and the Rise of 
Capitalism: A Reinterpretation, Berkeley/London: The University of California Press, 1988, p. 48.
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as enclosure, the use of new forage crops and even selective breeding having strong pre-18th 
century roots. There was therefore more continuity between mid-17th  century Hartlibian 
Baconianism and the mid-18th century improvement movement than is commonly held.205 I 
will further demonstrate this continuity by establishing the intellectual debt to Bacon 
(including a garden-centred practice and and pursuit of an Edenic ideal) owed by one such 
mid-18th century improver, the naturalist Carl Linnaeus. I will also show, however, how 
Linnaeus reinterpreted Bacon's restorationism in the light of his belief in the autonomy of 
natural and human economies, in particular his view that the human economy emerged from 
the natural, and will seek to demonstrate that this demarcation of nature from society and the 
reinterpretation of domestication as transformative, not restorative, would contribute to the 
development of the idea of wild types as original, normative units of nature and of domestic 
varieties as artificial, unstable and inclined to revert. 
205 Lord Ernle, English Farming Past and Present, 5th Ed., London/New York/Toronto: Longmans, Green and 
Co., 1936, p. 149; & Mark Overton, Agricultural Revolution in England: The Transformation of the 
Agrarian Economy 1500-1850, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 3.
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Chapter 4 – Gardens of Knowledge, Economies of the Domestic and Wild:
Linnaeus and the Origins of the Wild Type Concept
Linnaeus as a Baconian.
Francis Bacon spoke of gardens and fields as significant spaces for naturalistic investigation 
but did not himself significantly develop such spaces into organised sites for scientific 
knowledge production. But the potential highlighted by Bacon of using such hybrid spaces in 
order to draw in wild nature and then interrogate it through regimes of disciplining 
domestication was seen by other natural philosophers, who sought, like the Hartlibians, to 
realise Bensalem. The naturalist who in many ways would do most to realise the Baconian 
idea of gardens as sites of scientific domestication would be the 18th century Swedish botanist
Carl Linné, better known as Linnaeus. His realisation of the power of scientific domestication
to determine plant species would moreover significantly contribute to the idea that the 
variability of wild species was best understood by bringing them into controlled and uniform 
conditions, a notion that would set an important precedent for subsequent efforts to 
understand the nature of variation across the domestic-wild divide. 
Linnaeus has not always been recognised as a Baconian, in part due to erroneous 
characterisations of him by Arthur Cain and Ernst Mayr, who presented him as a latter-day 
scholastic working from formal logic as opposed to experience. Cain himself came later to 
realise that Linnaeus was no mere “intellectual caddis-worm, going about in a case of 
incongruous bits and pieces of philosophy” but rather instead that Linnaeus had a holistic 
worldview that, whilst derived from various philosophical sources, was ultimately bound 
together and reinforced by experience.206 Linnaeus' empiricism and his indebtedness to Bacon
have both been further established by Staffan Müller-Wille. He points out that not only is 
Bacon one of only two authorities Linnaeus quotes on scientific method (the other, Herman 
Boerhaave, was furthermore a well-known Baconian), but moreover that signs of Bacon's 
influence can be found in Linnaeus' aphoristic writing style and numerous instances of 
206
 Mary Winsor, 'Cain on Linnaeus: The Scientist-Historian as Unanalysed Entity', Studies in History and 
Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, Vol. 32, No. 2, 2001, pp. 239-254.
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paraphrasing Bacon's words. Furthermore, Linnaeus in 1746 referenced Bacon's account of 
Adam's naming the animals of Eden, asserting that for such names to be retained required 
that Adam observe the “distinct characters or traits by which to distinguish species”, 
requiring he therefore “make zoology his business”.  Müller-Wille interprets this statement as
evidence of Linnaeus' Baconian empiricism “in that it shows Linnaeus ’ vision of a natural 
history proceeding by the observation of individual instances, rather than a priori reasoning 
[as claimed by the younger Cain and Mayr]”.207 Müller-Wille elsewhere speaks of Linnaeus' 
taxonomic system as “inductive and empirical, although disciplined... by a complex apparatus
of methodological, terminological, and nomenclatorial conventions”.208 Linnaeus, in other 
words, was not a naïve empiricist nor an abstract reasoner, but rather a systematic collator 
and classifier, and his practice was that of a good Baconian bee, gathering in specimens from 
far-flung corners of the wild and domestic and analysing and synthesising said specimens 
both materially under controlled and homogeneous experimental conditions (principally the 
soil of the botanical garden), as well as abstractly through the use of paper tools such as lists, 
tables and diagrams.209 
The Economy of Nature 
Before getting to Linnaeus' Baconian practices of scientific domestication, it is first useful to 
consider a less observed Baconian influence which significantly shaped Linnaeus' 
interpretation of the wild and domestic, namely the idea of an 'economy of nature' existing 
alongside the human economy. Whilst this concept has other older roots (see Egerton's 
lengthy discussion of the origins of the idea of 'balance' in nature), I believe that a key 
influence in shaping the version developed by Linnaeus was Francis Bacon's doctrine of God 
as author of nature “by links and subordinate degrees”.210 This was a theodicy developed by 
Bacon in response to Calvin's doctrine of predestination, which he felt implied God to be 
responsible for evil in the world. Bacon held instead that whilst God was the original source 
207 Staffan Müller-Wille, 'History Redoubled: The Synthesis of Facts in Linnaean Natural History', 
Philosophies of Technology: Francis Bacon and his Contemporaries, Claus Zittel, Gisela Engel, Romano 
Nanni and Nicole C. Karafyllis (Eds.), Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2008, pp. 519-521.
208 Staffan Müller-Wille, 'Collection and Collation: Theory and Practice of Linnaean Botany', Studies in 
History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, Vol. 38, No. 3, 2007, p. 559.
209 For details on Linnaeus' paper tools, which I will not cover here in any detail, see: Staffan Müller-Wille and
Isabelle Charmantier, 'Natural History and Information overload: The Case of Linnaeus', Vol. 43, No. 1, 
Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 2012, pp. 4-15.
210 Frank N. Egerton, 'Changing Concepts of the Balance of Nature', The Quarterly Review of Biology, Vol. 48,
No. 2, 1973, pp. 322-350; & Steven Matthews, Theology and Science in the Thought of Francis Bacon, 
Great Britain: Ashgate, 2008, p. 34.  
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of universal motion, he otherwise manipulated events only through the arrangement of long 
chains of causation. Whilst the world was ordered in such a way that history would unfold in 
a divinely designed manner and reach its desired ultimate ends, human beings nevertheless 
were able to select between proximately good and evil outcomes. Bacon thus claimed that 
God did not purposefully cause evil and that whilst sacred history was pre-ordained, humans 
still possessed free will.211 A further consequence of this view was that, by asserting nature to 
only be indirectly contingent on God's will, Bacon buttressed his claim that nature had an 
independent and regular order which could be determined through observation and 
experiment and manipulated for human benefit. If, on the other hand, nature was directly 
contingent on God, confirmation of its order would require knowledge of the mind of God. 
Bacon held such direct knowledge to be impossible, as he thought God transcendent.212 
Making God an indirect actor in the world was therefore both a theodicy and a guarantor of 
the possibility of independently attaining knowledge of the world through empirical study. 
The treatment of God as transcendent and indirectly maintaining nature (as opposed to the 
occasionalist belief in God as immanent and directly sustaining the world) would spur the 
growth of natural theology as an attempt to understand the world in terms of God's indirect 
governance of it. This governance would be interpreted using metaphors from the 
administration of earthly states, such as ideas of divine dispensation, natural law and natural 
economy. 'Economy'/'Oeconomy' is derived from 'oikos', the Greek equivalent of the Latin 
'domus', and originally referred to household management. During the 16th and 17th centuries, 
it began to be used to refer to the political administration of the resources of a state, i.e. the 
societal domus. When adopted by natural theology 'economy' came to refer to the wise 
manner in which God designed the world and matched means to ends.213 This application of 
the term 'economy' to nature can be interpreted as an attempt to cognitively domesticate the 
wild by imposing the logic and language of household management upon it, a strategy of 
domestication by analogy. In particular, by imposing on 'feminine' nature the order of the 
211 Jürgen Klein, "Francis Bacon", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2015 Edition), Edward 
N. Zalta (Ed.), URL= <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/francis-bacon/>.; & Steven 
Matthews, Theology and Science in the Thought of Francis Bacon, Great Britain: Ashgate, 2008, pp. 34-35. 
212 Steven Matthews, Theology and Science in the Thought of Francis Bacon, Great Britain: Ashgate, 2008, pp.
55-56 & 68. 
213 Donald Worster, Nature’s Economy: A History of Ecological Ideas, Cambridge University Press, 1985, p. 
37; & Trevor Pearce, ‘“A great complication of circumstances” – Darwin and the economy of nature’, 
Journal of the History of Biology, Vol. 43, No. 3, p. 497.
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domus, its subordination to God was emphasised. As the Father, God occupied a role in the 
natural economy analogous to the paterfamilias within the domestic economy, to whom 
Nature as wife and mother was subservient. Therefore, even when God acted through nature, 
nature was not of itself to be credited with true authority and agency. This domesticating 
metaphor was used to argue against 'animist' beliefs that nature possessed agency and 
independently perpetuated its own order. This view, termed by Robert Boyle “the vulgar 
notion of nature”, was condemned as propagating the erroneous idea that nature was a 'semi-
deity' and collaborator in God's creation.214 The use of 'economy', by drawing on the analogy 
with the order of the domus, therefore allowed God to act indirectly in the world without 
undermining His authority over nature. 
The first natural philosopher to speak explicitly of an 'economy of nature' was Kenelm Digby,
in whose work the term appears in 1644. Whilst he “cannot properly be called a Baconian in 
method”, Digby was heavily influenced, Betty Jo Dobbs asserts, by Bacon's theories of 
matter and motion, and it seems likely that the idea of nature as indirectly contingent on God 
via long causal chains was transmitted as part of this take-up of Baconian  physical theory.215 
This Baconian influence was incorporated into an eclectic mechanistic cosmology that has 
been termed an “Aristotelian atomism”, a synthesis of scholastic metaphysics and the newer 
systems of Descartes, Hobbes and Gassendi.216 Digby therefore retained Aristotle's  
natural/violent motion distinction whilst simultaneously denying the original basis for this 
differentiation, namely the idea of natural things as having inherent motion. This left Digby 
with a problem of “how bodies that of themselves have no propension unto any determinate 
place do never the less move constantly and perpetually”, i.e. how entities might have a 
natural motion and orderly disposition without having an inherent source of directed motion. 
Digby believed the resolution to this apparent contradiction lay in understanding “the 
economy of nature that hath set on foot due and plain causes to produce known effects”. He 
theorised that the cosmic order was sustained by the Sun, established by God as the constant 
and perpetual engine of universal motion, which through its operations continually powered 
the movement and natural cycles of the Earth and heavens. It was God's fashioning of the 
214 Elizabeth Potter, Gender and Boyle's Law of Gases, Indiana University Press, 2001, pp. 124-129. 
215 Betty Jo Dobbs, 'Studies in the Natural Philosophy of Sir Kenelm Digby', Ambix, Vol. 18, No. 1, 1971, p. 
13. 
216 Paul S. MacDonald , 'Introduction', Kenelm Digby's Two Treatises, Paul S. MacDonald (Ed.). The Gresham 
Press, 2013, pp. 31-33.
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universe in a manner that allowed for perpetual existence and motion without requiring 
divine intervention which Digby considered the major aspect of nature's economy.217  
Digby also extended his discussion of nature's economy and God's design to living creatures. 
Defending Descartes' 'beast-machine', he asserted that whilst the “admirable economy of 
some living creatures” may lead observers to conclude they possess reason, when their nature
and operations was reflected upon it became clear that they were merely “material 
instruments of a rational agent working through them, from whose orderly prescriptions they 
have not power to swerve in the least circumstance”. Rather than ascribe agency to nature and
natural things, Digby would have us instead “look with reverence and duty upon the 
immensity of that provident Architect out of whose hands these masterpieces issue”. Digby's 
Architect, like Bacon's God, operated indirectly in the world through composing and ordering
chains of causation. God is for instance stated to make “a chain of a thousand or of a million 
links” as easily as one alone, and “the whole economy of [God's] actions” is said to consist of
“nothing else but a production of material effects by a due ranging and ordering of material 
causes”.218 We thus see here in Digby, as in Bacon, a presentation of God as a transcendent 
creator operating indirectly in nature through long causal chains. 
The idea of a well-ordered cosmos designed by God in such an economic fashion as to run 
autonomously and indefinitely was a common theme in in 17th and early 18th century natural 
philosophy. This was commonly conjoined, as seen in Digby, with the belief in a purely 
mechanical nature lacking agency, with the individual and collective behaviour of non-human
organisms dismissed as unthinking and deterministic. This position would be challenged  
towards the end of the 17th century by John Ray, who instead argued living creatures to 
contain within them an “intelligent Plastick Nature” that was both responsible for their 
growth and development and allowed them free agency (see also his previously discussed and
related critique of anthropocentrism). Ray derived this notion of 'plastic nature' from the 
Cambridge Platonist Henry More, who had, against purely mechanical interpretations of 
nature, proposed that God was assisted in his labours by an Anima Mundi or 'world spirit' 
(More would subsequently be one of the main targets of Boyle's critique of 'animism'). Ray 
217 Kenelm Digby, Kenelm Digby's Two Treatises, Paul S. MacDonald (Ed.). The Gresham Press, 2013, pp. 
135-143.
218 Kenelm Digby, Kenelm Digby's Two Treatises, Paul S. MacDonald (Ed.). The Gresham Press, 2013, p. 407.
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further developed More's animism in order to argue that whilst nature was an economy 
divinely designed on mechanistic principles, its creatures nonetheless possessed agency and 
could therefore proximately influence nature's course.219 
Ray's model of nature as a mechanistic economy of organisms with agency was likely the 
major influence for Linnaeus' economy of nature. Like Ray, his “special hero” (Koerner), 
Linnaeus believed that, unlike brute matter, “Animals move of their own accord, simply by 
willing”.220 Because of this belief in animal agency, Linnaeus had little problem in declaring 
Man too to be “an animal”, and furthermore condemned the Cartesian supposition that the 
human body is “a little clockwork, a machine”.221 Even plants, which Linnaeus believed to 
lack sensation, are described in metaphorical terms that suggest liveliness and agency – they 
“imbibe nourishment through bibulous roots, breathe by quivering leaves [and] celebrate 
their nuptials in a genial metamorphosis” (emphasis mine).222 That Linnaeus endorsed Ray's 
belief in 'plastick nature' should not preclude us from recognising that his model of the 
natural economy was very much machine-like. The difference is that unlike 17th century 
mechanists such as Digby he did not model nature on clockwork but instead on a different 
kind of mechanism, namely the legislative and organisational machinery of the state. Lisbet 
Rausing asserts that “What we regard as nature’s checks and balances and feedback loops, 
Linnaeus imagined as the visible and heavy hand of the state”, with the dominant metaphor in
both his natural and national economics being that of “state violence” as a means of 
maintaining order.223 This interpretation of 'economy' is in many ways closer to the original 
political sense than Digby's, in that nature, like society, is conceived of as a collective of 
agents which it is the role of authority to organise and police. This state-like interpretation of 
the natural order is reflected in another of Linnaeus' terms for it, namely politia naturae, or 
the 'polity of nature'. 
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As part of this notion of the natural economy as a state-like mechanism, Linnaeus embraced 
an alternative interpretation of the Baconian idea of indirect divine action through long causal
chains. He begins by describing the economy of nature as “the all-wise disposition of the 
Creator in relation to natural things, by which they are fitted to produce general ends, and 
reciprocal uses”. But he goes on to state that all things in nature are “so connected, so chained
together, that they all aim at the same end, and to this end a vast number of intermediate ends
are subservient [emphasis mine]”.224 The difference between this natural economy and that of
Digby was this necessity of subordinating intermediate ends. Digby, as quoted above, 
believed non-human creatures mere 'material instruments' lacking in agency, means to the 
ends of God's creation, not ends in themselves. Linnaeus, on the other hand, recognised not 
only the agency of non-human creatures but also that the natural economy served their ends 
as much as it served human ones. Linnaeus was still anthropocentric in much of his basic 
analysis, asserting that ultimately nature's order was “intended by the Creator for the sake of 
man”, a common sentiment for his time.225 But he rejected a linear hierarchy of the 
subordination of ends, stating that he could discover no reason to suppose that plants were 
created for the sake of animals or that animal prey had been created for predators' sake. 
Linnaeus instead counter-intuitively concluded that predation principally served the purposes 
of plants by maintaining “a due proportion among vegetables”, consuming the superfluous 
and useless, removing disease and impurities, and helping disseminate seeds.226 Linnaeus thus
recognised both the interdependence of trophic levels for a stable ecology and the cyclical 
nature of nutritional exchange between them. He stressed that even “Man who turns 
everything to his needs” could still serve as “food of the beast or bird or fish of prey or of the 
worm and the earth”.227 
Linnaeus believed that the interconnection and cyclical interdependence of nature was not 
only arranged to serve the proximate ends of non-human creatures but also helped perpetuate 
the natural order as a whole through dynamically maintaining equilibrium. As established by 
Müller-Wille, there are two major dimensions to Linnaeus' economy of nature – the 
224 Carl Linnaeus, ‘The Œconomy of Nature’, In: Miscellaneous Tracts Relating to Natural History, 
Husbandry and Physick to which is added the Calendar of Flora, 2nd Edition, Benjamin Stillingfleet (Ed. & 
Trans.), London: R. and J. Dodsley/S. Baker/T. Paine, 1762, pp. 39-40.
225 Ibid., p. 121.
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continued series and the nexus. The series is the diachronic perpetuation of species through 
reproduction and the inheritance by offspring of their parents' species-specific hereditary 
character and ecological niche (what Linnaeus calls an 'office' or 'station'). The nexus, on the 
other hand, is the synchronic network of ecological relations between species.228 These 
relations have been so ordered by God that all species are able to continually maximally 
flourish within their own office without overexploiting their food sources or impinging on the
offices of other species, with 'due proportions' being maintained through a combination of 
predation, disease and reproductive prudence (e.g. longer-lived organisms propagate more 
slowly so as not to overwhelm the world with their numbers). The state-like nature of these 
arrangements is emphasised by Linnaeus' use of analogies of human social hierarchy. 
Discussing the plant kingdom, he speaks of mosses as “poor laborious peasants”,  grasses as 
yeomanry, herbs as gentry, and trees as the nobility. Each order moreover carries out parallel 
social roles, with mosses modifying infertile tracts of land to enable other plants to occupy 
them, grasses performing the role of a downtrodden citizenry, herbs through their luxuriance 
and splendour giving “dignity to the vegetable community”, and trees as protecting their 
“fellow-citizens” from heat, cold and storms. Plant predators such as insects are meanwhile 
termed “ministers of nature”, policing vegetable growth and curbing excess.229 It is this idea 
of nature's economy as a parallel state and independent order lying alongside and preceding 
the human economy which would from the mid-18th century onward become key to the idea 
of the wild as an original state and domestication as a derived one. This understanding of the 
domestic-wild divide was an essential pre-requisite for the idea of the wild type as the 
original and natural form of the species.   
Linnaeus on the Human Economy and the Possibility of Improvement
Linnaeus' economy of nature serves both the purposes of natural history and of theology. It 
speculates how, with a pre-designed ordering of things, nature might be so arranged that once
started it may perpetuate its order indefinitely without need of continual corrective 
interventions. It further posits that nature has an independent order that operates according to 
pre-established natural laws and towards the end of all agents' general benefit. Attaining this 
228 Staffan Müller-Wille, 'Figures of Inheritance, 1650-1850' Heredity Produced: At the Crossroads of Biology,
Politics, and Culture, 1500-1870, Staffan Müller-Wille & Hans-Jörg Rheinberger (eds.), The MIT Press, 
2007, p. 185.
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greater good is shown to come at a price, for in order “to perpetuate the established course of 
nature in a continued series”, living creatures must “constantly be employed in producing 
individuals”, “contribute and lend a helping hand to preserve every species”, and die, the 
destruction of one organism always being “subservient to the restitution of another”.230 
Linnaeus is thus also constructing a theodicy to explain natural evil as not incompatible with 
a benevolent Creator. Even human disease and war are suggested to some extent to be part of 
the great balancing act of natural economy, for humankind as an animal species is not exempt
from the force of this “general institution”.231 But Linnaeus did not believe humankind to be 
wholly subsumed into nature, nor did he fail to acknowledge that there were evils of 
deprivation and poverty which his theodicy of a natural economy did little to answer for. 
Conventionally, these evils were attributed to the Fall, as punishment for human hubris. But 
Linnaeus became otherwise convinced, believing that not only had human economy derived 
from the natural economy but moreover that there still peoples who retained traces of “man's 
natural and almost unspoilt state”. He thought himself to have encountered such a 
prelapsarian people in the nomadic Sami, whom Linnaeus spent time amongst on his 
expedition to Lapland in 1732. He described the Sami as living in harmony with their 
environment, judiciously exploiting its sparse resources to meet all their needs, and to lack 
the vices and diseases found amongst propertied peoples. The existence of people still living 
in an 'Edenic' state challenged the Christian belief that original sin applied universally. 
Against this, Linnaeus instead suggested that the cause of evil inclinations was cultural – “we
are taught by parents and upbringing and conversation to desire unnatural things”. Human 
deprivation, meanwhile, was a consequence of the loss of knowledge of nature among 
civilised peoples. Reattaining this knowledge and applying good economic principles could, 
Linnaeus thought, be a means to eliminating misery. One means towards societal moral and 
economic improvement would be therefore to treat “the Lapp [as] our teacher”, in particular 
to emulate their wise utilisation of local resources and lack of unwarranted desire for 
imported goods. Whilst Linnaeus would not advocate that Swedes take up a nomadic life like 
the Sami, he would nonetheless utilise 'the Lapp' as an exemplar of good economic prudence 
and a partial model for Sweden's own effort to become self-sufficient.232  
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As Koerner has shown, the goal of national self-sufficiency was at the core of Linnaeus' 
cameralist economic beliefs. Cameralism was a school of 17th century German fiscal theory 
which sought to improve agriculture and manufacturing through a combination of innovation 
and protectionism. It was a politically conservative doctrine tied to the interests of the 
aristocratic elite, but one which stressed the importance of commitment to the nation, rational
oversight and the integration of the social order. Its idea of the social order as an integrated, 
interdependent but hierarchical whole clearly left its imprint in Linnaeus' conception of the 
natural order. But there was for Linnaeus a clear difference between natural and social order, 
namely that this rational integration was never as fully achieved in society as it was in nature.
In nature, harmony had been pre-established by God. Human society, once it emerged out of 
nature's economy, had on the other hand to struggle to attain concord. But Linnaeus believed 
that God, being benevolent, had granted humankind both the cognitive and technical ability 
and the natural resources necessary to attain the end of prosperity. He was highly optimistic 
of the possibilities for improvement, remarking  that “The most savage wilderness, where 
hardly a sparrow can feed itself, can through good economics become the most wonderful 
land”.233 We here again hear echoes of Bacon, who in his Novum Organum had commented 
that the great differences between “the most civilized provinces of Europe and the wildest 
and most barbarous districts of New India . . . come not from the soil, not from climate, not 
from race, but from the arts”.234 The similarity in sentiments may in part be due to the 
influence of Hartlibian economics on cameralism. But I believe it also reflects a more general
Baconian influence on Linnaeus' natural philosophy and theology, particularly the idea that it 
is the expansion of human knowledge and technology, especially technologies of 
domestication, which will serve to raise humankind from its current state. 
I shall now, drawing on Koerner, briefly summarise how Linnaeus' apparently disinterested 
research programme of scientific collection and classification was in fact linked to highly 
concrete projects aimed at furthering the ends of the economy and well-being of the Swedish 
nation. During Linnaeus' youth, Sweden had lost a substantial land empire during the Great 
Northern War of 1700-1721, which had also seen tens of thousands of Swedish civilians die 
233 Ibid., pp. 1-3 & 102. 
234 Francis Bacon, 'Novum Organum', The Philosophical Works of Francis Bacon, Vol. I, Robert Leslie Ellis 
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from famine. It was this loss of territory and threat of famine that Linnaean economics would 
seek to compensate against and combat. One aspect of Sweden's privations that Linnaeus 
especially concentrated on was its unequal allocation of natural resources. This had become 
particularly apparent in an age of mercantilism that had brought valuable new commodities to
Europe from Asia, Africa and the Americas, e.g. spices, textiles and stimulants such as tea, 
sugar and coffee. Adam Smith would later in the 18th century advocate free trade as a means 
by which countries could mutually compensate for their deficiencies through the exchange of 
goods. Another possible avenue for accessing overseas resources was colonialism. Linnaeus 
however rejected both these avenues. Colonial expansion would depend on Swedish strength 
of arms and Linnaeus thought the country too weak to defeat the military might of the great 
Asian empires or significantly challenge the imperialist efforts of the major European powers
in the New World and Africa. On the issue of trade, Linnaeus followed the popular cameralist
dictum that it was parasitic. This was based on the belief that it was necessary to keep a 
positive trade balance, measured in terms of metal bullion. There was a particular worry that 
European gold and silver was being lost to Asia due to a substantial trade imbalance. 
Linnaeus therefore advocated import substitution as the best means to halt this outflow of 
bullion and make Sweden self-sufficient. Import substitution would be effected through three 
main strategies – increasing domestic production through rationalistic improvement 
programmes, developing native equivalents to substitute for foreign imports, and 
acclimatising non-native species to Swedish environmental conditions. Linnaeus had 
particular hope that Lapland could be Sweden's  West Indies, offering plentiful land for the 
expansion of traditional agriculture, an array of Arctic flora that could be domesticated and 
studied for their potential as substitutes (he for instance developed a 'Lapp tea' from the shrub
Linnaea borealis), and space for experimental plantations of acclimatised foreign species. All
of these strategies would require the use of such hybrid spaces as botanical gardens and 
experimental plots and pastures, and would succeed or fail based on the ability of extant 
technologies of domestication to control and modify plants and animals and their conditions 
of existence.235 
Linnaeus' Baconian belief that the Arctic wilderness could be remade into a productive and 
domesticated landscape may appear naïve, but his faith that human technological innovation 
235 Lisbet Koerner [née Rausing], Linnaeus: Nature and Nation, Harvard University Press, 1999, pp. 1-11 & 
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could dramatically modify animals, plants and the environment had some grounding in recent
successes in Sweden and elsewhere in Europe. One of the most notable achievements had 
been Jonas Alströmer’s successful establishment of Spanish merino sheep in Sweden, 
beginning in 1723. He did this by crossing the transplanted stock with local varieties, 
selecting offspring that maintained a merino wool coat and then crossing them with local 
stock, repeated over several generations. Using this method, later known as 'grading up', he 
was able to produce a Swedish merino breed that could survive in their harsh new climate 
without degenerating and losing their valued merino wool. Linnaeus, as a friend of 
Alströmer's, was well-informed about this acclimatisation project and acted as one of its 
major advocates.236 Linnaeus' own acclimatisation efforts with plants were less successful – 
his failed efforts trying to grow tea in his experimental gardens were particularly 
disappointing – but his initial optimism was similarly underwritten by the long-standing 
success of establishing plants like tobacco, potatoes and rhubarb as northern European 
crops.237 
On the Reclamation of Names and the Transformation of Nature
Linnaeus' ambitious acclimatisation experiments have been ignored by most historians, who 
have tended to focus on what is seen as his positive contribution to science, namely his 
taxonomic work (including, of course, his introduction of binomial nomenclature). But the 
work of Koerner (née Rausing) and Müller-Wille have helped show that Linnaeus' taxonomic
labours were an integral part of his broader project of seeking to increase knowledge of 
nature for the practical purposes of economic improvement. Koerner argues, for instance, that
Linnaeus' use of binomials originated as “a stopgap measure to make his students into a more
efficient support staff in his project of national self-sufficiency”.238  Müller-Wille and 
Charmantier have meanwhile shown that determining “[t]he taxonomic proximity of genera...
clearly guided Linnaeus in speculations about domestic substitutes”. They give the example 
of Linnaeus' efforts to develop silk production in Sweden. Because the silkworm's favoured 
food source, mulberry trees, did not fare well in cold climates, Linnaeus explored possible 
substitutes, including, among other things, nettles. This was based on his (spurious) belief in 
the affinity between the mulberry genus Morus and the nettle genus Urtica, which was 
236 Roger J. Wood, ‘The Sheep Breeders’ View of Heredity (1723-1843)’, In: A Cultural History of Heredity 
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Page -107-
grounded in their reproductive similarities and Linnaeus' use of the sexual system of 
classification.239 This and other examples show that Linnaean taxonomy was not 
classification for its own sake but was rather motivated by pragmatic concerns such as being 
used to identify domestic substitutes, based on the presumption that related species would 
have similar useful properties. 
It is admittedly one thing to demonstrate that Linnaeus believed taxonomy to have useful 
local applications and quite another to establish that he thought the ultimate end of 
naturalistic classification a supremely practical one. Depictions of Linnaeus as a scholastic 
logician have certainly aimed to dismiss the pragmatic orientation of his research programme,
as well as to discredit the experimental nature of his work. This of course ignores the fact that
Linnaean scientific practices owe far more arguably to the practical efforts of 16th and 17th 
century European naturalists to experimentally domesticate exotic plants and animals than to 
medieval Aristotelianism. I shall shortly discuss the experimental nature of Linnaeus' 
determination of species and how this would help contribute to the nascent concept of wild 
types. But I shall first establish what I believe Linnaeus saw as the ultimate end of 
classification, namely the reclamation of nature's names. 
Linnaeus, as established, was heavily influenced by Francis Bacon, evidence of which is 
found in his scientific practice, theories of nature and theology. He furthermore adhered to 
the popular analogy, also found in Bacon, of gardens as an attempt to re-create Eden – he 
refers to the botanical garden as a 'Hortus paradisus' ('paradise garden'). Müller-Wille has 
linked Linnaeus' idea of botany as a paradisiacal practice with his creationist and fixist 
account of species. Linnaeus asserted in his 1737 Genera Plantarum that “There are as many 
Species as different forms produced by the Infinite Being in the beginning. Which forms 
afterwards produce more, but always similar forms according to inherent laws of generation; 
so that there are not more Species now than came into being in the beginning. Hence, there 
are as many Species as different forms or structures of Plants occurring today, those rejected 
which place or accident exhibits to be less different (varieties)”.240 By gathering specimens 
from across the world and distinguishing species from varieties, Linnaeus believed the 
239 Staffan Müller-Wille and Isabelle Charmantier, 'Natural History and Information overload: The Case of 
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original order of creation could be determined. But there is a notable difference between 
Linnaeus and Bacon's restorationist projects, one grounded in their divergent beliefs about 
nature's economy and the nature of improvement. As established, Bacon believed the natural 
world as fallen into reluctation as punishment for human hubris, and thought scientific 
domestication to restore its former obedience. Linnaeus, on the other hand, thought the 
economy of nature as not fallen but instead a well-ordered system designed to equitably 
benefit all its constituents. This included human beings, who when self-sufficient and 
ecologically mindful (like the Sami) did not suffer the evils of malfunctioning human 
economy. Human misery only escalated with the move to a propertied society, the loss of the 
nomad's naturalistic knowledge and prudence, and the development of culturally transmitted 
harmful inclinations (such as a want for exotic goods). Because of this different 
understanding of natural economy, Linnaeus' conception of improvement also subtly differed 
from Bacon's, for whereas Bacon thought improvement was constituted by the restoration of 
a docile and tame Edenic natural order (an original domestication), Linnaeus instead believed
that Eden's order was that of the (wild but wisely governed) economy of nature. He did not, 
however, advocate a wholesale adoption of more naturalistic ways of living as a means of 
restoring Eden. What Linnaeus instead sought to restore was the knowledge of nature's names
and uses that was found among 'Edenic' peoples such as the Sami and which he, like Bacon, 
assumed to be possessed by Adam. The work of taxonomy was the reclamation of these 
original names and the taxonomist was thus a 'second Adam' restoring nature's proper 
names.241 
Linnaean knowledge of nature's economy could be utilised to improve the human economy 
by emulating what was best in nature, but with the ultimate end of better controlling nature 
for the promotion of the political power and societal well-being of the nation. For Linnaeus, 
knowledge of nature thus offers both a model for the state and acts as a means to further the 
state's ends through domesticating the natural environment and its creatures. There are of 
course here echoes of Bacon's assertion that nature is best commanded through utilising 
knowledge of its own laws, but Linnaeus' divergent belief that nature's economy is 
autonomous and free of reluctation entails that improvement is not a matter of restored 
Edenic domesticity but rather one of transformative utilisation of nature's untapped resources.
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This characterisation of improvement as a process by which an emergent human economy 
uses knowledge of nature to transform and domesticate an original and wild natural order 
would become increasingly influential as the 18th century progressed. Precedents for this view
can be found in Aristotle and Hobbes (see above), but it was Linnaeus who was the great 
scientific populariser of the idea of natural economy as original, autonomous and well-
ordered and human economy as derived, artfully technological and transformative. It was 
these presuppositions which were necessary for the modern concept of the domestic-wild 
divide to emerge and for the idea of wild types as ancestral to domestic varieties to develop. 
Linnaeus' Experimental Programme of Reduction: Successes and Challenges
In order for nature to be transformed, nature need first be understood through the reclamation 
of its original names. Reclaiming names required the determination of species, in particular 
through distinguishing species from variety. As noted, Linnaeus adhered to a fixist notion of 
species whereby no new forms had arisen since creation. He believed species had spread 
outwards from Eden, which he theorised in his 1744 essay On the Increase of the Habitable 
Earth to have been located on a mountainous tropical island that had over time expanded to 
become the continents of today.242 Each species had descended from a “procreative unit” 
created in Eden, an original pair for species with separate sexes and an individual for 
hermaphroditic species. Descent from this original reproductive unit occurred through 
‘continued generation’, the passing down of the original unit’s typical properties to its 
progeny.243 This may be contrasted with the belief in generation as occurring through ‘fresh 
creation’, or ‘epigenesis’, advocated by Renaissance Aristotelians, for whom generation was 
a fallible process requiring divine guidance to ensure its success, the parents having no direct 
role in procreation aside from that of supplying ingredients for the embryo. Hereditary 
resemblances were explained as being as due to a combination of shared physical properties 
and environmental circumstances but were thought a secondary rather than necessary effect 
of the process.244 For Linnaeus, by contrast, the reproduction of the parent and their species’ 
kind occurred through ‘laws of generation’, these being laws of nature as eternal and 
242 Staffan Müller-Wille, ‘Gardens of Paradise’, Endeavour, Vol. 25, No. 2, 2001, p. 51.
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infallible as Newton’s physical laws.245 Under constant environmental conditions, this would 
imply that parent and offspring should be identical within a species. Linnaeus recognised this 
not be the case, that nature tended towards variation rather than uniformity, but considered 
there to be good reason to believe that much of this variability was surface deep. 
John Ray had previously established that in some plants species numerous variations in 
colour and number of flower could be triggered simply through differing regimes of soil and 
cultivation. Ray had responded to this discovery by in 1686 asserting that the classification of
species should only use “distinguishing features that perpetuate themselves in propagation 
from seed”, for “no matter what variations occur in the individuals or the species, if they 
spring from the seed of one and the same plant, they are accidental variations and not such as 
to distinguish a species”.246 Linnaeus followed Ray in treating species as characterised by 
their constantly inherited traits and in believing that inconstant traits were accidental products
of environmental influences. This assumption would ground Linnaeus' programme of 
experimental taxonomy, for it suggested that the best means to determine species and thus 
reclaim nature's names would be to negate the interference of environmental influences. 
Linnaeus sought to achieve this by sowing the seeds of dubious species in the uniform soils 
of his botanical garden (a widespread existing practice but one which had not previously been
seen as essential to the classificatory process). Since species were assumed to be visibly and 
constantly distinct across all environments, any loss of distinguishing specific traits when 
subjected to “cultivation in various soils” was the mark of a mere variety, a product of 
“climate, soil, heat wind etc... reduced in changed soil”.247 I will refer to this strategy of 
determining species through transplantation as 'reduction'. 
It can be seen that Linnaeus assumed variation to be caused by external forces affecting the 
expression of an inherited type through interfering in its developmental process. Reduction 
was assumed to work by removing varieties to a uniform environment where they would 
develop under the same conditions. The idea of reduction to the species type has similarities 
with the later idea of reversion to the wild type. This is no coincidence, as both are based on a
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similar model of species and variation grounded in the idea of the species as what is 
constantly transmitted across the generations and variation as the product of environmental 
interference in the development of individual instantiations of the species. This can be 
considered a form of what Sober calls the 'Natural State Model' (see my earlier discussion of 
Aristotle for its roots).248 Natural state models were central to fixist theories of species such as
that of Linnaeus, for they offered a means of explaining how species could at once be 
constant and be seen to vary in nature. But this theory of variation would be challenged in the
course of the Linnaean programme of experimental taxonomy.
Reduction can be considered a form of scientific domestication ancestral to the lab-based  
strategy of negating locality that Shapin terms 'placelessness' (discussed in later chapters).249 
Applied systematically, it became a fruitful strategy for scientific knowledge production, 
allowing for true species to be distinguished from varieties and the natural order to be better 
uncovered. Linnaeus hoped that reduction could establish how it was that the immense 
variation seen in nature had arisen from a relatively small number of species created in Eden. 
He further anticipated that knowledge of how climate produced varieties might be utilised to 
help acclimatise foreign species in Sweden. Initially, Linnaeus' programme of experimentally
determining species was very successful. He managed, for instance, to cut Ray's 18,500 
described plant species down to a mere 7,000.250  But reduction would soon show its 
limitations and furthermore would problematise the assumptions upon which Linnaeus' 
paradigm was grounded. Firstly, Linnaeus' original downward revision of species numbers 
was undone by a continual influx of new specimens, driven by expanded chains of scientific 
exchange and correspondence and a growth in collecting activity at home and abroad, 
especially in the tropics.251 This made it clear that the number of species in the world was 
beyond Linnaeus' initial imagining, it being less clear how they could all fit on one original 
island Eden. The strange distribution of many genera, such as the unique and often bizarre 
248 Elliot Sober, ‘Evolution, population thinking, and essentialism’, Philosophy of Science, Vol. 47, No. 3, 
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250 Marc J. Ratcliff, ‘Duchesne’s Strawberries: Between Growers’ Practices and Academic Knowledge’, 
Heredity Produced: At the Crossroads of Biology, Politics, and Culture, 1500-1870, Staffan Müller-Wille &
Hans-Jörg Rheinberger (eds.), The MIT Press, 2007, pp. 211.
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5.
Page -112-
megafauna of Australasia, moreover led to some philosophers speculating that there may 
have been multiple sites of creation, an idea which was also associated with polygenic 
theories of race. Voltaire, for instance, speculated that there might have been individual 
creations on each continent, that “the same providence which placed men in Norway, planted 
some also in America and under the Antarctic circle, in the same manner as it planted trees 
and made grass grow there”.252 
Polygenic creation, whilst challenging the Biblical Eden narrative, did not admittedly 
undermine Linnaean species fixism. There were, however, other naturalists inclined to 
suggest that species may be mutable as a means of allowing for growth in number from an 
original few. One of the more radical theories forwarded was the Comte de Buffon's 
degeneration hypothesis. Buffon assumed, like Linnaeus, that the character of species was 
hereditarian in nature. He believed species constancy due to the passing down from parent to 
offspring of a ‘moule interieur’ (‘interior mould’), a biological property responsible for the 
transmission of type, the generation and growth of individuals, and the regeneration of lost 
parts.253 Each species had its own individual ‘mould’, which acted as a ‘memory’ organising 
matter to produce offspring in the image of their parents, enabling the species’ continued 
reproduction.254 Where Buffon differed from Linnaeus was in asserting that climatically 
induced variation could become permanent and constantly transmitted, as not only the 
external characters but also the internal constitution of the organism could thus be affected. 
Buffon’s differing view of constant variation was in part motivated by a very different notion 
of what constituted species, as he considered capacity to interbreed and produce fertile 
offspring as distinctive of species difference, a view under which varieties that reproduced 
themselves constantly but which also could interbreed were considered as part of a larger 
species. Buffon still considered species to be “the sole beings of Nature, perpetual beings, as 
ancient and as permanent as it is”, but did not consider them as united by their constancy in 
the present but rather by their historical connectedness through descent. Species thus were 
real and everlasting units of Nature but with the capacity to degenerate into races which 
252 François-Marie Voltaire, ‘Of the Different Races of Men’ from The Philosophy of History [1765], In: The 
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reproduced themselves constantly.255 Buffon's degeneration theory was but one part of a 
radically materialist cosmogony which went much further than even Linnaeus had in offering
a mechanistic and secular account for the natural economy. For Buffon, God the creator 
existed but had merely established a general cosmic order. The Earth itself came into being 
later, as a fragment of the Sun thrown out by a comet, which had then cooled to its present 
temperature over 70,000 years. Life had originated in the hotter conditions of the early Earth 
not through direct divine creation but instead through spontaneous generation. It was to 
survive the planet's cooling and colonise a variety of climates that species degenerated from a
few original forms into the multitude seen today.256 The appeal of  ecological theories which 
saw the economy of nature as emerging out of a larger cosmic order with minimal direct 
divine intervention (as opposed to being designedly established by God in Eden), would 
increase towards the end of the 18th century, particularly as evidence accumulated for the 
ancient age of the Earth and the ubiquity of past extinctions. But I shall leave discussion of 
further developments in these strains of ecological thought for my next chapter. 
It was not only the deluge of new species and competition from alternative theories of natural
economy which caused Linnaeus' research programme difficulties, for reduction also raised 
its own problems. A particular challenge was the taxonomic place of so-called ‘constant 
varieties’. These were varieties derived from known species but which did not reduce when 
transplanted into different soils. As early as 1744, Linnaeus accepted one of these, the 
'monstrous' toadflax variety Peloria, as a species, in doing so explicitly accepting the 
possibility of new species arising through degeneration and undermining his model of the 
distinction between species and varieties.257 Whilst Peloria eventually proved sterile, 
reproducing vegetatively, other constant varieties – e.g. Antoine-Nicolas Duchesne’s 
strawberry, Fragaria monophylla, discovered in 1763 – were fertile and reproduced 
constantly from seed in varying environmental conditions.258 Here, the interfering cause 
preventing reduction could not be externally found in the earth or sky and therefore, it was 
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inferred, had to be internal, an aspect of the organism’s individual and inherited constitution. 
Intraspecific variation could thus not always be dismissed as an environmental effect. 
In addition to the problem of constant varieties, doubts were being raised in Linnaeus' time 
regarding the effectiveness of transplantation as a means of causing reduction. This strategy 
was certainly successful for many plants – indeed many of Linnaeus’ methods would be re-
utilised by taxonomists in the 20th century (see for instance the work of his latter-day 
countryman, Göte Turesson).259 However, other variations long supposed to be environmental
in origin proved to endure obstinately following translocation. The most notable of these was 
human skin colour, the variations of which were thought due to the differing effects of 
temperature and humidity, but which it had long been noted did not appear significantly 
affected by removal to new climates. As François Bernier observed already in 1684, “if a 
black African pair be transported to a cold country, their children are just as black, and so are 
all their descendants until they come to marry with white women”.260 Consequently, when 
Immanuel Kant developed his theories on racial derivation, he would suppose that, whilst the 
cause of racial differences was due to adaptation to environmental conditions, once this initial
plasticity was used up such changes had become permanent and irreversible.261 
Such Buffonian style degeneration theories faced their own problems, for there were other 
variations that very much did appear affected by changes to living conditions. There were, for
instance, numerous cases reported of European animals gone wild in overseas colonies 
reacquiring ancestral characteristics. The Spanish naturalist Felix de Azara, writing in the 
1790s, asserted that of the many wild horses encountered in South America’s La Plata region 
“I have never seen one of any color but chestnut”. Non-chestnut horses invariably turned out 
to be recently escaped domestic animals. He concluded that it seemed likely that “the horses 
that have become feral have regained not only the habits, disposition, and shapes of the 
type… but also the color”.262 Azara believed his observations refuted Buffon's degeneration 
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theory by showing, as Linnaeus had claimed, that variation from the type was an 
impermanent effect of environmental influences. But because of the constancy of racial 
variations and of spontaneously appearing 'constant varieties' (later termed more commonly 
termed 'sports'), there was now a strong inclination to believe that variation, at least when 
produced by nature, was commonly permanent. Azara's observations therefore did not greatly
stymie the belief that species might degenerate, but did cast doubt on whether variation under
domestication was permanent. This doubt combined with an increased recognition of the 
ability of human breeders to direct variation to profitable ends to lead many naturalists c. 
1800 to conclude that whilst racial variation in nature might be permanent, the variability of 
breeds under domestication was by contrast the artificial product of human interventions in 
the habits, alimentation and reproduction of organisms. As shall be seen, this would influence
a normative early interpretation of wild type as what is returned to once artificial intervention
is removed. This idea of variation in the wild and under domestication as differing in nature 
will be further explored in the next chapter.
From Uppsala to Brno – Mendel and the Legacy of the Linnaean Effort to Determine 
Species
It can be seen that, in spite of Linnaeus' early efforts to systematise and clarify taxonomy, by 
the late 18th century there was a great deal of debate as to what constituted a species and what
was the nature of variation. The limitations of Linnaean transplantation-based strategies of 
scientific domestication having been made apparent, new means were sought by which to 
determine species. One of these means would be hybridisation studies. I will now conclude 
this chapter by showing how Mendel's experimental discoveries were a legacy of Linnaeus' 
earlier efforts to determine species through garden-based techniques of experimental 
domestication. Buffon had suggested hybrid sterility as an alternative method of demarcating 
species and varieties, but had himself lost faith in this technique with the discovery in the 
1750s of occasional fertile hybridisations between otherwise well-distinguished species of 
domesticated songbirds.263 Linnaeus himself, under the influence of Peloria, would from the 
1740s onwards contrastingly suggest hybridisation not as a means of distinguishing species 
but instead of creating new ones. He believed this could account for how tens of thousands of
species had originated from a created few in Eden. He doubtless also aspired to discover the 
263 Ernst Mayr, ‘Joseph Gottlieb Kolreuter's Contributions to Biology’, Osiris, Vol. 2, 1986, p. 152.
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secrets of hybridisation for the purposes of improving human economy. Linnaeus and his 
students would subsequently search for true-breeding hybrids, with a thesis produced in 1751 
listing 100 discovered, though Olby regards most of these as dubious. Nonetheless, several 
hybrids would eventually be accepted as legitimate species and two, a seed-producing goat’s 
beard hybrid and a cuttings-propagated speedwell, would be produced artificially through 
hand cross-pollination.264 
It was to challenge this idea that hybridisation could be used to produce new species that 
Joseph Kölreuter would instead develop it as a systematic means of experimentally 
determining species. Kölreuter believed the formation of new species through hybridisation 
did not conform to observed nature or with the idea of a well-designed world, thinking that if 
it were the case “incredible confusion would result in nature”.265 His utilisation of otherwise 
ordinary garden and farm plants as a means of producing data to defend this worldview can 
be considered an act of scientific domestication par excellence. Kölreuter’s first significant 
discovery was that the seeds of the hybrid goat’s beard did not produce plants like their 
hybrid parent. Instead, this second hybrid generation was a heterogeneous mixture of 
individuals which overall tended to resemble more their grandparents, the original maternal 
and paternal parent types from which the hybrid was derived. He thus demonstrated that even
those hybrids which overcame the sterility barrier usually could not breed true, instead 
disintegrating into the species from which they were derived.266  Kölreuter termed this 
phenomenon 'transformation' or 'restoration', but it would in the 19th century come to be 
considered a form of reversion (see later chapters).267 Kölreuter would go on to conduct 
around 140 experimental crossings utilising 13 genera and 54 species over the five years 
between 1760 and 1765.268 His findings would not only confirm the tendency to reversion in 
hybrids but also demonstrated the equal contribution of the parent types at a time when the 
spermism-ovism debate was still extant.269 Kölreuter's hope to use hybridisation to better 
elucidate the species/variety distinction would, however, not be fully met. He had initially 
expected that species hybrids would be near or completely sterile but that he would be able to
264 Robert C. Olby, Origins of Mendelism, London: Constable and Company Ltd, 1966, pp. 19-26.
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raise fertility through backcrossing with one of the parent types.270 He based this 
presumptions on a fluid theory of heredity drawn from alchemy, comparing the production of
the hybrid from the parent types to the synthesis of a neutral (hermaphrodite) salt from the 
mixing of the sulphuric male and mercurial female principles. What he instead found was that
hybrid sterility was highly variable and that backcrossing often produced offspring of no 
greater fertility than the hybrid parent. Kölreuter did, however, successfully complete the 
‘transformation’ of several of his hybrids back to one of their parent types. In doing so, he 
extended the initial crossing experiment into an experimental pedigree, and so established 
lineage domestication for experimental purposes as a standard practice in hybridisation 
studies.271 
After Kölreuter, the experimental scientific production of hybrids and their study became a 
mainstay of European botany. Thomas Andrew Knight would notably pioneer the deliberate 
use of hybridisation as a tool for producing new agricultural varieties.272 But the ongoing 
attempt to find general laws for the determination of species would continue to be frustrated 
by the great variation in hybrid fertility and sterility. In response to this difficulty, Carl 
Friedrich Gärtner, the most notable hybridist after Kölreuter and before Mendel, would adopt 
an instrumentalist approach to species defined purely by constancy in reproduction and thus 
encompassing both true Linnaean species and constant varieties. Abandoning the search for 
the general, Gärtner instead sought only to determine the particular biological laws of 
development – ‘Bildungsgesetze’ –  active in each species. This is not to say that Gärtner's 
gardens were not scientifically productive domestic spaces or that his research was without 
direction. Gärtner carried out hybridisation experiments on a vast scale – over 25 years, he 
initiated 10,000 experiments utilising 700 species. Whilst he did not believe these 
experiments could determine general laws, he held that they did reveal the 'elective affinities' 
between species (i.e. their greater or lesser inclination to hybridise). These interspecies 
relations were constant and could therefore be mapped onto one another in order to determine
general interspecific relations within the plant kingdom. Gärtner can thus be seen as 
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attempting to extend the experimental application of hybridisation in order to empirically 
determine taxonomic relationships.273 
Whilst Gärtner's own contributions to hybridist thought are largely forgotten, those of one 
experimentalist he heavily influenced, namely Gregor Mendel, have not. That Mendel was 
part of a long-standing hybridist tradition was not initially realised by many of those life 
scientists who rediscovered him circa 1900. Thence has arisen the myth of the 'monk in the 
garden', the isolated genius ahead of his time, and even Foucault's “veritable monster” 
operating outside his era's episteme.274 Historians such as Roger Wood and Vitězslav Orel 
have since corrected this error by showing that Mendel was not isolated but was rather part of
a thriving community of Central European experimental breeders centred on Brno, the 
industrial heartland of the Hapsburg empire.275 Mendel was also familiar with the latest 
laboratory science of his day, having studied at Vienna under the plant physiologist Franz 
Unger. The joint influence of Unger and Gärtner can be seen in Mendel's methodology. Like 
Unger, and unlike Gärtner, Mendel believed his experiments could be used to infer universal 
laws of plant development and heredity. Mendel's working species concept, however, appears
to borrow from Gärtner, as can be seen from the fact that he refers to his pea strains as 
distinct 'Arten' ('species') despite their only differing in single characters, as well as justifying 
this label on the basis that he spent two years selecting and breeding his peas until they 
“yielded perfectly constant and similar offspring”.276  
The fact Mendel referred to his strains as 'species' should cause us to be cautious about one 
common claim about Mendel's works, namely that unlike his predecessors he moved beyond 
the study of species and the whole organism (habitus) as units of hybridisation and instead 
adopted a traits-based approach which assumed particulate hereditary factors to be the unit of 
analysis. It is true that Mendel believed that by concentrating on 'detail experiments' 
involving parent types differing in one or two characteristics, he would be able to more easily
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determine patterns of heredity, which could then be scaled up to more complex cases of 
hybridisation between more differentiated parent types.277 But simply because he believed 
more similar species would produce more tractable data does not imply that he believed the 
habitus decomposable into traits – it is quite likely he instead thought there to be a basic law 
for elective affinities that would only be visible in minimally distinct species. It may further 
be noted that Mendel's concept of segregation, commonly cited as evidence of his particulate 
interpretation of heredity, was in fact little different from that employed earlier by the French 
hybridist Naudin, who explicitly defines segregation as occurring between “two different 
essences”, i.e. two holistic parent types.278 Mendel even follows Naudin in supposing that the 
meeting of homogeneous essences in reproduction results in blending as opposed to 
segregation. This is evident in his formulas, which describe homozygous individuals with 
‘dominating’ and ‘recessive’ factors as ‘A’ and ‘a’ respectively (compare with the use of 
‘AA’ and ‘aa’ in modern genetics, which clearly records the contribution of two like parent 
factors whilst emphasising non-blending).279 
If Mendel was not investigating the nature of an intraspecific particulate heredity, what was 
he looking for in his experiments? Robert Olby has suggested that the main research question
motivating Mendel was determining “the role of crossing in the production of variability”. 
He was, in other words, seeking to answer the question of whether hybridisation could 
produce new variability and therefore be a potential source of new species. Olby believes that
this interpretation of Mendel’s work better explains his turning away from his earlier work 
with Pisum to work with Hieracium, a move commonly seen as erroneous but which makes 
sense if we consider that what Mendel was looking for were ‘constant hybrids’, which 
Hieracium appeared to be very good at producing.280 On this revisionist account, Olby 
concludes, Mendel was certainly not the kind of researcher he would be interpreted to be by 
his ‘rediscoverers’ in 1900, that if a Mendelian is understood to be “one who subscribes 
explicitly to the existence of a finite number of hereditary elements which in the simplest 
case is two per hereditary trait, only one of which may enter one germ cell, then Mendel was 
clearly no Mendelian”.281 
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The purpose of this last section has not been to seek to deflate Mendel's worthy reputation as 
a highly significant contributor to scientific knowledge but rather to stress the historical 
context of his work and its relationship with other forms of 18th and 19th century scientific 
knowledge production which have employed methods of experimental domestication in 
garden-based settings. I have particularly stressed the importance of such experimental 
research in the early modern history of taxonomy as an experimental and applied (as opposed
to theoretical or paper-based) effort to determine the boundaries between taxa (especially 
species and varieties), to establish relationships between species and to interrogate the 
problem of variation. I have also sought to establish in this chapter the theoretical and societal
context, in particular the demarcation of natural and human economy, which both motivated 
the Linnaean effort to reclaim nature's names and influenced the kind of experimental 
domesticating strategies undertaken for the purposes of scientific knowledge production. 
Finally, I have also sought to use this chapter to establish the context out of which the idea of 
the wild type as an ancestor of domestic varieties would develop, specifically by showing 
how the evolution of this idea was shaped by changes in how relations between society and 
nature were conceived. I will now turn my attention to the initial appearance of the wild type 
concept, its place in 19th century natural historical worldviews, and how it was affected by 
Darwin's reinterpretation of the domestic-wild divide.  I will return to Mendel at a later point 
in this thesis. 
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Chapter 5 – The Concept of Wild Type amongst Darwin and his Contemporaries
The Conceptual Background of Wild Type and Early Citations
As discussed in the last chapter, the emergence of a distinct concept of ‘wild type’ pivoted on
the idea that the human and natural economy constituted distinct orders operating under 
differing organisational regimes. I suggested Linnaeus as an influential populariser of the 
idea of natural economy as original, autonomous and well-ordered and human economy as 
derived, artfully technological and transformative. This interpretation of the society-nature 
divide promoted the idea that the domestic-wild divide was also one of a distinction between 
what was original, free-living and acting as a means to its own ends (the wild) and what was 
artificial, subject to constraint and made to act as a means to human ends (the domestic). 
Organisms in nature also had a given place in its economy, whereas those under 
domestication were forced to serve humankind under many different roles. When combined 
with a belief that changes in the conditions of existence caused organisms to degenerate so as 
to adapt to their new circumstances, this led to the common view that organisms under 
domestication varied more than those in stabler natural conditions. This was corroborated by 
the visible evidence of there being a great many domestic varieties and only a few wild 
species that were plausible candidates as ancestral wild types.  Buffon would thus be led to 
conclude that “Men... have greatly altered and modified the domestic kinds”, rendering them 
“greatly variegated and changed” and establishing “physical and real genera”. But he goes on
to state that where those genera “modified by the hand of man” “have but one common origin
in Nature, the whole genus ought to constitute but a single species”.282 This statement 
establishes a distinction between naturally occurring and ancestral wild types and derived, 
humanly modified domestic varieties, whilst emphasising their shared specificity. 
Furthermore, whilst Buffon did believe wild species to degenerate, he emphasised that 
domestic species are induced to do so at a greater rate and extent through human intervention.
He additionally pointed to the dependence on human guardianship of many domestic breeds, 
noting that “our domestic sheep, in their present condition, could not subsist without the 
support of man”. He considers this to render it “apparent, that nature never produced them as 
they exist at present, but that they have degenerated under our care”, and thus moves to 
282 Georges-Louis Leclerc Comte de Buffon, Natural History, General and Particular, Vol VI, William Smellie
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discredit any claim that domestic stock instead derived from multiple wild ancestors now 
unknown or extinct.283 
Buffon himself does not use the term 'wild type' – though he does speak of the 'primitive 
stock', 'principal stock' and 'original stock' (in Smellie's translation at least), which may be 
ancestral synonyms of the term.284 But even if the terminology is not there, I certainly think it 
can be said without too much anachronism that the wild type concept is nascent in the work 
of Buffon and followers such as Blumenbach. It is my guess that casual use of the term 'wild 
type' may have already existed amongst Anglophone naturalists before 1800, perhaps as part 
of trying to translate concepts from continental naturalism. To search for early citations of the
English term 'wild type', I employed online resources such as Google Books and journal 
archives on JSTOR, searching 'wild type' and restricting results to before 1850. Whilst far 
from foolproof, my methods did generate some useful results. The earliest citations of ‘wild 
type’ in English language publications that I have found are from between 1820 and 1840, the
majority of these being from the last five years of this period. Even in these early citations, 
the term is used with a degree of sophistication that suggests its use was already well 
established in scientific discourse prior to these texts appearing. This inference of established 
usage is further warranted, I believe, by the fact that none of these sources treat ‘wild type’ as
a term in need of explanation – readers’ familiarity with the term is assumed. That usage was 
relatively sophisticated even at this early stage can be shown by analysis of the citations. I 
believe it can be shown that, by the 1830s, ‘wild type’ was already being utilised in the three 
main manners typical in later 19th century usage. These three main uses are: (1) ‘wild type’ as
referring to the posited ancestors of domestic species, and also their untamed descendants, 
especially those living wild in the region where domestication first occurred; (2) the believed 
‘wild type’ species as used as a point from which to measure the physiological and 
behavioural divergence of domestic varieties; (3) the ‘wild type’ as the type to which 
organisms return in cases of reversion, particularly cases of degeneration brought on by 
ferity. The latter two senses of ‘wild type’ are additionally linked by their often involving the 
presumption that the wild type is a normative as well as genealogical or comparative 
category.
283 Ibid., pp. 205-206.
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The earliest citation of the term ‘wild type’ that I have been able to find is in an 1823 article 
in The Philosophical Magazine and Journal, ‘Memoir on the different Species, Races, and 
Varieties of the Genus Brassica (Cabbage), and of the Genera allied to it, which are 
cultivated in Europe’, by the Genevan botanist Augustin Pyramus de Candolle. Referring to 
“BRASSICA RAPA OLEIFERA”, “the ‘Wild or oleiferous Turnip”, de Candolle states that “This 
third race of Turnips appears to be the wild type of the species, or at least is very near to a 
wild state”. He lacks direct evidence for this claim, but points to the fact that oleifera was 
“mentioned, and tolerably described, by ancient authors under the name of Wild Turnip” as 
evidence that it cannot have been recently derived. He moreover states that he himself has 
reared from seed several individuals of this variety and that they “resembl[e] the figures 
given by the ancients”.285 Furthermore, this is likely the variety he earlier comments as being 
“said to be found in a wild state in various parts of Europe”. He has, however, doubts as to 
whether the turnip actually originates in Europe due to “the facility with which its seeds can 
be transported from the place where it is cultivated”, which “must leave its native habitat a 
matter of doubt”, as it is not clear whether wild European turnips are actually the ancestral 
stock of domesticated varieties or alternatively descended from escaped domestic stock 
originating outside of Europe.286 This first citation of wild type is a clear example of its use in
the first sense described above, namely as referring to the specific wild ancestor of a domestic
species and also those of its descendants which remain undomesticated. The citation also 
illustrates a related line of enquiry of interest to those naturalists seeking to establish the 
origins of domestic varieties, namely the question of where domestication first occurred. The 
question of how domestic varieties were derived from the wild type is, however, here little 
explored. 
My second early citation appears ten years later in The Edinburgh New Philosophical 
Journal, in the article ‘On Dwarfs and Giants’. This is an anonymous commentary on the 
book Histoire générale et particulière des anomalies de l'organisation chez l'homme et les 
animaux by the French zoologist Isidore Geoffroy St Hilaire. It is stated that as to the 
tendency to dwarfism and gigantism in domestic species St Hilaire believes that they “may be
285 M. Augustin Pyramus de Candolle, ‘Memoir on the different Species, Races, and Varieties of the Genus 
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divided into two groups, those whose races have all the same height, or nearly so, and those 
which consist of very large and very small races”. Of the first group, he asserts that “the 
height of the races or varieties cannot be different from that of the wild type; it may also 
present a difference of size, less or greater; this difference, however, is always very slight”. 
He contrasts this with the second group, in which “there are some domestic races existing 
much larger, and others much smaller than the wild type; but the medium height of the 
domesticated races, a height which is found exact, or almost so, among many of them, hardly 
differs, or does not differ at all from the wild type”.287 This is clearly an example of the use of
wild type in the second sense mentioned above, namely as a point from which to measure the 
differentiation from it of domestic varieties. St Hilaire moreover treats the wild type as being 
the average of the species, its ‘norm’, and believes that variation, if it occurs, always tends to 
move in equal proportions away from this norm. The wild type for St Hilaire is thus not an 
arbitrary point of measurement but rather a normative one, varieties, along with anomalies 
and monstrosities, being products of the deflecting of the natural course of species-specific 
development.288 
St Hilaire's treatment of the wild type as the result of undisturbed natural development and 
variation as a product of perturbation is clearly another instance of use of a ‘Natural State’ 
model of variation. As with Linnaeus' idea of reduction, so with wild type there was a general
idea that when such perturbations were removed an organism would return to this natural 
state. As discussed, by the 19th century this natural state was commonly assumed to be the 
organism in nature and domestication was considered as the artificial imposition of human art
upon nature's forms. A return to the natural state thus became conceptualised as a reversion to
wild type. The first direct allusion to reversion alongside a citation of ‘wild type’ that I have 
found is by Thomas Bell in his History of British Quadrupeds (1837), where, with reference 
to the Shetland bull cattle breed, he remarks that “the most interesting circumstance attached 
to this breed is the obvious tendency which a relaxation of domestic discipline and 
management produces towards a return to the form of the original wild type;—a fact which 
has been more particular insisted upon and illustrated in speaking of the relations between the
287 M. Geoffroy St Hilaire, ‘On Dwarfs and Giants’, The Edinburgh New Philosophical Journal, Vol. 15, 
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Wolf and the different domestic Dogs”.289 It was this normative conception of the wild type, 
as shall be seen, which would come into conflict with Darwin's claim of an analogy between 
variation in domestication and the wild.
Natural Disorder: Struggle & Change
As aforementioned, citations of ‘wild type’ start to become quite numerous in the years 
between 1835 and 1840, to the extent that I think it fair to judge that by the end of this period 
it had become mainstream terminology amongst British naturalists. It still continued to be 
used in the original context from which it derived, where a distinction was assumed between 
variation in nature and in domestication based on believed differences between the natural 
and human economies. But this rigid demarcation of nature and domesticity was coming 
under increasing challenge in this period, with significant implications for the nascent wild 
type concept. In particular, Linnaeus’ idea of nature as an economy whose movements served
to maintain a static set of relations between its constituent organisms was attacked on several 
fronts from the end of the 18th century onwards, with the consequence that “the balance of 
nature turned from a permanent process into a transient state of affairs, while adaptation 
turned from a transient state of affairs into a permanent process” (Müller-Wille).290 The first 
aspect of Linnaeus’ model of nature to be targeted was natural prudence, the idea that there 
are set limits to rates of reproduction and predation which ensure that species populations are 
maintained at “just” proportions.291 In 1798, Thomas Malthus presented an alternative vision 
of reproduction in nature. For Malthus there was no internal mechanism that checked species'
propagation. Nature “has scattered the seeds of life abroad with the most profuse and liberal 
hand”. What restrained species numbers was not prudence but rather necessity, there being a 
“natural inequality of the two powers of population and of production in the earth”, with the 
consequence that “The race of plants and the race of animals shrink under this great 
restrictive law... its effects are waste of seed, sickness, and premature death”.292 This 
inequality of propagation and production also applied to humans. Though often able to ward 
289 Thomas Bell, A History of British Quadrupeds, including the Cetacea, London: John van Voorst, 1837, p. 
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off starvation thanks to their intelligence and technology, where such measures failed or were
lacking humans would fall into a “struggle for existence” in which many would die. Malthus 
thought such contestations were especially common in the pre-civilised past, characterising 
this as a time of “perpetual struggle for room and food”.293 Malthus thus raised again the 
spectre of the state of nature as a Hobbesian war of all against all. Furthermore, his portrayal 
of population as regulated by necessity as opposed to divinely mandated prudence offered an 
alternative explanation for the apparent orderliness of nature, one in which divine 
government need not play a significant part.
New developments in another area of science, geology, also began to undermine the notion of
an unchanging economy of nature. 18th century naturalists such as Linnaeus and Buffon 
commonly assumed the Earth to have undergone significant changes in its history but 
believed that the order of organic nature had remained relatively static, not least due to 
organisms’ ability to adapt to new climatic conditions. This belief in the continuity of the 
organic order received a fatal challenge at the beginning of the 19th century with the 
discovery and formal scientific identification of undeniably extinct fossil species such as 
mammoths and mastodons. As a result of these findings, by the 1810s Georges Cuvier was 
postulating that the history of the Earth had been punctuated by great catastrophes, which had
reduced a once vast number of original species to their present number. With the increasing 
realisation that modern groups such as mammals were either poorly or not at all represented 
in older rocks, early palaeontologists such as William Buckland began to propose that these 
catastrophes were due to extreme changes in the environment, leaving few survivors. In place
of those exterminated, following each catastrophe God created new and more advanced 
species to fill their place, this progressive series of creations culminating finally in human 
beings, the most advanced of God’s creatures.294 What these catastrophist theories amounted 
to was a rejection of a singular economy of nature operating in perpetual cycles of a fixed 
equilibrium in favour of a succession of such economies, each destroyed to make way for a 
superior natural order. Whilst it was generally assumed that these episodes of destruction and 
succession had stopped now that their end-goal had been reached – human beings – the total 
continuation of the organic order was rejected and the offices of nature’s economy and their 
occupants now admitted to not be invulnerable to extinction. 
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Catastrophism’s rejection by Charles Lyell in his Principles of Geology did not rescue the 
notion of an unchanging organic natural order. Lyell was reviving the uniformitarian ideas 
first advocated by James Hutton in the 1790s, whereby the planet was viewed as an 
everlasting and self-sustaining ‘world machine’ shaped and reshaped by forces of uplift and 
erosion.295 As part of this uniformitarianism, Lyell was a species fixist, believing that “There 
are fixed limits beyond which the descendants from common parents can never deviate from 
a certain type”.296 These views would appear largely compatible with the Linnaean model of 
the economy of nature. But Lyell also acquired ideas from the works of Augustin Pyramus de
Candolle, as shown by Trevor Pearce. De Candolle, drawing from Malthus, was one of the 
first naturalists to suggest that a ‘struggle for existence’ might occur between non-human 
living things. In his 1820 Géographie Botanique, he affirms that “All the plants of a 
country… are in a state of war relative to all the others”. De Candolle was referring to the 
now well known phenomenon of the ecological succession of plants, whereby colonisers are 
gradually replaced by more competitive but typically slower growing species. The success of 
a species in the competition for a particular patch of ground depended on how well suited it 
was to the particular environmental conditions that held in an area. De Candolle classified 
such areas according to soil and climate type, identifying sixteen major classes, and from 
Linnaeus borrowed the term 'station' to refer to these units of ecological function.297 As with 
Linnaeus, de Candolle's stations prescribed their occupants to perform particular ecological 
roles, but they differed in being open to takeover by any invading species that could out-
compete the original occupant. Lyell adopted de Candolle’s notion of station but placed 
greater emphasis on the influence of interspecific relations in determining the space available 
for newcomers to a station. By stressing the role of organisms in determining the possibilities 
of their environment, Lyell further increased the possibility for dynamic change in the 
economy of nature. Both inanimate and animate circumstances, he insisted, are in a state of 
perpetual change, and consequently stations are constantly being created and destroyed. No 
longer could any species remain rooted in an unchanging office in nature’s economy; in the 
long term, environments degraded and species were forced to move to more amenable 
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surroundings or perish.298 Extinction for Lyell was therefore not the result of global 
catastrophes but rather of the action of everyday geological forces and interspecies 
competition.
It can thus be seen that at the same time that wild type was becoming mainstream 
terminology it was being undermined as a concept due to the increasing recognition that the 
economy of nature was far more dynamic than was posited by Linnaeus. Already in Lyell, the
idea had appeared that a species is not restricted to a particular office in nature, being able to 
invade others or be displaced from its own, and moreover that such stations are temporary 
spaces which appear and disappear as the conditions of existence and the organic 
communities they foster change over time. Nonetheless, whilst Lyell showed that the 
economy of nature was more kinetic than once thought, he at the same time assumed that 
species were created and unchanging. A shifting environment did not necessitate that species 
degenerate into new forms, as in Lyell’s view the changes in stations were usually local and 
occurred slowly enough to allow for migration to more tolerable habitations, with species 
extinction being a rare misfortune. It was true that any migrant species invading a station 
would need to compete with the organisms already there but most of the time somewhere 
some migrants would establish themselves and continue their kind. Lyell’s belief that species 
did not significantly change but rather survived by moving to more hospitable regions 
allowed for the maintenance of a continued natural order of species, though including the odd
extinction. This salvaging of the organic order was, however, contingent on a particular 
interpretation of what the ‘war of nature’ constituted. For Lyell and also de Candolle, 
competition was primarily between different species fighting for particular stations in nature. 
In such a scenario, there was no great need for species to change over time. A species could 
be pushed out of many stations but as long as it survived in a few marginal environments it 
was better adapted to than its competitors, it could wait out until conditions better favoured it 
and then expand its range again. 
Charles Darwin’s recognition that the ‘war of nature’ included not only competition between 
species but also between individuals within a species was therefore key in establishing that 
change was necessary for species lineages to survive through time. Darwin realised that if 
298 Ibid., p. 504-5.
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there was competition for stations in nature, it would surely be most fierce between 
individuals of the same species as “they frequent the same districts, require the same food, 
and are exposed to the same dangers”.299 Given that species vary in nature and that any 
variation favourable to survival, however minor, would tend to be preserved in such 
conditions of struggle, he therefore concluded that species are in a continuous process of 
gradual adaptation. Reaching this conclusion required Darwin to first reject ‘perfect 
adaptation’, the view that species are eminently equipped and fitted for their offices in nature.
This belief was still evident in Darwin’s unpublished 1844 essay, in which he still maintained
the orthodox view that “Most organic beings in a state of nature vary exceedingly little”.300 
Dov Ospovat has credited a pessimistic rereading of Malthus as key to Darwin’s change of 
mind.301 How Darwin came to understand the action of Malthus’ population principle on the 
economy of nature can best be seen in his ‘wedge’ metaphor, this being his comparison of the
face of Nature to “a yielding surface, with ten thousand sharp wedges packed close together 
and driven inward by incessant blows”.302 Organisms, in other words, battle for place in 
nature, forced into conflict by population pressures that lead to the expulsions or deaths of 
those less secure individuals and species. There is no inherent stability of place or type and 
what economy emerges, however orderly appearing, is the product of strife not pre-ordained 
harmony.
The tendency for favourable variations to be preserved in a state of competition is what 
Darwin termed ‘natural selection’. In establishing that inherent competition in nature 
promoted this tendency, Darwin determined that species by necessity could not remain 
unchanged through time, for the organic relations both between and within species are 
constantly changing due to the fact of adaptive variations appearing and being propagated. 
That the rate and extent of these processes of adaptive change is determined by the organic 
relations holding amongst species is affirmed by Darwin’s assertion that “Natural selection 
tends only to make each organic being as perfect as, or slightly more perfect than, the other 
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inhabitants of the same country with which it has to struggle for existence”.303 By establishing
that individuals in a species compete among themselves as well as with other species, indeed 
do so more fiercely, Darwin denied that species could survive through time unchanged 
merely by migrating to better conditions when ejected from their station. Organisms not only 
vary in nature and move to new stations within it, they also change biologically over time as 
successful new variations are promoted to the detriment of older forms. The capacity for 
organisms to move and change within the economy of nature could now be argued to be little 
different from their mobility and plasticity within the human economy. As was observed to 
be the case with Linnaeus' economy of nature, we can see Darwin as pursuing a strategy of 
cognitively domesticating wild nature by imposing categories of analysis from discourses of 
domestication and society, and therefore attaining what I have referred to as domestication by
analogy (see my introduction). Where nature was once seen as characterised by constancy 
and equilibrium, Darwin imported the language of human social competition from 
Malthusian economics and gradual but continual change through selection from breeders in 
order to reinterpret nature as unstable, vicious and evolving. By drawing such analogies, 
Darwin could maintain that there were no grounds for considering domestic and natural 
varieties as differing in kind. And yet, despite this Darwin himself used the term ‘wild type’, 
if occasionally, and it survived the Darwinian revolution, indeed increased in popularity. 
Why might this be? In order to understand wild type’s survival, it is worthwhile establishing 
how Darwin himself understood it, and in order to do this, it is important to first ascertain 
how the term was used by other naturalists with whom Darwin corresponded and shared ideas
with. 
The Use of ‘Wild Type’ by Blyth & Hooker
In pursuing his research for his evolutionary theories, Darwin established a sprawling and 
international web of communications with naturalists, animal and plant breeders, and other 
scientists and practitioners working in fields relevant to his enquiries. Of these many 
correspondents, only one, however, significantly stands out in terms of his use of the term 
‘wild type’, this being Edward Blyth, with whom Darwin shared a particularly extensive 
series of letters between 1855 and 1858. Blyth had already discussed ‘wild type’ in 1840, 
when he presented ‘An Amended List of the Species of the Genus Ovis’ to the Zoological 
303 Ibid., pp. 183-4.
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Society of London. Here he had observed that, regarding the Domestic Sheep, Ovis Aries, “it 
is still remarkable that we have certainly not yet discovered the principal wild type, or indeed 
any species with so long a tail as in many of the domestic breeds, which I cannot doubt 
existed also in their aboriginal progenitors”, going on to say that the best candidate for such a 
principal wild type is ‘O. Gmelinii’ of central Persia, which corresponds with a prediction he 
had made in a previous paper that “a wild Sheep more nearly resembling the domestic races 
than any hitherto discovered would yet occur somewhere in the vicinity of the Caucasus”, 
this prediction appearing to be based on a belief that sheep were domesticated at the same 
time and place as goats, whose domestic races he believes are “derived exclusively from the 
Caucasian C. Ægagrus”.304 Blyth had also earlier in 1835 discussed how “The common 
domestic breeds of the rabbit, ferret, guinea-pig, turkey, goose, and duck… have, in the 
course of generations, become much larger and heavier (excepting, however, in the case of 
the turkey) than their wild prototypes [emphasis added]”.305 Blyth was thus using ‘wild type’ 
and its closest synonyms at an early stage in his writings, mainly as an expression of his 
interest in determining the origins of domestic species and their relative physiological 
changes compared to their wild ancestors. 
Darwin’s regard for Blyth’s zoological expertise considerably predated their establishing an 
extended correspondence, in 1848 recommending him to Joseph Dalton Hooker who was on 
an expedition to India where Blyth was based.306 His particular reasons for contacting Blyth 
in 1855 can be related to certain evidence and opinion he desired regarding the nature of 
variation under domestication. In particular, Darwin was seeking further proofs to 
substantiate his view that most domestic variation was the product of the artificial selection of
a single or a few original stocks. He was especially concerned to refute the extreme 
polygenism professed by some animal and plant breeders, a view he characterised as the 
“doctrine of the origin of our several domestic breeds from several aboriginal stocks”.307 He 
was also seeking to establish whether or not domestic varieties had a strong tendency towards
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reversion, for by showing that characters acquired in domesticity were not lost Darwin could 
prove that modification by selection could be conserved.308 In response to these enquiries by 
Darwin, Blyth systematically detailed what he knew and believed regarding domestic animals
and their origins. Darwin treated Blyth’s disclosures on this matter as authoritative, stating 
later in the Origin that “I should value [his opinion on this subject] more than that of almost 
any one”.309 
In his correspondence with Darwin, Blyth utilises knowledge of wild types as a basic means 
of initially classifying domestic organisms into groups, observing that “The varieties of 
domestic animals may be conveniently distributed into 1, Those of which we know the origin,
—2, Those of which the origin (from existing wild types) is probable,—and 3, Those of 
which the origin is unknown”.310 When it comes to determining the origins of domesticated 
organisms, Blyth believes that for certain species all the varieties can be traced to a single 
wild type, as in the case of the canary. For many other domestic species, however, Blyth 
asserts there to have been multiple wild types, notably maintaining that regional varieties of 
dog are the product of the corresponding species of wolf found in the area, stating “Is not the 
Tibetan Mastiff a development of the T. Wolf, as the Newfoundland Dog is of the Arctic, & 
the St. Bernard’s dog of the European W?”.311 This polygenic belief in multiple wild types is 
partly facilitated by Blyth's perceiving that in many genii there are “clusters of species or 
varieties or races” that are “excessively affined”, and though they will usually produce sterile
offspring in the wild “would more probably blend under favorable circumstances, & more 
especially if domesticated” (This idea that domestication facilitated hybridisation, and that 
this explains the greater variability of domestic species, was originally proposed by the 
German naturalist Peter Simon Pallas in the later 18th century). He believes interspecific 
blending to have occurred “in the instance of the different races affined to C. livia [the 
pigeon], & the Dogs derived from different wild Canines, & ditto Cats, & Hogs, & Sheep”, as
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well as the Horse, which Blyth regards “a blended species, from several wild types”, based 
especially on the variation evident in ponies.312 
As to the question of whether domestic varieties revert to the wild type, Blyth’s views are 
complex, as can be ascertained from his 1835 paper ‘An Attempt to Classify…’, in which he 
distinguishes between four kinds of variations, these being simple variations (i.e. ordinary 
deviations from the mean), acquired variations, breeds and true variations. Blyth believes 
many of the novel variations found in domestic organisms, especially those of stature, to be 
mere acquired variations, a consequence of organisms being “supplied regularly with 
abundance of very nutritious, though often unnatural, food, without the trouble and exertion 
of having to seek for it”. He thought these oversized and dysfunctional varieties “if turned 
loose into their natural haunts, would most probably return, in a very few generations, to the 
form, size, and degree of locomotive ability proper to the species when naturally 
conditioned”.313 It is on these grounds that Blyth later affirms his belief to Darwin that “we 
may seek in vain for wild types of G[allus] giganteus” (Blyth refers to the asil, a South Asian 
giant variety of chicken, which he clearly thought a mere acquired variation).314 Elsewhere, 
he informs Darwin that “All the largest Dogs are from cold climates, & all dogs tend to revert
to the wild type in hot climates”, as a consequence of being removed from the environment 
inducing their variation towards large stature (though he considers the Cuban mastiff as a 
possible exception to this rule of correlation between climate and size).315 Blyth’s views on 
‘acquired variations’ and their susceptibility to reversion are in many ways not unusual, 
having roots in the old belief in the capacity of excess nutriment to stimulate variability and 
in the 18th century idea that many variations in species can be regarded as degenerations 
induced by exposure to novel climatic conditions. His views on ‘breeds’, on the other hand, 
are likely derived from William Lawrence, one of his major sources for his 1835 essay. 
Lawrence observed that when humans impose controls on domestic animal reproduction they 
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can “effect the most surprising changes in form and qualities”.316 Blyth’s ‘breeds’ are the 
products of such interventions, being “for the most part, artificially brought about by the 
direct agency of man” and therefore “if man did not keep up these breeds by regulating the 
sexual intercourse, they would all naturally soon revert to the original type”.317 Blyth believed
the hereditary variations isolated in breeds originated in nature, not domesticity, stressing to 
Darwin that the wild relatives of domestic varieties are usually quite variable. Blyth gave 
evidence to Darwin of this variability of wild stocks by sending him skins of the red 
junglefowl, believed ancestor of the domestic chicken, commenting that his specimens were 
“illustrative of the variation observable among [junglefowl]”, the length of the tarsus being 
particularly remarkable in its variability.318 Nonetheless, whilst Blyth believed wild stocks to 
be variable, he also thought that “the original and typical form of… a species is 
unquestionably better adapted to its natural habits than any modification of that form; and… 
the weaker… in a state of nature, is allowed but few opportunities of continuing its race”. 
Variation from the typical is therefore in nature rarely maintained, but does provide raw 
material for breeders to derive distinct varieties, breeds which, however, are liable to revert in
a state of panmixia. For Blyth, only ‘true varieties’ are relatively invulnerable to some form 
of reversion to the wild type, as they remain constant in new environments and when crossed,
and this is on account of their being “in fact, a kind of deformities, or monstrous births, the 
peculiarities of which… would very rarely, if ever, be perpetuated in a state of nature; but 
which, by man's agency, often become the origin of a new race”. Their lack of tendency to 
reversion he puts down to the fact that “most probably, [the original form] could only be 
restored, in a direct manner, by the way in which the variety was first produced”, i.e. through 
a monstrous deviation back towards the type.319 
Overall, Blyth did provide some theoretical and empirical evidence to support Darwin’s 
position that many domestic varieties did not have a direct wild counterpart, contrary to the 
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views of some breeders. As to what the source of this novel variability was, Blyth endorsed a 
combination of hybridisation between closely related species, excessive nourishment and the 
isolation of otherwise rare hereditary variations through selective breeding as being the main 
factors responsible. These were all causal influences Darwin acknowledged as possible 
causes of variation under domesticity. A manner in which Blyth differed was that unlike 
Darwin he did not consider the products of domestication as having much inherent stability 
independent of human interventions. Without excess nourishment, domestic giants lost their 
size within a few generations. Similarly, the distinctive characters of breeds were thought to 
rapidly disappear if human control over reproduction was relaxed – Darwin, by contrast, 
came to insist that artificial selection could produce breeds in which the inheritance of 
distinctive traits was relatively permanent. Even ‘monstrous’ variations, which were strongly 
inherited, were not thought by Blyth to be able to survive without human help, these being 
regarded as pathological traits that would be the doom of an organism in the wild. The only 
kind of variation Blyth may have thought to have a good likelihood of surviving in the 
medium term in nature would be that variability derived from interspecies hybridisation, as 
this was both inherited and not inherently debilitating. Nonetheless, Blyth appears to have 
thought hybrids unlikely to maintain themselves especially long, as he believed there to be a 
“law… intended by Providence to keep up the typical qualities of a species”, whereby 
variations from the type always tended to be outcompeted in nature by typical individuals.320 
Struggle existed in nature for Blyth as much as it did for Darwin, but for Blyth it tended to 
take the form of ‘stabilising selection’. The species type represented an optimal fitting to its 
place in the economy of nature and the atypical by default were less fit and therefore 
eliminated in struggle. Hybrids, being intermediary between their parent stocks, would also 
tend to perish in competition with their wild type relatives as they would be adapted for 
neither of their parent species’ natural stations. From this it can be seen that in contrast to 
Darwin, Blyth in his writings before 1859 appears to have still retained a notion of the 
economy of nature as relatively unchanging, species having set offices which the typical 
individual was best suited to carrying out, the atypical, ineffective and other deviations being 
weeded out by competition and predation.
320 Ibid., p. 46.
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The idea espoused by Blyth and other contemporary naturalists that domestic varieties had a 
strong tendency to reversion if human control over them was allowed to slip was challenged 
shortly before the publication of the Origin by Darwin’s close associate, Joseph Dalton 
Hooker. Hooker had himself once been a conventional believer in species fixity but claims in 
the introduction to his Flora of Australia that the presentation of Darwin and Wallace’s 
papers on evolution at the Linnaean Society in 1858 had caused him to revise his views.321 
Evidence from his correspondence with Darwin suggests he may have shifted in his views 
considerably earlier, in an 1844 letter stating that whilst there was clearly an original creation 
of plants “we can hardly suppose that we have now only the remains of that original stock”, 
an argument he based on the existence of endemic genera on islands of recent geological 
origin. He therefore suggested that “There may in my opinion have been a series of 
productions on different spots, & also a gradual change of species”.322 It is therefore clear that
Hooker already had misgivings at an early stage with the idea of all species as originally 
created and unchanging. However, it was only in 1859 that he chose to publically express 
these views, and his main target was the “prevalent opinion… that there is a tendency in 
cultivated, and indeed in all varieties, to revert to the type from which they departed”. 
Hooker, admitting himself to have once “quoted this opinion, without questioning its 
accuracy” when he supported the view of species as permanent, affirmed that he had come to 
“doubt the existence of this centripetal force in varieties, or at least to believe that in the 
phrase ‘reversion to the wild type’, many very different phenomena are included”.323 
Against this ‘prevalent view’, Hooker observes that “the majority of cultivated vegetables 
and cerealia… show when neglected no disposition to assume the characters of the wild states
of these plants”, that moreover “the great and acknowledged difficulty of determining the 
wild parent species of most of our cultivated fruits, cerealia, etc. … would not be so were 
there any disposition in the neglected cultivated races to revert to the wild form”. Neglected 
cultivated plants rather “certainly degenerate, and even die if Nature does not supply the 
conditions which man… has provided; they become stunted, hard, and woody, and resemble 
their wild progenitors in so far as all stunted plants resemble wild plants of similar habit; but 
321 Joseph Dalton Hooker, On the Flora of Australia: Its Origin, Affinities and Distribution, London: John 
Edward Taylor, 1859, p. ii.
322 Joseph Dalton Hooker, Letter to Charles Darwin, 29th January 1844. Darwin Correspondence Database,
http://www.darwinproject.ac.uk/entry-734 accessed on Sun Dec 2 2012.
323 Joseph Dalton Hooker, On the Flora of Australia: Its Origin, Affinities and Distribution, London: John 
Edward Taylor, 1859, p. viii.
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this is not a reversion to the original type, for most of these cultivated races are not merely 
luxuriant forms of the wild parent”. He then attacks the related idea that “by imitating the 
conditions under which the wild state of a cultivated variety grows, we may induce that 
variety to revert to its original state”, stating that “except in the false sense of reversion above
explained [loss of luxuriance], I doubt if this is supported by evidence. Cabbages grown by 
the seaside are not more like wild Cabbages than those grown elsewhere, and if cultivated 
states disseminate themselves along the coast, they there retain their cultivated form”. He 
concluded by stating that “Nature operates upon mutable forms by allowing great variation, 
and displaying little tendency to reversion”.324 Hooker thus rejected the notion that conditions
of domestication acted as an interference in the expression of the species type, maintaining 
that human neglect damaged domestic plants as opposed to allowing them to revert to type. 
He also rejected the idea that exposure to the wild type’s native conditions would cause a 
domestic strain to adaptively revert to its original form, observing that it retained its 
cultivated characteristics. This retention of domestic form suggested another factor was in 
play aside from the environment in determining species typicality and variation in the wild 
and domesticity, namely heredity. I shall discuss the role of late 19th century theories of 
heredity and variation on the development of the wild type concept in Chapter 7. 
The Use of ‘Wild Type’ by Darwin
Determining what views Darwin had on ‘wild type’ is on the surface a difficult task given his
use of the term is very occasional. He does not use the term in the Origin and does not appear
to have utilised it before 1868, when it appears in Variation of Animals and Plants under 
Domestication. Nevertheless, whilst ‘wild type’ itself does not appear in the Origin, a 
substantial number of synonyms and near synonyms are used in its place, including ‘proper 
type’, ‘wild prototype’, ‘aboriginal stock’, ‘wild stock’, and ‘aboriginal species’.325  It might 
be asked why, given his broad use of synonyms and near synonyms, Darwin does not use 
‘wild type’ in the Origin. He was certainly familiar with the term, not least given his lengthy 
correspondence with Blyth, who used it relatively frequently. He may have simply disliked 
the term, but then again he utilised it later on several times in Variation. A more interesting 
suggestion is that he was concerned that using ‘wild type’ could potentially mislead readers 
324 Ibid.
325 Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured 
Races in the Struggle for Life, Penguin Classics, 2009, pp. 100 & 169 [proper type]; p. 27 [wild prototype]; 
pp. 23, 24 & 27 [aboriginal stock]; p. 27 [wild stock]; pp. 28, 408 & 228 [aboriginal species].
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as to his views on nature and domestication. As I have previously maintained, the wild type 
concept originated out of the idea that domestic and wild organisms were different in kind 
due to the former being natural productions and the latter artificial. Darwin wanted to 
establish that the processes underlying variation (as opposed to the practices of selection) 
were relatively uniform across the domestic-wild divide. In using more neutral terms such as 
‘aboriginal species’ and ‘proper type’, which do not indicate whether the derivation of their 
descendants is natural or artificial, Darwin may have sought to get around any potential 
presumptions regarding the meaning of wild type that could lead to his work being 
misinterpreted. Additionally, he may have felt wild type a limited term given it was only 
applied to the ancestors of domestic organisms, a problematic limitation if we consider that 
he was considering the descent of all life, not just the descent of domestic varieties. 
Darwin appears to have had less qualms using ‘wild type’ in Variation, perhaps since he was 
almost exclusively dealing with domestic varieties and their ancestors in this piece of work so
was less afraid of misinterpretation and didn’t feel the need for a neutral language applying 
both to variation in nature and domestication. Darwin’s actual use of ‘wild type’ in Variation 
takes two primary forms; that of being a means of referring to domestic varieties’ ancestors 
and that of being an ancestral form which domestic varieties have a tendency to revert to. The
two major uses which refer directly to the ancestry of domestic stock are with reference to the
progenitors of the domestic dog. Darwin accepted polygenism in the case of the dog, stating 
that it is “highly probable that the domestic dogs of the world are descended from two well-
defined species of wolf (viz. C. lupus and C. latrans), and from two or three other doubtful 
species (namely, the European, Indian, and North African wolves); from at least one or two 
South American canine species; from several races or species of jackal; and perhaps from one
or more extinct species”. One of the major sources of evidence for this is that although 
Darwin believes it possible that introduced domestic dogs might after several generations 
have acquired traits convergent with those of local wild canids “we can hardly thus account 
for introduced dogs having given rise to two breeds in the same country, resembling two of 
its aboriginal species”. One candidate example of dogs with different wild ancestors in 
neighbouring locales is in Egypt and Nubia, Darwin citing Ehrenberg who “asserts that the 
domestic dogs of Lower Egypt, and certain mummied dogs, have for their wild type a species
of wolf (C. lupaster) of the country; whereas the domestic dogs of Nubia and certain other 
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mummied dogs have the closest relation to a wild species of the same country, viz. C. sabbar,
which is only a form of the common jackal”.326 Darwin tempers this polygenism by 
maintaining that “It is notorious how greatly the mental disposition, tastes, habits, consensual 
movements, loquacity or silence, and tone of voice have varied and been inherited in our 
domesticated animals. The dog offers the most striking instance of changed mental attributes,
and these differences cannot be accounted for by descent from distinct wild types”.327 Darwin 
thus accepts some degree of polygenism in particular domestic species on the balance of 
physiological and behavioural evidence but refuses to countenance the ‘doctrine of the origin 
of our several domestic breeds from several aboriginal stocks’, previously critiqued in the 
Origin, as this would deny the power of selection to direct variation. 
Darwin’s most notable consideration in Variation of the relationship between wild type and 
reversion is with reference to pigs. He identifies feral pigs as being the example on which 
“[t]he common belief that all domesticated animals, when they run wild, revert completely to 
the character of their parent-stock, is chiefly founded”.  He does not dismiss this belief but 
rather seeks to deflate it, affirming that on the basis of the evidence given that “with pigs 
when feral there is a strong tendency to revert to the wild type; but that this tendency is 
largely governed by the nature of the climate, amount of exercise, and other causes of change 
to which they have been subjected”. Thus he observes that whilst it is true that feral pigs 
“reassume their original bristly covering”, he points out that they do so “in different degrees, 
dependent on the climate”, those at high altitude being very hirsute, whilst those in hot 
climates are thinly haired. Similarly with regard to colour, the general tendency to return to 
those of the wild boar is reported, but deviations from this appear in certain environments, 
such as the red coats of feral pigs in Jamaica and other tropical climates. Darwin also ascribes
the reversion to the general shape and proportions of the wild boar as being what “might have
been expected from the amount of exercise which [feral pigs] are compelled to take in search 
of food”.328 In this passage, Darwin thus does not deny the power of the conditions of 
existence to affect change in the form of feral organisms. He rather points to there being 
nothing strange about these changes, being that they are adaptive, and that if there is a 
326 Charles Darwin, The Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication: Vol. 1, 2nd ed., London: John 
Murray, 1888, pp. 25-27.
327 Charles Darwin, The Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication: Vol. 2, 2nd ed., London: John 
Murray, 1885, p. 404.
328 Charles Darwin, The Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication: Vol. 1, 2nd ed., London: John 
Murray, 1888, pp. 81-82. 
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tendency to reversion, it is to be thought of not in terms of a return to type but rather as the 
reformation of the organism based on its reutilisation of adaptive faculties rendered dormant 
by domestication. That the degree of reformation differs depending on the nature of the new 
environment into which domesticated organisms are released is clear from examples such as 
differences in hair growth according to climate. This is not a product of the organism 
experiencing some normative force of Nature from which it has previously been shielded by 
human hands, but rather an expression of the organism’s plasticity in responding to changes 
in circumstance, enabling it to survive in the struggle for life. 
Darwin on the Parallels of Nature and Domestication
Darwin’s occasional use of ‘wild type’ should not distract us from the fact that he was very 
much determined to show that the same laws of variation operated in both the wild and in 
domestication, that there was, in other words, no significant difference between the products 
of nature and of human husbandry. This required him to explain away some apparently 
obvious differences between variation in nature and in domestication, most pointedly the fact 
that variation in the wild appeared “rare and evanescent”, as one of Darwin’s sceptics, John 
Crawfurd put it, whereas it appeared near ubiquitous in domesticity.329 Darwin’s strategy to 
combat these doubts was to lift from Lyell’s uniformitarianism the two principles of 
gradualism and actualism. He argued that variation in nature was very much real but occurred
at a rate too slow to be easily appreciation in everyday life. It was made further invisible by 
the fact that its causes are mundane. Minute adaptive variations accumulate over time within 
a population as a consequence of the selective pressures of competition and the conditions of 
existence weeding out maladapted individuals. The production of new varieties and 
subsequently new species occurred on a similar timescale to geological processes like the 
raising and wearing down of mountain ranges. Both evolutionary and geological processes 
leave behind more than enough evidence of their occurring for us to ascertain the fact of their
having happened. That these processes could not be directly observed by the human eye did 
not make them any less real. By maintaining that nature worked in the same manner and with 
the same material as the human breeder, just at a slower rate, Darwin was able to utilise the 
evidence of variation under domestication as a means of arguing for the possibility that the 
329 John Crawfurd, ‘On the Theory of the Origin of Species by Natural Selection in the Struggle for Life’, 
Transactions of the Ethnological Society of London, Vol. 7, 1869, p. 29.
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myriad life forms of Earth could have diverged over a vast expanse of time from a common 
origin.330 
A further intuition which Darwin’s claim of a uniformity of laws of variation across the wild-
domestic divide came into conflict with was the belief in there being a difference in kind 
between nature and art, and between the products of nature and art. Most obviously, humans 
produce art consciously, whereas nature is not conscious in its ‘acts’, so the argument goes 
that human products must be intrinsically different from those of nature. Provocatively, 
Darwin sought to portray the difference between human art and nature’s acts as not a matter 
of our consciousness enhancing our powers but rather as being central to the limitations of 
our powers when compared to nature. Art, he affirmed, is but an imperfect imitation of the 
effects of nature, the works of which are “immeasurably superior to man’s feeble efforts”.331 
For Darwin, the difference between art and nature lies in their capacity to perfect. In the case 
of organisms, nature is vastly more capable of perfectly adapting its creatures according to 
their needs, whereas human beings cannot shape their domestic varieties perfectly to their 
requirements. This is because “Man can act only on external and visible characters”, whereas 
nature “cares nothing for appearances, except in so far as they may be useful to any being”, 
and can act “on every internal organ... on the whole machinery of life”.332 Human beings, in 
other words, cannot manipulate nature for their own ends to the extent that nature can alter 
itself as humans can and will never comprehend the totality of nature’s operations, whereas 
nature can always utilise its own laws as it does not first require knowledge to do so. Nature’s
capacity to affect itself will therefore always exceed human capacity to affect nature, and 
nature will always be stronger than art. Darwin thus rejected the view inherent in the 
Aristotelian ‘Natural State Model’, whereby art is seen as operating through interfering in the
course of nature, in favour of interpreting art as the imperfect conscious rendition of nature’s 
unconscious operations. 
By asserting art and nature to operate through the same kind of processes, the conscious mind
being no more inventive in its capacity to generate outcomes than inanimate natural forces, 
330 For details on Lyell's gradualism and actualism see: Dov Ospovat, 'Lyell's Theory of Climate', Journal of 
the History of Biology, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1977, pp. 317-339. For Lyell's influence on Darwin, see: Michael 
Ghiselin, The Triumph of the Darwinian Method, USA: Dover Publications, 2003, pp. 13-31.
331 Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured 
Races in the Struggle for Life, Penguin Classics, 2009, p. 64.
332 Ibid., pp. 82-83.
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Darwin was enabled to claim that not only was his evolutionary power of natural selection 
analogous to the artificial selection practiced by breeders, but moreover that they were both 
in fact instances of a general principle of selection. This “great principle” was defined by 
Darwin as operating under any circumstances in which there exists variability, favourable, 
neutral and negative. If a favourable variation is heritable and if other variations in the same 
direction can accumulate, selection is enabled to create new forms of life.333 Whether the 
selector is human or natural can only influence the process by changing fitness conditions. 
The principle of selection operates in the same manner whether a variation is favoured due to 
its enabling escape from predation or because it appeals aesthetically to breeders. Selection 
operates across the boundaries of the natural and human economy, there existing, Darwin 
believed, a continuum of selection. At one extreme is ‘Methodical Selection’, where human 
knowledge and intention to modify are highly evident, at the other end is natural selection, 
with ‘Unconscious Selection’ being intermediate, this being the practice of selecting ‘the 
best’ of a breed without intention to modify it.334 A continuum of selection implied that the 
border between nature and domestication was itself continuous and not rigidly demarcated. 
Given that this outlook implies that we can never firmly distinguish between the wild and the 
domestic without some degree of arbitrariness, this further substantiates the claim of this 
chapter that Darwinian theory undermined the source of wild type’s original meaning, which 
was predicated on a rigid wild-domestic distinction and assumed a ‘Natural State Model’ of 
art and nature to hold.
Defenders of the Natural State Model
Darwin’s denial of the ‘Natural State Model’ and of a rigid wild-domestic distinction was 
itself rejected by many of his contemporary naturalists. Defending its legitimacy thereby 
became a primary means of attacking Darwinism. Dissenters did not, however, only include 
critics but also some of Darwin’s close allies and associates. The most notable of these was 
Alfred Russel Wallace. Whilst commonly his evolutionary ideas are perceived as differing 
little from Darwin’s, they rested on some conflicting presumptions that here come to light. 
Wallace believed the distinction between domestic and wild varieties to be real, the latter 
being ‘permanent’ and not tending to revert to their original type, whereas domestic varieties 
333 Charles Darwin, The Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication: Vol. 2, 2nd ed., John Murray, 
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he thought to necessarily revert if turned feral, or otherwise perished. The reason why 
reversion occurred in domestic varieties but not in wild ones was because, Wallace claimed, 
the processes by which they differentiated from their ancestors were different. Varieties 
formed in the wild through the struggle for existence, with favourable new varieties tending 
to displace less advantaged older types. For any variety to survive this internecine 
competition in the long-term, its individuals were thought to “depend upon the full exercise 
and healthy condition of all their senses and physical powers”. Domestication was believed 
by Wallace to suspend the struggle for existence, with the result that the capacities of 
domestic organisms “are only partially exercised, and in some cases are absolutely unused”. 
These conditions allow that “all variations have an equal chance of continuance”, whereas in 
the wild all suboptimal variation will lead to extirpation. Domestic organisms thus have an 
“abnormal, irregular, artificial” nature, many of them being “so far... removed from that just 
proportion of faculties... by means of which alone an animal left to its own resources can 
preserve its existence” that they are “depend[ent] altogether on human care”. Once human 
care is removed, however, domestic varieties “must return to something near the type of the 
original wild stock, or become altogether extinct”.335 As a consequence of these beliefs, 
Wallace did not believe domestic varieties could act as a model for variation in the wild, 
something unacceptable for Darwin given the importance of domestication as a source of 
evidence for variability. This disagreement between the two naturalists can simply be 
understood as a difference in their understanding of how art and nature operate. For Wallace, 
domestication intervenes in natural processes and suspends their influence, with the 
consequence that otherwise unfit varieties survive and prosper.  For Darwin, human 
intervention merely changes the parameters of selection, the influence of the principle 
holding whether what is useful for survival and propagation is better obtaining wild food or 
better meeting human desire for meat. 
Of those naturalists and scientists who defended a version of ‘Natural State Model’ as part of 
criticising Darwin, as opposed to merely disagreeing, among the most ardent and telling 
arguments were those made by Fleeming Jenkin in 1867. Jenkin denied that speciation might 
335 Alfred Russel Wallace, ‘On the tendency of varieties to depart indefinitely from the original type’, In: 
Contributions to the Theory of Natural Selection, Second Edition, WHS Corrections and Additions, 
Macmillan and Co., 1871, pp. 26-34 & 38-41; & Jean Gayon, Darwinism’s Struggle for Survival: Heredity 
and the Hypothesis of Natural Selection, Matthew Cobb (Trans.), Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 19-
59. 
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occur in nature through the same processes as those that produced domestic varieties. 
Artificial selection had yet to create a new species and Darwin’s claim that all that was 
required for nature to do such work was more time was for Jenkin counterintuitive, believing 
it could not be inferred that “if six or sixty years can make a pouter out of a common pigeon, 
six myriads, may change a pigeon to something like a thrush”. Jenkin then introduces a very 
telling analogy, comparing the idea that speciation could occur through the same processes 
operating in artificial selection to the inference that “because we observe that a cannon-ball 
has traversed a mile in a minute, therefore in an hour it will be sixty miles off, and in the 
course of ages that it will reach the fixed stars”. Jenkin takes this analogy as exemplifying 
how nature works in general, that in the case of organisms it suggests that “the rate of 
variation in a given direction is not constant, is not erratic; it is a constantly diminishing rate, 
tending therefore to a limit”. This assertion is, he considers, backed by the evidence of 
breeders’ experiences, as it is “established for all cases of man's selection” that “deviation 
from an average individual can be rapidly effected at first”, but that then “the rate of 
deviation steadily diminishes till it reaches an almost imperceptible amount” and the 
tendency to revert towards the type becomes overwhelming. He conceptualises this in terms 
of species as existing within a “sphere of variation”, with “the average animal at the centre” 
and all variation as tending towards this norm as opposed to the surface of the sphere. For 
Jenkin, the typical is therefore an organism’s natural and normative state, and species are 
fixed in their true form and place in nature even if the possibility of adaptive variation exists. 
Human art acts against this natural tendency towards type and, whilst it achieves rapid early 
success in promoting deviation, suffers diminishing returns and cannot ultimately resist 
nature, for as the edge of the ‘sphere’ is approached, reversion to type becomes as inevitable 
as a cannonball’s falling to Earth.336  
Jenkin acknowledges that he here presents a very different view of the nature of variation to 
Darwin, whom he ascribes the belief that “there is no typical or average animal, no sphere of 
variation, with centre and limits” as inheritance tends to ensure that “the child is more likely 
to resemble its father than its grandfather, its grandfather than its great-grandfather, etc.”, 
which allows cumulative variation across the generations and renders reversion to distant 
336 Anonymous [Fleeming Jenkin], ‘(Review of) 'The origin of species'’, The North British Review, Vol. 46, 
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ancestors unlikely. Jenkin presents his as the opposing view of “a race maintained by a 
continual force in an abnormal condition, and returning to that condition so soon as the force 
is removed”. He allows that, “A priori, perhaps, one view is as probable as the other”, but is 
adamant that the empirical evidence is on his side.337 The two competing paradigms identified
by Jenkin, one of variation as operating around a fixed norm and within limits, the other of 
variation as unlimited in the long-term and relative to heredity, would continue to play an 
important role in evolutionary debates through the rest of the 19th century and beyond. 
Determining which of these models of variation was correct depended on developing a 
scientific understanding of the workings of heredity, which would require its eventual 
domestication and deconstruction. I will leave this issue of the nature of heredity and 
variation for now but return to it in Chapter 7.
Conclusion
Whilst Darwin did not himself use the term ‘wild type’ with regularity, it may be observed 
that evolutionary theory, and in particular Darwin’s notion of common descent, did greatly 
change the status of ‘wild type’. There had previously been an assumption that variation in 
both domestication and the wild, whilst both caused by organisms encountering new 
conditions of existence, were fundamentally different in kind. Though variation in the wild 
occurred passively through natural mechanisms, variation in domestication was actively 
forced through human intervention and was therefore artificial. Darwin, by drawing analogies
between wild and domestic, was able to argue that nature was just as artful as the human 
breeder and infinitely more patient and perceiving. All the breeder's artifice did was therefore
speed up the course of nature, and therefore the variation they produced did not differ in kind 
from that found in the wild. By establishing these commonalities, Darwin allowed the 
familiar language of domestication to be extended to the wild, rendering nature more 
comprehensible and more amenable to scientific investigation (including, ultimately, 
scientific domestication).338 However, by denying there to be a difference in the kind of 
variation found in the wild and domestication, Darwin also denied the normative power of 
wild types over domestic varieties. The wild type was instead merely an ancestor from which 
337 Ibid.
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domestic varieties had diverged and could be compared with but to which state they would 
never truly return. Darwin moreover explained typicality, commonly thought a normative 
property of species, as a mere effect of heredity's tendency of like to produce like, and 
reinterpreted variation as being not a perturbation of the type but instead a potential source of 
new types that would eventually displace their parent stock. These types moreover had not 
existed for time immemorial but were instead portrayed as emerging out of the struggle for 
existence, having forced out the less well adapted from the economy of nature. The difference
between domestication and the wild was simply that different variations were favoured and 
different variations died under the human economy. The principles of selection and nature of 
variation remained however the same. 
To conclude, I refer back to the three main manners in which ‘wild type’ was used in the first 
half of the 19th century, which I listed at the beginning of this chapter. Darwinian 
evolutionary theory reduces wild type’s direct applicability to the first of these uses only, that
of wild type as referring to the posited ancestors of domestic species, and also their untamed 
descendants, what one might call the ‘genealogical’ meaning of wild type. The second usage 
of wild type, as a point from which to measure the physiological and behavioural divergence 
of domestic varieties (the ‘comparative’ wild type), is permitted to a certain degree by 
Darwin. However, the use of wild relations to measure the deviation of domesticated relatives
is problematised by the existence of a struggle for life, which ensures that populations exhibit
constant if gradual variation. These wild relatives will therefore have also undergone change 
in the time since their divergence from their domestic cousins, though more slowly, so 
measurement can never be truly accurate. The wild individual rather stands in as a modern 
day equivalent of the ancient wild ancestor of domestic lineages but is never fully 
representative of it. The third use of wild type, as referring to what is returned towards in 
cases of reversion, particularly cases of degeneration brought on by ferity, which I consider 
the ‘normative’ meaning of the term, is almost wholly rejected by Darwin, as can be seen 
vividly in his disagreements with Jenkin regarding the nature of heredity. It is this version of 
wild type which was most heavily tied to the Natural State Model, assuming as it did that the 
type is the natural state of the species and variation as due to interference. As will be shown 
in the following chapters, Darwin’s rejection of all but the first use of wild type as 
problematic did not stop other naturalists using wild type in its second and third sense. 
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Moreover, the belief in the comparative value of wild types and in their having normative 
properties continued to play a prominent role in both the theory and practice of later 19th 
century naturalists and arguably, as shall be shown, survived in the laboratory work of many 
early 20th century geneticists. But I will first need to show how it was that it was believed 
living nature could get into the laboratory, and that will be the subject of my next chapter. 
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Chapter 6 – Expanding Domestication, Encapsulating the Wild  : the New Indoor
Nature and the Birth of the Laboratory Lab Sciences, c. 1800-1880
Indoor and Outdoor Science in the Early 19th Century and the Origins of the Lab-Field 
Divide
In this chapter, I will illustrate some of the changes that occurred in 19th century European 
perceptions of the boundaries between the wild and domestic as a consequence of the 
establishment, through technological innovation, of new forms of indoor domestication that 
created new hybrid spaces for scientific investigation. These new spaces, which attempted to 
encapsulate fragments of wild nature, would allow an expansion of domesticating practices to
allow for the detailed observation, analysis and experimentalisation of new life-forms and 
organic relationships. The development of these new forms of 'indoor nature' and the 
scientific studies associated with them would eventually lead to the development of a division
in the life sciences between laboratory-based and field-based professions and practices. It was
this establishment of 'indoor nature' and the developing belief that only laboratory science 
could produce exact, reliable scientific knowledge which would be necessary prerequisites 
for the movement at the end of the 19th century of 'wild types' from nature and into the 
laboratory. 
Parallels between the lab-field divide in the late 19th and 20th century life sciences and the 
preceding division in post-Linnaean early 19th century natural history between indoor and 
outdoor science have already been observed by Robert Kohler.339 Of particular note was the 
division of labour between expeditionary field naturalism and museum-based systematics and
taxonomy. This division in operations was based on a model of periphery, where specimens 
were collected, prepared and then mobilised, and centre, where incoming specimens from the 
field were accumulated, further processed and ordered. This kind of division of labour 
between collection at the periphery and ‘centres of calculation’ has been argued by Latour to 
be characteristic of those sciences where ‘action at a distance’ is required. Müller-Wille has 
convincingly claimed that 18th and early 19th century natural history was an archetypical 
example of such a science.340 As to whether this division in labour led to a differentiation in 
339 Robert E. Kohler, Landscapes and Labscapes: Exploring the Lab-Field Border in Biology, Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2002, pp. 1-2.
340 Staffan Müller-Wille, ‘Joining Lapland and the Topinambes in Flourishing Holland: Center and Periphery 
in Linnaean Botany’, Science in Context, Vol. 16, No. 4, 2003, pp. 461-462; & Bruno Latour, Science in 
Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers Through Society, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
Page -149-
mentalities and attitude to nature, Kohler is somewhat dismissive, stating that “closet 
naturalists and naturalist voyagers asked essentially the same questions and dealt with the 
same material specimens, the only difference being that one dealt with it alive and in nature 
and other, dead and indoors”, and therefore concludes that “Closet science and fieldwork 
were two ways of doing natural history, not two distinctly different kinds of science”, as he 
thinks lab life science and field naturalism were to become in the late 19th century.341 
I will shortly question Kohler’s assumption that this difference of whether naturalists worked 
with dead or living specimens was inconsequential in the formation of boundaries between 
indoor and outdoor science. Before I do so, I turn to Dorinda Outram’s account of the ‘new 
spaces’ developing in natural history c. 1800, which Kohler draws on but disagrees on some 
of the finer points of. Notably, Kohler maintains that the lab-field border in biology is 
“probably no older than the mid-nineteenth century”, not existing prior to the ‘laboratory 
revolution’ of the 1840s to ‘70s when labs displaced museums as the primary centres of 
scientific research.342 Outram on the other hand appears to see the divide between lab and 
field as being prefigured in the divide between museum and field, which is where the 
differentiation between researchers working in the open and within enclosed built spaces 
began. She in particular points to some 1807 comments by the great museum naturalist 
Georges Cuvier made in response to the field research of the great expeditionary naturalist 
Alexander von Humboldt. Cuvier comments that “there is as much difference between the 
styles and ideas of the field naturalist… and those of the sedentary naturalist, as there is 
between their talents and qualities”. The field naturalist traverses through a multitude of 
locales; the sedentary naturalist remains rooted in his study. The field naturalist is immersed 
in nature and sees organisms in the “full vigour of life”, whereas the sedentary naturalist 
cannot experience the “great scenery of nature” with the “same vivid intensity”, working only
with written reports and more or less well preserved specimens. But on the other hand the 
field naturalist’s observations are “broken and fleeting”, whilst the sedentary naturalist may 
“survey all [nature’s] products spread before him… [and] compare them with each other as 
often as is necessary to reach reliable conclusions”. On this basis Cuvier asserts that “The 
traveller can only travel one road; it is only really in one’s study… that one can roam freely 
University Press, 1987, pp. 215-257.
341 Robert E. Kohler, Landscapes and Labscapes: Exploring the Lab-Field Border in Biology, Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2002, p. 2.
342 Ibid., p. 3.
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throughout the universe”. The claim is thus, as Outram notes, that “true knowledge of the 
order of nature comes not from the whole-body experience of crossing the terrain, but from 
the very fact of the observer’s distance from the actuality of nature”. The heroics of the 
expeditionary naturalist (Humboldt) should not distract from the fact that the undistracted 
mind of the sedentary naturalist (Cuvier) is better able to grasp the truth of the order of 
nature. Importantly, field and sedentary naturalists are conceived by Cuvier as possessing 
different mindsets and experiencing nature in very different manners due to their divergent 
ways of life.343  Ultimately, even if, as Kohler maintains, field and museum naturalists 
originally complemented each other’s work through different approaches to the same 
questions, their divergent phenomenological experience of nature eventually produced two 
groups operating under distinct thought-styles whose understanding of the natural world no 
longer necessarily cohered, especially as fewer and fewer individuals crossed the threshold 
between indoor and outdoor science.
It should moreover be noted that whether or not the degree of divergence in thought-style 
between field and research nexus in the Cuvieran model of natural history was significant 
already at the beginning of the 19th century, there did exist a contemporary research tradition 
which was commonly critical of museum-centred collection and collation of dead specimens 
and instead favoured direct engagement with living nature. This was the largely German 
Romantic naturalism and its associated research programme of Naturphilosophie, which was 
associated with figures such as Johann Goethe and Friedrich Schelling (who popularised the 
term Naturphilosophie). Humboldt, the target of Cuvier’s deflationary account of the 
expeditionary naturalist, was incidentally widely respected by these Romantics. His idea of 
nature as a harmoniously interconnected cosmos would heavily influence Schelling, and 
Humboldt was himself sympathetic to many Romantic ideas, though his research programme 
of ‘terrestrial physics’ (containing elements of what became geology, biogeography and 
climatology) remained distinct from that of Naturphilosophie.344 But differences of 
perspective between the German Romantics and French Cuvierans did not stop at a greater 
respect for the field naturalist. Cuvier believed in the supremacy of his approach in part 
343 Dorinda Outram, ‘New Spaces in Natural History’, In: Cultures of Natural History, N. Jardine, J.A. Secord 
and E.C. Spary (Eds.), Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 259-262.
344 Robert J. Richards, The Romantic Conception of Life: Science and Philosophy in the Age of Goethe, 
University of Chicago Press, 2002, pp. 129 & 134; & Michael Dettelbach, ‘Humboldtian Science’, In: 
Cultures of Natural History, N. Jardine, J.A. Secord and E.C. Spary (Eds.), Cambridge University Press, 
1996, pp. 288-291.
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because he drew on the methodology of the greatest of late 18th century French scientists, 
namely Antoine Lavoisier and his work in analytic chemistry. Lavoisier considered all matter
to be ultimately composed of ‘elements’, these being “simple and indivisible atoms”. He did 
not believe the elements could be known in terms of the atoms themselves but believed that 
the term ‘element’ could be safely applied to “the last point which analysis is capable of 
reaching”, that “we must admit, as elements, all the substances into which we are capable, by 
any means, to reduce bodies by decomposition”.345 Cuvier applied this analytic method, 
originating from the study of inorganic chemistry, to the study of animal economy. The 
organism was understood as integrated and co-ordinated but also as explicable in terms of 
physiological mechanism and function, in particular the function of specific organs and how 
they functionally related with each other. The most overtly analytic aspect of the Cuvieran 
approach to animal economy was the understanding of the organism as in effect the mere sum
of its parts. One great advantage of this standpoint was that it allowed Cuvier to extrapolate 
from the species level to higher taxa, being able to draw links between species based on 
shared similarities of the parts. Based on his assumption that the most vitally important parts 
would vary least between species, Cuvier was able to group animals into four 
embranchements based on the four kinds of nervous system found in nature (vertebral, radial,
articulate and that of molluscs), in doing so not only explicating animal form but also offering
a new classificatory system.346 
Whatever the successes of Cuvieran science, it was almost all done utilising dead specimens 
indoors away from wild nature, a distance Cuvier interpreted as allowing him to objectively 
compare and place organisms within nature, but which Romantics thought fundamentally 
perverse. For Goethe, true understanding of nature did not arise from material abstraction of 
specimens from the wilds to the museum but through mental abstraction and idealisation by 
means of comparison of multiple observed instances, in the process excluding accidental and 
impure elements to arrive at the ‘pure phenomenon’.347 For his work on the Urtypus 
(‘Archetype’) of the plant, this required lengthy periods of intimate experience with plants in 
gardens over a number of years and both at home and abroad (his initial research in the late 
345 Antoine-Laurent Lavoisier, Elements of Chemistry, in a New Systematic Order, Containing All the Modern 
Discoveries, Vol. 1, Robert Kerr (Trans.), New York: Evert Duykinck/James and Thomas Ronalds, 1806, p. 
xx.
346 Paul Farber, ‘The Type-Concept in Zoology during the First Half of the Nineteenth Century’, Journal of the
History of Biology, Vol. 9, No. 1, 1976, pp. 100-102.
347 Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, Objectivity, New York: Zone Books, 2010, pp. 58-59.
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1870s was conducted in Italy).348 It is true that Goethe would then work with skeletal material
when he turned to the study of the animal archetype, but nonetheless a fundamental 
difference can be seen between Goethe and Cuvier’s two ways of approaching nature. For 
Cuvier, nature is to be analysed into its parts and then classified on the basis of those parts 
which least vary across morphological space. For Goethe, by contrast, the whole is studied 
and differences between individuals are abstracted away so as to arrive at a holistic type 
which all members partake in. The rejection by Romantic naturalists of the analytic strategies
of decomposition and resynthesis was not accidental but rather based on a firm belief that 
such interventions destroyed the very life they were purported to aid the study of whilst 
lacking any power to revive it. Thus Goethe comments that “The living thing is dissected into
its elements… but one cannot from these put it together again and quicken it”.349 There is 
similarly the protest by the poet Joseph von Eisendorff that before the Romantic approach 
“nature was dissected atomistically like a dead corpse”.350 A corpse was thought to inform 
little concerning the nature of life as most Romantic naturalists believed life to require a vital 
force to intervene and organise inert matter, and that this force was absent in the cadaver. For 
Romantics, therefore, field and museum naturalism were not as neatly complementary as they
were for Cuvierans, for they were considered to have very different objects of study, one 
being a science of the living, the other a science of the dead. The living could not be 
adequately studied through the dead, nor the whole through the parts, and only life was 
thought able to bring life to the components of organic matter, it being assumed that its 
organisational powers could not be artificially replicated in the lab by inorganic means. The 
study of the dead was not illegitimate but claims for knowledge about the living based on the 
study of the dead were not to be taken seriously without corroborative observation of live 
organisms free from constraint. Field and museum studies were ultimately for Romantics not 
the complementary exploration of a single domain but rather the parallel investigation of two 
domains, living nature and dead nature.
Due to their strong preference for observation over intervention, the German Romantic 
naturalists were inclined to study in the field or garden as opposed to indoors if they wished 
348 Robert J. Richards, The Romantic Conception of Life: Science and Philosophy in the Age of Goethe, 
University of Chicago Press, 2002, pp. 394-396 & 413-419.
349 Gernot Böhme, ‘Knowledge Policy as the Task of Science: On Ethically Relevant Knowledge of Nature’, 
The Governance of Knowledge, Nico Stehr (Ed.), Transaction Publishers, 2004, p. 21.
350 Robert J. Richards, The Romantic Conception of Life: Science and Philosophy in the Age of Goethe, 
University of Chicago Press, 2002, p. 18.
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to investigate living nature. But this is not to say that they were especially averse to indoors 
work or that they disavowed work with dead organic material. As mentioned, Goethe’s 
studies of the animal archetype were based in the main on osteological materials and other 
kinds of dead specimen and not on living animals.351 Embryologists such as Lorenz Oken and
Karl von Baer would furthermore take Romantic morphology into the lab, where the 
materials studied were also mainly dead specimens. The important element of the Romantic 
approach was therefore not a preoccupation with living organisms or a greater proclivity for 
the outdoors but rather its emphasis on meticulous and repeated observation and favouring of 
mental idealisation over physical decomposition. It was this epistemic privileging of 
proximity over distance from nature and interaction-with over intervention-in which marked 
the major difference between the Romantic and analytic traditions. 
Encapsulating Nature: Vivaria & the Art of bringing Nature into the Lab and Home
The conflict between the French analytic tradition and German Romantic naturalism would 
come to manifest itself in Britain towards the middle of the 19th century. The encounter 
between these two rival methodologies and perspectives would centre around attempts to 
facilitate the study of living beings extracted from nature within the walls of the laboratory 
and home. The major naturalistic tradition in Britain in the early 19th century was natural 
theology, rooted in works such as John Ray’s Wisdom of God of 1691 and revived with 
considerable force by William Paley and others around 1800. The highpoint of 19th century 
natural theology is identified by Amundson with the eight Bridgewater Treatises of 1829-38, 
which sought to reconcile a creator God with the increasingly apparent evidence for an 
ancient Earth and for extinction, after which it went into decline. Its assumption of a natural 
order designed by the Creator to ultimately benefit all its creatures remained, however, 
influential, as we shall see in the case of the early aquarium popularisers.352 
The analytic tradition first gained a foothold in Britain in the late 1820s, imported by 
researchers seeking to reform what they saw as a decline in the nation's science. As 
conducted in British museums and labs, this new style of reasoning, which Elwick refers to as
‘analysis:synthesis’, emphasising its duel nature, investigated life-forms as composites of 
351 Ibid.
352 Ron Amundson, The Changing Role of the Embryo in Evolutionary Thought: Roots of Evo-Devo, 
Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 54-55.
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parts that were commonly assumed to possess a high degree of autonomy, a position Elwick 
calls ‘compound individualism’. This supposition had been influenced by investigations into 
the regenerative capacities of simple animals such marine worms and the capacity of hydra, 
polyps and many plants to reproduce through fission of parts. A similarly particulate 
understanding of development was common among British analytic life science researchers, 
who, under the influence of the French anatomist Étienne Serres, adhered to a centripetal 
model of ontogeny as the coming together of formerly separate parts and their integration to 
form a whole. German Romantic holism arrived in Britain around 1837, when Edinburgh 
doctor Martin Barry introduced von Baerian embryology. This new holistic style of 
reasoning, later known as ‘palaetiology’, would dispute Serres' model of ontogeny as 
centripetal in favour of the view of development as originating out of a single point, a 
fertilised ovum, and in doing so reject compound individualism and the conflation of sexual 
and asexual reproduction.353 
Importantly for the story of indoor nature, palaetiology would eventually prevail thanks to a 
recently introduced piece of scientific technology, the vivarium. A vivarium is a  controlled 
environment for the housing and long-term observation of living specimens, commonly 
taking the form of a glass enclosure. Vivaria would serve as a novel evidence source which 
palaetiologists could utilise in order to establish their greater access to nature and scientific 
authority over analysts. Analysts generally based themselves in museums and in adjoining 
labs and typically dealt either with dead specimens or else sought to dissect living specimens 
to determine the function of parts, the levels of compound individuality and the extent of 
regenerative capacities. Their interest in the relations of parts and whole was, in other words, 
largely ahistorical. Palaetiologists, by contrast, emphasised the importance of studying life 
histories using living animals and plants in controlled conditions tailored to the needs of 
captive organisms, with observation favoured over intervention.354 The kinds of vivarium 
utilised and developed during this period for palaetiological research included above all 
aquaria (particularly marine) and Wardian cases (near airtight glass containers used to house 
animals and plants in heavily polluted inner cities and to protect exotic plants from exposure 
to salt spray on long sea voyages). The Wardian case was first developed in the early 1830s 
353 James Elwick, ‘Styles of Reasoning in Early to Mid-Victorian Life Research: Analysis:Synthesis and 
Palaetiology’, Journal of the History of Biology, Vol. 40, 2007, pp. 37-54.
354 Ibid. 
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by its namesake, Nathaniel Ward, and whilst initially a luxury item due to heavy duties on 
glass became more widely accessible for less affluent scientists with the repeal of these duties
in 1845.355 The aquarium is claimed to have been invented in 1841 by Ward as the ‘aqua-
vivarium’, though there are earlier claims including an 1830 one for Frenchwoman Jeanne 
Villepreux-Power. Between 1849 and 1850, the chemist Robert Warington would then 
develop the aquarium as an instrument for scientific domestication in which organisms could 
be kept alive sometimes even for decades. (Warington, admittedly, was far from the first 
scientist to use glass vessels for the long-term study of aquatic life – the Scottish baronet John
Dalyell, whose work inspired Villepreux-Power, began doing so to study marine 
invertebrates possibly as early as 1790).356 
As Elwick comments “The more that creatures’ entire life cycles could be observed, the more
that palaetiology was strengthened”. But it was only in the mid-1850s that palaetiology began
to properly overtake the analytic approach. The spread of palaetiology was dependent on the 
spread of vivaria, which in the late 1840s were still outnumbered by the museums of analysts.
Publicity at the 1851 Great Exhibition and the opening of a public marine aquarium at the 
Zoological Gardens in 1853 all helped facilitate the expansion of vivaria. But it was the 
popular writings of the amateur field naturalist Philip Henry Gosse which were especially 
influential, in particular his 1853 Aquarium, which helped trigger the growth of a lay fashion 
for aquaria.357 Gosse’s vivid descriptions of the pleasures of looking after often peculiar 
marine life-forms interacting in unexpected harmonies, e.g. the symbiosis between hermit 
crab and anemone, caught the public imagination and inspired popular imitation, despite 
Gosse’s offering little technical information on tank maintenance. But Gosse did not just 
focus on spectacle; a fervent Christian and natural theologian (he later wrote the critically 
reviled Omphalos, which attempted to reconcile Biblical chronology with evidence for the 
ancient age of the Earth by suggesting the world was created 6,000 years ago with the 
appearance of age), he conceived of aquarium-keeping as a spiritual exercise which “brings 
355 David Allen, ‘Tastes and Crazes’, In: Cultures of Natural History, N. Jardine, J.A. Secord and E.C. Spary 
(Eds.), Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 402-403.
356 Christopher Hamlin, ‘Robert Warington and the Moral Economy of the Aquarium’, Journal of the History 
of Biology, Vol. 19, No. 1, 1986, pp. 131-132; James Elwick, ‘Styles of Reasoning in Early to Mid-Victorian 
Life Research: Analysis:Synthesis and Palaetiology’, Journal of the History of Biology, Vol. 40, 2007, pp. 55-
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us, in some sense, into the presence of God”. He moreover emphasised the romantic notion of
the aquarium as a miniaturised ocean, mocking the French zoologist Henri Milne-Edwards 
for utilising a diving bell to study marine life that could far more easily, safely and ‘naturally’
be studied at home through use of aquaria.358 Whilst laudatory regarding vivaria and the study
of living organisms indoors, Gosse was scathing of the ‘cabinet naturalism’ of museum 
analysts, deriding theirs as “a science of dead things; a necrology… mainly conversant with 
dry skins furred or feathered, blackened, shrivelled, and haystuffed... with uncouth forms, 
disgusting to sight and smell, bleached and shrunken, suspended by threads and immersed in 
spirit… their colours, changed and modified by death or partial decay”. The aquarium 
encapsulated nature to allow contemplation of the Creator’s handwork in one’s own home; 
the ‘distorted things’ analysed in museums offered no such mediation with God and nature.359
Gosse was not trying to do away with indoor science but sought to reform the museum, “to 
put life into the ‘collecting cases’ that had been designed centuries earlier for lifeless 
objects”, as Brunner notes.360
Gosse was not the only naturalist to emphasise the virtues of vivaria for studying nature 
indoors and to criticise the poor quality or absence of prior research on living organisms. 
Dalyell had earlier commented in his Rare and Remarkable Animals of Scotland of 1847 that 
“In endeavouring to ascertain the history of the animated tribes... [w]e should behold them 
under the nearest possible circumstances to their mode of life in their natural abode”. He goes
on to state that “The real organization and habits of the inferior tribes are never displayed 
unless in a tranquil, vigorous, and healthy state. When under constraint, placed in an 
unsuitable medium, or enfeebled by disease, the finest specimens languish: they alter and 
contract, the relative position of their parts is disturbed, their functions are impaired: the 
organs most conspicuous or most important during life, often disappear entirely, or they are 
changed by death, beyond the hope of recognition”. Dalyell, whilst displaying an analytic 
interest in the relation of parts to whole, was evidently dis-enamoured with typical analytic 
practices which too often dwelt on using dead or dying organisms and sought to move natural
history back to studying living organisms in conditions at least imitative of nature. He was 
358 Bernd Brunner, The Ocean at Home: An Illustrated History of the Aquarium, New York: Princeton 
Architectural Press, 2005, pp. 40-49.
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360 Bernd Brunner, The Ocean at Home: An Illustrated History of the Aquarium, New York: Princeton 
Architectural Press, 2005, pp. 49.
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dismissive of many of the results of analytic life science, stating that his readers should 
“reprehend and distrust the cruel operations and assumed results whereon too many modern 
anatomists have founded theories”, based as they were on “animals in the agonies of death” 
(a probable reference to vivisection, which in this period still played a major role in teaching 
medical students at Edinburgh, Dalyell’s home city).361 
Vivaria were thought to offer privileged access to nature not just because they allowed for the
extended survival of specimens and their naturalistic behaviour. The aquarist Shirley Hibberd
for instance maintained that a well-kept aquarium or Wardian case could simulate nature “not
in outward appearances merely, but in conditions”. A failed vivarium, i.e. one whose 
inhabitants died, was argued to be the result not of the contraption's artifice but rather of 
“error or oversight on the part of the practitioner”, a failing, in other words, to approximate 
nature.362 Properly attended to, an aquarium could act as the “Ocean on the Table” or “Lake 
in a Glass”, a piece of nature encapsulated and transported indoors.363 But this is an unusual 
understanding of 'nature', for here the natural is something maintained by constant 
supervision and intervention, with its failure being attributed to failure of supervision. How 
then, could this be reconciled with the popular view of nature as what lies outside human 
intervention (as seen in 'natural state models' of naturalness)? The strategy of Hibberd and co.
appears to have been to argue that what was problematic about vivaria micro-ecosystems was
not their artifice as constructed environments but rather their isolation from the larger 
environmental milieu. Whereas in nature a comparable micro-ecosystem, e.g. a rock pool, 
would be renewed by regular tidal contact and interchange with its parent ecosystem, the 
ocean, this was not possible with those indoor natures isolated within domesticity. With this 
natural interchange suspended, organisms in these captive environment would die unless their
supervisors adequately emulated the effects of these missing natural forces, e.g. through 
oxygenation, introduction of food stuffs, etc. This compensation through the intervention of 
the supervisor was therefore justified as necessary to best approximate nature. The 
theological mindset of many of the early pioneers of aquaria moreover allowed them to 
conceive of their roles in maintaining indoor nature as analogous to God’s supervision and 
361 John Dalyell, Rare and Remarkable Animals of Scotland, Vol. I, London: John Van Voorst, 1847, pp. vi-vii.
362 Christopher Hamlin, ‘Robert Warington and the Moral Economy of the Aquarium’, Journal of the History 
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dispensatory maintenance of outdoor nature. So long, therefore, as their interventions 
paralleled perceived divine dispensations, these researchers believed themselves to 
appropriately emulate nature. In sum, indoor nature was widely acknowledged as an artful 
construct that moreover lacked outdoor nature's capacity for self-regulation. However, it was 
believed that so long as outdoor conditions were appropriately emulated in miniature, even 
when this required continuous intervention, then it was acceptable to consider the vivarium as
a successful transplanting of nature indoors.
 
The kinds of interventions necessary to establish and maintain indoor nature were 
considerable. As a primer, actual experience in the field was a great advantage in that it gave 
an idea of what one wanted to emulate. Gosse and Dalyell divided time between collecting 
and observing at the shoreline and further observation and experiment on specimens kept 
indoors, but as the aquarium became a more standardised piece of scientific equipment, the 
usual regimes of division of labour took place, with many researchers preferring to use 
suppliers for their specimens. As Raf De Bont has documented, this tendency would lead to 
the paradoxical near complete separation of researchers at Anton Dohrn’s Naples marine 
station (founded in 1872) from the very field which that institute was originally designed to 
offer optimal access to. Instead of collecting specimens themselves at the shore, fishermen 
were hired to provide the lab scientists with materials, which were brought to a ‘sorting 
room’ where the researchers selected their share of the daily catch.364 But this is not to say 
that when researchers selected their own specimens for investigation that they necessarily 
extracted a representative sample of nature. John Dalyell, for instance, specifies that “All 
specimens ought to be healthy, vigorous, and entire”, i.e. since extraction from their native 
environs is stressful, only the fittest individuals should be taken into captivity. But Dalyell 
goes further to argue that selecting the best individuals and in the right numbers is also 
necessary for the “truth and accuracy of observation”, i.e. those individuals perturbed least by
living in number in novel, artificial conditions will provide the best, most naturalistic data. So
even if the resulting micro-ecosystem is not representative of the variety of fitness levels 
found in the sea, this is actually better than taking a random sample, as weaker individuals 
will produce less naturalistic data under artificial conditions.365 
364 Raf de Bont, ‘Between the Laboratory and the Deep Blue Sea: Space Issues in the Marine Stations of 
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Once organisms were successfully introduced into a vivarium, there was a need for constant 
support. There might be an ideal view that these installations were miniature samples of 
nature in which life was maintained by its being kept in biochemical equilibrium (Warington 
for instance claimed that his ‘balanced aquarium’ was illustrative of “that beautiful and 
wonderful provision which we see every where displayed throughout the animal and 
vegetable kingdoms, whereby their continued existence and stability are so admirably 
sustained”), but at the same time vivaria could not be maintained as closed systems.366 There 
was a need, in other words, for the constant introduction of new energy – oxygen, food, etc. –
in order to keep things running. Whereas as outdoor nature was happily able to maintain 
itself, indoor nature was necessarily on life support mediated by its human supervisors. 
Hibberd went as far as to acknowledge that “an aquarium… is a prison; and as birds in cages 
require special care to compensate them for confinement, so gold-fishes and sea-anemones, 
must be looked after, with love of course, for there can be no success without that”.367 Gosse 
similarly speaks of how “It will still be needful to exercise a watchful supervision of the 
collection. It must be remembered that both the animals and plants are not in their natural 
circumstances, and that a certain amount of violence is done to their habits. Death, which 
spares them not at the bottom of the sea, will visit them in the Aquarium; and hence the 
vessel should be occasionally looked over, searched, as it were, to see if there be any of the 
specimens dead”.368 
In addition to these interventions of introducing nutriment and air and of removing the dead, 
aquarium keepers furthermore sought to minimise the appearance of conflict. In part this was 
done through rhetorical measures, in particular by arguing for the necessity of violence in a 
healthy ecosystem. Gosse was not the only early aquarium enthusiast with a background in 
natural theology. Christopher Hamlin has shown how Warington’s modelling of the balanced 
aquarium was guided by the doctrines of contemporary ‘chemico-theologians’ such as James 
F.W. Johnson and Charles Mansfield, who saw in chemical cycles such as the oxygen-carbon
dioxide cycle found in plant and animal respiration evidence for the benevolent hand of God. 
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Like Linnaeus and Paley, they explained the suffering incurred in ecosystems by the 
existence of predation as in fact a beneficial means by which life, being good, might be 
maintained at a maximal level. The chemico-theologians especially emphasised how 
predation freed up ‘borrowed molecules’ that would otherwise not be optimally recycled.369 
But whilst this might have served as a theodicy to account for the general problem of 
predation in nature, it was less useful as a means of explaining away the violence found in 
indoor nature, which after all was regulated by man, not God, so therefore was the 
responsibility of the scientist. Dalyell dealt with this problem by advising that “the observer 
must guard against those destructive propensities of many of the lower animals”, which 
appears to have consisted in noting which species tend to attack each other and which are 
peaceful and being sure to separate and not combine those who wage war on each other.370 
The problem that was faced by Warington was that he wanted both to prevent excess conflict 
and to have long-term equilibrium. Achieving both these key aims was necessary in his view 
if he was to emulate outdoor nature, designed as it was by God to be optimally balanced and 
harmonious, indoors. The chemico-theologians Warington took after insisted that predation 
was a necessary part of the circulation of molecules, and therefore an aquarium without 
predation did not adequately emulate nature. But the levels of predation in his experimental 
aquaria tended to be in excess of what was desirable. Warington had settled on the ecological 
triad of goldfish, snails and tape grass. He believed this ordering would provide balance to 
the aquarium ecosystem – the tape grass would oxygenate the water, enabling the fish to 
survive, and the snails would fulfil the dual purpose of consuming dead plant matter (which 
Warington believed, in line with sanitarian thought of the time, could poison the fish if 
allowed to rot) and of producing young that would act as one of the fishes’ food sources. The 
fish and snails would also carbonate the water through respiration, which would promote 
plant growth. The aquarium would thus be in a “healthy state” of biochemical harmony. But 
the original species of snail used, Limnea stagnalis, had the nasty habit of devouring living as
well as dead plant matter, thus endangering the equilibrium of the aquarium. Warington then 
found that other species of snail were too easily eaten by the fish and therefore were 
unsuitable. Eventually, two species were found the adult form of which could adequately 
369 Christopher Hamlin, ‘Robert Warington and the Moral Economy of the Aquarium’, Journal of the History 
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defend themselves against fish predation. But the fish were so vigorous in their predation of 
snail young that snail reproduction was “entirely prevented from the fish consuming them the
instant they exhibit[ed] signs of locomotion”. Consequently, Warington was forced to 
periodically introduce new snails into the tank . As Hamlin remarks, “This vision of an 
unending stream of baby snails serving to sustain the fiction of harmonious equilibrium was a
sharp contrast from [Warington’s] 1850 claim that the snails "thrive wonderfully"”. In other 
experiments involving even more voracious animals, Warington gave up on any attempts to 
keep them together with their prey and simply kept them separately in special shallow tanks 
which allowed for the necessary gas exchange to keep them alive. This environment wholly 
failed to simulate the natural conditions Warington sought to approximate in his balanced 
aquarium; as Hamlin observes “Here "equilibrium,"… had become virtually a tautology – 
simply that the fish lived was an indication that it was in equilibrium with its environment”.371
As can be seen by the example of Warington, the ‘indoor nature’ created in vivaria not only 
required continual intervention to maintain but moreover in some cases bore no resemblance 
to natural states of affair, and yet could still be considered a successful installation on 
instrumental grounds. In other words, if nature could not be properly emulated, an indoor 
installation could still be considered successful if it met some lesser project goal. For 
Warington, for example, whilst he modelled the equilibrium of the balanced aquarium on the 
perceived balance of nature, where a naturalistic balance could not be attained, a minimal 
form of ‘equilibrium’, in this case specimen survival, became considered acceptable in its 
stead. This tendency for life science researchers to circumvent obstacles to the establishment 
of an ‘indoor nature’ by accepting standards for minimal naturalism that nonetheless fell well 
short of emulating natural conditions will be further explored later in this chapter. 
It should be emphasised that experimenters, not just their troublesome subjects, were just as 
often to blame for the failure to approximate natural conditions in vivaria. The theological 
mindset of many of the early aquarium researchers, whilst aiding their self-conception of 
their interventions as naturalistic, also brought with it moralistic baggage. Often it was felt 
that it was not enough that aquarium conditions emulate nature, for nature, whilst exhibiting 
harmony and balance, was after all also a post-Edenic nature ‘red in tooth and claw’. Nature 
371 Christopher Hamlin, ‘Robert Warington and the Moral Economy of the Aquarium’, Journal of the History 
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could and should be improved so as to be brought closer to its pre-Fall standard – as lions had
once lain down with lambs, so they should be able to do so again. It was widely believed that 
domestication could attenuate predatory instincts; the aquarist Kirby, for instance, reported 
on a showman keeping cats, rats and mice, and hawks and small birds together in cages.372 It 
can thus be seen that whilst the Baconian belief that domestication could effect the restoration
of an originally tame nature was increasingly dismissed by those naturalists convinced of the 
original character of wildness, it remained for many religiously-inclined experimentalists a 
powerful idea that guided their domesticating practices and end-goals. 
The failure to emulate nature in vivaria was not always due to a belief in a moral duty of 
restoration. Other researchers simply did not consider approximating natural conditions 
essential to the validity of their research, so made little effort to do so. Warington had stated 
that he believed the purpose of the balanced aquarium would be to help answer “questions 
about physical, chemical, and biological components of aquatic and marine ecosystems”. His 
interest lay, in other words, in the study of communities of organisms and their physical and 
chemical requirements for existence. The main group, however, to initially take up aquaria 
for scientific research were naturalists primarily interested in using them to compile 
‘biographies’ of collected species, i.e. not for the purposes of ecological study but rather as a 
means of distinguishing species from one another and of classifying them based on their life 
histories. The advantage of the aquarium was not its capacity to simulate nature but rather, as 
one anonymous aquarist put it, “To bring [the organisms] to us... since we could not go 
comfortably to them, and to have them up in a witness-box, and make them give an account 
of themselves”. For this interrogation to be enabled, it was necessary only that organisms 
have “a portion of their element with them… little comforts… such as stones, sand, mud, and
marine-plants”. Another aquarist, James, similarly asserted that all a supervisor needed to 
provide his prisoners with “to imitate their natural haunts” was “sand, pebbles, and rocks… to
afford them shelter”. Again, as with Warington’s changing conceptualisation of equilibrium, 
we can see the influence of a tendency towards a minimal naturalism whereby markers were 
established for what counted as ‘natural’, and so long as these were evident in the 
experimental set-up and end-point, then results attained could be considered as applying both 
to indoor and outdoor nature. It can moreover be seen that these markers of nature were 
372 Ibid., p. 148. 
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contextually relative to the aims of the experiment – studies of individual behaviour and 
development for classificatory purposes required only that the set-up be naturalistic enough 
that specimens could live and grow in reasonable health for enough time to generate 
interesting data (depending on the species, days, weeks or months), whereas ecosystem 
studies were more demanding in that ideally multiple species should flourish over several 
generations and an extended period of time (months, years, even decades). For researchers 
using aquaria primarily for classification, that their specimens survived at all for some time 
away from their native environs was proof that their indoor set-up was naturalistic enough for
their purposes. They accepted that their charges were most likely to lead brief lives in 
captivity, one aquarian, J.G. Wood, even going so far as to argue that this was a positive thing
in that it meant naturalists would have a steady stream of specimens for dissection and study 
under the microscope.373 
Based on the attitudes of Wood and other naturalists with similar views on aquarium keeping,
it can be seen that despite the advances vivaria offered for studying active organisms, their 
life histories and ecologies, these pursuits still in many ways remained secondary to the 
analysis and classification of dead specimens. This was not least in part due to the increased 
acceptance in this period of microscopy as a means of bringing nature indoors. Goethe had 
been notably sceptical of the validity of using mechanical means to aid observation, 
declaiming that “Microscope and telescope are only good for confusing healthy reason”, that 
“man in himself, insofar as he uses healthy reason, is the greatest and most exact instrument 
that can exist”.374 Goethe’s critique perhaps should not be dismissed as mere obscurantism; 
chromatic and spherical aberrations were a ubiquitous part of early 19th century microscope 
use. Technical advancements in the construction of ‘true’ lenses in the 1820s by J.J. Lister 
and others are commonly credited as restricting the mechanistic causes of these occlusions. 
Gooday, however, points to evidence of academic scepticism concerning the naturalness of 
microscopic observations continuing well into the mid-19th century. It is notable that it was 
the same romantic naturalists who promoted aquaria, in particular Gosse and the novelist 
Charles Kingsley, who would in the mid-19th century also advocate the utility of microscopes 
as means of bringing nature indoors (the aforementioned J.G. Wood was another such co-
373 Ibid., pp. 133 & 145-147.
374 Pierre Hadot, The Veil of Isis: An Essay on the History of the Idea of Nature, Michael Chase (Trans.), The 
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Page -164-
populariser of microscopy as well as aquaria). Whereas taxonomy was presented as a 
necrology, microscopy was instead portrayed as a means of accessing previously unseen 
pastures. Gosse, for example, speaks of the microscope as illuminating a “vast field of 
marvels” otherwise invisible. Another microscopist, Mary Ward, spoke of viewing through 
the lens as being equivalent to “visiting a rich but hitherto undiscovered region”. For these 
naturalists, the microscope slide was a means of bringing nature indoors, a piece of the field 
which one could explore at one’s table at one’s leisure, and also to some extent a vivarium, a 
“boundless field of minute organic life” as Cuthbert Collingwood characterised it in 1862.375 
As to why the British aquarists so fervently co-promoted microscopy as a further legitimate 
means, alongside vivaria, of bringing nature indoors, Gooday points to the socio-political 
advantages of endorsing these research tools for those looking raise the public profile of 
natural science. Those living in the city had little direct access to nature, so the easiest means 
of reaching these people and convincing them of the wonder and beauty of living nature was 
through vivaria. That these people were interested in having access to nature was evidenced 
by the various 19th century natural history fashions that arose in the growing industrial British
cities, such as the fern craze that followed the early development of Wardian cases.376 
Allowing nature to reach these citizens was important not only for promoting the cause of 
science but also of Christianity, the argument from design having since Newton increasingly 
relied on the complexities of life as opposed to the majesty of the heavens as its primary 
argument for the necessary existence of a creator (Paley in 1809 notably states that 
astronomy, as compared with living nature, “is not the best medium through which to prove 
the agency of an intelligent Creator”).377 Microscopes were readily available to the general 
public thanks to the increased manufacture of cheap instruments from the 1850s onward, e.g. 
by Field & Son. They were thus, Gooday argues, an ideal vehicle for bringing nature into the 
homes of the educated public and of convincing them of the power of science to explore 
natural mystery. The microscope therefore became a tool for the egalitarian spread of science 
from an often distant nature into the homes of all citizens. This role was celebrated in 1870 
375 Graeme Gooday, ‘'Nature' in the Laboratory: Domestication and Discipline with the Microscope in 
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by the Oxford Professor of Anatomy, George Rolleston, who commented that “The 
microscope has done very much... in enabling all persons to obtain the necessary minimum of
practical acquaintance with the arrangements of the natural world”. Gooday thus concludes 
that however artificial aspects of microscopy were for the viewing of nature (slides often had 
to be prepared with chemicals or specimens squashed and immobilised between slides, etc.), 
the “political expediency” of promoting the microscope as a legitimate locus of indoor nature 
to audiences who would otherwise have little access to the ‘field’ was motive enough for 
romantic naturalists such as Gosse, who were otherwise critical of studies of dead or 
disturbed nature, to overlook such naturalistic failings.378 
This is not to say that life scientists utilising microscopes were not self-conscious of the 
problem of artifice. Even with the restriction of optical aberrations thanks to the advances in 
lens craft of the 1820s and 1830s, there still remained problems in microscopy of 
distinguishing natural object from technical artefact. A case in point was the argument over 
‘globulism’ that broke out in the 1830s. Globule hypotheses regarding the fundamental 
composition of living tissue were popular in the early 19th century prior to the rise of cell 
theory.  They originated as an elaboration on the earlier fibre theory of organic constitution, 
advocates claiming to observe fibres to be composed of more fundamental spherical particles,
‘globules’, which were often said to be arranged like beads on a string. In traditional histories
of microscopy, these entities have tended to be presented as the erroneous product of a 
combination of bad instruments producing optical illusions and bad scientific theorising due 
to the influence of naturphilosophie. Lister and Hodgkin are then attributed to have 
discredited these fallacious theories through their construction of superior instruments c. 1827
which demonstrated globules not to exist. There are good reasons to be sceptical regarding 
this received account given, as Pickstone pointed out in 1973, that it is Whiggish, treating 
globule theory not in terms of its historical context but rather as a failed precursor of cell 
theory, and as its technical determinism is undermined by the fact that Lister’s lens were 
neither dramatically superior to pre-existing equipment nor did they prevent globule 
advocates from continuing to see such entities. Schickore’s more recent analysis of the 
controversy, whilst sympathising with Pickstone’s revisionism, continues to support a role for
378 Graeme Gooday, ‘'Nature' in the Laboratory: Domestication and Discipline with the Microscope in 
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error in argumentation over the globulist position. But Schickore differs from the received 
account in pointing to the plethora of kinds of globules observed – varying in size, shape and 
behaviour – which therefore required a multiplicity of potential sources of artifice to be 
identified by actors as a means of distinguishing artefact from natural object. Most notably, 
Ernst Heinrich Weber, Leipzig professor of Anatomy, did in 1830 influentially posit that 
reports of spherical globules of regular size arranged like beads on a string were most likely 
optical illusions due to a combination of observations in direct sunlight, which produced 
interference patterns, and over-magnification. But Weber was himself a globulist, differing 
from those he criticised in that he believed them to differ in size and not necessarily be 
spherical or of regular shape. Similarly, Gottfried Treviranus in 1835 would agree with 
Weber that the ‘strings of beads’ he observed when studying nerve fibres were artefacts. But 
Treviranus did not put this down to light conditions or magnification – he was after all using 
an advanced Plössl microscope. Instead, he argued that the true form of nerve fibres was 
cylindrical and that their globular appearance under the microscope was due to deterioration 
after death and treatment with water.379  
In short, phenomena observed under the microscope commonly could not simply be 
determined as natural objects or artefacts by sight alone. What was required therefore was the
identification of common sources of error and artifice and the establishment of codes of 
practice which best avoided these problems. Practices which conformed to these codes would
then be considered naturalistic. Gooday has discussed how in the case of microscopy in 
Britain, influential conventions of naturalistic use emerged from the 1850s onwards which 
would be crystallised into a general set of standard practices in the early 1870s as a result of 
their being co-opted by T.H. Huxley in his pedagogical program for the training of science 
teachers at South Kensington. These conventions included preferences for natural light 
conditions, stable working surfaces, robust but mobile instruments and the development of 
particular accepted methods of handling and preparing materials for microscopic study, all 
these being employed with the intention of “minimizing the apparent artificiality and 
situational idiosyncracies [sic] of the indoor situation; so that whilst socially constructing the 
‘natural’ conditions, practitioners… could claim a direct, i.e. unmediated, contact with 
379 Jutta Schickore, ‘Error as Historiographical Challenge: The Infamous Globule Hypothesis’, In: Going 
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Nature”.380 ‘Naturalisation’ was not in this case as much a process of making the effects of 
scientific instruments less artificial as it was one of convincing student practitioners that their 
use of such instruments, if conducted according to proper prescriptions, did not significantly 
disrupt the natural phenomena they were studying. Whilst nature was often invoked as the 
authority and the source of knowledge in microscopy, in truth what kind of ‘nature’ was 
investigated by Huxley’s students was delimited by Huxley himself. The plethora of 
conflicting images that had plagued early 19th century microscopy was thus resolved by 
implicit collective agreement among senior experts that certain practices did not significantly 
intervene upon the natural objects being observed and then by these agreed conventions being
presented to the next generation of researchers as the given parameters of the natural in 
microscopic investigations. In this way, Gooday concludes, “canonically 'natural' forms of 
laboratory research practice arise from the training of practitioners in highly conventionalized
'natural' forms of pedagogical practice”.381
To summarise, the development of naturalistic conventions in microscopy can be considered 
comparable to the ‘minimal naturalism’ I earlier discussed in relation to Warington’s 
ecological balance research programme and with regards to those naturalists using aquaria as 
a means primarily of storing live specimens for description, long-term observation and 
dissection. The development of these conventions should not necessarily be seen as negative. 
Nature in its full complexity and diversity is impossible to fully miniaturise and bring 
indoors. To create an indoor nature, aspects of outdoor nature must necessarily be selected for
extraction and then tested to determine whether they remain stable for the time period 
demanded by a particular scientific investigation. But how the extent of stability is measured 
is also relative to the particular object of research. For instance, if we consider viability as a 
species of stability, Warington’s snails usually lived short lives, but what he measured was 
not the lifespan of individuals but rather of the aquarium as a sustainable ecosystem as a 
whole; by contrast, Wood did think of viability in terms of individuals, but did not see short 
lifespans as a problem given that his research required a steady supply of dead as well as of 
the living. Furthermore, because maintaining nature indoors is difficult, researchers tend to 
gravitate towards experimental practices that can attain naturalistic results with minimal 
380 Graeme Gooday, ‘'Nature' in the Laboratory: Domestication and Discipline with the Microscope in 
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hassle. What is deemed naturalistic is both a product of individual judgement and social 
conditioning. The aim is to avoid artifice as any non-analogy between indoor and outdoor 
nature can be seized on by critics as evidence of the irrelevance and non-transferability to 
nature of knowledge produced in a particular laboratory. But artifice is a necessary part of the
creation of indoor nature due its being brought about through the human interventions of 
extraction from the outdoors and stabilisation and maintenance indoors. Therefore, 
researchers tend to establish a set of conditions or components which must be kept maximally
naturalistic and free of artifice, whilst the rest are negotiable and do not need to be ‘true to 
nature’. What is necessary and what is negotiable is based on an assessment of which 
parameters can be manipulated without relevantly affecting the ‘natural’ behaviour of the 
phenomena of interest and which are less robust and therefore demand careful treatment. As 
we shall see, it was advantageous that early 20th century geneticists were able to tie the 
identity of their wild type experimental subjects to their hereditary constitution, as since 
genes are highly conserved aspects of an organisms biology they were able to argue around 
the highly artificial nature of their lab stocks and environment on the basis that so long as a 
strain carried the wild type gene relevant for a particular experiment, then it could stand in for
the natural form of the species. The more robust a phenomena of interest is under lab 
conditions, the more negotiable secondary phenomena will therefore be interpreted as and the
more 'truth to nature' will be sacrificed to increase tractability. 
Problems arise for the representativeness for outdoor nature of knowledge acquired from 
indoor nature when there are errors of judgement with regard to which parameters are in truth
necessary or negotiable. But equally, even when parameter judgements are broadly correct, 
the knowledge produced from observations of and experiments on indoor nature is never 
fully representative of outdoor nature in the first place because indoor natures are in general 
constructed and evaluated relative to particular purposes of study. These purposes of study 
dictate the selection of particular aspects of outdoor nature for isolation, transplantation and 
stabilisation indoors. Indoor nature is therefore never a truly miniaturised outdoor nature but 
is rather an abstraction of particular aspects of outdoor nature. Indoor nature can therefore be 
regarded as constituting what Leonelli has called (with reference to model organisms in 
contemporary biology) a ‘material abstracting’ from outdoor nature. ‘Material abstracting’ is 
a form of scientific modelling whereby objects extracted from nature and brought under 
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controlled conditions “are taken to be representative of a [broader] set of phenomena”, e.g. 
phenomena in a balanced aquarium are treated as comparable with general phenomena in 
tidal rock pools. It is also characterised by the fact that “Epistemic access to phenomena is 
granted first and foremost by material [as opposed to intellectual] manipulation”, which 
requires ‘performative skills’ of being able to interact with the lab environment in such a way
as to enable study without producing unwanted artificial or accidental phenomena.382 Whilst 
Leonelli has focused on 20th and 21st century plant biology, I feel this characterisation equally
applies to the ‘indoor nature’ found in various mid-19th century laboratories and homes. 
Performative skills that can be pointed to, for example, involve particularly the ability of the 
experimenter to take on functions normally performed by nature, such as aeration, in order to 
maintain the viability of living indoor nature and in the case of studies of dead nature, the 
skill to stabilise tissues before decay using correct preservative media to prevent distortions. 
To these may be added the skill of ensuring that the correct conditions of observation are 
maintained to prevent interfering phenomena when using intercessional equipment such as 
the microscope. 
Indoor Nature and the 'New Biology'
Through naturalising conventions of practice and the conceiving of the microscope slide as a 
vivarium, the microscope was able to claim paramount status as an indoor mediator between 
life scientist and nature, arguably at the expense of true vivaria such as aquaria and Wardian 
cases, which were less conspicuously utilised as means of bringing nature indoors for serious 
scientific research for much of the rest of the 19th century. The microscope furthermore leant 
itself more to analytic research of part-whole relations than it did to the study of life histories 
– as François Jacob comments “For the eye armed with a microscope, every living organism 
was finally resolved into a collection of juxtaposed units”.383 The one major exception to this 
is effectively the one that proves the rule, namely the growth in studies of microbes and their 
life histories, microbes being of course those organisms which were too small for the 
microscopes of the time to dissolve into smaller units. It is therefore not surprising that 
microbes were targets for rigorous lab-based scientific domestication early on, as they 
382 Sabina Leonelli, ‘Performing Abstraction: Two Ways of Modelling Arabidopsis thaliana’, Biology and 
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represented a form of life that, so long as they could be cultured, were easily incorporated 
into the sterile, uniform and often cramped spaces of modern laboratories. 
Generally then, the new lab life sciences – cytology, embryology, plant physiology, 
microbiology, and evolutionary and functional morphology, to mention a few – can be seen 
as characterised by an internalist focus which concentrated less on the macroscopic organism 
and more on internal units within the organism, e.g. cells, embryos, tissues, pathogens and 
other kinds of hidden structures. As Lynn Nyhart observes, “Natural historians sought to 
uncover the large-scale pattern of living nature… ‘modern’ biologists in their laboratories 
sought to penetrate the internal workings of the living organism to discover their fundamental
causes”.384 This internalist focus was also influenced by the growth of the idea that the body 
constituted an enclosed space distinct from the external milieu, an ‘interior milieu’ as the 
physiologist Claude Bernard dubbed it in the 1850s.385 As a consequence, whereas the field 
naturalist studied the organism in its outdoor environment, for this new generation of 
laboratory life scientist the organism commonly was the environment, the 'experimental 
system' (to recall Rheinberger's terminology), within which their 'epistemic objects' 
persisted.386 Both naturalist and lab worker experimented by intervening in an environment 
and observing the effect on their units of study, but because of the difference in the nature of 
the environments they investigated, different kinds of interventions were typically required. 
This allowed lab scientists to justify interventions in organisms that would be considered 
artificial in the naturalistic tradition, on the grounds that whilst damaging to the integrity of 
the organism these invasive procedures were not damaging to the integrity of the internal 
units they studied.387 This is not to say that traditional life history studies such as those 
conducted by palaetiologists in Britain and ‘scientific zoologists’ in Germany (both for whom
vivaria and field studies played an important role in studying organisms) disappeared in the 
second half of the 19th century – Nyhart has shown that in the German case at least these kind
of research programmes remained healthy in this period. Rather, they tended to suffer from 
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being treated as auxiliary to the dominant paradigm of evolutionary morphology, a perception
exacerbated by the fact that the major founders of evolutionary morphology in Britain and 
Germany, Huxley and Haeckel, both had roots in life history studies but turned away from 
them in the 1860s as they believed morphology to offer more opportunities to answer 
evolutionary questions.388 
The rise of the laboratory life sciences coincided with a relative decline in importance of 
museum-based naturalism (though Kohler has shown that systematics and biogeography 
remained a considerable growth industry for late 19th and early 20th century museums).389 This
decline was not purely a matter of outcompetition, for, as Sophie Forgan argues, changes in 
the social function of museums in this period were also an important influence. Whereas 
previously museums had been largely research facilities, access to the contents of which was 
largely restricted to academic researchers and students, in the second half of the 19th century 
this system of public exclusion began to fall away with the growth of the idea of public 
education as a means of moral improvement. This had the consequence that museums 
increasingly catered to “visitors… whose interest had to be caught by carefully arranged and 
attractive displays”, rather than patrons who could be assumed to have a certain level of 
understanding of the natural order of collected objects. Forgan acknowledges, however, that 
there was a significant clash between the epistemologies of museum and lab, namely between
museum naturalism's emphasis on ‘passive’ ordering and observation and laboratory 
biology's emphasis on active intervention and manipulation. In this confrontation, the 
laboratory possessed an advantage over the museum as it could offer both more exact and 
more generalisable knowledge due the control practitioners exercised over environment and 
parameters, which importantly allowed for the replication of experiments and the 
confirmation of findings across different sites. By contrast, museum naturalism relied on 
unique specimens kept at single locations which could at best be compared with similar 
instances but could not be re-created elsewhere.390 
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The lab life sciences' control for exactitude was the outcome of the successful standardisation
of laboratory equipment and pedagogy. By promoting a maximal similitude of practice and 
situation across different lab spaces, the laboratory could attain a sense of what Steven 
Shapin calls ‘placelessness’ – a genericness of place which helped overcome many of the 
effects of locality which had previously interfered with the replication of experiments and the
confirmation of findings.391 'Placeless' knowledge could, it was argued, be easily extrapolated 
between labs, in contrast to knowledge produced in the field which was commonly difficult 
to validly apply outside of its original context of production. Laboratory-produced knowledge
thus came to be perceived as possessing a universality lacking in localised and variable 
outdoor nature, and through what Kohler calls “a kind of cultural body snatching” lab nature 
came to exemplify broader nature more than any particular instance of outdoor nature could 
do so. Results attained in controlled indoor conditions were judged reliable and could be 
extrapolated to new locales by re-creation of the correct parameters, what Schaffer has terms 
the “multiplication of contexts”. Results attained through study in the field or, for that matter,
in less strictly controlled domestic environments such as gardens and ordinary households, 
were dismissed as lacking in rigour as non-lab conditions were seen as uncontrolled, the 
parameters being set by nature not the scientist, and as particular to the locale of research.392 
Exactitude was thus not just an aspiration, it was a necessary condition for credibility. Its 
espousal thus constituted a form of what Thomas Gieryn calls 'boundary-work', a form of 
standard-setting designed to prevent amateurs and dilettantes encroaching on the turf of lab 
science professionals.393 Even the experimental work of a naturalist as esteemed as Charles 
Darwin was not immune to attack, as shown by his dispute with Julius Sachs over plant root 
geotropism. Sachs' issue appears not to have been Darwin's conclusions, which whilst 
opposed to his own had previously been anticipated by another professional whom Sachs had 
not gone on to attack. Instead, Sachs almost solely criticised Darwin's 'unprofessional' 
methods of experiment (his research was based at home and in the garden and he used non-
391 Steven Shapin, Never Pure: Historical Studies of Science as if It Was Produced by People with Bodies, 
Situated in Time, Space, Culture, and Society, and Struggling for Credibility and Authority, John Hopkins 
University Press, 2010, p. 57.
392 Robert E. Kohler, Landscapes and Labscapes: Exploring the Lab-Field Border in Biology, Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2002, pp. 3-8; Peter Galison, ‘Material Culture, Theoretical Culture and 
Delocalisation’, Science in the Twentieth Century, John Krige & Dominique Pestre (Eds.), Netherlands: 
Harwood Academic Publishers, 1997, p. 677; & Simon Schaffer, 'Making up Discovery', In: Dimensions of 
Creativity, Margaret A. Boden (Ed.), The MIT Press, 1996, pp. 13-52. 
393 Thomas F. Gieryn, Cultural Boundaries of Science: Credibility on the Line, Chicago & London: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1999, pp. 15-18.
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standard equipment). By establishing limits to the kinds of practitioner, methods and settings 
that were granted credibility in plant physiology, Soraya de Chadaverian observes that “Sachs
redefined the standards of scientific work by turning the laboratory into a privileged place for
access to 'nature'”.394 De Chadaverian's observation conforms with Latour’s claim that in 
modern technoscience the phenomena being investigated often require such an extensive 
technical set-up in order to render them ‘correctly’ visible that the only option for dissenters 
is “to build another laboratory”.395 Thus it was that even though Darwin's hypothesis proved 
the correct one, it was only accepted among professional plant physiologists when tested in 
'proper' laboratory conditons. 
The demand for exactitude both as a requirement for placeless knowledge and as a condition 
for credibility would be one influential motivation for the standardisation of living indoor 
nature, one outcome of which would be the development of lab wild type strains. But this 
movement towards exactitude and placelessness in laboratory science did not occur in a 
vacuum. Rather, it can be situated in the broader social context of 19th century 
industrialisation and the growth of what Canguilhem has called “technological 
normalization” – the increased standardisation of the constituent parts of ensembles of 
production through top-down hierarchical organisation conducted by corporations and the 
state so as to improve efficiency and better sync fabrication and consumption.396 Indoor 
nature was also to be ‘normalised’, purified of contamination by the original context from 
which it was extracted and rendered generic and mobile, a process Galison refers to as 
“delocalization”.397 Laboratory science thus moved from emulation of nature indoors in 
miniature to what Knorr-Cetina appropriately terms ‘enculturation’, this being the process by 
which nature is ‘brought home’, isolated from the ‘wild’ and subjected to the conditions of 
the social order of the laboratory so as to “[derive] epistemic effects from the new 
situation”.398 This also may be compared with what Hacking calls the ‘creation of 
394 Soraya de Chadarevian, ‘Laboratory science versus country-house experiments. The controversy between 
Julius Sachs and Charles Darwin’, The British Journal for the History of Science, Vol. 29, 1996, pp. 17-41. 
395 Bruno Latour, Bruno Latour, Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers Through Society, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1987, Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists 
and Engineers Through Society, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1987, p. 79.
396 Georges Canguilhem, The Normal and the Pathological, Carolyn R. Fawcett & Robert S. Cohen (Trans.), 
New York: Zone Books, 1991, pp. 246-247.
397 Peter Galison, ‘Material Culture, Theoretical Culture and Delocalisation’, Science in the Twentieth Century,
John Krige & Dominique Pestre (Eds.), Netherlands: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1997, p. 676-677.
398 Karin Knorr Cetina, ‘The Couch, the Cathedral, and the Laboratory: On the Relationship between 
Experiment and Laboratory in Science’, Science as Practice and Culture, Andrew Pickering (Ed.), Chicago 
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phenomena’ and his observation, discussing the various ‘effects’ found in physics (his 
example is the Hall effect in electromagnetism) that these are in fact human productions not 
truly found in nature in their undiluted state as “nowhere outside of the laboratory is there 
such a pure arrangement [without intervening causes]”. The enculturation of living nature 
similarly produces standardised cultures of a kind not found outside of the lab, existing over 
multiple generations in a single species dominated ecosystem and nourished by bland but 
plentiful food mediums. Enculturation can overall be regarded as a particularly extreme 
manifestation of the scientific domestication of nature where the captured natural object is 
deliberately stripped of as much of its original context as possible and is subjected to new 
orderings which aim to provoke it into producing phenomena which whilst novel artefacts 
give simultaneous insight into fundamental aspects of the object’s nature. Such artifice is 
necessary and insightful, Hacking argues, as phenomena of a regular quality upon which 
generalisations may be based are actually rare in nature (astronomical phenomena are an 
exception, and therefore the basal status of astronomy in early science is not surprising). To 
extend the reach of science, it is therefore necessary to abstract from nature and reconstruct it 
under controlled conditions.399 
Given the link proposed between industrialisation and enculturation, it is perhaps no great 
surprise that the most significant pioneers of pure culturing methods among lab life scientists 
in this period were those working in the emerging field of microbiology, the development of 
which paralleled the growth of industries such as breweries in which microbes played a 
central role in production (breweries, as we shall see, would also play an important role in the
later development of plant 'pure line' cultures by Johannsen). Louis Pasteur, for instance, 
whilst spending the first ten years of his scientific career working in crystallography, then 
spent two decades (1857-’77) working on problems of fermentation, specifically the ‘diseases
of beer and wine’, and it was this industry research which led him directly towards tackling 
the question of spontaneous generation and later the diseases of humans and livestock, via 
studying disease in silkworms, organisms fundamental to another significant industrial 
enterprise.400 Pasteur’s research background can moreover be clearly seen to have had a clear 
and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1992, p. 118.
399 Ian Hacking, Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, 
Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp. 225-228.
400 Arthur M. Silverstein, ‘Pasteur, Pastorians, and the Dawn of Immunology: The Importance of Specificity’, 
History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences, Vol. 22, No. 1, Selected Papers from a Conference Held at the 
Dibner Institute: 'Pasteur, Germs and the Bacterial Laboratory', 22-23 November 1996, Part I, 2000, pp. 30-
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effect on his scientific practice and conduct, as can be seen in the testimony of his disciple 
Duclaux, who stated him to have “the masterful qualities of a chief of industry who watches 
everything, lets no detail escape him, wishes to know everything, and who, at the same time, 
puts himself in personal relation with all his clientele”.401 Robert Koch’s work also became 
increasingly enmeshed with the emergent pharmaceutical and chemical industry as the 19th 
century drew to a close, with research on his tuberculosis antiserum, tuberculin, being 
eventually outsourced to the company Farbwerke Hoechst in 1892; in this case, however, this
was against Koch’s intentions, being a consequence of the failure of tuberculin on the market 
and the Prussian Ministry of Culture therefore being able to impose this deal as part of their 
agreeing to support Koch’s institute.402 
Enculturation has, as Knorr Cetina notes, significant advantages in that it “enable[s] 
investigations to be performed in one place, without regard to natural conditions (e.g., 
weather, seasonal changes, regional differences in visibility, etc.), subject only to the 
contingencies of local situations (e.g., to the speed and the local resources that scientists can 
bring to bear on the work)”. These advantages of enculturation have been further stressed by 
Latour in his study of the Pasteurian ‘war and peace of microbes’. He points first to the 
weakness of prior efforts at disease control by hygienists, who because they believed that 
“almost anything… might cause illness” found it “necessary to act upon everything at once, 
but to act everywhere is to act nowhere”. Pasteurians, by isolating microbial agents and 
moving disease into the terrain of the laboratory, acted in accord with “the [general] principle
of any victory: you must fight the enemy on the terrain that you master”. Whereas the 
contagions and miasmas of the hygienists were invisible forces operating more or less 
everywhere, Pasteurians extracted ferments from the environment, brought them under 
control and, by offering microbes ‘ideal’ conditions in which they could develop blithely, 
“freed from the competition of other living beings”, made “these invisible agents visible”. So,
whereas outdoors the microbes moved freely unseen, infecting and killing humans and 
32.
401 Gerald L. Geison, ‘Organization, Products, and Marketing in Pasteur's Scientific Enterprise’, History and 
Philosophy of the Life Sciences, Vol. 24, No. 1, Selected Papers from a Conference held at the Dibner 
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402 Christoph Gradmann, ‘Money and Microbes: Robert Koch, Tuberculin and the Foundation of the Institute 
for Infectious Diseases in Berlin in 1891’, History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences, Vol. 22, No. 1, 
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Page -176-
animals, indoors they were forced to show themselves, becoming pampered prisoners of the 
Petri dish. Furthermore, once a means was determined of attenuating their virulence, these 
domesticated microbes could be utilised to inoculate people and livestock against the 
depredations of the still dangerous wild microbes.403  
The artifice and ecological novelty of culturing methods did not escape practitioners. 
Duclaux, speaking later of the advantages of Koch’s solid culturing method, commented on 
how it “forces each germ to develop on the spot and to form a colony”.404 Given this 
recognition that the single species colony ecology constitutes a forced non-natural state, it is 
perhaps ironic that one major use of culturing was as a means of identifying bacterial species.
This function was formalised in 1872 when Ferdinand Cohn established the first major 
system of bacterial classification, which was based on morphological characteristics 
including those displayed by cultures. A microbe which could not be cultured was therefore a
microbe which could not be properly classified. This system had serious shortcomings, as 
only a fraction of microbe species can be cultured under traditional lab conditions.405 Early 
microbiologists, whilst not aware of the scale of this problem, were far from ignorant of the 
difficulties of domesticating wild microbes. As Latour observes, “to pasteurize a disease was 
no easy matter... a link had to be made between a disease and a microbe… after that the 
microbe had to be isolated, a process that was not always possible… then the microbe had to 
be cultivated in a favorable medium in such a way as to increase its effects, an operation that 
was often impossible if the wild microbe refused to allow itself to be domesticated”.406 But 
whilst the requirements of Cohn's culture-based taxonomy made it difficult to classify hard-
to-culture microbes, it did help bring stability to microbial classification, for it was only as 
lab cultures feeding on uniform media that many bacteria species retained constancy. Early 
microbiologists were well aware that outside of the artificially uniform environment of the 
culture, microbial behaviour and physiology was very changeable. Pasteur, for instance, 
observed that acetic acid bacterium Mycoderma aceti, which in wine breaks down alcohol 
into acetic acid and carbon dioxide, will once the wine has thus been turned into vinegar 
403 Bruno Latour, The Pasteurization of France, Alan Sheridan and John Law (Trans.), Harvard University 
Press, 1988, pp. 20-21, 61-63 & 91. 
404 Ibid., p. 82. 
405 William C. Summers, ‘From Culture as Organism to Organism as Cell: Historical Origins of Bacterial 
Genetics’, Journal of the History of Biology, Vol. 24, No. 2, 1991, pp. 171-172.
406 Bruno Latour, The Pasteurization of France, Alan Sheridan and John Law (Trans.), Harvard University 
Press, 1988, p. 105.
Page -177-
switch to turning acetic acid into carbon dioxide and water. Such adaptability had led some 
observers to suggest that bacterial ‘species’ in fact represented different forms of mutable 
entities. Most radically, Carl Nägeli argued all microbial life to be a single species in constant
flux.407 This, of course, would have undermined the very possibility of a bacterial taxonomy, 
and it is therefore understandable that culture traits, being relatively stable, were utilised as 
means of demarcating bacterial species despite their being artificial products of laboratory 
culturing techniques. For microbiologists, it was therefore intuitive that domestication was 
necessary to understand the natural order of microscopic life – an attitude that we will see 
early geneticists increasingly apply also to macroscopic life. The success of the domestication
and enculturation of animals and plants for the purposes of genetic knowledge production 
would moreover similarly depend on the ability of geneticists to detect and control tiny 
structures internal to the organism, in this case genes. The efforts of later 19th century life 
scientists to domesticate cells, microbes, tissues and other previously invisible or intangible 
fragments of life which might be found within or extracted from the organism-as-
environment can therefore be seen as an important preamble to the geneticist's endeavour to 
domesticate heredity (including domesticating the wild type). But in order to domesticate 
heredity, it would first need to be established that heredity could be stabilised, isolated and 
controlled. For this to happen would require advances in both theory and practice. I will try to
summarise some of the more important developments in theory in the following chapter. 
407 J. Andrew Mendelsohn, ‘'Like All That Lives': Biology, Medicine and Bacteria in the Age of Pasteur and 
Koch’, History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences, Vol. 24, No. 1, Selected Papers from a Conference held 
at the Dibner Institute for the History of Science and Technology, MIT, on 'Pasteur, Germs and the 
Bacteriological Laboratory', 22-23 November 1996, Part II, 2002, pp. 13-15.
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Chapter 7 – Darwinism, the Late 19  th   Century Problem of Variation, and the
'Move out of History'
Introduction: The Unresolved Nature of Variation and Darwin's Provisional Hypothesis
I have earlier discussed in this thesis how the wild type concept was restricted and 
reinterpreted in the context of Darwinian evolutionary theory. Of particular consequence was 
Darwin's dismissal of normative interpretations of variation based on 'Natural State Models', 
which he did not believe to accord for what he saw as the widespread evidence of divergence 
in the course of nature, both in the wild and under domestication. Whereas critics such as 
Jenkin saw reversion as evidence of such normative variation, Darwin instead reinterpreted 
the reappearance of ancestral traits in feral organisms as simply an effect of their return to 
ancestral conditions of existence, which induced the redevelopment of wild traits rendered 
latent in the process of domestication. In short, Darwin forwarded a unified theory of 
variation as operating under the same laws in domestication and the wild and assumed a 
causally-based correlation between changes in the conditions of existence and organismic 
variation. This left Darwin with two problems, however. Firstly, he required a mechanism to 
explain how the conditions of existence effected change in organisms. Secondly, his belief 
that environmental and organismic variation would correlate was an empirically untested 
presupposition and could therefore be brought into question by contradictory observations. 
This chapter will explore first how Darwin (largely unsuccessfully) sought to deal with the 
problem of variation, then explore some of the alternative theories in play towards the end of 
the 19th century and their role in the division of evolutionism into rival camps, before closing 
by examining how the rejection of Darwin's theory of correlational variation would presage 
efforts to domesticate heredity and establish wild type lineages in the laboratory. 
It has been suggested by less diligent historians that Darwin did not properly develop an idea 
of a mechanism to explain heredity and variation until he was shocked into doing so in 1867 
by the twin assault of Jenkin's 'swamping' argument and William Thomson's calculation of a 
young age for the Earth.408 This myth survives in many popular accounts of Darwin's work, 
e.g. 1982's Darwin for Beginners: “Confronted by the twin spectres of Kelvin and Jenkin, 
Darwin began to lose faith in the effectiveness of natural selection. He now felt it necessary 
408 For discussion of this myth and its falsity, see: Robert C. Olby, 'Charles Darwin's Manuscript of 
Pangenesis', The British Journal for the History of Science, Vol. 1, No. 3, 1963, pp. 251-263; & Peter 
Vorzimmer, 'Charles Darwin and Blending Inheritance', Isis, Vol. 54, No. 3, 1963, pp. 371-390. 
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to introduce some auxiliary process which would hasten evolutionary change in a purposive 
direction”.409 The myth typically goes on to claim that Darwin 'reverted' to a belief in the 
Lamarckian inheritance of acquired adult characteristics (ignoring the fact that Darwin never 
ceased believing in such forms of inheritance), on the grounds that this would speed up 
evolution on a younger Earth, and that the product of this 'reversion' was his 1868 provisional
hypothesis of pangenesis. This claim is often backed up by pointing to Darwin’s son Francis’ 
assertion that pangenesis was a late addition to his father's evolutionary thought.410 This last 
claim, however, is disproved by Charles' declaration in an 1867 letter that the hypothesis was 
“26 or 27 years old”.411 Detailed investigation of Darwin's notebooks by Jonathan Hodge has 
shed more light on this long incubation of pangenesis. Hodge traces the hypothesis' origins to
Darwin's tutelage under Robert Grant at Edinburgh (the term 'gemmule' is Grant's originally) 
and his reading of early 19th century theories of development and inheritance such as those of 
his grandfather Erasmus.412 This derivation from decades-old theories was recognised by 
some of Darwin's contemporaries, as can be seen from a critical comment by ‘Dr. Bastian’ 
that it appeared more “a relic of the old rather than a fitting appanage of the new evolution 
philosophy”.413 
I will shortly return to the origins of pangenesis when discussing why it was poorly received 
in 1868. I will first, however, detail the theory itself. The hypothesis suggests the 
fundamental units of heredity to be molecules called ‘gemmules’, which are thrown off by 
cells and are dispersed throughout the body, where they also independently propagate by 
division. They accumulate in the sexual organs and in the sex cells and are thus passed on to 
the next generation in reproduction. Gemmules tend to gather with their like, i.e. gemmules 
produced by cells of the same organismic function and distinctive characteristics, and in 
ontogeny will act collectively on “partially developed or nascent cells” and cause them to 
specialise and take on the characteristics of their precursor cells. Where there are inherited 
409 Jonathan Miller and Boris van Loon, Darwin for Beginners, Cambridge: Icon Books, 1992, p. 138.
410 P. Kyle Stanford, Exceeding our Grasp: Science, History, and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives, 
Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 76. 
411 Ibid., p. 76.
412 M.J.S. Hodge, ‘The Darwin of Pangenesis’, Comptes Rendue Biologies, Vol. 333, 2010, pp. 131-132; & 
M.J.S. Hodge, 'Darwin Studies at Work: A Re-examination of Three Decisive Years (1835-37)', In: Nature, 
Experiment and the Sciences: Essays on Galileo and the History of , Trevor H. Levere and William R. Shea 
(Eds.), Boston Studies in Philosophy of Science, Volume 120, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
pp. 249-274.
413 Charles Darwin, The Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication: Vol. 2, 2nd ed., London: John 
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different varieties of gemmules for one particular trait, the different varieties will compete to 
influence and develop that trait. In such cases, the most numerous group of gemmules will 
tend to win out. Variability for Darwin was therefore caused by in part by the “deficiency, 
superabundance, and transposition” of the particular kinds of gemmule inherited from the 
parental generation. These variations in number were further affected by the fact that 
gemmules can also be inherited in a dormant as opposed to active state, and rather than being 
developed will then be passed on to future generations. This ability for gemmules to be 
inherited in a dormant state and only activated in later generations was believed by Darwin to
explain reversion. Reversion was in this manner explained as a simple effect of the 
mechanism of heredity and part of the overall capacity for variability as opposed to its being 
a force antagonistic to divergence. In addition to dealing with the problem of reversion, 
pangenesis was also intended to answer the charge that there existed limits to variability by 
positing a means by which novel variations could arise. Darwin here turned to the inheritance
of acquired characteristics, positing that when the phenotype is altered through “the direct 
action of changed conditions on the organisation, and of the increased use or disuse of parts”, 
“the gemmules from the modified units will be themselves modified”.414
Darwin always considered pangenesis highly speculative and admitted in an 1867 letter to 
Asa Gray that he feared it would “be called a mad dream”.415 That he remained committed to 
it for so long was because he believed it a uniquely unitary causal mechanism able to explain 
a whole panoply of otherwise anomalous phenomena of heredity and variation. These 
included “how it is possible for a character possessed by some remote ancestor suddenly to 
reappear in the offspring [atavism]; how the effects of increased or decreased use of a limb 
can be transmitted to the child [inheritance of acquired characteristics]; how the male sexual 
element can act not solely on the ovules, but occasionally on the mother-form [xenia and 
telegony]; how a hybrid can be produced by the union of the cellular tissue of two plants 
independently of the organs of generation [graft hybridisation]; how a limb can be 
reproduced on the exact line of amputation, with neither too much nor too little added 
414 Ibid., pp. 368-390.
415 P. Kyle Stanford, Exceeding our Grasp: Science, History, and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives, 
Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 65.
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[regeneration]; how the same organism may be produced by such widely different processes, 
as budding and true seminal generation”.416 
Pangenesis, was, however, coldly received and for good reason. When  Darwin had originally
formulated the hypothesis in the early 1840s, he worked under assumptions based on 
contemporary cell theory, in particular Schwann’s theory that cells originated out of 
‘blastemic’ crystallisation from inorganic materials. It was on this basis that Darwin proposed
that sex cells might form out of a pre-cellular conglomerating of gemmules. By the 1860s, 
however, Virchow’s doctrine of omnia cellula e cellula (‘all cells from a cell’) had become 
cytological orthodoxy. Darwin's hypothesis was therefore out of step with recent scientific 
developments.417 
In an attempt to secure evidential support for his faltering hypothesis, Darwin supported an 
experiment by his cousin, Francis Galton, which involved giving purebred rabbits blood 
transfusions from other stock and then breeding them to see if signs of mongrelism would 
appear, as would be expected if gemmules circulated in the blood. This spectacularly 
backfired when despite breeding over a number of generations and utilising increasing doses 
of foreign blood, no mongrelism was detected. This experimental failure embarrassed 
Darwin, who admitted that “I certainly should have expected that gemmules would have been
present in the blood”. To save face and theory, he maintained that gemmule circulation in the 
blood “is no necessary part of the hypothesis”, suggesting other vehicles must be responsible 
for circulation, as would evidently be the case in bloodless organisms like plants and simple 
animals.418 Galton’s experiments nonetheless discredited pangenesis in many life scientists’ 
minds, at least in the form Darwin proposed.
Galton
Galton would further problematise Darwin's theories of variation when in the early 1870s he 
discovered a statistical phenomenon that appeared to vindicate Jenkin's earlier claim that 
there were fixed limitations to ordinary variation (the following details are largely based on 
416 Charles Darwin, The Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication: Vol. 2, 2nd ed., London: John 
Murray, 1885, p. 349.
417 M.J.S. Hodge, ‘The Darwin of Pangenesis’, Comptes Rendue Biologies, Vol. 333, 2010, p. 131.
418 Charles Darwin, The Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication: Vol. 2, 2nd ed., London: John 
Murray, 1885, p. 350.
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Gayon's account of Galton in Darwinism's Struggle). Becoming known as 'regression to the 
mean', it was an effect at the population level, invisible at the individual, whereby although 
selection could have impressive results directing a lineage in a particular direction, the 
offspring of any exceptional members within the lineage would tend to be ‘meaner’ than their
parents, that is, they will be closer in character to the original mean of the overall population 
than their immediate progenitors, as opposed to varying in the direction of selection. This 
suggested to Galton that all effects of selection were to be considered merely temporary, that 
whilst the average quality of a stock could be gradually shifted, if selection were relaxed 
regression would push the population mean back to its original position. For Galton, 
regression implied that selection was impotent when it came to producing novel variation. It 
could at best divide a population into sub-populations with distinctive characters, in the 
manner that humans created breeds out of the extant variation found in domesticated species, 
but such distinct isolate groups would not remain divergent if reproductive barriers were 
disabled and normal interbreeding commenced. Galton believed ‘mean’ characteristics would
always predominate in a freely interbreeding population on the basis of a belief in what 
would later be called the ‘Law of Ancestral Heredity’. This ‘law’ drew upon pre-existing 
beliefs common particularly amongst animal breeders which interpreted heredity as operating
fractionally, with each individual receiving ‘blood’ from all its ancestral generations, these 
contributions proportionally diminishing with each generational step back in time. Ancestral 
heredity connected any selected lineage back to the population from which it derived, and 
this shared populational inheritance acted as a form of ‘racial inertia’ that would tend, in its 
collective weight, to overwhelm over time any recent divergences from the norm produced by
selection. Galton’s regression to the mean appeared to demonstrate very real limits to the 
capacity of selection to direct variation, limitations reinforced, it was claimed, by the 
tendency of ancestral heredity to overwhelm any recent divergence. If true, the extant 
capacity in any species to vary could not act as the raw material for its evolution.419 
Unlike Jenkin, Galton did believe in evolutionary change but the theories he would develop 
of how this occurred assumed a completely different set of forces to those of Darwin. Galton 
was an internalist who thought that the main driver of evolution was spontaneous variation 
along pre-established developmental pathways. In his 1869 text  Hereditary Genius, Galton 
419 Jean Gayon, Darwinism’s Struggle for Survival: Heredity and the Hypothesis of Natural Selection, Matthew
Cobb (Trans.), Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 132-144.
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compared the variability of specific types to a multifaceted stone which may rest at 
equilibrium in many positions (each position corresponding to a type). This polygon is 
relatively stable when resting, yielding only slightly to minor pressures and returning to its 
original equilibrium when such pressure is withdrawn. These minor pressures are analogous 
to the effects of selection on ordinary variability, which is capable of creating subtypes within
populations but cannot safeguard them against regressing to the mean once its pressure is 
withdrawn. The stone can only be made to roll onto a new face and attain a new position of 
stability from which it will not regress through a “powerful effort”. But even if this effort is 
attributed to external forces such as selection, these can be considered to have no role in 
shaping the form of the new type. For Galton the faces of his polygon instead represent pre-
existing and fixed ‘islands’ of stability in a sea of possible configurations between the 
structural components of the organism. For Galton, selection therefore only has a capacity to 
shape directly the continuous variability found in populations, which is subject to regression 
and therefore cannot produce permanent new forms. The only constant forms produced in 
evolution are discontinuous and cannot be altered by selection, as their inherent stability 
precludes their being moulded.420 
Galton's discontinuous variations produced distinct racial populations. Because regression 
within populations prevented true divergence, the only means by which selection could effect
anything evolutionarily permanent was through choosing between these competing races. 
Galton's idea of evolution through natural selection as a racial contest was shared by Herbert 
Spencer, the renowned British polymath and public intellectual, and it was this interpretation 
of selection which informed Spencer's description of evolutionary history as “the survival of 
the fittest”. This idea of racial contest was informed by the contemporary belief in world 
history as shaped by a struggle between human races for global supremacy. This was a 
variation-led model of evolution which treated selection as a merely destructive force, a sieve
shaking out the weak and sparing the strong ('sifting' was another of Spencer's terms for his 
version of selection). Darwin, however, was unconvinced that such inter-populational 
competition could produce the level of adaptation seen in nature. It was only, he thought, 
through the differential accumulation of minute and ordinary favourable variations as a 
consequence of intra-populational competition over vast stretches of time that nature could 
420 Ibid., pp. 342-351.
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achieve the fine-grained fit of purpose to place seen in wild organisms. This accorded 
selection a creative role as an architect piecing together adaptive structures out of irregular 
naturally occurring material.421 
For Galton, unlike Darwin, ancestral heredity would almost always outweigh recent 
divergence and return lineages to the population type. To effect an equilibrium shift required 
single large variations, 'sports', in order to overcome this racial inertia. Galton was not the 
first to question Darwin's reliance on the accumulation of small variations – T.H. Huxley 
reprimanded Darwin just prior to the Origin’s publication for having “loaded yourself with an
unnecessary difficulty in adopting Natura non facit saltum [‘nature does not proceed in 
jumps’] so unreservedly”. From 'saltum' derives the term used to describe theories of 
'jumping evolution', 'saltationism'.422 Darwin acknowledged the existence of larger variations 
and asserted that selection could operate on both “excessively slight individual differences… 
[and] on those greater differences which are called sports” but he did not believe the latter to 
play a major role in evolution due to their comparative scarcity as material for selection.423 
Darwin became further convinced of the minimal role of sports in evolution as a consequence
of Jenkin’s 1867 argument that rare variations would generally be diluted down into 
irrelevance within a few generations due to the tendency of parental inheritances to blend 
(Darwin commented in the 5th edition of Origin that until he read Jenkin “I did not appreciate 
how rarely single variations, whether slight or strongly marked, could be perpetuated”).424 
One of Galton’s significant contributions to the case for saltationism was in his pointing to 
examples such as the inheritance of eye colour in humans and coat colour in dogs where 
unions between differing parents produced offspring with the trait of one or the other parent 
as opposed to an intermediary trait. Galton used these to argue that some variations were 
inherited ‘exclusively’ rather than being blended, and therefore sports could potentially 
produce new species without the risk of reverting to type.425 
421 Ibid., pp. 52-53 & 60-70.
422 Stephen Jay Gould and Niles Eldredge, ‘Punctuated Equilibria: The Tempo and Mode of Evolution 
Reconsidered’, Paleobiology, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1977, p. 115.
423 Charles Darwin, The Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication: Vol. 1, 2nd ed., London: John 
Murray, 1888, p. 234.
424 Jean Gayon, Darwinism’s Struggle for Survival: Heredity and the Hypothesis of Natural Selection, Matthew
Cobb (Trans.), Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 96.
425 Ibid., p. 173.
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One reason Galton embraced saltationism was due to his rejection of Darwin's theory of 
pangenesis, which as we have seen assumed the inheritance of acquired adult characteristics.  
Against this view, Galton held that individuals are “no more than passive transmitters of a 
nature we have received, and which we have no power to modify”. He went further to state 
that it would be “an approximately correct view of the origin of our life, if we consider our 
own embryo to have sprung immediately from those embryos whence our parents were 
developed, and these from the embryos of their parents, and so on for ever”.426 He would later
point to the additional fact that the ova and testes of mammals formed when they developed 
in the womb, and that therefore if any pangenetic mechanism for the inheritance of acquired 
characteristics existed, it would likely only affect grandchildren rather than the first 
generation of offspring and could therefore not directly respond to environmental influences, 
as Darwin's provisional hypothesis supposed.427  
Based on the apparent similarities of their views on acquired characteristics, Galton has been 
suggested to have anticipated Weismann's hypothesis of the sequestration of the germ-plasm. 
Bulmer, however, argues that he only does so “in a weak sense”, pointing out that he arrived 
at his hypotheses from the reverse direction to Weismann, moving from an assumption that 
acquired adult characteristics are rarely if ever inherited to the conclusion that inheritance can
be regarded as taking place from embryo to embryo.428 Moreover, Radick has observed that 
whilst Galton is often regarded as an “arch hereditarian”, he allowed for a substantial role for 
environmental factors in the development of hereditary potentials – eugenics, Galton 
remarked in 1904, deals not only with “all influences that improve the inborn qualities of a 
race” but also “those that develop them to the utmost advantage”. Galton’s environmentalism 
has been downplayed by many historians of science, Radick suggests, due to the fact that 
19th century Galtonism has come to be seen as foreshadowing 20th century Batesonian 
Mendelism. This interpretation is problematic not least due to the fact that prior to 1900 the 
most influential British utilisers and developers of Galtonian method and theory were 
biometricians such as Walter Weldon and Karl Pearson, both among the loudest of 
Mendelism’s early critics. Weldon in particular would argue that Galtonian analysis of 
426 Staffan Müller-Wille and Hans Jörg Rheinberger, A Cultural History of Heredity, Chicago and London: 
The University of Chicago Press, 2012, p. 79.
427 Francis Galton, Natural Inheritance, New York and London: Macmillan and Co., 1894, p. 14-16.
428 Michael Bulmer, ‘The Development of Francis Galton's Ideas on the Mechanism of Heredity’, Journal of 
the History of Biology, Vol. 32, No. 2, 1999, p. 291.
Page -186-
populational data showed, contrary to the Mendelian claim that trait production could be 
understood in terms of the uniform action of binary dominant-recessive factor pairs, that 
instead trait production was highly dependent on the broader genetic and environmental 
context. In Weldon’s eyes, Galton’s research supported his belief that dominance “depend[s] 
not upon the character borne by a germinal determinant, but upon the condition of the 
determinant itself, and upon its relation to the other germinal determinants, at some moment 
during fertilisation or subsequent development”. This evident diversity of research and theory
among Galton’s acolytes suggests that his direct influence on anti-environmentalist accounts 
of variation should not be overestimated.429 The interpretation of Galtonism as a precursor of 
Mendelism was instead a product of the biometrician-Mendelian debate of the early 1900s, 
which can subsequently be reinterpreted as a debate within Galtonism (de Marais observes 
that “Galton was claimed as a father by both Mendelians… and biometricians”).430 Bateson’s 
apparent victory in this debate (eased by Weldon’s untimely death in 1906) would henceforth
shape the interpretation of Galton’s science as proto-Mendelian, and this interpretation of 
Galtonism did, I would argue, aid in the promotion of anti-environmentalist theories of 
variation. 
Whilst arising from different sources, Weismann’s theory of germline sequestration and 
Bateson’s anti-environmentalist Galtonism would be important contributors to what 
Christoph Bonneuil has termed 'the move out of history'. This was a shift in fin de siècle 
biology towards a dehistoricised view of certain aspects of living things, especially heredity. 
As already identified by Jean Gayon, heredity shifted in this period from being thought of as 
a fluid force subject to historical dynamics to being identified as a rigid structure enduring 
through time. Alongside this movement towards structural thinking, Bonneuil also identifies 
a growing ‘sanctuarisation’ of heredity in units deep within the body, a shift “from infinite 
universe to closed world”. These hereditary units additionally underwent ‘devitalization’, 
being no longer thought of as comparable to autonomous, self-reproducing and competing 
microorganisms and more and more treated as stable and immutable bearers of elementary 
traits.431 What applied to heredity also applied to variation, which shifted in this period from 
429 Gregory Radick, ‘Physics in the Galtonian Sciences of Heredity’, Studies in History and Philosophy of 
Biological and Biomedical Sciences, Vol 42, 2011, pp. 129-138.
430 Robert de Marais, ‘The Double-Edged Effect of Sir Francis Galton: A Search for the Motives in the 
Biometrician-Mendelian Debate’, Journal of the History of Biology, Vol. 7, No. 1, 1974, p. 142.
431 Christoph Bonneuil, ‘Producing Identity, Industrializing Purity: Elements for a Cultural History of 
Genetics’, In: A Cultural History of Heredity IV: Heredity in the Century of the Gene, Max Planck Preprint 
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being thought of as a continual product of organism-environment interactions, as in Darwin's 
correlational theory, to being instead conceived as “a definite, physiological event, the 
addition or omission of one or more definite elements”, as William Bateson would later 
describe the early Mendelian interpretation of variation.432 This shift would have major 
implications for concepts of wild type, which shifted from being understood as a contingent 
product of temporary stabilities in the natural economy to being reinterpreted as unchanging, 
constituted by a biochemically stable hereditary constitution and as being open to 
translocation into the artificial environment and disciplining domesticating regime of the 
genetics laboratory.
Weismann’s Mosaic Theory of Development
Having introduced his concept of sequestration of the germ-plasm, I will now turn my focus 
to the theories of August Weismann and discuss their impact on Darwinism. As indicated 
previously, Weismann came to reject the inheritance of acquired adult characteristics and 
Darwin's correlational theory of variation from the opposite direction to Galton, beginning 
with a theory of hereditary transmission before drawing conclusions regarding variation. His 
theory of sequestration was rooted in a mosaic theory of embryonic development. 
Purportedly, a fertilised zygote contains all the hereditary units, or ‘determinates’, inherited 
from its parents. To specialise into brain, bone, blood, etc. cells, these determinates are 
unequally divided among the daughter cells. All adult somatic cells therefore only have the 
contingent of determinates relative to their specific function. This raises a problem for 
reproduction, since if all cells specialise, there will remain no cell with the full complement 
of determinates necessary for embryonic development.433 Therefore, Weismann reasoned, the 
hereditary materials in the fertilised egg must be copied at the beginning of ontogeny, 
producing an intact, inactivated germ-plasm unutilised in development, which migrates into 
the reproductive organs.434 Because somatic cells, unlike the germ-line, are not sequestered, 
any alterations they acquire cannot be passed down to future generations. Consequently, use 
and disuse of organs in life cannot be a source of novel variation. 
343, pp. 86-90. 
432 William Bateson, The Methods and Scope of Genetics, Cambridge University Press, 1908, p. 48.
433 Ron Amundson, The Changing Role of the Embryo in Evolutionary Thought: Roots of Evo-Devo, 
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In denying the possibility of Lamarckian use inheritance, Weismann was not seeking to 
undermine Darwin's theories. Rather, Weismann believed that the generation of novel 
variation was in itself unnecessary for most evolutionary change. He regarded selection to be 
the ‘all-sufficient’ evolutionary power and as capable of pushing extant variability in 
whatever direction was needed, a radical adaptationism diverging from Darwin’s own view 
that natural selection is the “main but not exclusive means of modification”.435 He did not 
think limits to variation significantly impacted the potential creativity of selection, selection 
being able, like a composer working with the twelve musical notes, to craft great works out of
basic components.436 This belief in selection’s power extended as far as Weismann claiming 
that even heredity was subordinate to it. Selection acted as both a principle of conservation 
and of divergence, maintaining adaptive structures in stable environments and permitting 
their variation in fluctuating ones. As a consequence, Weismann did not think, as Darwin did,
that if selective pressures were relaxed that heredity would ensure the continuation of traits 
acquired under selection, but rather believed that under a state of relaxed selection 
degenerative ‘regressive evolution’ would occur. He for example attributes the loss of the 
instinct to escape in domestic animals as due to the “cessation of the action of natural 
selection, and a consequent gradual degeneration of the instinct”, as opposed to, say, artificial
selection for tameness.437 Elsewhere, he asks ““Why have most of our domestic animals lost 
their original colouring?”, to which he answers “Clearly because colour became of little or no
importance to them as soon as they were sheltered under the protection of man, while in a 
wild state it was a great safeguard against detection by their enemies”.438 Weismann therefore 
denied there to be a strict analogy between domestic and wild variation, which were products 
of the absence and presence of the struggle for existence respectively. If reversion to the wild 
type did occur, it must be due to re-exposure to the struggle for existence and consequent 
adaptation, not due to the influence of the conditions of existence.439 
435 Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured 
Races in the Struggle for Life, Penguin Classics, 2009, p. 15. 
436 Sander Gliboff, ‘The Pebble and the Planet’, Thesis (PhD): Johns Hopkins University, 2001, p. 110.
437 August Weismann, ‘Retrogressive Development in Nature’, Lilian J. Gould (Trans.), In: Essays upon 
Heredity and Kindred Biological Problems, Vol. II, Edward B. Poulton and Arthur E. Shipley (Eds.), 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1891, pp. 23-24. 
438 Ibid., pp. 18-19.
439 Jean Gayon, Darwinism’s Struggle for Survival: Heredity and the Hypothesis of Natural Selection, Matthew
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Even given Weismann's 'all-sufficient' selection, it was difficult to see how evolution could 
proceed without at least occasional novel variations. There has been some confusion as to 
what Weismann's actual views on variation were, facilitated, Rasmus Winther has shown, by 
the fact that he changed his main theories several times. It has consequently been  asserted 
that Weismann believed in internal sources of variation (Coleman) or else that he thought 
variability inherent to organisms (Gayon).440 Winther has however maintained that Weismann
held to an externalist view of variation's causes throughout his career, believing that whilst 
acquired somatic variations were not inherited, acquired germ-plasm variations were, and that
these were only ever produced through being induced by external conditions.441 Winther 
identifies four principles stages to Weismann's thinking on variation: ‘vague externalism’ 
(1875-1884), ‘phylogenetic externalism’ (1885-1891), ‘hierarchical externalism’ (1892-5), 
and ‘externalist selectionism’ (1895-1914). Winther asserts that it was only as a phylogenetic 
externalist that Weismann argued for both the morphological and the variational 
sequestration of the germ-plasm. The former entails only the physical separation of germ-
plasm and soma, whereas the latter also assumes the shielding of the germ-plasm from the 
direct effects of environmental influences. At this stage, Weismann assumed all variability in 
multicellular life to be ancestral variability derived from their prokaryote evolutionary 
progenitors. Whilst Weismann did leave room for changes for external conditions to 
indirectly cause germ-plasm variations through nutrition, temperature, etc., he did not during 
this period believe their effects to be significant. Weismann instead believed the great 
majority of differences between individual multicellular organisms to be due to the effects of 
amphimixis in sexual reproduction, which had the effect of ‘shuffling’ the determinants 
passed down from the parents. He abandoned this position in 1891 in response to a critical 
paper by Marcus Hartog, which derided the notion that ‘shuffling’ through amphimixis could 
explain speciation and the constancy of species differences. Hartog pointed out that either 
there were species-specific germ-plasms, in which case amphimixis could not explain how 
new kinds of germ-plasm might arise, or else there was a common ancestral germ-plasm 
shared by all metazoans, which simply begged the question of why, if the assortment of 
440 William Coleman, ‘Cell, Nucleus, and Inheritance: An Historical Study’, Proceedings of the American 
Philosophical Society, Vol. 109, No. 3, 1965 pp. 153-154; & Jean Gayon, Darwinism’s Struggle for 
Survival: Heredity and the Hypothesis of Natural Selection, Matthew Cobb (Trans.), Cambridge University 
Press, 1998, p. 152.
441 Rasmus G. Winther, ‘August Weismann on Germ-Plasm Variation’, Journal of the History of Biology, Vol. 
4, 2001, pp. 519-22 & 526-8. 
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determinants was what determined species differences, amphimixis did not occasionally 
produce offspring of a different species to the parent.442
Weismann’s post-Hartog ‘hierarchical externalism’ subsequently dropped the assumption of 
‘variational sequestration’ in favour of the assumption that the metazoan germ-plasm could 
be directly induced to vary. But Weismann’s account of how germ-plasm variations could be 
induced remained unconvincing in explaining evolutionary change. He for example 
suggested that excess nourishment could lead to determinants doubling. He believed that in 
some cases the functionality of these doubled determinants could change but did not specify 
how. Determinant doubling at best appears to have allowed restricted variation on a theme, 
not true novelty.443 Similarly, he also suggested that nutritional variations within the body 
might increase or diminish the effects of particular determinants, but again only quantitative 
differences as opposed to qualitative variations were thus possible.444 Weismann continued to 
insist that quantitative change was enough, maintaining that “what appears to us a qualitative 
variation is, in reality, nothing more than a greater or less”.445 This reluctance to countenance 
the qualitative production of novelty may seem strange and counter-productive since it forced
Weismann to demand more of selection as a creative force. But it can be understood as a 
product of a time of warring camps within the evolutionist community, which in places 
promoted a reactionary and polemical radicalism. Weismann for instance proclaimed 'the all-
sufficiency of natural selection' as a direct response to his Neo-Larmarckian opponent 
Herbert Spencer declaring 'the inadequacy of natural selection'. Neither would seek to 
compromise.446 It is this context of polarisation, where qualitative interpretations of variation 
were increasingly associated with competing variation-led interpretations of evolution, e.g. 
Batesonian Mendelism and de Vriesian mutationism, which likely explains Weismann's 
persistent attachment to quantitative variation, even given that it was an unconvincing 
solution to the problem of the origins of novelty.  
442 Ibid., pp. 519-540.
443 Ibid., p. 541.
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Haeckel's Externalism & the Origins of Weismann’s Break with Darwinian Orthodoxy
If we accept Winther’s revisionist account, Weismann continued throughout his career to 
believe that external conditions operating on the developing germ-plasm were the most likely
significant source of novel variation. Whilst his sequestration theories certainly contributed to
the ‘sancturisation’ of heredity, Weismann was evidently anxious not to be seen as an 
internalist. It may at this point be asked why Weismann was so opposed to internalist theories
of variation given that they appear more compatible with a sanctuarised view of heredity (as 
we saw, Galton took this path after his rejection of inherited acquired characteristics). To 
understand why this alternative was not palatable for Weismann, it is necessary to place his 
views in the context of what for most of the late 19th century was considered 'orthodox' 
Darwinism. Weismann's Germany was dominated by what might be referred to as the 
'Haeckelian consensus'. Ernst Haeckel was Darwin's principal German evangelist and had 
chiefly won over supporters by downplaying the theory of natural selection's radical 
contingency and 'English' utilitarianism in favour of claiming continuity with the work of 
Goethe and Lamarck and arguing selection to complement, not compete, with already popular
theorised evolutionary mechanisms, e.g. the inheritance of acquired characteristics and 
developmental forces such as recapitulation.447 The most influential product of Haeckel's 
evolutionary synthesis was his Darwianian version of recapitulation, the ‘biogenetic law’, 
which held that the stages of an embryo in development represent a condensed reiteration of 
its prior evolutionary history, a law famously summarised as “ontogeny recapitulates 
phylogeny”.448 
Under Haeckel's influence, Darwinism in Germany was a broad church up until the 1880s. 
Haeckel, furthermore, was less interested in strict advocacy of natural selection than he was 
in promoting materialism and biology's reconciliation with physico-chemical law. Haeckel's 
main concern was therefore to attack what he saw as the principal threats to Darwinian 
materialism, namely natural theology and vitalist theories of life. Haeckel adhered to a 
mechanistic monist metaphysics which saw the biological world as an extension of the 
physical and denied that life processes could be directed by providence, non-physical laws or 
by the organism itself.449 It should be noted that Haeckel’s monism was somewhat different 
447 Peter J. Bowler, Evolution: The History of an Idea, University of California Press, 1989, p. 199.
448 Stephen Jay Gould, Ontogeny and Phylogeny, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1977, p. 1-7.
449 Sander Gliboff, ‘The Pebble and the Planet’, Thesis (PhD): Johns Hopkins University, 2001, p. 78.
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from today's scientific materialism in that it represented a “vitalization of matter as much as a
materialization of life”, as Haeckel, whilst hostile to Christianity, had pantheistic 
sympathies.450 Haeckel nonetheless insisted that all biological phenomena were reducible to 
physico-chemical causes and that any theory which failed to meet this monistic criteria, e.g. 
by invoking forbidden teleologies or idiosyncratic 'biological laws', was to be dismissed as 
‘dualism’. A scientific theory was further only compatible with Haeckel's metaphysics if it 
concurred with what Gliboff dubs the ‘doctrine of external causes’, following which “the 
admissible causes of variation could not include either divine providence or any influences of
the organism’s own purposes, mind, spirit, or just about any internal initiative”.451 The 
Haeckelian demand that the ascribed causes of variation be external presupposed that 
typicality and divergence were products of organismic responses to the conditions of 
existence, and therefore tacitly assumed that little could be discovered about evolutionary 
variation through the study of organisms under unvarying laboratory conditions. 
Understanding the environment was as important as understanding heredity, and external 
conditions could therefore not be dismissed from consideration as geneticists would later 
claim. Wild types, moreover, were the product of wild conditions and could not be 
domesticated without triggering changes in the organisms. 
Weismann, whilst having little time for Haeckel's monism, supported the reductionistic drive 
to limit the number of causal powers invoked in science. He wrote approvingly that 
Haeckel’s plastidule theory, by proposing “that heredity depends upon the transference of 
motion, and variability upon a change of this motion”, helped promote the reductionist goal 
that “all laws must finally be merged in laws of motion”.452   Weismann also endorsed 
Haeckel’s theory of recapitulation, in earlier research on the origins of caterpillar markings 
being pleased to state his conclusions as “entirely based on Fritz Muller's and Haeckel's view,
that the development of the individual presents the ancestral history in nuce, the ontogeny 
being a condensed recapitulation of the phylogeny”.453 Weismann further shared Haeckel's 
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452 August Weismann, Studies in the Theory of Descent Vol. II, Raphael Meldola (Trans.), Sampson Low, 
Marston, Searle, & Rivington, 1882, pp. 667-669.
453 Stephen Jay Gould, Ontogeny and Phylogeny, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1977, pp. 
102-3; & August Weismann, Studies in the Theory of Descent Vol. I, Raphael Meldola (Trans.), Sampson 
Page -193-
fervent rejection of internalist evolutionary theories, dedicating much of his 1875 book 
Studies to the refutation of attempts, such as Ernst Nägeli's “automatic perfecting process”, to
introduce a “developmental force” into evolution.454 Weismann asserts that that the 
acceptance of “a phyletic vital force… involves a renunciation of the possibility of 
comprehending the organic world”, for “the admission of this power is directly opposed to 
the laws of natural science, which forbid the assumption of unknown forces as long as it is 
not demonstrated that known forces are insufficient for the explanation of the phenomena”. 
He also thought such a phyletic vital force incompatible with selection, maintaining that 
“both together are inconceivable”.455 Weismann moreover argued that “A change arising from
purely internal causes seems to me above all quite untenable, because I cannot imagine how 
the same material substratum of physical constitution of a species can be transferred to the 
succeeding generation as two opposing tendencies… All changes, from the least to the 
greatest, appear to me to depend ultimately on only external influences: they are the response 
of the organism to external inciting causes”.456 Consequently, evolutionary variation without 
external causation could not be entertained, and therefore bringing organisms into uniform 
controlled conditions, whilst productive of initial variation, would be useless as a means of 
studying evolutionary variation once a lineage was adapted to lab conditions, for there would 
be no stimulus to further variation. Any appearance of variation in lab-adapted strains was 
instead interpreted by Weismann as an effect of panmixia, which had no correlate with the 
composition of variations by selection under nature's struggle for existence. Haeckel's 
externalism thus led Weismann to be sceptical of the possible use of domesticated strains as a
means of studying general variation.
Haeckel did not respond well to Weismann's theory of germ-line sequestration, which he held
to have preformationist implications. Because Haeckel believed preformationism could only 
work in an adaptive evolutionary context by anticipating, rather than merely reacting to, 
environmental changes, he considered it to imply the necessity of some form of intelligence 
Low, Marston, Searle, & Rivington, 1882, p. 270.
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ensuring synchrony between organism and environment (he elsewhere militaristically 
declares “Either epigenesis and descent or preformation and Creation!”).457 Haeckel 
subsequently cast aspersions on sequestration, maintaining that “The hypothetical ‘continuity 
of the germ-plasm’ is neither empirically demonstrable nor theoretically acceptable”. He 
further more pointed to the fact that recent cytological observations had cast doubt on 
Weismann's original mosaic theory of development through the differential parcelling out of 
determinants, with observations of “the finer morphological behaviour of the karyoplasm and
the cytoplasm in the fertilisation and cleavage of the egg provid[ing] no evidence for it” (the 
mosaic theory would by 1901 be thoroughly discredited and regulative theories of 
development preferred in its stead).458 Haeckel thereby regarded the idea of the absolute 
independence of germ-plasm from soma-plasm as “purely speculative” and determinants as 
“purely hypothetical elements” of which experimentation had done nothing to prove their 
existence.459 Haeckel's determination to refute sequestration demonstrates that whilst 
Weismann did not view his theories as a threat to externalist doctrine, Haeckel himself 
perceived otherwise and saw in Weismann a challenge to Darwin's correlational theory of 
variation. 
Weismann drifted further away from Haeckelian orthodoxy with his 1895 adoption of the 
theory of germinal selection, which Winther cites as signalling Weismann's move to an 
externalist selectionism.460 Germinal selection originated as an attempt to counter Spencer's 
claim that natural selection could not explain why useful variations regularly arise in 
evolution. Spencer cited examples such as the extremely rudimentary state of whale 
hindlimbs, which he believed could only be explained in terms of the Lamarckian effects of 
disuse as their diminution went far beyond any adaptive requirement.461 To explain such 
cases, Weismann postulated that not only can changes in nutrition lead to quantitative 
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variations in determinants but also that individual determinant-types compete for this 
nutrition, resulting in the greater attenuation of useless traits. Weismann also believed that 
germinal selection would increase the general range of variation upon which natural selection
could act.462 His critics, however, pointed out that this variation by and large still remained 
quantitative, not qualitative, so did not solve the problem of novelty. Additionally, germinal 
selection appeared to suggest that internal forces (the competing determinants) could direct 
evolution along trajectories antithetical to the adaptive interests of the organism as a whole.463
Weismann at first sought to avoid this implication by making the ad hoc suggestion of a 
correlation between selection at the personal and the germinal levels, whereby competition 
between determinants would only push variation in directions beneficial to the organism as a 
whole. This idea did not prove credible and in his later rendition of the theory in 1904 
Weismann acknowledged that germinal selection on determinants would on occasion direct 
variation along maladaptive trajectories.464 The utility of this alteration was to provide a 
hypothetical but strictly physicalist causal account for how limited directional and non-
adaptive evolution might take place. This helped combat the claims of some anti-Darwinian 
evolutionists, such as the American paleaontologist Alpheus Hyatt, who argued that natural 
selection could not explain certain patterns in evolutionary history, e.g. the apparent 
overgrowth of ammonite shells, which he attributed to 'orthogenesis', the non-adaptive 
internally driven tendency for species to directionally vary over time. Indeed, the American 
Darwinian Vernon Kellogg approvingly described germinal selection as “a real orthogenesis”
that he believed could help explain ‘un-Darwinian’ development in ‘causo-mechanical’ 
terms, i.e. without Hyatt's mysterious internal drives.465 But whilst Weismann could now 
account for non-adaptive variation, he had also embraced a hierarchical theory of selection 
that ran contrary to the orthodox interpretation of Darwinism as a single-level theory of 
selection restricted to operating at the level of the organism for the benefit of individuals and 
their descendants.466 The 1904 version of germinal selection therefore eschewed more 
462 Rasmus G. Winther, ‘August Weismann on Germ-Plasm Variation’, Journal of the History of Biology, Vol. 
4, 2001, pp. 542-5.
463 Sander Gliboff, ‘Monism and Morphology at the Turn of the Twentieth century’, Pre-circulated paper for 
the International Colloquium on “The Monist Century, 1845–1945: Science, Secularism and Worldview,” 
Queens University, Belfast, 2–3 October 2009, 2009, pp. 1-3.
464 Rasmus G. Winther, ‘August Weismann on Germ-Plasm Variation’, Journal of the History of Biology, Vol. 
4, 2001, p. 544.
465 Vernon L. Kellogg, Darwinism To-Day, New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1907, p. 135.
466 Stephen Jay Gould, The Structure of Evolutionary Theory, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
2002, p. 63.
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optimistic interpretations of natural selection  as always tending to work for the ultimate good
of organisms and lineages.
Weismann's new ontology of selection left much less room for Haeckel’s claim of evolution 
as mechanistic but generally progressive. Moreover, whilst Weismann continued to profess 
himself to be an externalist, it is clear that his theories of germinal sequestration and germinal
selection played a major role in making appeals to internal forces and downplaying the role 
of the environment in variation acceptable in Darwinian evolutionary theory. This 
undermined Haeckel’s orthodoxy of the doctrine of external causes and created a rift between
Darwinians who continued to accept the inheritance of acquired characteristics and those who
believed the germ-line shielded from somatic influences. Whilst Weismann did not deny the 
influence of external conditions on organismic variation, he constrained their influence and 
emphasised the role of internal forces at their expense. He therefore, in spite of his externalist
inclinations, played a significant role in Bonneuil's 'sanctuarisation' of heredity. Furthermore, 
by foregrounding the determinant as an independent entity which on occasion acted for its 
own advantage against that of the organism as a whole, Weismann made a significant 
contribution to the early 20th century development of genocentrism, with its accompanying 
rejection of both the primacy of external environmental influences and the importance of 
genetic interactions in the ontogeny of adaptive traits. Whilst sanctuarisation would enable 
wild types to cross the domestic-wild divide into the laboratory, this incipient genocentrism 
would eventually disintegrate wild types into their component genes. In this manner, 
Weismann's 'Neo-Darwinism', as his pan-selectionist evolutionist paradigm would come to be
known, would both contribute to the domestication of wild types and to their ultimate 
destruction as 'epistemic things'. 
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Chapter 8 – ‘Revisionary Darwinians’: De Vries & Bateson, their Influences &
their Solutions to the Problem of Variation
'Revisionary Darwinism': the Influence of Galton and Weismann
This chapter will examine the origins and development of the research programmes of Hugo 
de Vries and William Bateson, 'revisionary Darwinians' whose efforts to understand and 
experimentalise variation would open the way for the domestication of wild types as tools for
genetic research. I will begin by examining their theoretical influences, then discuss their 
individual research histories prior to the 'rediscovery' of Mendel in 1900. I will discuss their 
post-1900 work in the next chapter. Whilst not downplaying Mendel's contribution to their 
subsequent thought and practice, I will in this chapter seek to show that both de Vries and 
Bateson were already convinced before 1900 that the causes of evolutionary variation were 
internal, that the germ-line was sequestered, and that the most promising avenue for scientific
investigation lay in bringing organisms under controlled conditions and subjecting them to 
experimental intervention (mostly in the form of breeding experiments). This move towards 
experimentally domesticating heredity and variation would prove a platform for the wild 
type's crossing the threshold into the laboratory. 
I will preface my discussion of de Vries and Bateson by noting that they were part of a larger,
heterogeneous group of late 19th century evolutionary theorists and experimentalists 
investigating variation as a means of establishing the process of evolution. This group, which 
included many of the founders of genetics, was characterised by a seemingly paradoxical 
common tendency to dismiss natural selection but profess admiration for Charles Darwin.467 
Similarly, they were influenced to accept the sanctuarisation of heredity by Weismann's 
sequestration theory (so had little time for the inheritance of acquired characteristics favoured
by many Darwinian 'moderates') but strongly rejected his 'all mighty' selection, tending 
instead to favour Galtonian saltational variations as the main driver of evolutionary change. 
This group were therefore not strict anti-Darwinians but they were far from orthodox.468 Roll-
467 Bowler notes that this only appears paradoxical to us due to our failure to appreciate that it was common 
descent not natural selection that most 19th century evolutionists saw as the chief theory and scientific 
contribution of Darwin's Origin. See: Peter J. Bowler, The Eclipse of Darwinism: Anti-Darwinian Evolution 
Theories in the Decades around 1900, The John Hopkins University Press, 1983, pp. 12-13. 
468 For an example of members of this group being portrayed as anti-Darwinists, see: Ernst Mayr, The Growth 
of Biological Thought: Diversity, Evolution and Inheritance, The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 1982, p. 777 (Bateson and de Vries are described as “essentialists and saltationists” opposed to 
Darwinism). T.H. Morgan admittedly openly flirted with “anti-Darwinism” (1903) but his hostility seems 
principally aimed at Weismann's Neo-Darwinism as opposed to Darwinism in general. Notably, he later 
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Hansen has suggested a possible umbrella term of ‘reform Darwinism’ to characterise this 
group (he marks Wilhelm Johannsen out as a ‘reform Darwinian’ and suggests many of his 
fellow plant breeders, who were disappointed with the outcomes of systematic mass selection
experiments, also qualified under this label).469 To avoid confusion with the American anti-
Spencerian social Darwinists also termed under this label, I will instead of 'reform 
Darwinians' use my own alternative coining, ‘revisionary Darwinians’, a label which, whilst 
lacking grounding in historical usage, does not have the problem of an established and 
different prior usage.470 I believe this title is also more appropriate given that whilst this 
grouping was ostensibly loyal to Darwinism, it is certainly true that their attempts to reform 
evolutionary theory were widely seen as reading Darwin both against the grain of ‘moderate’ 
interpretations and in conflict with pan-selectionist ‘Neo-Darwinian’ interpretations. 
Alongside de Vries and Bateson, I also include Wilhelm Johannsen and T.H. Morgan, both of
whose work I will discuss later, as 'revisionary Darwinians'.
The differences between de Vries and Bateson's revisionary views compared to those 
orthodox Darwinians who held to the correlational theory of variation are particularly evident
when it comes to the matter of 'wild type'. Through their experimental and theoretical work, 
wild types were transformed from unstable products of the economy of nature to inherently 
stable types constant in their heredity. This transformation was enabled through both 
assuming Weismann's sequestration of heredity and developing saltational theories of 
variation. In his 1894 work Materials, Bateson, discussing two forms of cockroach, describes
how “as the structure of the typical form varies around its mean condition, so the structure of 
the variety varies around another mean condition”, and from this argues that it may be usual 
in what he calls ‘discontinuous variation’ “that in varying the organism passes from a form 
which is the normal for the type to another form which is a normal [sic] for the variety”.471 De
Vries similarly identifies a “‘species-forming’ variability” which he terms “Mutability”, and 
states in 1909 that “Darwin's method is our method, the way he pointed out we follow” – See: Thomas Hunt 
Morgan, Evolution and Adaptation, The Macmillan Company, 1903, pp. 154-166, & Thomas Hunt Morgan, 
‘For Darwin’, The Popular Science Monthly, J. McKeen Cattell (Ed.), Vol. LCCIV, New York: The Science 
Press, 1909, p. 380.
469 Nils Roll-Hansen, ‘Sources of Wilhelm Johannsen’s Genotype Theory’, Journal of the History of Biology, 
Vol. 42, 2009, p. 465.
470 For details on American 'reform Darwinism', see: Maureen L. Egan, ‘Evolutionary Theory in the Social 
Philosophy of Charlotte Perkins Gilman’, Hypatia, Vol. 4, No. 1, The History of Women in Philosophy, 
1989, pp. 104-6.
471 William Bateson, Materials for the Study of Variation treated with Especial Regard for to Discontinuity in 
the Origin of Species, Macmillan and Co., 1894, p. 68.
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further which is distinguished from the “ordinary or so-called individual variation” which 
Darwin had identified as the material for the origin of species. This individual variation de 
Vries held to be incapable of bringing about evolutionary change, regarding it as merely 
environmentally induced and non-inherited “fluctuation” around the species norm.472 It was 
thus by mutation, a stochastic and non-directional process, that de Vries held wild types and 
other specific forms to be produced. These forms were moreover considered to be either 
“elementary species” or “retrograde varieties”, the former being distinct from their parent 
species due their possessing an additional hereditary character whereas the latter were 
regarded as derivative but could similarly be kept constant if pedigree bred. De Vries 
distinguished these “real units” from the “systematic species” of taxonomy, which he 
regarded “practical units” but “not really existing entities”. 473 The affiliation between wild 
types and other so-called varieties was therefore for de Vries an interspecific, not 
intraspecific, relationship.
Bateson and de Vries attributed the stability of wild types as unchanging “units of nature” to 
the stability of the biochemical elements that composed their constitution. The discontinuous 
character of mutations was seen as further evidence for this chemical basis to the nature of 
types. De Vries for example observes how “Transitions… are as completely absent 
between… [elementary species] as they are between the molecules of the chemist”, and 
compares the production of a new elementary species through mutation to “a chemical 
substitution”.474 Bateson similarly asserts that “It is on the whole not unreasonable to expect 
that the definiteness of at least some Substantive Variations depends ultimately on the 
discontinuity of chemical affinities”, citing the example of colour, there being many instances
of chromatic discontinuities in nature and it further being well-known that discontinuous 
pigmentation changes can be effected in organisms by administering chemical reagents.475 
Bateson and de Vries thus both contributed to the 'devitalization' (Bonneuil) of wild types and
472 Hugo de Vries, The Mutation Theory: Experiments and Observations on the Origin of Species in the 
Vegetable Kingdom, Vol. I: The Origin of Species by Mutation, J.B. Farmer and A.D. Darbishire (Trans.), 
Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1909, pp. 4-5. 
473 Hugo de Vries, Species and Varieties: Their Origin by Mutation, Daniel Trembly MacDougal (ed.), The 
Open Court Publishing Company, 1905, pp. 12-14.
474 Ibid., p. 460; & Hugo de Vries, The Mutation Theory: Experiments and Observations on the Origin of 
Species in the Vegetable Kingdom, Vol. I: The Origin of Species by Mutation, J.B. Farmer and A.D. 
Darbishire (Trans.), Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1909, pp. 3-4. 
475 William Bateson, Materials for the Study of Variation treated with Especial Regard for to Discontinuity in 
the Origin of Species, Macmillan and Co., 1894, pp. 71-72.
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therefore helped legitimise the idea that not only would the constitution of wild types be 
unaffected by the transition into an experimental laboratory ecology but also that once 
domesticated wild types could be depended upon to remain stable, much as the materials of a 
chemistry lab could be depended on not to deteriorate so long as they were properly purified 
and isolated. The variation of the progeny of crosses between purified wild types and mutant 
strains was similarly interpreted as analogous to a reaction generated by the combining of 
chemicals. Reversion to the wild type was meanwhile interpreted as due to the activation or 
addition of a hereditary factor previously lost in the transition into domestication.476  
The scientific domestication of wild types in the lab or experimental garden would not only 
allow for purification and experimental control over variation but would also allow for study 
of greater variation than that found in nature itself. Whilst they denied its creative capacity, 
Bateson and de Vries did very much acknowledge natural selection's destructive ability to 
exterminate unfit variations. The prevalence of wild types in nature as compared to other 
varieties was down to their better capacity to survive under such conditions. The laboratory, 
by ‘suspending’ the effects of natural selection, allowed deficient and deleterious forms to 
perpetuate themselves and therefore be studied. De Vries thus comments that whilst in nature 
most mutants “have as a rule but a very short lease of life”, the experimental garden instead 
preserved what “among wild-growing plants, is lost to observation”.477 Laboratory conditions 
were thus valorised over the wild as sites for the study of variation's full range (another 
example of Kohler's 'cultural body-snatching').
Overall, Bateson and de Vries’ new interpretation of wild type was based on an acceptance of
Darwin’s claim that evolution is based on common descent and not inherently directional, but
both scientists rejected the fundamental Darwinian argument that species are historical 
entities in a state of flux. They recognised that species did tend to show fluctuating variability
around a norm but did not regard this as ‘real’ variation in that they believed it merely to 
affect the external properties of organisms and not the internal hereditary units which 
constituted their true species identity. These hereditary units were thought chemical in nature 
and like other chemical substances tended to be inherently stable and only capable of 
476 Hugo de Vries, Species and Varieties: Their Origin by Mutation, Daniel Trembly MacDougal (ed.), The 
Open Court Publishing Company, 1905, pp. 254-5; & Elof Axel Carlson, The Gene: A Critical History, 
W.B. Saunders Company, 1966, pp. 58-62.
477 Hugo de Vries, ‘The Origin of Species by Mutation’, Science, New Series, Vol. 15, No. 384, 1902, p. 723.
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discontinuous change. The nature of such changes, it was believed, could only be explicated 
in terms of internal stochastic dynamics – the external conditions of nature could at most 
stimulate variation but had no capacity to affect either the form or the direction of the 
variational change in these internal units as they were almost entirely shielded from its 
effects. Consequently, wild types and other ‘elementary species’ could be legitimately 
studied under domestic conditions, as it was not believed that such environs had any effect on
their heritable nature. Indeed, it was only in the laboratory that the true ‘units of nature’ could
be properly studied in isolation, as in nature closely related elementary species would tend to 
interbreed and vary into one another. The wild type thus would become a dehistoricised 
(Bonneuil), de-natured, purified, experimentalised and thoroughly domesticated component 
of a set of laboratory-based systems of scientific knowledge production. Having explored the 
impact of Bateson and de Vries' theories on conceptions of wild type, I will now seek to 
establish how it was they arrived at such radical conclusions. 
De Vries
Hugo de Vries was a Dutch botanist who had trained in the study of plant physiology under 
Julius Sachs, a pedagogy which influenced his career-long tendency to interpret biological 
phenomena in terms of their biochemistry and the mechanistic function of their parts.478 His 
first major contribution to evolutionary theories of heredity and variation was his 1889 book, 
Intracellular Pangenesis. De Vries specifically credited Darwin and Weismann as his two 
major influences in arriving at his theory of intracellular pangenesis, stating that it was from 
the former that he derived the idea of discrete hereditary particles representing individual 
characters and from the latter that he attained the understanding of acquired somatic 
characters as playing no significant role in inheritance and evolution.479 De Vries' modified 
theory of pangenesis, whilst having obvious debts to Darwin, is indeed, like Weismann's 
theory of the germ-plasm, as much an attempt to explain how developmental differentiation 
occurs as a theory of heredity. Because, unlike Weismann, he worked with plants as opposed 
to animals, and was therefore familiar with examples of vegetative reproduction (e.g. the 
ability of a new begonia plant to develop from a leaf or stem), de Vries was unconvinced by 
the argument for mosaic development and a firm dichotomy between somatoplasm and germ-
478 Stephen Jay Gould, The Structure of Evolutionary Theory, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
2002, p. 419-420.
479 Ida H. Stamhuis, Onno G. Meijer and Erik J. A. Zevenhuizen, ‘Hugo de Vries on Heredity, 1889-1903: 
Statistics, Mendelian Laws, Pangenes, Mutations’, Isis, Vol. 90, No. 2, 1999, p. 243.
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plasm. He asserted there to be “nowhere a sharp line of demarcation between the secondary 
germ-tracks and the somatic tracks of the plant. The latter have developed only quite 
gradually out of the former. And even though they have in fact often lost the power of 
reproduction, everything speaks in favor of the fact that they still very frequently possess it 
potentially”. De Vries bolstered his argument by pointing to the phenomenon of galls, which 
are formed when a parasite utilises a plant’s own genetic resources to form a protective shell. 
He observed that since galls “even at their highest differentiation, are built up of only such 
anatomical elements as are otherwise found in the plant bearing them”, and as they are “not at
all restricted [in their components] to the anatomical elements of the organs on which they 
originate”, that therefore “all, or at least the greatest number of the cells of the plant-body 
contain all the hereditary characters of the species in a latent condition”.480 De Vries 
explained this latency of the pangens in terms of their residing in the cell nucleus. Pangens 
were only activated when they crossed into the cytoplasm, and it was this comparatively 
limited motility that he referred to as ‘intracellular pangenesis’.481 Activation required that a 
pangen duplicate within the nucleus, with one of the two sibling units migrating into the 
cytoplasm to perform its functional roles and the other being retained as a developmental 
resource. This model, unlike Weismann’s, allowed all cells to retain the determinants 
necessary to produce a new organism, as opposed to exhausting them in their functional 
usage, thus allowing for vegetative reproduction (which Weismann could only account for 
with the ad hoc supposition that some somatic cells retained latent germ-plasm in their 
idioplasm).482 
Theunissen has argued that de Vries was motivated to change his model of pangen activation 
and latency from a developmental one in 1889 to an evolutionary one c. 1900 as a 
consequence of reading Mendel. In the 1889 model, activity and latency were temporary 
states which were not necessarily inherited, whereas in de Vries’ later Mutationstheorie these 
are permanent, hereditary states of the pangens which are only altered by mutation.483 But 
480 Hugo de Vries, Intracellular Pangenesis, C. Stuart Gager (Trans.), Chicago: The Open Court Publishing 
Company, 1910, pp. 115-119.
481 P. Kyle Stanford, Exceeding our Grasp: Science, History, and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives, 
Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 108.
482 Ida H. Stamhuis, ‘The Reactions on Hugo de Vries’s Intracellular Pangenesis; the Discussion with August 
Weismann’, Journal of the History of Biology, Vol. 36, 2003, pp. 146-147.
483 Bert Theunissen, ‘Closing the door on Hugo de Vries’ Mendelism’, Annals of Science, Vol. 51, 1994, pp. 
236-238.
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though de Vries’ version of intracellular pangenesis c. 1900 is certainly distinct from its 
original incarnation, there are important continuities which show that de Vries’ views on 
heredity and variation, and thus on wild type, were already well developed in this earlier 
period. Firstly, de Vries already in 1889 recognised there to be two distinct forms of 
variability, ‘fluctuating’ and ‘species-forming’, which would form the basis for his later 1894
distinction, also made about the same time by Bateson, between ‘continuous’ and 
‘discontinuous’ variation.484 He based this distinction on Darwin’s argument that variability 
could be attributed to “two distinct groups of causes”, the first group being variations in 
gemmule number and activity, the second being those cases where variation was due to 
gemmule modification due to the direct action of changed conditions or the use and disuse of 
parts.485 But de Vries differed from Darwin in assuming, following Weismann, that there was 
no possibility of somatic cells communicating new characters to the germ-line.486 This led 
him to conclude that the formation and nature of novel kinds of pangens as occurred in 
‘species-forming’ variability must be due to stochastic internal forces. In particular, he 
suggested that whilst “pangens, in their division, produce, as a rule, two new pangens that are
like the original one”, “exceptionally these two new pangens may be dissimilar”, and that as 
the novel one of these two pangens multiplies it will exercise an influence on the organism’s 
phenotype.487 Already at this early stage, de Vries believed this ‘species-forming’ variability, 
later his ‘mutability’, to be the only means (as the name implies) by which new species could 
arise. ‘Fluctuating’ variability due to variation in pangen numbers, which produced the 
individual differences within species, he regarded to be ultimately caused by conditions of the
environment such as nutrition. Whilst he accepted them to be “in a way, hereditary” (since 
elements of the cytoplasm as well as the nucleus were inherited by offspring), he observed 
that they are both subject to constant change and are on average highly stable over 
generations – “The average stature of man remains the same in the course of centuries, for the
same race (elementary species), but the individual stature changes constantly from one 
individual to another”.488 
484 Hugo de Vries, Intracellular Pangenesis, C. Stuart Gager (Trans.), Chicago: The Open Court Publishing 
Company, 1910, pp. 73 & 214; & Jean Gayon, Darwinism’s Struggle for Survival: Heredity and the 
Hypothesis of Natural Selection, Matthew Cobb (Trans.), Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 172.
485 Charles Darwin, The Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication: Vol. 2, 2nd ed., London: John 
Murray, 1885, p. 390.
486 Hugo de Vries, Intracellular Pangenesis, C. Stuart Gager (Trans.), Chicago: The Open Court Publishing 
Company, 1910, p. 6.
487 Ibid., p. 214.
488 Ibid., pp. 244-245.
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De Vries therefore unlike Darwin, but like Galton, did not believe ‘continuous variations’ 
could ever produce new species. This was furthermore based on an understanding of species 
as ultimately homogeneous in their inheritance of what he termed “specific characteristics”. 
De Vries distinguished these from the ‘individual features’ he attributed to changes in pangen
numbers induced by the environment, asserting specific characteristics to refer to the “units in
the hereditary substance of the nuclear thread”, the “sum total” of which “forms that which 
distinguishes any given species from all others”. This sum total consisted of those pangens 
which remained within the nucleus, as opposed to those activated in the cytoplasm, which 
whilst responsible for pangen expression were unable to influence nucleic pangens. On the 
basis of this argument, he therefore concluded that “Individual differences are thus not 
included in the type of the species”, i.e. the phenotypic differences between individuals belie 
their sharing an identical sum total of pangens in their cell nuclei. De Vries’ belief that all 
members of an elementary species share the same specific characteristics has been traced by 
Stamhuis to an erroneous interpretation of Weismann. In his preliminary version of 
Intracellular Pangenesis, de Vries “had written that according to Weismann all the ancestral 
plasms of one individual were identical”. His friend Jan Willem Moll pointed out that 
“Certainly Weismann does not assume that the germ plasm is uniform. After all he sketches it
as consisting of all kinds of striped and spotted ancestors”. De Vries acknowledged this 
mistake but continued to maintain an idea of the hereditary substance as homogeneous, 
resulting in criticism from Weismann himself in 1892.489 Whether de Vries’ misreading of 
Weismann was his inspiration or simply an indication of pre-existing beliefs, what is clear is 
that he continued to maintain and refine this belief concerning the nature of specific heredity, 
it being central to his ideas on species and evolution in both this earlier work and in the later 
Mutationstheorie. In particular, de Vries’ idea of the ‘elementary species’ as opposed to the 
systematic species as the fundamental unit of nature can be seen to have already been at least 
partially developed by 1889, as seen from the quote above regarding the variation of stature 
within human races. This implies that de Vries’ idea of the wild type as a fundamentally 
static entity and ‘elementary species’ in itself was almost certainly well developed long prior 
to his rediscovery of Mendel. 
489 Ida H. Stamhuis, ‘The Reactions on Hugo de Vries’s Intracellular Pangenesis; the Discussion with August 
Weismann’, Journal of the History of Biology, Vol. 36, 2003, pp. 141-142.
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As to whom the primary influence was in shaping such beliefs about species, it would seem 
likely that Galton's arguments concerning the impossibility of extant variability overcoming 
the limits imposed by the populational norm, and his related contention that only internally 
directed saltational change could create new species, had percolated into de Vries’ 
consciousness through his being immersed in a scientific culture sceptical of the power of 
natural selection and in which complementary and alternative evolutionary mechanisms were 
widely entertained. I say percolated as de Vries, according to James Schwartz, only became 
aware of the work of Adolphe Quetelet (the Belgian statistician whose work on human 
average variation was the major influence on Galton’s methods of analysing heredity) as late 
as 1887, and only read Galton himself in 1894, having been stimulated to do so when he read 
a paper of Weldon’s the previous year which utilised Galton’s statistical methods.490 Gould 
asserts de Vries to have stated himself to have read Quetelet and Galton in the early 1870s, 
but this is contradicted not only by Schwartz but also by de Vries’ statement in 1917 that he 
had begun his famed Oenothera experiments (which started in 1886) prior to reading 
Quetelet (“I set at work at once, first in the field but soon in the garden. I cultivated over a 
hundred wild species... Fluctuating variability was everywhere present. Then I chanced to 
meet with Quetelet's Anthropométrie… applied his methods to plants and saw that here the 
same general laws prevail”).491 This appears to corroborate Schwartz’s account. The influence
of Quetelet on de Vries’ views in Intracellular Pangenesis is quite evident in his discussion 
of fluctuating variation. With regards to Galton, however, it appears de Vries was not directly
influenced by him before 1893-4, having in the meantime arrived at many of his parallel 
conclusions concerning heredity and variation independently. Reading Galton did most likely
help de Vries codify his existing perception of variability as bimodal, in particular in his 
coming to view from 1894 onward variation as either ‘continuous’ or ‘discontinuous’. De 
Vries also did explicitly reference Galton’s polygonal model of variation in his 
Mutationstheorie, a metaphor he considered “very beautiful”.492 But Galton’s main role in 
influencing de Vries likely lay in confirming what was already suspected and in providing 
methodological tools to refine the analysis of his findings. Overall, it appears that Quetelet’s 
490 James Schwartz, In Pursuit of the Gene: From Darwin to DNA, Harvard University Press, 2008, pp. 79-80.
491 Stephen Jay Gould, The Structure of Evolutionary Theory, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
2002, p. 430; & Hugo de Vries, ‘The Origin of the Mutation Theory’, The Monist, Vol. 27, No. 3, 1917, p. 
406.
492 Hugo de Vries, The Mutation Theory: Experiments and Observations on the Origin of Species in the 
Vegetable Kingdom, Vol. I: The Origin of Species by Mutation, J.B. Farmer and A.D. Darbishire (Trans.), 
Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1909, pp. 53-55.
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methods of analysis were more useful to de Vries, Schwartz observing that they offered a 
more “simple way to compute the probabilities of the expected outcomes” compared to 
Galton’s techniques. Quetelet’s probabilistic techniques would prove central to the project 
that de Vries launched from 1895 onward of determining a “law of pangenes” through the 
study of hybrids, a research programme which would subsequently lead to de Vries 
replicating Mendel’s experimental findings.493 But whilst these findings and de Vries’ 
‘rediscovery’ of Mendel in 1900 are commonly seen as central to the beginnings of 
Mendelian genetics, they had little impact on de Vries’ own views on heredity and variation 
because he saw Mendel’s laws as having little to do with ‘natural heredity’. Mendel’s laws 
only applied to hybrids, which were uncommon in nature and in which two different sets of 
pangens were temporarily combined, de Vries believing ‘normal heredity’ to be between like 
parents with identical hereditary substances. Mendelism was therefore largely a “laboratory 
phenomenon” which moreover was not informative about the evolutionary processes which 
were de Vries’ main interest as it did not appear to involve the production of new pangens.494 
As I have attempted to show above, de Vries’ idiosyncratic views on heredity, variation and 
evolution were already well developed by 1889 (his interest in mutants, moreover, did not 
start with Oenothera Lamarckiana in 1886, having initiated a project to collect a “herbarium 
of monstrosities” to study the action of pangens as early as the late 1870s; Oenothera was 
moreover selected from the hundred plus species de Vries claimed to have cultivated as the 
one which showed the most tendency towards sudden variations).495 This is not to say that de 
Vries’ ideas were fully formed at the time he wrote Intracellular Pangenesis but rather that 
the Mutationstheorie of 1901-3 was strongly built upon the back of long-standing prior 
convictions which predated his experiments on Oenothera, his exposure to Quetelet and 
Galton and also his reading of Weismann. De Vries’ original training in plant physiology 
may have contributed to his understanding of variation as due to internal processes, but it is 
unlikely, given his mentor Julius Sachs’ scepticism towards investigating ‘speculative 
questions’, that his ideas on evolution were much influenced by this work.496 If there is a 
493 James Schwartz, In Pursuit of the Gene: From Darwin to DNA, Harvard University Press, 2008, pp. 80-85.
494 Bert Theunissen, ‘Closing the door on Hugo de Vries’ Mendelism’, Annals of Science, Vol. 51, 1994, pp. 
247-8.
495 James Schwartz, In Pursuit of the Gene: From Darwin to DNA, Harvard University Press, 2008, pp. 74-75, 
& Hugo de Vries, ‘The Origin of the Mutation Theory’, The Monist, Vol. 27, No. 3, 1917, pp 406-407.
496 Philip J. Pauly, Controlling Life: Jacques Loeb and the Engineering Ideal in Biology, Oxford University 
Press, 1987, p. 35.
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primary catalyst for de Vries’ views to be identified, the best candidate is likely to be his 
reading of Darwin’s Origin as a student.497 It has long been noted that de Vries had a very 
unorthodox reading of Darwin’s arguments concerning variation and selection.498 In 
particular, de Vries interpreted Darwin’s statement that selection works on “chance 
variations” which “[u]nless such occur natural selection can do nothing” to imply that 
“Darwin attributed a very great and often preponderating, perhaps even an exclusive, 
significance to "single variations"”, that the ‘chance variation’ referred to “were not therefore
the extreme variants of the ordinary variability” but rather ‘sports’.499 As we know, Darwin 
did acknowledge that selection operated both on ordinary variations and on sports, but he 
regarded the latter as much less important in evolution given their rarity, frequent lack of fit 
to adaptive needs and tendency to be diluted into irrelevance by blending inheritance. But 
perhaps de Vries as a student misread Darwin’s intention here, with this interpretation of 
evolution subsequently becoming a fixed idea in his mind that would not be shifted by those 
who argued him to have misconstrued Darwin’s argument. Indeed, it is notable that de Vries 
would come to ascribe the view that selection primarily acts on and forms species from 
individual variations to Wallace (he even speaks of this as the “one essential point” on which 
Wallace and Darwin’s selection theory differ). Against Wallace, de Vries asserts that “It is an
absolutely unproved assumption that individual variation extends its range by selection”, 
apparently unconscious of the irony that he is here echoing the argument for limits to 
variation which Fleeming Jenkin had in 1867 directed against Darwin.500 
Because Darwin was ultimately de Vries’ primary influence in his understanding of heredity, 
variation and evolution, I consider it incorrect not to regard him as in some sense still a 
Darwinian (or, if not a Darwinian, then at least a “most reluctant non-Darwinian”, as Gould 
terms him).501 That his interpretation of Darwin was not only idiosyncratic but went very 
much against the grain of both the broader life science community’s understanding of the 
theory and Darwin’s own very much justifies his being tagged as a revisionary Darwinist. 
497 James Schwartz, In Pursuit of the Gene: From Darwin to DNA, Harvard University Press, 2008, p. 69.
498 Stephen Jay Gould, The Structure of Evolutionary Theory, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
2002, pp. 415-417.
499 Hugo de Vries, The Mutation Theory: Experiments and Observations on the Origin of Species in the 
Vegetable Kingdom, Vol. I: The Origin of Species by Mutation, J.B. Farmer and A.D. Darbishire (Trans.), 
Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1909, pp. 35-36.
500 Ibid., pp. 39-41.
501 Stephen Jay Gould, The Structure of Evolutionary Theory, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
2002, p. 415.
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Notably, de Vries never appears to have taken natural selection seriously as a factor shaping 
evolution. As much as his reading Quetelet and Galton can be attributed to the hardening of 
his belief in the limited nature of fluctuating variation, it is apparent that de Vries’ doubts 
about the possibility of selection creating new species purely by operating on existing 
variability preceded his coming across these texts. Already in Intracellular Pangenesis, we 
have seen that he attributed individual variations as primarily due to environmental factors 
such as nutrition. In the Mutationstheorie, he becomes even more explicit in these claims, 
stating that “Nutrition in the widest sense… is at the bottom of all individual variability. 
Every character varies only in a plus or minus direction. Favorable conditions are responsible
for the former, unfavorable ones for the latter”. He believes that the variation induced by 
nutrition can in a sense be inherited, as is made evident in the fact that vigorous parents 
produce vigorous children, and that since it can in this way be inherited it can be acted on by 
selection. He on these grounds argues that selection as commonly understood (i.e. as 
operating on individual variations) in fact “consists in the choice of the most highly 
nourished”. But whilst variation in nutrition can in this way produce changes in characters in 
a plus or minus direction, de Vries also insists that “nothing new can arise in this way”. This 
can be seen as a direct critique of Weismann’s notion of variation as limited in this manner 
but as able to produce new species through its being acted on by selection, which de Vries 
argues to be impossible, as no true novelty arises by these means. Furthermore, the “fact of 
regression” ensures that however extreme the variation in selected individuals, there is 
always a constant “definite backsliding of the mean of the race” which ensures that the limits 
of ordinary variability are never surpassed.502 
It is because of this understanding of ordinary variability as environmentally determined, and 
fluctuating but limited around a permanent mean that de Vries could only ever conceive as 
selection as having a permanent effect on the course of evolution in its operating as a 
Spencerian ‘sieve’ sorting between distinct species and varieties. But because he considered 
environmental disparities between nature and garden as essentially unproblematic for the 
study of heredity and evolution due to their having in general a null effect on the actual 
pangens, de Vries was also broadly supportive of the experimental investigation of heredity 
502 Hugo de Vries, The Mutation Theory: Experiments and Observations on the Origin of Species in the 
Vegetable Kingdom, Vol. I: The Origin of Species by Mutation, J.B. Farmer and A.D. Darbishire (Trans.), 
Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1909, pp. 88-137.
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and evolution in the laboratory. Indeed, he considered his seminal contribution to science to 
be in showing that “The origin of species is an object of experimental investigation”, placing 
himself in the footsteps of Lamarck, who showed the origin of species to be a natural 
phenomenon, and Darwin, who showed it to be an object of inquiry.503 De Vries’ views thus 
concurred with a growing consensus amongst experimental life scientists that the key to 
understanding heredity and evolution lay not in observations in the field but in interventions 
in the lab. De Vries’ conceptualisation of living processes also offered such researchers a 
theoretical defence against the accusation of field naturalists that results attained under lab 
conditions were not relevant to organisms in nature. When it came to the study of heredity 
and mutational variation, de Vries held the only environmental parameters to be of 
significance were conditions of viability and the presence or absence of factors which might 
possibly stimulate mutation. De Vries believed the lab would represent an ideal environment 
for both controlling and utilising such factors, superior, indeed to nature in this manner. By 
isolating organisms from nature’s struggle for existence and providing them with plentiful 
nutriment, elementary species other than wild types had a much greater chance of surviving 
to be studied. And if it could be discovered which external factors might stimulate mutation 
(de Vries ascribed the amount and direction of mutability to internal causes but believed 
mutability to be an impermanent quality which must be activated by some external cause), 
then mutations could be directly induced for study rather than requiring to be collected.504 In 
this manner, de Vries’ arguments were very much key for the notion that wild types could be 
transferred and experimented on in the laboratory without any significant changes to their 
nature except for those caused by mutation. He can further be credited as the father of non-
Lamarckian experimental evolution, endeavours in which would run alongside those of early 
genetic analysis and which would be united in the Morgan group’s efforts to both analyse and
alter Drosophila. 
Bateson
William Bateson is primarily known for his post-1900 work, in particular his early adoption 
of Mendelism and defence of its claims against the arguments of biometricians such as 
Walter Weldon who continued to profess the evolutionary importance of continuous 
503 Hugo de Vries, Species and Varieties: Their Origin by Mutation, Daniel Trembly MacDougal (ed.), The 
Open Court Publishing Company, 1905, p. v.
504 Ibid., pp. 690-1.
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variation. His other well-known contribution to the life sciences was terminological, giving 
the name ‘genetics’ to the study of heredity in 1905 and introducing much now ubiquitous 
disciplinary nomenclature, including ‘allele’ and the paired terms ‘homozygous’ and 
‘heterozygous’.505 But focusing on the post-1900 period of Bateson’s work ignores the fact 
that, like de Vries, Bateson had largely made up his mind about what the nature of heredity, 
variation and evolution consisted in some time prior to his coming across Mendel (though 
some of these presumptions would later be challenged in the course of his genetics work). 
Indeed, the primary reason why Bateson, unlike de Vries, so vigorously adopted and 
evangelised Mendelism was that his pre-existing beliefs about discontinuity in variation 
appeared confirmed by it and, moreover, an experimental method for their further 
investigation was suggested. Bateson, unlike de Vries, had primarily sought to study variation
prior to 1900 through fieldwork and fact collection but sincerely wished to experimentalise 
his research, and it was the provision of a means of doing so, through the analysis of the 
offspring of hybrids, that Bateson found so valuable in Mendel’s work. De Vries, by contrast,
had already developed a sophisticated experimental methodology to research variation, 
thought hybridisation to have little relevance to the evolutionary processes he was interested 
in and had attained Mendel-like results independent of his reading the famed 1865 paper, so 
found this rediscovered work less revelatory.
It was Bateson’s two brief stints working alongside William Keith Brooks in the summers of 
1883 and ’84 which first stimulated his interest in studying variation as a means to 
understanding evolution. Either side of these visits to America, Bateson was training in the 
study of descriptive morphology at Cambridge. The department there was heavily influenced 
by the work of Francis Balfour, who had attempted to determine the origins of vertebrates by 
studying the embryology of organisms considered to be primitive relations such as tunicates 
and Amphioxus. Balfour died in 1882 before Bateson properly began his Cambridge studies 
but his research programme endured, and Bateson’s first scientific work was on determining 
the phylogeny of the acorn worm Balanoglossus, on the suggestion of his friend and later 
adversary Weldon. It was as part of studying Balanoglossus that Bateson went to work with 
505 Elof Axel Carlson, The Gene: A Critical History, W.B. Saunders Company, 1966, pp. 9-16.
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Brooks, who was in the process of writing and publishing his Law of Heredity, ‘a study of the
cause of variation, and the origin of living organisms’.506 
In this book, Brooks proposed an amended version of Darwin's pangenesis whereby 
gemmules are only produced by cells on those rare occasions when they are stressed by 
unfavourable conditions. He moreover theorised that the male and female sexual elements 
had specialised in different directions. The ovum conserved heredity and thus perpetuated the
species (Brooks would later claim, against claims his theory was Lamarckian, that he “like 
Weismann, attributed inheritance to germinal continuity”).507 The male sex cell was by 
contrast the ‘progressive’ element responsible for adaptation and variation, the sperm having 
“acquired, as its especial and distinctive function, a peculiar power to gather and store up 
germs”. Sperm, Brooks pointed out, are unlike ova produced throughout a male’s life, and 
therefore were open to the influences of environmental variation.508 Brooks theorised that 
when an ovum was fertilised by a gemmule-carrying sperm, these gemmules would then be 
inherited not only by immediate offspring but also would be represented in the ova of female 
offspring, thus ensuring the continuation of variation in immediate descendants. Cells which 
began throwing off gemmules would moreover continue to do so “until a favorable variation 
is seized upon by natural selection”, at which point this would be propagated, selection then 
acting against gemmule-producing cells given that further variation was no longer adaptive. 
Brooks saw this hypothesis as a means of showing that the development of new variations 
could occur in response to environmental change without invoking the Lamarckian claim that
external conditions had a direct modifying influence. Brooks was motivated by concerns that 
Darwin’s original idea of natural selection as operating incrementally across vast swathes of 
time was incompatible with William Thomson’s estimates for the age of the Earth. He 
therefore assumed that variation must be better than random to allow for more rapid 
evolutionary change. He furthermore advocated a saltational theory of variation, in the 
process referring to both Huxley’s argument that Nature likely occasionally makes ‘jumps’ 
506 Brian K. Hall, ‘Betrayed by Balanoglossus: William Bateson’s Rejection of Evolutionary Embryology as 
the Basis for Understanding Evolution’, Journal of Experimental Zoology Part B: Molecular and 
Developmental Evolution, Vol. 304B, 2005, pp. 3-5; & Erik L. Peterson, ‘William Bateson from 
"Balanoglossus" to "Materials for the Study of Heredity": The Transatlantic Roots of Discontinuity and the 
(Un)naturalness of Selection’, Journal of the History of Biology, Vol. 41, No. 2, 2008, pp. 272-273.
507 William Keith Brooks, ‘An Inherent Error in the Views of Galton and Weismann on Variation’, Science, 
Vol. 1, No. 5, 1895, p. 121.
508 William Keith Brooks, The Law of Heredity: A Study of the Cause of Variation, and of the Origin of Living 
Organisms, Baltimore and New York: John Murphy & Co., 1883, p. 326.
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and to Galton’s polygon model wherein variation is conceived of as constituting a form of 
‘facet flipping’ between pre-existing stable equilibria.509 
 
In the introduction to his book, Brooks had stressed that he had previously refrained from 
publishing his views as he had hoped to first “submit them to the test of experiment”. He 
envisioned that this would require a programme of scientific domestication involving “the 
cultivation and hybridization, over many generations, of such animals and plants as will 
thrive and multiply in confinement”. He conceded, however, that he lacked the time and 
resources for such an endeavour.510 Brooks subsequently sought to encourage students to take
up such experimental work where possible. Brooks' evangelism was highly effective on 
Bateson, whom he managed to convince to think of variation as a problem to be solved rather
than (as his Cambridge teachers and colleagues believed) a mere distraction. Brooks also 
exposed Bateson to the saltationist arguments of Galton and his polygonal model of organic 
stability. Ultimately, Brooks’ intervention would persuade Bateson to abandon the laboratory 
in favour of attempting to find evidence in the field for Brooksian-style saltational variation 
in response to environmental pressures, leading to a permanent break with Cambridge 
morphology.511 The opportunity to find such evidence arose in 1886 when Bateson undertook 
a biogeographical expedition to Central Asia where he would spend 18 months researching 
the fauna of the Aral Sea and neighbouring salt lakes. Bateson believed these bodies of 
waters to be the remaining residue of an “Asiatic Mediterranean” that had once covered the 
region, and his original major aim was to catalogue whether any oceanic fauna still survived 
from this earlier time. This goal was thwarted due to technical difficulties, so in the summer 
of 1886 he switched to a new project, namely to study whether differentiations between lakes 
in conditions such as salinity and depth had had the effect of producing parallel 
differentiations in the organisms found there.512 This second aim was stimulated by the 
findings of the Russian biologist Schmankewitsch, who had shown that brine shrimp kept 
over several generations in gradually desalinated water appear to change into a freshwater 
509 Ibid., pp. 296-7.
510 Ibid., p. vii.
511 Marsha L. Richmond, ‘The 'Domestication' of Heredity: The Familial Organization of Geneticists at 
Cambridge University, 1895-1910’, Journal of the History of Biology, Vol. 39, No. 3, 2006, pp. 576-7.
512 Beatrice Bateson (Ed.), William Bateson, F.R.S., Naturalist. His Essays and Addresses together with a 
Short Account of his Life, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1928, p. 18; & Erik L. Peterson, 
‘William Bateson from "Balanoglossus" to "Materials for the Study of Heredity": The Transatlantic Roots of
Discontinuity and the (Un)naturalness of Selection’, Journal of the History of Biology, Vol. 41, No. 2, 2008, 
pp. 277-278.
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form, a discovery most likely reported to Bateson by Brooks.513 Bateson’s research in these 
saline lakes can be seen as a utilisation of ‘natural experiments’, this being where researchers 
attempt to find conditions in the field which parallel the conditions of experimentation in the 
lab in order to corroborate lab findings.514 
Bateson’s aims were ultimately disappointed, finding no definitive proof of a primordial 
Asian Mediterranean and no clear-cut evidence for a linear relationship “between the 
variations of animals and the conditions under which they live”. Bateson was not put off 
continuing his study of variation but from this point was sceptical of the idea that the 
production of variability was in itself an adaptive response to external conditions. He retained
from Brooks a belief in saltationism but now believed the origins of variation could only 
properly be studied through the experimental analysis of internal factors.515 The results of 
Bateson’s ‘natural experiments’ also hardened his belief that not only was variation 
ultimately discontinuous but also that natural selection was a far from all-powerful force. He 
clearly refers to his experiences in Central Asia in his 1894 Materials when he observes that 
whilst environmental conditions such as salinity are continuous, not only do species “on the 
whole form a Discontinuous Series” but also “forms which are apparently identical live under
conditions which are apparently very different, while species which though closely allied are 
constantly distinct are found under conditions which are apparently the same”. This leads him
to conclude that it is most likely that “the relation between environment and structure is not 
finely adjusted”, and consequently the environment cannot be either the directing cause (as 
held by neo-Lamarckians) or the limiting cause (as held by Darwinians) of specific 
differences.516 The Central Asian expedition overall represented a pivotal failure in Bateson’s 
variation research programme, which would now begin moving away from the field and 
migrate back towards the lab and the garden, and which would now interpret variation, not 
selection, as ultimately driving evolution. 
513 Alan G. Cock and Donald R. Forsdyke, Treasure Your Exceptions, Springer Science, 2008, pp. 23-24 & 47.
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London: University of Chicago Press, 2002, pp. 212-218.
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516 William Bateson, Materials for the Study of Variation treated with Especial Regard for to Discontinuity in 
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Having been convinced by his Central Asian expedition that variation must be explained in 
terms of internal causes but yet to ascertain a particular experimental research methodology 
for studying such factors, Bateson turned to fact collection and theoretical hypothesising. The
primary product of the former would be his great 1894 compendium Materials for the Study 
of Variation; the major fruit of speculation was his vibrational theory of variation, which he 
first announced in a letter to his sister in September 1891.517 Materials was an ambitious text, 
“a massive litany of some 886 aberrations covering most phyla”, which sought to collect as 
many examples as Bateson could find of apparent discontinuous variation in organisms in 
order to argue for a primary role for discontinuity in evolution.518 He gathered his information
primarily by “ransack[ing] museums, libraries and private collections” through 
correspondence with a wide range of life scientists and medical professionals, and by 
contacting farmers and horticultural amateurs.519 He also relied on field studies performed in 
the early 1890s in the countryside around Cambridge, which looked at discontinuity in traits 
such as the secondary sexual characteristics of insects and the floral symmetry of plants 
(showing that despite his experiences in Central Asia, Bateson continued to see value in field 
studies as a means of studying variation).520 
Bateson believed that in undertaking this project he was following in the footsteps of Darwin,
in particular the Darwin of Variation in Animals and Plants under Domestication, who had 
sought to establish laws of variation by collating reports of its various manifestations, 
regularities and anomalies.521 Bateson thus here presents himself as a Darwinian, but as one 
critical of contemporary trends in evolutionary research, so rightly may be labelled a 
‘revisionary Darwinian’ like de Vries (support for my position on Bateson as a Darwinian can
be found in Nordmann and Peterson).522 Specifically, he argued that Darwin’s ‘Doctrine of 
517 Stuart A. Newman, ‘William Bateson’s Physicalist Ideas’, In: From Embryology to Evo-Devo: A History of 
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Massachusetts, 2007, pp. 83-84.
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Descent’ had changed naturalism, which had formerly been devoted to the “indiscriminate 
accumulation of facts”, by providing a needed criterion by which the value of such facts 
might be judged. This had led to changes in method, but whilst there had been originally “a 
large field of possibilities”, two particular methodologies had become overly relied upon and 
institutionalised. Bateson identified these as ‘the Embryological Method’ of morphology and 
‘the Study of Adaptation’. Both of these had their limitations and had been pushed to the 
point of no longer being especially productive. Studies of embryology could provide general 
support for the fact of common descent, but Bateson, based on his own frustrating 
experiences with Balanoglossus, had come to consider the exclusive use of this method to try 
and ascertain the evolutionary histories of particular lineages as a speculative waste of time. 
He similarly regarded studies of adaptation as not in truth capable of advancing much beyond
the basic conclusion that organisms are ‘more or less’ adapted to their circumstances. He 
observed that whilst it was easy to suggest how, for example, dull colouration allowed for 
edible moths to camouflage themselves and thus survive, there was no means of determining 
what was “the particular benefit which one dull moth enjoys as the result of his own 
particular pattern of dullness as compared with the closely similar pattern of the next 
species”. This tied in with what he regarded as an even more serious defect of the 
adaptationist approach, namely that to determine the utility of a structure required a 
quantitative method of assessment in order to know “how its presence affects the profit and 
loss account of the organism”, i.e. how its utility offset the cost of its production. In the case 
of evolutionary history, acquiring such data is “entirely beyond our powers and is likely to 
remain so indefinitely”. Consequently, Bateson concluded that “We have no right to consider 
the utility of a structure demonstrated, in the sense that we may use this demonstration as 
evidence of the causes which have led to the existence of the structure”, unless such data 
could be somehow attained.523 Studies of adaptation, in other words, could never provide a 
definitive causal story for why particular new traits and species arose in evolution. Bateson 
Discontinuity and the (Un)naturalness of Selection’, Journal of the History of Biology, Vol. 41, No. 2, 2008, 
pp. 291-8.
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thus anticipates Gould and Lewontin in critiquing adaptationists for their propensity for ‘just-
so stories’.524 
Having established the shortcomings of the two principal methods utilised by contemporary 
evolutionists, Bateson argued that reviving Darwin’s historical programme of the ‘Study of 
Variation’ would thus provide a much required third method for evidencing the ‘Doctrine of 
Descent’, and moreover perceived it to have greater potential for offering a detailed and 
credible causal account for evolutionary processes.525 To speak in anachronistic terms, 
Bateson recognised Darwin as having established a scientific paradigm within the bounds of 
which all serious natural history research was now conducted; he was not, in promoting the 
Study of Variation, seeking to establish a new paradigm but rather to help the old one escape 
the cul de sac which he perceived current methodology to have led it to. Bateson’s proposals 
therefore may have been outside of Darwinian orthodoxy but remained firmly within the 
“Darwinian landscape”.526 
Alongside evidencing the ubiquity of discontinuous variation in organisms, Bateson was also 
trying to understand how such ‘jumping’ variations might come about. Whilst he had 
absorbed from Brooks a belief in the importance of variation as a subject of investigation and 
in the evolutionary importance of saltations, it is not clear whether Bateson was ever 
particularly convinced of the truth of Brooks’ modified version of pangenesis as a material 
and mechanistic account of heredity and variation. In Materials Bateson heavily criticises 
Darwin’s original hypothesis for perpetuating what he sees as the erroneous notion that 
reproduction consists in “the actual body and constitution of the parent… [being] in some 
way handed on”. Bateson’s critique of pangenesis was partially based on the fact that he saw 
it as promoting the “assumption that Variation must necessarily be a continuous process; for 
with the body of the parent to start from, it is hard to conceive the occurrence of 
524 Stephen Jay Gould and Richard C. Lewontin, 'The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm: 
A Critique of the Adaptationist Programme', Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B, 
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discontinuous change”.527 But Bateson’s criticism also extended to other materialist theories 
of heredity which he deemed ‘static’, a conviction which would eventually lead to his 
famously rejecting chromosomal accounts of heredity in the 20th century. This was not 
because Bateson had any sympathies for vitalistic occult forces in biology – very much the 
opposite, Bateson being firmly convinced that biological phenomena were ultimately 
grounded in physio-chemical processes. The issue was rather that Bateson was certain that 
biological phenomena such as heredity, development and variation were fundamentally 
dynamic in nature and thought particulate theories of inheritance to fail to truly explicate the 
operation of these phenomena. Bateson instead sought to understand these processes using 
kinetic force and field models taken from contemporary physics, such as those developed by 
James Clerk Maxwell and William Thomson. He was not unique in thinking such analogies 
and links could be drawn between biology and physics, T.H. Huxley in 1889 having 
suggested organisms to be comparable to vortex whirlpools, and that they, as all other 
material things, were ultimately made up of ‘aether’ arranged in atoms which themselves 
were spinning vortices (recall also Quatrefages’ notion of the tourbillon vital [‘maelstrom of 
life’] found in the fertilised ova, which Darwin himself refers to in Variation). Importantly 
for Bateson, kinetic force and field models were both quantifiable and dynamic, and he 
believed that if biological phenomena could be explained in these terms, it would produce a 
causal account that was also measurable and predictable.528 Particulate theories of heredity 
such as pangenesis were in Bateson’s view neither properly quantifiable nor dynamic, for 
they lacked any account of how hereditary material interacted in order to induce 
development.529 This attitude of Bateson’s also explains why he was never fully convinced of 
the value of biometry, for biometric methods only ever measure trait outcomes and can 
therefore only ever offer phenomenological, correlational accounts of heredity and 
development. 
527 William Bateson, Materials for the Study of Variation treated with Especial Regard for to Discontinuity in 
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Bateson’s vibratory theory of variation, which he believed offered a dynamic alternative to 
particulate hypotheses, was based on an analogy between the formation of repetitive 
morphological patterns, a form of variation he called ‘merism’, and the nodal Chladni 
patterns which are produced when granular materials are placed on a plate which is then 
caused to vibrate by acoustic resonances, the classic example being when sand is spread on 
the back of a violin which is then played with a bow. Bateson argued that just as 
discontinuous repetitive patterns in sand could be explained in terms of the vibrations 
imparted by a bow, so cases of the symmetrical repetition of organic parts could also be 
explicated in terms of mechanistic forces vibrating through the tissue of a developing 
organism and in this manner inducing divisions and differentiations, different frequencies 
producing different conformations of tissue. An exemplary example of merism was 
segmentation, but Bateson also argued other forms of periodic variation, e.g. zebra stripes, to 
be likewise produced in such a manner. He further believed that examples of the 
displacement of parts (e.g. an insect with a leg in place of an antenna), which he termed 
‘homeotic variations’, could also be explained by changes in organic vibrations.  Bateson did 
however acknowledge that his hypothesis was lacking in one important area, namely that 
unlike the cases of mechanistic configurations he found analogous with organic variations, a 
favourite  example of which was patterns found in beach sand, “We cannot tell what in the 
[organism] corresponds to the wind or the flow of the current”.530 This lack of known causal 
factors would ensure that Bateson’s theory remained inchoate, closed to experimental testing 
and would fail to find converts. However, he would remain loyal to it at the expense of 
marginalisation as the ‘static’ materialist chromosome theory became genetic orthodoxy, and 
would continue to insist on the vortical nature of life and undulatory nature of variation until 
his death, even after admitting the truth of the chromosome theory in 1922.531 
It is important to understand that whilst Bateson has been misunderstood and ridiculed for his
vibratory theory of meristic variation, his allied understanding of biological phenomena in 
chemical terms, which can Whiggishly be interpreted as progressive (see for instance his 
early adoption of an enzyme [then called ‘ferments’] theory of genetic action), arose from the
same physicalist mind-set (recall how Haeckel was also led by his reductionist physics to 
530 Ibid.; & Alan G. Cock and Donald R. Forsdyke, Treasure Your Exceptions, Springer Science, 2008, p. 92.
531 Alan R. Rushton, ‘William Bateson and the chromosome theory of heredity: a reappraisal’, The British 
Journal for the History of Science, Vol. 47 Part 1, No. 172, 2014, pp. 167-170.
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propose a vibrational theory of heredity).532 For Bateson, biochemistry and kinetic field forces
together accounted for biological phenomena, but could not do so one without the other. 
Biochemistry accounted for the constitution of organisms but there was a requirement for 
physical forces to explain directionality and arrangement in phenomena such as cell division. 
Bateson did, incidentally, point to variations in biochemistry as another source of 
discontinuity between varieties and species. Distinguishing them from those variations 
caused by merism, he referred to these as “Substantive Variations”, and argued that their 
discontinuity originated due to discontinuities between chemical affinities. He pointed in 
particular to cases of colour variation in the Icelandic poppy, which has a yellow and an 
orange variety, and between species in a genus of South African butterflies, where the tips of 
the fore-wings are generally either orange red or purple. In both cases, colour is the main 
differentiation between two forms, intermediary forms are rare or non-existent and there is at 
least a partially known chemical basis for the colour trait. Bateson argued that it was difficult 
to explain the lack of intermediary forms in terms of the selection of minute variations, since 
it was both difficult to explain why particular colours, e.g. red and purple, were useful and 
why any intermediaries would not be. Given this, he “submit[s] that it is easier to suppose 
that the change from red to purple was from the first complete, and that the choice offered to 
Selection was between red and purple; and that the tints of the purple and of the red were 
determined by the chemical properties of the body to which the colour is due”. Whilst 
Bateson found such cases persuasive, he was not able to provide definitive examples outside 
of the domain of colour in 1894. He was therefore inclined to believe ‘Substantive 
Variations’ as to a certain extent less important than meristic ones on the grounds that he did 
not think colour variations as especially significant in the production of new species. This 
attitude would to a certain extent shift after 1900 thanks not only to the rediscovery of 
Mendel but also due to Archibald Garrod’s 1902 discovery of the role of the absence of 
chemical ferments in congenital metabolic diseases such as alkaptonuria, conditions which 
Garrod would refer to as ‘chemical sports’.533 Garrod offered Bateson an instance of 
chemically-induced discontinuous variation which was non-trivial (unlike colour variations), 
leading him to consider a greater role in evolution for substantive variation. Nonetheless, it 
would seem that prior to 1900, Bateson found merism more intriguing and persuasive as a 
532 William Bateson, Mendel’s Principles of Heredity, 2nd Ed., Cambridge University Press, 1909, pp. 268.
533 Elof Axel Carlson, The Gene: A Critical History, W.B. Saunders Company, 1966, pp. 166-167.
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major mechanism for evolutionary variation, not least as its effects were more holistic and 
therefore seemed to offer a plausible means for instant speciation. 
Alongside his theorising and fact-collecting, Bateson had been preparing to experimentalise 
his programme, the desire to do so being announced in Materials, where he states that “So 
long as systematic experiments in breeding are wanting… in this part of biology which is 
perhaps of greater theoretical and even practical importance than any other, there can be no 
progress”.534 Materials had, as Gould observes, attempted to act as a compendium of 
discontinuous variation that “might suggest some hints, or at least prove useful faute de 
mieux”, but which ultimately lacked a causal account of how variation was generated.535 
Bateson found this fact frustrating and had only held back from experimentation due to its 
anticipated expense and his lack of funding opportunities following his falling out with 
Cambridge morphology. Disappointed by the failure of Materials to spark better disposed 
scientists and naturalists into action on behalf of his research programme, Bateson chose to 
concentrate on producing new data closer to home.536 In 1895, Bateson and his collaborator 
Edith Saunders began planning a series of experiments to determine whether hybridisation 
would result in ‘blending heredity’, as was widely thought to occur, or if rather the distinct 
parental traits would retain discontinuity in the offspring, i.e. if they demonstrated Galton’s 
‘exclusive’ heredity, which was thought necessary in order for sports to be perpetuated. 
These experiments were performed by Saunders on an allotment of the Cambridge Botanical 
Gardens and focused on crossing three species of plant which exhibited both smooth and 
hairy leaved varieties. She published results in 1897-9 which appeared to show support for 
discontinuous over blending heredity but which lacked any discernable hereditary pattern or 
regularity. Another female collaborator of Bateson’s, Dorothea Pertz, carried out related 
research on floral variation in Veronica, but their jointly published 1898 conclusions were 
‘disappointing’ – the ratio of normal to abnormal flowers was the same in filial generations 
whether the parents were normal or abnormal. Bateson himself concentrated on small-scale 
experiments with sweet-peas and butterflies among other organisms, using various facilities 
534  William Bateson, Materials for the Study of Variation treated with Especial Regard for to Discontinuity in 
the Origin of Species, Macmillan and Co., 1894, p. 76.
535 Stephen Jay Gould, The Structure of Evolutionary Theory, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
2002, p. 409.
536 Erik L. Peterson, ‘William Bateson from "Balanoglossus" to "Materials for the Study of Heredity": The 
Transatlantic Roots of Discontinuity and the (Un)naturalness of Selection’, Journal of the History of 
Biology, Vol. 41, No. 2, 2008, pp. 283-284 & 288.
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including the grounds of a local farm, his rooms in the morphology department and later his 
marital home. None of these experiments received external support until 1897, when Galton 
convinced the Royal Society’s Evolution Committee to give low-level funding to allow 
Bateson and Saunders to expand their work.537 
Given the inability of these early experimental results to confirm much more than the 
persistence of discontinuous variations, without a hint of an actual causal mechanism, and the
sense of marginalisation Bateson no doubt felt as a consequence of his having to make do 
with whatever facilities and tools he had at hand, it is thus not surprising how enthusiastically
he received the work of Mendel. Mendel offered Bateson clarity on methods of statistical 
analysis (Bateson’s poor mathematical abilities being a longstanding weakness), showed him 
the importance of ensuring varieties bred true by always propagating F2 generations, and 
pushed him towards understanding character differences in terms of internal factors that were
not always phenotypically expressed, whereas previously he had overtly relied on 
morphological and taxonomical assessments.538 Moreover, Mendel appeared to offer strong 
corroboration for the discontinuous nature of variation and its exclusive heredity, in particular
through his determination of a law of segregation between the inheritances of parents in the 
offspring. Bateson can here be contrasted with de Vries for whom, as aforementioned, 
Mendelism wasn’t especially exciting or revelatory, the reason being that whilst Bateson had 
been struggling for a means to analyse his findings on variation in order to determine its 
causes, de Vries had already developed a sophisticated methodology which he believed 
elucidated salient facts about evolution. De Vries moreover did not have the same concerns 
about the effects of blending on the perpetuation of his mutants given that his theory assumed
the hereditary material of species to be uniform, with the consequence that outside of hybrid 
crosses there were no differences to be blended between parents. 
The extent of Mendel’s impression on Bateson can be seen in his elegiacally stating in 1908 
that thanks to Mendelian analysis “For the first time Variation and Reversion have a concrete,
palpable meaning. Hitherto they have stood by in all evolutionary debates, convenient genii, 
537 Marsha L. Richmond, ‘The 'Domestication' of Heredity: The Familial Organization of Geneticists at 
Cambridge University, 1895-1910’, Journal of the History of Biology, Vol. 39, No. 3, 2006 pp. 570-5; & 
Staffan Müller-Wille and Marsha L. Richmond, 'Revisiting the Origin of Genetics', In: Heredity Explored: 
Between Public Domain and Experimental Science, 1850-1930, C. Brandt, H.-J. Rheinberger, and S. Müller-
Wille (Eds.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2015.
538 Ibid.; & Ibid.
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ready to perform as little or as much as might be desired by the conjuror. That vaporous stage
of their existence is over; and we see Variation shaping itself as a definite, physiological 
event, the addition or omission of one or more definite elements; and Reversion as that 
particular addition or subtraction which brings the total of the elements back to something it 
had been before in the history of the race”.539 Mendel thus helped Bateson feel he had a grasp 
on the underlying material causes of variation and also showed the tendency to revert to 
ancestral forms such as wild types to parallel the tendency to diverge, being also a product of 
the addition or deletion of factors. By demonstrating this symmetry between divergent 
variation and convergent reversion and the exclusivity of heredity, Bateson and other early 
geneticists were finally able to overcome Jenkin’s claim that rare sports would tend to be 
diluted out of existence. The proof of segregation, moreover, showed wild types and other 
varieties to not only be stable when bred to their own kind but also as being recoverable from 
crosses without risk of contamination from the dissimilar parent, the risk being rather induced
by failure to breed F2 generations to test if F1 offspring bred true and to allow selection of 
homozygous F2 offspring. Furthermore, Mendel’s observation of the tendency of certain 
allelic varieties to dominate over others and thus produce discontinuous phenotypes was 
understood by Bateson to offer further proof of the chemical nature of the expression of 
hereditary characters. This not only suggested to him that variations were generally, like 
chemical elements, inherently stable, but moreover allowed him to see a bigger role for 
substantive variations in evolution than he had first allotted (in particular through factors and 
their chemical products being ‘present or absent’), to the point that in 1914 he would briefly 
entertain a degenerationist theory that evolution had almost entirely proceeded through the 
suppression of the chemical activity of factors inherited from the primordial first organism.540 
Reading Mendel thus not only shored up a number of Bateson’s pre-existing convictions but 
also further persuaded him of the reality of discontinuity and the stability of discontinuous 
forms when crossed. Having already been convinced by his field studies of the irrelevance of 
differences in environmental conditions between nature and the garden or lab when it came to
the investigation of heredity and variation, Bateson therefore came to similar conclusions as 
de Vries regarding the nature of wild types. Wild type could now cross the threshold into 
539 William Bateson, The Methods and Scope of Genetics, Cambridge University Press, 1908, p. 48.
540 Jean Gayon, Darwinism’s Struggle for Survival: Heredity and the Hypothesis of Natural Selection, Matthew
Cobb (Trans.), Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 272.
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controlled experimental conditions and be domesticated for the purposes of scientific 
investigation. 
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Chapter 9 – Bateson   and De Vries after Mendelism
Wild Type Crosses the Threshold
I have sought to show in my previous chapters how the way was opened for wild type to enter
the lab through the establishment of 'indoor natures', the scientific domestication of sub-
organismic elements of the body, and the sancturisation and devitalisation of heredity. I have 
presented Hugo de Vries and William Bateson as key figures whose theoretical and empirical
work on the subjects of variation and evolution helped effect the transition of wild types into 
controlled experimental conditions. Of the two, de Vries in particular was important in 
establishing the general practice of investigating heredity and variation through the use of 
inbred lineages in controlled conditions and for propagating the notion that true-breeding 
‘elementary species’, not the larger Linnaean species accepted by most taxonomists, were the
true ‘units of nature’. His work in this field was complemented by that of the Danish plant 
breeder Wilhelm Johannsen. Johannsen had shown in the mid-1890s that the widespread 
assumption of a general correlation between seed weight and high nitrogen content in 
commercial strains of barley was erroneous. He did so by breeding from a single ear of grain 
and genealogically dividing its progeny into pedigree ‘lines’, a technique first developed in 
the mid-19th century by the Vilmorin family of plant breeders in France. Johannsen showed 
that whereas at a populational level seed weight and nitrogen content appeared correlated, at 
the level of individual pure-bred lineages there was considerable variation between lines, 
including lines with both high weight and low nitrogen.541 Variation within lines, was, 
however, strictly limited, as Johannsen would further show in his 1903 monograph based on 
follow-up studies on beans. Here he again broke a population down into a number of ‘pure 
lines’ and showed that whereas populations exhibited, as Galton had shown, partial 
regression to the mean, offspring in pure lines exhibited full regression, i.e. each generation 
exhibited the same range of variability whatever selective program was imposed. From this 
result, Johannsen concluded that the partiality of regression in populations was due to their 
being composed of a mixture of types, types which were revealed by dividing the population 
into pure lines. Full regression showed that within a pure line the same germinal material, 
what Johannsen would later call the genotype, was shared by all individuals and passed down
541 Staffan Müller-Wille and Marsha L. Richmond, 'Revisiting the Origin of Genetics', In: Heredity Explored: 
Between Public Domain and Experimental Science, 1850-1930, C. Brandt, H.-J. Rheinberger, and S. Müller-
Wille (Eds.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2015.
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intact to descendants, with all appearance of variability, e.g. in size of bean, being attributable
to environmental influences.542  
The work of de Vries and Johannsen thus showed that studying variation at the populational 
level did not give a full picture of its true nature, indeed could be positively misleading at 
times. These findings moreover legitimated studies of pedigree cultures under controlled 
conditions as a less superficial means of investigating variation compared to the biometric 
studies of natural populations which had been pioneered by researchers such as Walter 
Weldon. Biometric studies were admitted even by their proponents to be phenomenalist in 
their penetration of variation (Karl Pearson, a self-declared disciple of the phenomenalist 
physicist Ernst Mach, openly advocated treating laws of heredity as purely statistical 
correlations rather than biological hypotheses).543 Laboratory-type studies based on ‘pure 
lines’, however, promised to reduce varying populations to their constituent invariant 
lineages and to define these lineages in terms of their hereditary physiological constitution. 
What de Vries and Johannsen established through their experimental programmes was thus 
the groundwork for another instance of the “cultural body snatching” (Kohler) that 
exemplified late 19th and early 20th century laboratory biology.544 
One of the means by which such a valorisation of lab over nature was made possible was 
through the establishment of what Star and Griesemer call ‘boundary objects’. These are 
objects, both concrete and abstract, which “inhabit several intersecting social worlds” and are
“both plastic enough to adapt to local needs and… constraints… yet robust enough to 
maintain a common identity across sites”.545 By establishing boundary objects between the 
lab and nature, lab scientists were able to bring natural objects into the lab, act on them in 
order to attain knowledge, and then project that knowledge out of the lab and onto nature, 
based on the assumption that the common identity of their boundary objects in both lab and 
542 Jean Gayon, Darwinism’s Struggle for Survival: Heredity and the Hypothesis of Natural Selection, Matthew
Cobb (Trans.), Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 260-267.
543 Jean Gayon, ‘The Philosophical History of the Concept of Heredity’, The Concept of the Gene in 
Development and Evolution, Peter J. Beurton, Raphael Falk & Hans-Jörg Rheinberger (eds.), Cambridge 
University Press, 2000, p. 75.
544 Robert E. Kohler, Landscapes and Labscapes: Exploring the Lab-Field Border in Biology, Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2002, pp. 3-8. 
545 Susan Leigh Star and James R. Griesemer, ‘Institutional Ecology, ‘Translations’ and Boundary Objects: 
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nature provided an adequate foundation for such a projection. It is my view that the abstract 
wild type concept and its concrete manifestations, the lab lineages known as ‘wild types’, was
one such instance of a boundary object, and one which played a key role in grounding the 
epistemic claims of classical genetics regarding the nature of evolution, heredity and 
variation in the wild. In the case of the wild type, the claim of identity was based on the 
assumed isomorphism between the genetic constitution of natural ‘wild types’ and of lab wild
types. I will refer to such claims of identity as claims of substitutability. By being an adequate
substitute for a truly wild and typical instance of the species, a lab wild type could play an 
important dual role as both a ‘natural entity’ and a laboratory tool. Both de Vries and 
Johannsen made important theoretical and empirical contributions that allowed for this claim 
of identity, namely by showing that natural populations could be broken into true-breeding 
types that displayed negligible hereditary variability. They also both assumed Weismann’s 
sequestration of the germ-plasm, which provided assurance that a species could move 
between nature and domestication without being altered in its fundamental genetic 
constitution. These developments allowed for the idea that if one of the types in a true-
breeding natural population could be identified as the wild type, then this wild type, as 
defined in terms of its genetic constitution, could paradoxically cross the threshold from wild 
nature into the severely domesticating regime of the laboratory. Kohler has discussed the 
crossing of the lab-field threshold by organisms such as Drosophila in terms of a movement 
from one ecosystem to another.546 I propose that here we can think of concepts as also 
crossing this threshold, moving from the conceptual sphere of nature to that of the laboratory.
These different conceptual spheres have characteristically been dominated by diverging 
scientific methods and discourses, nature being associated with observation, authenticity and 
independence from human domination, the lab with intervention, artifice and subjugation to 
human power. These distinctions are far from absolute and the boundaries between lab and 
nature are in many places highly permeable and interacting. Nonetheless, the development of 
this dichotomy/dialectic has played an important role in the formation of the modern life 
sciences, as shown by Kohler and others.547 The importance of objects and concepts which 
have helped bridge this divide cannot therefore be easily dismissed. And, as the case of the 
wild type I believe demonstrates, when objects, e.g. organisms, cross the threshold from one 
546 Robert E. Kohler, Lords of the Fly: Drosophila Genetics and the Experimental Life, The University of 
Chicago Press, 1994, p. 19.
547 Robert E. Kohler, Landscapes and Labscapes: Exploring the Lab-Field Border in Biology, Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2002, pp. 3-8. 
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domain to another, concepts very often follow closely by, especially when they are integral to
the interpretation of a scientific object as an epistemic thing. Concepts may therefore also be 
endangered when the material coherence or primacy of a scientific object is threatened by the
forces of experimental analysis and synthesis. In the case of the wild type, this would play out
in a debate between holistic and reductionistic tendencies which alternatively sought to 
preserve the wild type as a unit of nature and scientific analysis, and to disintegrate it into to 
its component traits and genes. I will begin to explore this debate by examining its origins in 
the differing reception of Mendel by de Vries and Bateson, and their related differing 
interpretations of wild type.
De Vries on Mendelism, Dominance & Wild Type
As established, de Vries’ mutationist experimental programme and theoretical framework 
were important factors in the development of wild type as a boundary object between nature 
and the lab, leading towards its eventually becoming a key concept in classical genetics. But 
it should be emphasised that de Vries himself held to quite a distinct notion of ‘wild type’ 
compared to what became established in genetics and that, moreover, wild types did not play 
a particularly important role in his experimental epistemology or in attaining the empirical 
aims of his project. This lack of interest in wild types was in a large part based on de Vries’ 
particular views on variation in domestication and nature.  De Vries held that because so little
was known about the history of domesticated plants it was “impossible to decide whether 
all… [domestic varieties] are older than culture or have come into existence during historic 
times, or as some assume, through the agency of man”.548 Nonetheless, de Vries was prepared
to assume “that cultivated species, as a rule, are derived from wild species... The botanic units
are compound entities, and the real systematic units in elementary species play the same part 
as in ordinary wild species”.549 De Vries believed, in other words, that there was no 
fundamental difference at a genetic level between variation in domestication and in nature. 
The appearance of greater variation in domestication was due to a combination of factors. 
Firstly, species in nature were typically not found in their pure form – “The mixed condition 
is the rule, purity is the exception”. De Vries here saw a parallel between elementary species 
and chemical elements, which in nature are usually found as compound ores. In both cases, 
548 Hugo de Vries, Species and Varieties: Their Origin by Mutation, Daniel Trembly MacDougal (ed.), The 
Open Court Publishing Company, 1905, p. 81.
549 Ibid., pp. 90-91.
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the purity of elements and races is “a condition implanted in them by man”.550 Therefore, 
when pedigree breeding revealed a host of distinct lineages as existing within a racial 
population, it was not creating new variation but rather purifying populational variation into 
its distinct elements. Further ‘variation’ was then created by crossing elementary species 
which do not usually associate in nature in order to produce new trait complexes. Again, for 
de Vries this was not ‘real’ variation, which only occurs through the latency and activation of
pangens, which produce varieties and reversion to type, and the rare acquisition of novel 
pangens in progressive mutations. Overall, in de Vries’ assessment much of the additional 
‘variation’ claimed to occur in domestication was simply the result of the unstable and 
evolutionarily insignificant processes of purification and intercrossing of elementary species. 
The wild type/domestic variety distinction had little use for de Vries as in his view the 
differences between them were purely products of the recombination of extant genetic 
material, whereas progressive evolution only occurred through fundamental changes in the 
germ-plasm. The commonly identified ‘wild types’, moreover, being, he thought, typically 
admixtures, were usually not real units of nature and were not amenable to experimental 
investigations that depend on their purification into component elementary species. De Vries 
did not abandon the idea of wild type altogether but instead employed a minimalist 
interpretation based on the viability of an elementary species in the struggle for existence – 
those types which could survive and propagate without human intervention could be thought 
of as ‘wild types’. This is an unusual definition of ‘wild type’ which is neither normative nor 
genealogical/historical. It may be perhaps described as the viability-based concept of wild 
type. 
Regarding de Vries’ place in Mendelian genetics, once again his views on variation served to 
distance him to a certain extent from this emerging field. Though one of the claimed Mendel 
‘rediscoverers’ of 1900, de Vries quickly came to the conclusion that Mendelian inheritance 
was irrelevant to long-term evolutionary trends as it only dealt with the recombination of 
extant hereditary units, not the production of novel pangens. He also observed that Mendel’s 
law of segregation only applied to what he called ‘bi-sexual’ hybrids and not to ‘uni-sexual’ 
hybrids. ‘Bi-sexual’ hybrids were the offspring of two parents which possessed the same 
hereditary make-up but which differed in the activity of at least one elementary character, as 
550 Ibid., pp. 101-102.
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in crosses between parent types and retrogressive varieties. ‘Uni-sexual’ crosses, on the other 
hand, were between parent types which differed in the presence of at least one elementary 
character, as in crosses between closely related species. For de Vries, uni-sexual crosses were
far more interesting than Mendelian hybrids as not only were they a means of determining 
elementary species, and thus of establishing whether a mutation was progressive or not, but 
also because he believed that they “lead to the direct production of constant hybrid races”, i.e.
potentially represent a means of speciation.551 That Mendelian hybrids were disposed to 
segregate, i.e. were inconstant, showed for de Vries that they could not result in the 
production of new species. Moreover, not only did de Vries think Mendelian inheritance 
irrelevant to speciation processes but he also did not believe it a useful means of studying 
ordinary variation. This was because he viewed hybridisation, whether bi-sexual or uni-
sexual, as very much the exception to the rule in nature, ‘natural heredity’ being the pairing 
of like germ-lines within the same elementary species, as opposed to crosses between 
varieties and parent types or between different elementary species. On these grounds, he 
dismissed Mendelism as a “laboratory phenomenon”.552 As early as October 1901 he 
implored Bateson by letter to “please don’t stop at Mendel… Mendelism is an exception to 
the general rule of crossing. It is in no way the rule! It seems to hold good only in derivative 
cases, such as real variety-characters”.553
Nonetheless, despite his professed misgivings and tendency to deny credit to Mendel for 
influencing the development of his ideas, de Vries’ 1900 reading of the monk’s 1866 paper 
did lead to changes in his theories of heredity and variation. One major alteration was de 
Vries’ adoption of Mendel’s diploid model of bi-parental factor contributions and his Law of 
Independent Assortment.  Whereas in 1889 de Vries had assumed that “All the hereditary 
characters of the father [and mother] must therefore be transmitted in the nucleus, as 
potentialities in a latent state” (a view similar to Galton’s idea of ancestral heredity), in his 
1900 essay ‘The Law of Segregation of Hybrids’ he asserts that “The pollen grains and 
ovules of monohybrids [crosses between varieties differing in one character] are not hybrids 
551 Hugo de Vries, The Mutation Theory: Experiments and Observations on the Origin of Species in the 
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[as would be the case if all parental hereditary characters were transmitted in each sex cell] 
but belong exclusively to one or the other of the two parental types”.554 Related to this, he 
moved from assuming an almost indefinite number of pangens in each nucleus to the view 
that there were only two for each unit character, one from each parent.555 He thus removed 
himself from his earlier idea that the multiplication of pangens could be responsible for 
continuous variations towards the idea that all such fluctuations were in fact purely somatic in
nature. This further aided the mobility of types between nature and the lab as it further 
diminished the believed possible influence of conditions of existence on the germ-line. 
But the most notable influence Mendel had on de Vries was in shaping his concept of 
dominance. Mendel had theorised that the uniformity of the first filial generation and the 3:1 
character ratio found in the second filial generation of his pea hybrids could be explained in 
terms of both male and female plant in the parental generation equally contributing to their 
offspring’s inheritance but with one of the factors responsible for trait production being 
‘dominating’, the other ‘recessive’. In the first filial generation these distinct factors would be
paired in each individual and only the dominating trait would be produced. But in the second 
filial generation, these factors would be independently assorted and would recombine in such 
a manner that half of offspring would be paired with like factors, half with differing. In those 
paired with differing factors, the dominating trait would be expressed, as it would in 
individuals with a pair of dominating factors, but the recessive trait would be expressed in 
that quarter of the generation which received a pair of recessive factors. Now for Mendel, it 
has been argued by Falk, the tendency for one factor to dominate over another was not 
inherent and absolute but rather a product of interaction between factors.556 There was, in 
other words, no stated ‘Law of Dominance’ in Mendel’s original paper. De Vries, on the 
other hand, sought to incorporate Mendel’s observations of dominating traits into his pre-
existing theory of pangen activity. For de Vries, whether a pangen was active or latent was 
not a product of its interactions with other pangens but rather an intrinsic property that 
existed independent of such interactions. As a consequence, he also interpreted Mendelian 
554 Hugo de Vries, Intracellular Pangenesis, C. Stuart Gager (Trans.), Chicago: The Open Court Publishing 
Company, 1910, p. 180; & Hugo de Vries, ‘The Law of Segregation of Hybrids’, [1900], In: Curt Stern and 
Eva R. Sherwood (ed.), The Origin of Genetics: A Mendel Sourcebook, San Francisco and London: W.H. 
Freeman and Company, 1966, p. 112.
555 Raphael Falk, Genetic Analysis: A History of Genetic Thinking, Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp. 40-
45.
556 Ibidl, pp. 52-3.
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phenomena in terms not of factor interactions but of differences in factor properties. As to the
pattern of these property differences, de Vries noted that “Ordinarily the character higher in 
the systematic order is the dominating one, or, in cases of known ancestry, it is the older 
one”. He does note apparent contradictions to this general rule – e.g. the dominance of 
domestic maize, Zea mays, which has a naked seed, over its believed wild type Zea 
cryptosperma, which has a covered seed – but is confident enough in its generality to believe 
that “In species hybrids… where the relative ages of the parental forms are usually unknown, 
possibly conclusions may be drawn from crossing experiments [regarding phylogenetic 
seniority]”.557 De Vries’ confidence in the generality of this law of ancestry was likely rooted 
in its being a long-standing conviction among many breeders that the older a variety the more
prepotent its hereditary power. This hypothesis of ancestry was another of the means used to 
explain the tendency of reversion to wild type, e.g. domestic varieties derive from the wild 
type, therefore the older wild type is more prepotent in crosses, resulting in reversion. This 
hypothesis was known to Darwin as ‘Yarrell’s Law’, after the breeder he attributed it to 
(though belief in it was considerably older).558 De Vries’ theory of ancestral dominance thus 
pushed geneticists to seek to answer an old question – why do wild types tend to dominate 
over derivative varieties – within the novel theoretical framework of hereditary factors as 
discrete biochemical units the behaviour of which was understood in terms of intrinsic 
microstructurally defined properties. This marked the beginnings of a shift in how the 
relationship between wild type and non-wild type factors was understood and investigated. 
Whereas before wild/non-wild type trait relations were principally studied in terms of 
biological function and functional products such as corporeal traits, there was now a move 
towards studying such relations at the level of fundamental structures such as chromosomes 
and genes transmitted across generations. De Vries’ theory of dominance thus significantly 
contributed to the gradual disintegration of the wild type phenotype into the constituent wild 
type genes responsible for its production. 
557 Hugo de Vries, ‘The Law of Segregation of Hybrids’, [1900], In: Curt Stern and Eva R. Sherwood (ed.), 
The Origin of Genetics: A Mendel Sourcebook, San Francisco and London: W.H. Freeman and Company, 
1966, p. 111.
558 M.J.S. Hodge and David Kohn, 'The Immediate Origins of Natural Selection', In: The Darwinian Heritage, 
David Kohn (Ed.), Princeton University Press, 1985, p. 189. 
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Bateson on Mendelism, Dominance & Wild Type
That wild type would come to assume a much more prominent role in William Bateson’s 
theoretical framework than it did in de Vries’ may seem surprising when one considers the 
similarities between their views on variation in domestication and the wild. Bateson had 
argued in 1894 that the frequency of variation “has no necessary relation to the conditions of 
civilization or domestication”. He asserted that “the special fallacy of the belief that great 
Variation is much rarer in wild than in domesticated animals” had arisen “as the outcome of 
certain theoretical views [i.e. the adaptationist belief, found in both Darwin and Lamarck, that
diversity of environment is correlated with diversity of forms] and has received support from 
the circumstance that so many of our domesticated animals are variable forms, and that so 
little heed has been paid to Variation in wild forms”. Instead of comparing domestic varieties 
with their claimed wild types, Bateson proposed instead that “To compare rightly their 
variability with that of wild animals choice should be made of animals that are also variable 
though wild”, his favoured examples being the vertebrae of sloths, the teeth of great apes and 
the colour of the dog whelk Purpura lapillus. In such cases, “we find a frequency and a range
of Variation matched only by the most variable of domesticated animals”. This set of 
arguments shows that at the time of Materials, Bateson believed variation to be a uniform and
arbitrary process which did not differ across the domestic-wild divide. Whilst it was true that 
many domestic species were variable and their believed wild types were known or thought to 
be less so, this did not imply that domestic organisms were more variable than all wild 
species. As a particular example, Bateson observed that whilst it was true that supernumerary 
teeth were more common in both domestic dogs and cats than in wild Canidae and Felidae, 
dentition was even more variable in wild apes and seals than in these domestic species.559 
Bateson, unlike de Vries, saw great potential in Mendel’s experimental method as a means to 
determine the nature of variation both generally and evolutionarily. In particular, he saw 
Mendel’s principle of segregation, demonstrated by the recovery of both parent types in the 
second filial generation, as proof of the discontinuous nature of variation against the claim 
that variation was blending and therefore continuous.560 In contrast, Bateson was sceptical of 
de Vries’ mutation theory – especially the claim of a fundamental difference between 
559 William Bateson, Materials for the Study of Variation treated with Especial Regard for to Discontinuity in 
the Origin of Species, Macmillan and Co., 1894, pp. 4-5, 116, 266 & 572. 
560 Linley Darden, ‘William Bateson and the Promise of Mendelism’, Journal of the History of Biology, Vol. 
10, No. 1, 1977, pp. 93-94.
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retrograde and progressive mutations – and of its basis in experiments on Oenothera. Bateson
noted that crosses between de Vries’ evening primrose mutants produced ratios which could 
not be fitted to any standard Mendelian account, and as a consequence the gametic relations 
between parent type and mutants and between sister-mutants could not in Bateson’s view be 
determined. “All that can be positively asserted”, Bateson maintained, “is that these 
mutations are forms arising discontinuously”; nothing could be established regarding the 
actual internal causes, in particular whether the mutations were due to the production of novel
pangens.561 Grounds for doubt were furthered by the fact that de Vries could not provide 
evidence for his progressive mutations outside of Oenothera, whereas, by contrast, Bateson 
was able to rapidly establish Mendelian inheritance as occurring in multiple species of plant 
and animal. This led Bateson to conclude that “Outside the [ambiguous] evidence from 
Oenothera… I know no considerable body of facts favourable to that special view of 
Mutation which de Vries has promulgated”.562 In rejecting de Vries’ theory of speciation as 
occurring through progressive mutations, Bateson was inclined to take a very different view 
of Mendel’s varieties. Whereas for de Vries these were merely retrograde varieties, relatively 
uninteresting evolutionarily, Bateson was instead inclined to view these as “nascent species”, 
and their behaviour when crossed as offering insight into processes of evolution as opposed 
to mere short-term variation.563 
Bateson’s embrace of Mendelism and rejection of de Vries’ experimental findings should not 
imply that there were not still significant convergences between their two views of variation 
after 1900. Both agreed that much ordinary variation merely consisted in the recombination 
of extant variability without the generation of true novelty, with much of the supposed 
additional variability of domestic forms being attributed to the crossing of distinct elementary
species usually geographically separated in nature. Bateson also endorsed de Vries’ account 
of elementary species as the true units of nature, as illustrated by his 1914 statement that 
“The only definable unit in classification is the homozygous form which breeds true”, further 
maintaining that whilst “the great systematists… have pooled them into arbitrary Linnean 
species, for the convenience of collectors”, “[t]hese "little species", finely cut, true-breeding 
[and fixed]… are what [the student of the physiology of variation] finds when he examines 
561 Alan G. Cock and Donald R. Forsdyke, Treasure Your Exceptions, Springer Science, 2008, p. 260.
562 William Bateson, Problems of Genetics, Yale University Press, 1913, p. 115.
563 Linley Darden, ‘William Bateson and the Promise of Mendelism’, Journal of the History of Biology, Vol. 
10, No. 1, 1977, p. 91.
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any so-called variable type”.564 But where Bateson’s ontology of variation differed 
significantly from de Vries’ was in his reluctance to accept the idea that novel factors arising 
spontaneously might play a central role in evolution, as was assumed in de Vries’ theory of 
progressive mutations. In the course of his experimental investigations, Bateson did come 
across numerous dominant mutations, such as polydactyly in humans and dominant whiteness
in chickens. This led him among other things to reject de Vries’ ascription of dominance as 
related to factor ancestry, as in cases like dominant whiteness in chickens there was no 
evidence of it being found in the wild type Gallus bankiva, leading to the conclusion that it 
must have arisen after domestication.565 But Bateson did not think these cases to be examples 
of de Vries’ progressive mutations. Firstly, unlike the Oenothera mutants, which differed 
from the parent type in multiple aspects, these dominant mutations instead tended to be single
trait differences much like those produced by recessive mutations. But another important 
difference was that whereas de Vries had treated his mutants as representing an independent 
norm of health from the parent type, judged in their fitness only by the struggle for existence, 
Bateson on the other hand was much more inclined to treat dominant mutants as diseased 
forms of the normal or wild type instance of the species. His inclination to do so is already 
seen in 1894 in his approvingly quoting Virchow’s view that “every deviation from the type 
of the parent animal must have its foundation on a pathological accident”.566 Thus we may 
contrast de Vries’ viability-based notion of wild type with Bateson’s idea of the wild type as 
not merely viable but moreover as normal. This was a normativity based on health and the 
idea of the wild type as the endpoint of ‘normal development’ in a species, not, as in earlier 
natural state-style models of wild type, on ideas of specific essence. There is still an element 
of teleology, but this is tied to the directed nature of individual ontogeny (which following 
Haeckel was seen as tied to evolutionary phylogenetic history), not, as in for instance 
Jenkin’s ‘sphere of variation’ model, to a fixed place in nature. 
This associating of variation with pathology and the wild type with health was strengthened 
by Bateson’s corresponding in 1902 with the physician Archibald Garrod. Garrod had studied
the congenital human illness alkaptonuria and had noted the predominance of first cousin 
564 William Bateson, ‘Address of the President of the British Association for the Advancement of Science’, 
Science, Vol. 60, No. 1026, 1914, p. 297.
565 William Bateson, Problems of Genetics, Yale University Press, 1913, p. 90. 
566 William Bateson, Materials for the Study of Variation treated with Especial Regard for to Discontinuity in 
the Origin of Species, Macmillan and Co., 1894, p. 74.
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marriages in the parents of sufferers. Bateson suggested to Garrod that this indicated a 
recessive hereditary condition. Garrod then went on to show that the cause of the disease was 
the absence of an enzyme that decomposes a specific amino acid, leading him to develop a 
theory of ‘inborn errors of metabolism’ which classed alkaptonuria as one of a number of 
hereditary maladies caused by the non-production of a particular enzyme in an important 
metabolic pathway.567 The influence of Garrod’s case of alkaptonuria can be seen in 
Bateson’s following formulation on hereditary diseases: “If… a disease descends through the 
affected persons, as a dominant, we may feel every confidence that the condition is caused by
the operation of a factor or element added to the usual ingredients of the body. In such cases 
there is something present, probably a definite chemical substance, which has the power of 
producing the affection… On the contrary, when the disease is recessive we recognize that its
appearance is due to the absence of some ingredient which is present in the normal body”.568 
Now what applied to the ‘normal body’ in cases of human diseases also for Bateson applied 
to the wild type in cases of variation. As to what was present in cases of dominant mutations, 
Bateson found it difficult to imagine exactly what, commenting that whilst “there is… no 
special difficulty” in understanding the origin of recessive mutations, which, as we shall see, 
he attributed to absences, “as soon as it is understood that dominants are caused by an 
addition we are completely at a loss to account for their origin, for we cannot surmise any 
source from which they may have been derived”. Tellingly, Bateson follows this statement by
making an analogy between the generation of a dominant mutant and a pathogenic outbreak, 
stating that “Just as when typhoid fever breaks out in his district the medical officer of health 
knows for certain that the bacillus of typhoid fever has by some means been brought into that 
district so do we know that when first dominant white fowls arose in the evolution of the 
domestic breeds, by some means the factor for dominant whiteness got into a bird, or into at 
least one of its germ-cells”.569 This implies that he was more inclined to think of a dominant 
mutant factor as a heritable invading foreign body than supposing it might be an internally 
generated novel hereditary unit.  
 
The apogee of Bateson’s scepticism regarding evolution through the generation of novel 
factors occurred in 1914 at his presidential address to the British Association for the 
567 Peter S. Harper, ‘William Bateson, Human Genetics and Medicine’, Human Genetics, 2005, Vol. 118, No. 
1, pp 143-144.
568 William Bateson, Mendel’s Principles of Heredity, 2nd Ed., Cambridge University Press, 1909, p. 232.
569 William Bateson, Problems of Genetics, Yale University Press, 1913, pp. 93-94. 
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Advancement of Science. Here he presented a hypothesis of evolution through degeneration 
asserting that “we must begin seriously to consider whether the course of evolution can at all 
reasonably be represented as an unpacking of an original complex which contained within 
itself the whole range of diversity which living things present”. This position bears some 
resemblance to Weismann’s earlier idea that all multicellular variation consisted in the 
rearrangement of hereditary determinants derived from their prokaryote ancestors. Like 
Weismann, Bateson suggested that the periodic rearrangement of a small number of 
primordial factors could account for the full course of evolution without need of additional 
factors, stating that “That which is conferred in variation must rather itself be a change, not of
material, but of arrangement, or of motion”. But unlike Weismann, Bateson also proposed 
that the appearance of some novel traits could be accounted for as due to the fractionation of 
factors (a suggested possible case was pied coat colouration in animals) and others as due to 
the loss of inhibiting ‘epistatic’ factors which allowed for the manifestation of suppressed 
traits. Regarding the latter, Bateson suggested that the apparent greater variation found in 
domestic varieties, in his example the apple, could be due to the progressive loss of epistatic 
factors originally present in the wild type crab apple.570 The wild type, in other words, 
possessed potentially all the variation found in domestic varieties but needed to be 
‘unpacked’ in order for this to be expressed. 
Bateson’s adoption of this degenerationist model of evolution has often been ridiculed by 
historians of science. Jean Gayon describes the hypothesis as “disconcerting”, and “marked 
by an explicitly preformist and degenerative bias”.571 Peter Bowler is more charitable, 
offering Bateson a get out clause by suggesting that he only “almost [emphasis mine] seemed
to suggest this as a general theory of evolution”, implying that he could not have been 
serious.572 Cock and Forsdyke are perhaps an exception in suggesting that Bateson, in 
hypothesising the development of new forms through the “quantitative disintegration” of 
factors, anticipated “what we now generally ascribe to an amino acid-changing base 
substitution in a DNA sequence”.573 But not only is this assessment Whiggish, it also commits
a fundamental error in its failure to appreciate that Bateson’s theory implied an entropic and 
570 William Bateson, ‘Address of the President of the British Association for the Advancement of Science’, 
Science, Vol. 60, No. 1026, 1914, pp. 298-300.
571 Jean Gayon, Darwinism’s Struggle for Survival: Heredity and the Hypothesis of Natural Selection, Matthew
Cobb (Trans.), Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 272.
572 Peter J. Bowler, Evolution: The History of an Idea, University of California Press, 1989, pp. 275-276.
573 Alan G. Cock and Donald R. Forsdyke, Treasure Your Exceptions, Springer Science, 2008, p. 411.
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one-way trajectory of evolutionary change, factors being lost and disintegrating but never 
being gained and reintegrating, with the end result that evolution would eventually run out of 
material to work with. No such degenerative trajectory is evident in contemporary DNA-
based accounts of mutation.  But however Bateson’s hypothesis is to be judged in a modern 
light, what is of interest for the purposes of my narrative is how we can fit Bateson’s 
degenerative account of evolution to his treatment of wild types. In particular it should be 
noted that this 1914 speech was not the first time Bateson had referred to processes of 
variation in terms of ‘unpacking’. 5 years previously in the second edition of his Mendel’s 
Principles, Bateson had asserted that “it has become clear that variation, in so far as it 
consists in the omission of elementary factors, is the consequence of a process of 
"unpacking"”, and the example used to illustrate this was that of “When from a single wild 
type, man succeeds in producing a multitude of new varieties”. This firstly shows that 
Bateson’s 1914 presidential address was not a one-off, as evidenced in particular by his 
assertion here that “Such variation is not… a progress from a lower degree of complexity to a
higher, but the converse… and that the obvious appearance of increased complexity may in 
reality be the outcome of a process of simplification”.574 But by looking at the context within 
which these 1909 comments occur, we can also connect the development of Bateson’s 
degenerationist theory of evolution to an earlier commitment made in order to make sense of 
a particular aspect of variation and heredity, namely the phenomenon of dominance, which 
Bateson explained in a very different manner compared to de Vries.
Bateson’s Interpretation of Wild Type in the Context of the Presence and Absence 
Hypothesis
De Vries, as previously discussed, had interpreted the phenomenon of dominance, which for 
Mendel had been a product of interaction between factors, as being an intrinsic property of 
pangens, which he observed to be correlated with greater pangen phylogenetic age. De Vries’
interpretation can be criticised on a number of accounts, most notably for being something of 
a virtus dormativa attribution (‘dominating pangens dominate because they possess a 
property of dominance’). Nonetheless the idea of dominance as a property of an allele would 
prove an enduring notion in classical genetics.575 This was not without significant resistance 
from Bateson, who from an early stage was inclined to reject de Vries’ account of 
574 William Bateson, Mendel’s Principles of Heredity, 2nd Ed., Cambridge University Press, 1909, p. 280.
575 Raphael Falk, ‘The rise and fall of dominance’, Biology and Philosophy, Vol. 16, 2001, pp. 288-291.
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dominance, becoming from 1906 onwards the most prominent proponent of a rival theory, 
the ‘presence and absence’ hypothesis. The roots of Bateson’s rejection of dominance as a 
property go back to his 1902 conflict with the biometrician Weldon. Weldon had attacked an 
embryonic Mendelism, focusing in particular on the phenomenon of dominance, which he 
had argued could not be regarded a general law given that even such emblematic cases as 
green and yellow colour and round and wrinkled shape in peas were irregular and showed 
many grades in variation. Bateson’s response to this was to point out that in fact Mendel had 
never made any reference to a ‘Law of Dominance’ in his original paper, only speaking of 
‘dominating’ and ‘recessive’ characters. What was clear from Mendel’s findings, Bateson 
asserted, was that the dominance of, e.g., wrinkled over smooth shape “is a general truth for 
Pisum sativum… that it is a universal truth I cannot believe any competent naturalist would 
imagine, still less assert. Mendel certainly never did”.576 Dominance, Bateson implied, was a 
secondary phenomenon that was not central to Mendel’s theory, being an auxiliary 
hypothesis to help explain how uniformity in the F1 generation and reversion in the F2 
generation could be squared with the independent assortment and segregation of factors. 
Mendel had never suggested that dominance was universal and the examples Weldon pointed
to of irregular dominance merely showed that it was a relative phenomenon, not challenging 
in the slightest the core Mendelian laws. Bateson, it should be noted, was far from alone in 
rejecting the interpretation of dominance as a law – Carl Correns, another ‘rediscoverer’ of 
Mendel, had castigated de Vries in 1900 for assuming dominance to apply to all trait pairs 
based only on its being shown to apply to many trait pairs. Correns, like Bateson, insisted that
dominance was a relative outcome of factor interactions, a vegetative product of 
development, not, as de Vries would have it, an intrinsic property of factors.577 
Nonetheless, even if dominance was not in Bateson’s view central to Mendelism, it still 
required explanation. Importantly, most wild type traits were dominant, implying the 
phenomenon to have an evolutionary importance. Failing to explain dominance was therefore
not optional if Bateson wanted to offer a complete account of evolution. An alternative 
explanation of dominance had emerged in competition with de Vries’ property-based model 
in 1903. In this year, both Correns and the mouse geneticist Lucien Cuénot suggested that in 
cases of complete dominance the dominating trait could be treated as ‘present’ and the 
576 William Bateson, Mendel’s Principles of Heredity, 1st Ed., Cambridge University Press, 1902, pp. 117-119.
577 Raphael Falk, ‘The rise and fall of dominance’, Biology and Philosophy, Vol. 16, 2001, pp. 291.
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recessive trait as ‘absent’. This originally was not so much a theory of factors as a theory of 
factor products. In Cuénot’s case, he had been studying the case of crosses between albino 
coat colour and the dominating black and grey coat colours. He argued that in such cases the 
total dominance of black and grey in the F1 generation could be treated in terms of the 
dominance of the character ‘pigment’ over the character ‘absence of pigment’. Cuénot here 
does not appear to have committed himself to arguing that absence of pigment implied 
absence of character. It was only later, at the 1906 International Congress of Genetics, that 
C.C. Hurst would make the argument that the true nature of the ‘absence’ factor might well, 
after all, be the very absence of a factor. Hurst furthermore proclaimed this idea of actual 
factor absence as being more “appeal[ing] to the practical mind” and as less open to objection
than the alternative view of ‘absence’ as due either to a latent factor or a factor of active 
absence. Bateson adopted the ‘presence and absence’ model in the same year as Hurst. This is
not to say that he did not recognise it to have its problems. Not least of these was that he had 
already identified dominant characters “which appear to us to be negative”, e.g. dominant 
whiteness in chickens. This led him to propose already the possibility that “such negative 
characters [are] due to the presence of some inhibiting influence”, a harbinger of his later idea
of evolution through loss of epistatic factors. But he did not pursue this idea further at this 
stage.578 
The extent to which 1906’s Bateson truly endorsed Hurst’s idea of ‘absent’ characters as 
being caused by actual factor absence is unclear. His own response to Hurst’s paper was 
lukewarm, observing that whilst “The facts we have been discussing are very interesting and 
very important to us”, indicating his commitment to some version of the ‘presence and 
absence’ hypothesis, he insisted that “until the problem [of ‘negative’ dominants] is settled 
we shall be in constant difficulties”.579 It has often been emphasised by those wanting to 
argue that Bateson did believe in actual factor absence that he did not properly distinguish 
between factor and trait, holding both to be aspects of a unitary unit-character, the implication
being that Bateson could not understand trait absence except in terms of factor absence. It is 
certainly true that Bateson did not see transmission and development as clearly demarcated 
separate processes, as was not unusual among biologists of his time.580 But it should be 
578 Elof Axel Carlson, The Gene: A Critical History, W.B. Saunders Company, 1966, pp. 58-59.
579 C.C. Hurst, ‘Mendelian Characters in Plants and Animals’, In: Report of the Third International Conference
1906 on Genetics, Rev. W. Wilks (Ed.), London: Spottiswoode & Co. Ltd., 1907, p. 129.
580 Elof Axel Carlson, The Gene: A Critical History, W.B. Saunders Company, 1966, p. 26.
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stressed that Bateson had a heterodox understanding of the causal basis of heredity and 
variation which gives grounds for belief that this common interpretation of his views on 
‘presence and absence’ is mistaken. As noted previously, Bateson rejected particularist 
accounts of heredity, finding it difficult to reconcile the ‘static’ nature of concrete matter with
his conviction that factor action was dynamic and vibratory in nature. Whilst he never 
developed a fully-fledged theory, he appears to have favoured a colloidal model of the 
material nature of factors.581 In this model, a factor could contribute to development in one of 
two ways, either by affecting organisation or by effecting changes in substance. Factors 
affected organisation by producing vibrations in the cellular protoplasm, resulting in 
differential cell divisions and the repetition of parts, what Bateson in 1894’s Materials had 
identified as ‘meristic variations’. Changes in substance were effected by factors through the 
production of enzymes (then commonly referred to as ‘ferments’), resulting in what Bateson 
in 1894 had identified as ‘substantive variations’.582 That Bateson clearly differentiated 
between the factor and its capacity to produce effects is seen in his 1909 statement that whilst
it may be concluded from Mendelian observations that “in at least a large group of cases the 
heredity of characters consists in the transmission of the power to produce something with 
properties resembling those of ferments”, he remarks that it is “scarcely necessary to 
emphasise the fact that the ferment itself must not be declared to be the factor or thing 
transmitted, but rather, the power to produce that ferment, or ferment-like body”.583 This may 
have been a response to the speculations of his Cambridge collaborator Muriel Wheldale, 
who had suggested that enzymes might represent the actual biochemical units of heredity.584 
Given this evidenced capacity on Bateson’s behalf to distinguish factor and factor product, 
the notion that he could not conceive of trait absence without imputing factor absence lacks 
foundation. This gives increased support for Falk’s alternative interpretation of Bateson’s 
understanding of ‘presence and absence’ as referring to “functions, not to structures”, i.e. that
what was present or absent was a vibration or enzyme, not a factor. Falk would furthermore 
have us understand that what Bateson was arguing for, contra to the view of dominance and 
recessiveness as intrinsic properties of paired factors, was the view that instead dominating-
581 Alan R. Rushton, ‘William Bateson and the chromosome theory of heredity: a reappraisal’, The British 
Journal for the History of Science, Vol. 47 Part 1, No. 172, 2014, pp. 168-169.
582 William Bateson, Problems of Genetics, Yale University Press, 1913, pp. 86-87.
583 William Bateson, Mendel’s Principles of Heredity, 2nd Ed., Cambridge University Press, 1909, p. 268.
584 Robert C. Olby, The Path to the Double Helix: The Discovery of DNA, Dover Publications Inc., 1994, pp. 
133-135.
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recessive relationships should be conceived of as “quantitative alternatives of the same unit-
character”.585 By adopting this position, Bateson would be able to kill several birds with one 
stone. As aforementioned, it dealt with Weldon’s first major objection to Mendelism, namely 
that dominance was usually incomplete, by maintaining dominance to be relative not 
absolute. This also allowed Bateson to tackle Weldon’s argument that Mendelian techniques 
could not be used to analyse continuous traits by arguing that these could be accounted for in 
terms of single factors producing differing levels of vibration or enzymes in different 
individuals. This was therefore in some ways a forebear of the ‘dosage’ accounts of 
dominance later developed by Haldane and Muller. This was also a parsimonious account, “a 
simpler system” as Sara Schwartz notes Bateson as expounding, both doing away with the 
need for purporting extraneous additional factors in cases of continuous variations and 
unifying the previously divided dominant and recessive alleles into functional aspects of a 
single factor.586  
Importantly, adopting a dosage-based account offered Bateson a means of explaining why 
most wild types were dominant over mutants. The wild type, as previously established, was 
equated with the idea of the ‘normal body’ in medicine. In the normal body, the factors 
contributing to the development of a healthy organism all produced an appropriate dose of 
enzymes or vibrations. Recessive mutations occurred in cases where a factor produced a 
substandard dose; in cases where the dose was negligible, it could be considered an 
‘absence’. It should be noted that the notion of the ‘normal body’ was flexible enough that it 
was able to incorporate the discovery of “paradoxical” cases where the wild type was a 
heterozygote, examples of which were found by Bateson and co. in the sweet pea and the 
currant moth Abraxas grossidariata.587 In such cases, the ‘presence and absence’ system 
could simply regard it as normal in a healthy individual of such a species that one of the two 
copies of the relevant factor would produce a low or negligible dosage of factor product. 
Dominant mutations, on the other hand, were interpreted in this schema as due to a factor 
product that was usually not present in the ‘normal body’ interfering with the operation of 
another factor. For instance, Bateson suggested that dominant whiteness could be caused by 
585 Raphael Falk, ‘The rise and fall of dominance’, Biology and Philosophy, Vol. 16, 2001, pp. 286 & 293-294.
586 Sara Schwartz, ‘Characters as units and the case of the presence and absence hypothesis’, Biology and 
Philosophy, Vol. 17, 2002, p. 380. 
587 William Bateson, ‘Facts Limiting the Theory of Heredity’, Science, New Series, Vol. 26, No. 672, 1907, p. 
655; & William Bateson, The Methods and Scope of Genetics, Cambridge University Press, 1908, pp. 46-47.
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“organisms possessing a substance which has the power of suppressing the development of 
pigment, whether by preventing its excretion or by destroying it when formed”.588 
Understanding Bateson’s theory of the ‘normal body’ in terms of a dose-based ‘presence and 
absence’ interpretation of wild type development helps us understand why he was inclined to 
believe that the factors responsible for dominant mutations might have originated as invading
foreign bodies. Whilst no adaptationist, Bateson did believe in the power of natural selection 
to act as a destructive force weeding out the unfit. This would include recessive mutations in 
the wild, but as according to Bateson’s ‘presence and absence’ account these were caused by 
the loss of function of a usually beneficial factor found in the normal body, their persistence 
through evolutionary time was not unexpected. In contrast, dominant mutations should have 
been selected out in nature given that the factors responsible for them usually had no 
beneficial aspect, interfering as they did with the operations of the normal body. One 
explanation for their occurring in domestication was therefore that they had invaded the 
organism’s germ-line after they had left nature and had been allowed to persist due to the fact
that human breeders were less fastidious than nature in destroying unfit variations, and also in
many cases deliberately perpetuated them due to the perceived economic or aesthetic 
advantages of some mutations. The other alternative was that dominant mutations in nature 
were perpetuated due to their not being expressed, i.e. being functionally ‘absent’, and so 
hiding themselves from the sieve of selection. This was an explanation Bateson explored, as 
we have seen, by supposing inhibiting factors which would prevent dominant mutants from 
producing vibrations or enzymes. So it can be seen that Bateson’s degenerationist theory of 
evolution had its roots in his particular conception of wild type in terms of the ‘normal body’ 
combined with a dosage-based account of factor functional ‘presence and absence’ which 
made it difficult for him to understand how evolutionarily detrimental dominant mutations 
might arise except either by invasion from without or by being hidden within from 
destructive selective forces by inhibiting factors. 
Types or Traits?
It should be noted that Bateson’s equation of the wild type with the ‘normal body’ is not 
unusual in the history of genetics. The 1999 edition of Griffiths et al’s Modern Genetic 
Analysis, a widely used textbook around the turn of the millennium, describes the wild type 
588 William Bateson, Mendel’s Principles of Heredity, 2nd Ed., Cambridge University Press, 1909, p. 267.
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phenotype as requiring for its development that “All essential genes must be capable of 
producing their functional products”.589 The language differs but there is again here a clear 
equation of the wild type and the normal body. The impact of Bateson’s ‘presence and 
absence’ modelling of wild type was therefore more long-standing than is widely appreciated.
One reason this was the case was that the ‘presence and absence’ system was widely adopted 
across genetics between 1906 and c. 1912, when it began to be surpassed in fruitfulness by 
the chromosomal linkage studies pioneered by the Morgan group.590 The use of the ‘presence 
and absence’ system helped bolster the idea that wild types were fundamental entities in 
genetics which whilst they could be studied in terms of their constituent unit characters could 
not be fully disintegrated into them on the grounds that the ‘normal body’ was required as a 
reference in order to determine what constituted variation and whether it was due to loss of 
factor function (recessive mutations) or the appearance of a novel factor not usually found in 
healthy individuals (dominant mutations). By contrast, those adopting a more de Vriesian 
outlook and who attributed dominance to being a property of factors as opposed to a product 
of interaction were more inclined towards an atomistic view of traits and factors in which 
wild type and the normal body held a much lesser importance. Atomism at the level of both 
trait and factor was central to de Vries’ theory of heredity and development, which by his 
own characterisation consisted in the view that “the total character of a plant is made up of 
distinct units. These so-called elements of the species, or its elementary characters, are 
conceived of as tied to bearers of matter, a special form of material bearer corresponding to 
each individual character”.591 
De Vries’ organism may therefore fairly be regarded a mosaic composed of its elementary 
characters produced by largely autonomously acting pangens. This idea of the organism was 
unacceptable for Bateson given his interactionist understanding of biology. Moreover, 
whereas de Vries’ views implied that organisms could be theoretically decomposed into their 
constituent traits and pangens without a significant loss of information, Bateson believed that 
organism was more than the sum of its parts, as for factors to interact they must have a pre-
existing milieu within which to interact, much in the same way as forces in physics required a
589 Anthony J.F. Griffiths, William M. Gelbart, Jeffrey H. Miller, & Richard C. Lewontin, Modern Genetic 
Analysis, W.H. Freeman and Company, 1999, p. 70.
590 Elof Axel Carlson, The Gene: A Critical History, W.B. Saunders Company, 1966, p. 53-54.
591 Hugo de Vries, ‘The Law of Segregation of Hybrids’, [1900], In: Curt Stern and Eva R. Sherwood (ed.), 
The Origin of Genetics: A Mendel Sourcebook, San Francisco and London: W.H. Freeman and Company, 
1966, p. 107.
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field within which to interrelate (as shown by Radick and Rushton, Bateson was heavily 
influenced by the electromagnetic field theories of fin de siècle British physics).592 This prior 
milieu, more fundamental than any trait or factor, was referred to by Bateson as the ‘residue’.
He had first raised the idea in a 1902 paper with his collaborator Edith Rebecca Saunders, 
rhetorically asking the question of “Can we rightly conceive of the whole organism as 
composed of such unit-characters”, as had been argued by de Vries, “or is there some residue 
– a basis – upon which the unit-characters are imposed?” Bateson and Saunders, favouring 
the latter, then make a highly intriguing suggestion – that the residue may be responsible for 
reproductive incompatibility between species, as seen in hybrid sterility, and that therefore 
“We may be driven to conceive “Species” as a phenomenon belonging to that ‘residue’”. 
Hybrid sterility, they noted, could not simply be due to factor differences between parents, as 
Mendelian varieties could still cross without issue.593 Darden is thus correct in assessing 
Bateson as considering Mendelian varieties to be ‘nascent species’ but only if we interpret 
nascency in the sense of being a movement in the direction of speciation without this 
movement having become irreversible.594 Overall, this theory of the residue implied that 
whilst variety-producing factor changes were an important first step in speciation, what was 
needed for full speciation was a change at the level of the organisational substratum which 
scaffolded factors and mediated their interactions. Bateson and Saunders argued that the 
particular effect of a meeting of two distinct residues, as in a species hybridisation, was that 
the characters could not be properly divided up amongst the gametes, resulting in an 
individual that was a mosaic of the two species which, unable to produce its own sex cells 
due to this dual heritage, was consequently sterile.595 
Bateson’s theory of residue-based speciation presented a direct challenge to de Vries’ 
pangen-centred theory of mutation in that speciation was conceived not as caused by the 
activity of hereditary factors but rather as the result of changes in the underlying 
592 Gregory Radick, ‘Physics in the Galtonian Sciences of Heredity’, Studies in History and Philosophy of 
Biological and Biomedical Sciences, Vol 42, 2011, pp. 134-6; & Alan R. Rushton, ‘William Bateson and the
chromosome theory of heredity: a reappraisal’, The British Journal for the History of Science, Vol. 47 Part 1,
No. 172, 2014, pp. 163-165. 
593 William Bateson and Edith Rebecca Saunders, ‘The facts of heredity in the light of Mendel’s discovery’, 
Reports to the Evolution Committee of the Royal Society, Vol. I., 1902, pp. 125-160.
594 Linley Darden, ‘William Bateson and the Promise of Mendelism’, Journal of the History of Biology, Vol. 
10, No. 1, 1977, p. 91.
595 William Bateson and Edith Rebecca Saunders, ‘The facts of heredity in the light of Mendel’s discovery’, 
Reports to the Evolution Committee of the Royal Society, Vol. I., 1902, pp. 125-160.
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organisational scaffold within which factors were embedded. As to what this residue 
consisted of, Bateson was not clear, save that it was an “irresoluble base”, being what 
remained unchanging throughout a species’ history whatever changes occurred in its 
factors.596 The principle impact on conceptions of ‘wild type’ had by this thesis was that it 
defined species not at the level of the unit characters, as in de Vries’ theory of elementary 
characters and associated pangens, but at the higher level of the organisation of these unit 
characters. Species, and therefore also wild type, could therefore not be decomposed into 
traits or factors without its being denatured, and as a consequence the species, and its normal 
manifestation the wild type, retained an epistemic privilege over traits and factors in 
Bateson’s worldview. The differences between de Vries and Bateson’s conceptions of species
and variation thus led to a conflict within the embryonic field of genetics between those who 
would privilege traits and factors as fundamental and those who privileged types and 
organisation. 
Bateson’s use of a ‘presence and absence’ based developmental model of trait production was
highly successful early on in undermining the de Vriesian atomistic model based on 
elementary characters and autonomous factors. An instructive case is that of small mammal 
coat colours, one of the first areas of genetics where ideas of ‘presence and absence’ were 
utilised and also an early case of a study of the interaction of multiple factors. The first 
researcher to study the genetics of small mammals is attributed to have been Lucien Cuénot, 
who in 1902 showed that traits such as coat colour Mendelised (in particular that grey coat 
colour is dominant over albino), thus demonstrating that Mendelism was not restricted to 
plants. Bateson was among the researchers following up Cuénot’s experiments and in May 
1903 published a paper detailing ‘The Present State of Knowledge o£ Colour-Heredity in 
Mice and Rats’. One notable fact emerging from this publication was that microscopic 
analysis of mouse hair had shown that the wild type cinnamon or ‘agouti’ trait was in fact 
compound, being produced by three pigments, black, brown and yellow, which were 
distributed along the hair in distinct bands. Moreover, it had been shown that “The different 
colour-types of fancy mice are due to the presence or absence of one or more of these 
pigments in various amounts”, i.e. that each pigment was produced by an independently 
assorting factor and that pigment production varied according to factor activity. For example, 
596 William Bateson, Mendel’s Principles of Heredity, 1st Ed., Cambridge University Press, 1902, p. 26.
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the ‘Golden Agouti’ variety was formed by the loss of black pigment, the yellow by the 
further loss of brown, and the albino through the loss of all capability to produce pigment. 
Other varieties were formed by pigment ‘dilution’, i.e. the lowering in activity of a pigment-
producing factor, e.g. ‘Silver-fawn’, a diluted form of the Chocolate variety where the 
decreased activity of the brown pigment producing factor resulted in hairs having colourless 
tips.597 This early example of a compound trait showed the fallacy of depending on superficial
morphological assessments in determining patterns of heredity – what was necessary was to 
determine what factor products, e.g. pigments, were involved in trait development, and then 
to analyse variation in terms of the recombinations and activity changes of factors, which 
were detectable through the pedigree isolation and synthetic hybridisation of factors within 
lab lineages. The example also showed that there was a distinction between traits as defined 
in terms of units of selection and as units of factor production – to understand wild types, it 
was necessary to study the interaction of factors in their production of adaptive traits which 
would escape the sieve of natural selection; the wild type could not be understood properly 
by just studying factors in isolation, as de Vries had attempted. The discovery of compound 
characters thus showed that the wild type was composite but also that the units of heredity 
could not be treated atomistically at an evolutionary level. Even ignoring Bateson’s residue-
based speciation theory, compound characters still showed that evolution operated at the 
species level not at the level of factors, the wild type and its morphological traits being the 
product of factor interactions and therefore not fruitfully reducible to individual unit-
characters. 
An even more impressive application of the ‘presence and absence’ system to explain 
compound traits was developed by Bateson and Punnett in 1905 to explain the inheritance of 
different allelomorphs of comb in chickens (Figure 1). The trait associated with the wild type 
Gallus bankiva was in this case the single comb. Two dominant mutations, ‘pea’ and ‘rose’ 
were identified which when crossed produced a fourth phenotype, ‘walnut’, all animals of the
F1 generation being walnut. Crosses between ‘walnut’ birds often produced the classic 
Mendelian ratio of 9:3:3:1 (9 walnut, 3 pea, 3 rose, 1 single) associated with Mendelian 
dihybrids (two factors as varying). The reappearance of the wild type was regarded as 
surprising as it was “not known to have been put in”. It was later determined that some of the 
597 William Bateson, ‘The Present State of Knowledge of Colour-Heredity in Mice and Rats’, Proceedings of 
the Zoological Society of London, Vol. II, London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1903, pp. 72-5.
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fowls presenting rose and pea combs were heterozygous for the wild type, explaining 
reversion in the one-in-16 occasions when two wild type-producing factors were paired. 
Bateson and Punnet had in 1905 supposed that, rather than assuming four distinct alleles, that
the unusual behaviour of this set of traits could be explained in terms of the interactions of 
two factors, rose and pea, and their ‘absences’, no-rose and no-pea. Heterozygotes between 
‘present’ and ‘absent’ factors produced the dominant mutant phenotype, whereas the presence
of both rose and pea produced the compound walnut character. The wild type, meanwhile, 
was only produced in the ‘absence’ of both factors (Figure 2).598 This implied to Bateson, as 
discussed previously, that the products of the pea and rose factors were not found in the 
‘normal body’ of the chicken, implying either that these factors had entered the species after 
domestication as invading foreign bodies or else that in the wild type Gallus bankiva they 
were usually suppressed by an inhibiting factor since lost in some domestic breeds. 
Importantly regarding the conflict in genetics between interactionist and atomistic 
approaches, the case of comb variation in chickens also further demonstrated that even in 
cases where microscopic analysis did not determine any visible delineations in a trait such as 
walnut, it could still be the case that the trait was at a genetic level the compound production 
of multiple factors. This applied to wild type traits as much as it did mutant ones. 
In summary, whilst de Vries ultimately rejected the use of wild type as a significant unit of 
analysis, Bateson embraced it, utilising it as a boundary object bridging not only the 
domestic-wild and lab-field divides but also between variation and typicality and health and 
disease, and evolution and degeneration. Bateson was therefore able to use the wild type 
concept in order to enhance the capacity of genetics to extend its claims beyond the lab to 
nature and beyond a relatively small array of experimental organisms to life in general. The 
debate between holist and reductionist interpretations of wild type was not, however, over, 
and it would not be long before the Batesonian system would again be challenged by a 
research programme less committed to preserving the wild type as a primary unit of analysis, 
namely the chromosomal genetics of the Morgan group.
598 Lindley Darden, Theory Change in Science: Strategies from Mendelian Genetics, Oxford University Press, 
1991, pp. 69-70; & William Bateson, Mendel’s Principles of Heredity, 2nd Ed., Cambridge University Press, 
1909, pp. 61-66.
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Figure 1 - Source: William Bateson, Mendel's Principles of Heredity, 2nd Ed., (1909), p. 61.
Figure 2 - Source: William Bateson, Mendel's Principles of Heredity, 2nd Ed., (1909), p. 65.
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Chapter 10 – The Chromosome Theory of Mendelian Heredity, the Downfall of
Interactionist Models of Wild Type & Its Disintegration Into Genes
For all its evident virtues as a heuristic, Bateson’s ‘presence and absence’ model would be 
rapidly surpassed as a research programme by the Morgan group’s Drosophila-based studies 
of chromosomal linkage from around 1912 onwards. Traditionally, much has been made of 
the apparent inbuilt limitations of the model, namely that it could only treat alleles as 
‘present’ or ‘absent’, therefore was unable to incorporate the discovery of multiple allelism, 
and that it claimed ‘absent’ alleles to represent actually absent factors, therefore could not 
account for back mutations.599 Whilst it is true that Hurst did appear to endorse actual factor 
absence c. 1906, I do not believe the evidence is definite that Bateson himself committed to 
this interpretation. Instead, I suggest it more likely that what Bateson meant when he spoke of
‘presence’ and ‘absence’ was the presence or absence of factor products, i.e. enzymes or 
vibrations. As to why Bateson was otherwise interpreted, I point to, following Falk, his 
adoption of de Vries’ terminology of the ‘unit-character’, with its embedded de Vriesian 
assumption of a one-to-one relation between factor and trait, as the cause of the widespread 
perception that by ‘absence’ Bateson implied the actual absence of a factor.600 As I have 
sought to show, Bateson’s interpretation of factor-trait relations was in fact a many-to-one 
and one-to-many one. Factors could both pluralistically interact to produce compound 
characters like ‘walnut’ combs and singularly vary in their generation of products, resulting 
in a spectrum of ‘diluted’ phenotypes lying between the fully ‘present’ and fully ‘absent’ 
phenotypes. Bateson’s presence-and-absence model was therefore not, as suggested by 
Darden, “a hypothesis that explains two and only two states of a character”, but was in fact 
able to incorporate much of the data suggesting multiple allelism by instead arguing that such
variations were due to a change within a factor in its capacity to produce enzymes or 
vibrations.601 Back mutations could similarly be explained as due to a factor re-attaining its 
capacity to produce. 
599 Lindley Darden, Theory Change in Science: Strategies from Mendelian Genetics, Oxford University Press, 
1991, pp. 69-71; & Elof Axel Carlson, The Gene: A Critical History, W.B. Saunders Company, 1966, p. 64.
600 Raphael Falk, ‘The rise and fall of dominance’, Biology and Philosophy, Vol. 16, 2001, p. 286.
601 Lindley Darden, Theory Change in Science: Strategies from Mendelian Genetics, Oxford University Press, 
1991, p. 70; & Raphael Falk, ‘The rise and fall of dominance’, Biology and Philosophy, Vol. 16, 2001, p. 
295.
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So if we dismiss these traditional arguments for the surpassing of the ‘presence and absence’ 
model by the chromosome theory, what other reasons can be given? The main cause, I will 
suggest, was that whilst the ‘presence and absence’ model was able to incorporate an 
interactionist and developmental account of the function of factors in the production of traits, 
one which moreover ontologically prioritised the type over its component factors, it offered 
no account of overall genomic structure and materiality. This was not least in part because 
Bateson’s research programme was almost entirely dependent on an inferential analysis of 
factors based on studying morphological traits. It was thus in many ways a phenomenalist 
examination of surfaces as a means to infer underlying causes. This is not to say that Bateson 
and his collaborators did not make substantial efforts to directly investigate these underlying 
causes, e.g. Muriel Wheldale’s studies of the role of enzymes in colour production in 
snapdragons, but isolating the chemical reagents involved in trait production was difficult if 
not impossible much of the time. There was even less experimental access to the causes of 
meristic variations (assumed to be produced by vibrations), Bateson admitting that these 
represented a “range of problems of causation from which we are as yet entirely cut off”.602 
This inaccessibility of the internal causes of traits was one reason why assumptions about the 
‘normal body’ of a species, its wild type, were so important in the ‘presence and absence’ 
system. This can be seen from the example of dominant whiteness, a dominant ‘absent’ trait 
which Bateson was able to explain by assuming an interaction between the products of the 
wild type and the mutant factor whereby the latter destroyed the former. The assumption of a 
wild type norm thus allowed Bateson to explain such apparent anomalies as dominant 
‘absences’ as due to the inhibition of wild type factors. But ultimately all these supposed 
interactions could only be assumed and indirectly investigated through breeding experiments 
– as to what really was going on under the surface, little could be said. 
The issue of the structural arrangement of factors came to a head with the discovery of new 
forms of associative inheritance. In 1906, Bateson and Punnett, studying sweet peas, found 
what they called ‘partial coupling’ between long pollen grains and purple flower colour 
(dominant alleles [represented by Bateson and Punnett as ‘AB’] to the recessive round pollen 
(‘a’) and white colour [‘b’]). Instances of ‘coupling’ (the consistent co-inheritance of two 
otherwise distinct characters) had already been found by Correns in the early years of 
602 William Bateson, Problems of Genetics, Yale University Press, 1913, p. 86.
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Mendelism. This already suggested some form of structural relation between certain factors. 
The difference here was that this co-inheritance was incomplete (i.e. there were still instances
of the non-coupling traits Ab and aB  being inherited together). This had the consequence, 
unlike complete coupling, of massively distorting the 9:3:3:1 ratio usually expected when 
crossing individuals differing in two allelic characters. In the case of the sweet pea, for 
instance, the ratio of long to round pollen was 12:1 in purple flowers as opposed to the 
expected 3:1. Bateson and his colleagues then found other examples of partial coupling in 
which different ratios presented themselves. Then in 1908, a second phenomenon was 
reported, at first called ‘spurious allelomorphism’, then later ‘repulsion’, this being where 
otherwise unrelated factors, instead of being consistently co-inherited, were consistently 
shown to segregate at the gametic level (this produced a 2:1:1 gametic ratio [AB, aB, Ab] in 
which a double recessive did not form due to the repulsing nature of A and B). This in turn in
1911 was also shown to be partial with the discovery of a double recessive, ‘cretin sterile’ 
(nf), in crosses between ‘normal sterile’ (Nf) and ‘cretin fertile’ (nf) (‘cretin’ was a flower 
character so named for its open mouth and projecting stigma/‘tongue’; ‘sterile’ referred to 
sterile anthers). This phenomenon was only visible in large experiments, the initial ratio it 
was found in (again in peas) being 226:95:97:1. These high ratios were a problem for 
Bateson. It had originally been noted that these differing ‘gametic ratios’ could be aligned in 
a predictive mathematical model based on discontinuous geometric steps. Each step was 
assumed to represent a cell division in gamete production. But Bateson was already aware 
that the number of cell divisions usually observed in meiosis (two) was lower than required 
for most of his coupling ratios to work. 603 It was, in other words, a known false model 
without a working theoretical mechanism. As Bill Wimsatt has emphasised, a model’s being 
false is not in itself a bad thing, as such models often have uses in clarifying data and 
suggesting future avenues for research.604 Nonetheless, so long as the model lacked a 
mechanism, Bateson and Punnett were unable to offer a proper explanation for their data, and
it appears that the high partial repulsion ratios forced their hand. The mechanism proposed to 
explain these anomalous phenomena was called ‘reduplication’. It assumed that during the 
mitotic multiplication of germ cells prior to gamete formation that a germ cell would first 
603 Elof Axel Carlson, The Gene: A Critical History, W.B. Saunders Company, 1966, pp. 41-3 & 50-2; & 
William Bateson and Reginald C. Punnett, ‘On Gametic Series involving the Duplication of Certain Terms’, 
The Journal of Genetics, Vol. 1, No. 4, pp. 294-301.
604 William Wimsatt, ‘False Models as Means to Truer Theories’, Re-engineering Philosophy for Limited 
Beings: Piecewise Approximations to Reality, Harvard University Press, 2007, pp. 104-105.
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double its contingent of factors then divide twice in such a way that each of the four 
quadrants would contain one of four possible combinations of alleles, namely AB, ab, Ab, 
aB. In cases of coupling, quadrants containing paired dominants and recessives would then 
further divide, whereas in cases of repulsion it would be the cells containing a dominant-
recessive combination which would do so. By this means, reduplication would produce the 
unusual gametic ratios seen in cases of coupling and repulsion.605
Reduplication, whilst a lovely example of ‘saving the phenomenon’ through the addition of 
epicycle-style auxiliary assumptions, was from the very start a highly problematic hypothesis 
for explaining associative inheritance. Whilst it worked as an abstract model, it could not be 
correlated with any observations from cytology, a fact pounced upon by the Morgan group’s 
Alfred Sturtevant, who surmised that the reduplication hypothesis required that geneticists 
“assume an enormously complex series of cell divisions, many of them differential, 
proceeding with mathematical regularity and precision, but in a manner for which direct 
observation furnishes no basis”.606 The limitations of a phenomenalist approach as that used 
by Bateson and his colleagues are thus made clear. Where Sturtevant and his fellow 
Drosophilists differed was in that their chromosomal theory of heredity allowed them to 
adopt a correlational method where phenotypic traits could be correlated with the behaviour 
of chromosomes. Their theory, in other words, was not simply dependent on analysis of 
surfaces but could also call on the evidence presented by internal structures. By correlating 
the evidence of both genetic breeding experiments and of cytology, a form of what Wimsatt 
refers to as “multiple determination”, the Morgan group were able to offer far more robust 
hypotheses about genomic structure than Bateson.607 
It should be noted that theorised correlations between cytological observations of 
chromosomes and hereditary phenomena were not new in 1910, when Morgan discovered the
white-eyed male mutant fly that led him to discover the first instance of ‘sex-limited 
inheritance’ in Drosophila. It had been proposed by Boveri and Sutton in 1902-3 that 
differences between the chromosomes of male and female sea urchins and grasshoppers 
605 Elof Axel Carlson, The Gene: A Critical History, W.B. Saunders Company, 1966, pp. 41-43 & 50-2; & 
William Bateson and Reginald C. Punnett, ‘On Gametic Series involving the Duplication of Certain Terms’, 
The Journal of Genetics, Vol. 1, No. 4, pp. 294-301.
606 Elof Axel Carlson, The Gene: A Critical History, W.B. Saunders Company, 1966, p. 55.
607 William Wimsatt, ‘Robustness, Reliability, and Overdetermination’, Re-engineering Philosophy for Limited
Beings: Piecewise Approximations to Reality, Harvard University Press, 2007, p. 44.
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indicated that the determination of sex was based on chromosomal inheritance, and that this 
therefore implied that the rest of the hereditary factors were also located in chromosomes. 
They pointed to similarities between chromosome behaviour in meiosis and the Mendelian 
phenomena of segregation. Even earlier, Weismann had similarly proposed, based on 
cytological observations of the time, that his hereditary determinants were based on the 
chromatin of the nucleus. But as Carlson shows, there were initially significant reasons for 
scepticism among geneticists regarding this correlation. One of these was the fact that the 
chromosomal theory was purely structural and offered no account of factor action. This was 
Bateson’s main reason for having little time for it, along with his scepticism regarding 
particulate theories of heredity. But more mundanely, there was also a conflict between 
cytological findings in the United States and genetic work in Great Britain. Wilson and 
Stevens’ studies of insects had shown that sex was determined by the presence in males of 
either a single or two differing chromosomes, whereas the British data based on studies of 
moths and birds suggested it to be females whose pair of sex chromosomes differed. That the 
case of sex-limited white eyes in Drosophila accorded with the prevailing cytological 
wisdom caused Morgan to take it more seriously. But Morgan also had other good reasons to 
doubt the Boveri-Sutton hypothesis, namely that if factors were situated together on 
chromosomes, then why was coupling not much more common than observed. It was 
therefore fortuitous that later in 1910 Morgan came across a case of partial coupling. 
Partiality of coupling demonstrated to Morgan that if factors were located on chromosomes 
then there must be some means of transference between them. Morgan therefore proposed his
theory of crossing over, whereby homologous chromosomes conjugating in meiosis were 
theorised to exchange material when, having twisted around each other, they then split along 
a single plane. The major difference between this proposed explanatory mechanism and 
Bateson’s reduplication hypothesis was that whilst they attempted to explain the same facts, 
Morgan based his theory on Frans Alfons Jannssens’ cytological observations of 
chromosomal chiasmata which had been published the previous year.608 The superiority of 
Morgan’s over Bateson’s model thus lay in the fact the latter lacked the robustness of a 
correlation between the known facts of genetics and the evidence of cytology.
608 Elof Axel Carlson, The Gene: A Critical History, W.B. Saunders Company, 1966, pp. 43-48.
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The theory of crossing over allowed Morgan to explain coupling and repulsion as due to the 
relative closeness or distance between factors on a chromosome. The fact that non-allelic 
coupling was partial in nature also dealt with the problem of why coupling was not more 
widely observed, namely that crossing over made cases of coupling at medium-to-long 
distances difficult to detect without conducting large scale breeding experiments and easily 
hidden by rounded-up/-down ratios. This theory of linkage would shortly after be adopted by 
Sturtevant as a founding assumption of the great modelling project of classical genetics, 
linkage mapping. Linkage mapping would further problematise Bateson’s phenomenalist 
approach to genetics by rendering locus as a new major fact that a competent geneticist 
should endeavour to explain. Whilst Bateson’s ‘presence and absence’ model was an 
excellent means of modelling function, it offered no hints as to factor location. But this is not 
to suggest that linkage-based models of genetic structure did not also have their drawbacks. 
For whilst ‘presence and absence’ said nothing about structure, linkage-based models said 
precious little about function. For most early geneticists, organismic development could not 
be meaningfully bracketed from factor transmission; after all, the former was in essence a 
continuation of the latter, and classical geneticists did not directly investigate factors but 
rather inferred their existence principally through the study of adult somatic traits, which 
represented as much the endpoint of ontogeny as they did markers for the factors which 
initiated and mediated it. This, in fact, was very much Morgan’s own position prior to 1910. 
This can be seen in a 1909 statement in which he lambasts the de Vriesian concept of a ‘unit-
character’ with a one-to-one relation between factor and trait, asserting that “we are not 
justified in speaking of the materials in the germ-cells as the same thing as the adult 
characters until they develop”.609 These views are not surprising given that Morgan’s 
background was in embryology, being led towards genetics by the study of the ontogeny of 
sex determination.610 Scrutinising Mendelian phenomena with an embryologist’s eyes, the 
younger Morgan was a confirmed sceptic regarding not only the Boveri-Sutton hypothesis 
but also particulate theories of inheritance, to which his later conversion would be 
“incomplete and reserved”, and the Law of Independent Assortment, which in his view 
smacked of preformationism. Denouncing Mendelians as turning “facts… into factors at a 
rapid rate” and “superior jugglery” in their attempts to present Mendelian ratios as absolutes 
609 Thomas Hunt Morgan, ‘What are “Factors” in Mendelian Explanations?’, American Breeders Association 
Reports, Vol. 5, 1909, p. 367.
610 Ron Amundson, The Changing Role of the Embryo in Evolutionary Thought: Roots of Evo-Devo, 
Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 149.    
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instead of averages, he instead favoured a more epigenetic approach to inheritance where 
factor symbols were seen as representing developmental potentialities contained within the 
sex cells as opposed to marking out discrete particulate factors that unilaterally determined 
the development of particular adult traits.611 Morgan’s commitment to an interactionist and 
developmentalist account of heredity was thus arguably even stronger than Bateson’s. It is 
therefore no surprise to learn that Morgan enthusiastically adopted the ‘presence and absence’
system in his early work on genetics and that this influenced his early interpretation of wild 
type, as I will discuss shortly.  
Given the above, it becomes clear that when Morgan chose to bracket off development from 
transmission after 1910 in his pursuit of the study of chromosomal genetic structure that this 
was an instrumental decision based on the limitations of the ‘presence and absence’ system 
outside of phenomenalist analyses of function. As I will show, this did not mark the end of 
Morgan’s use of the ‘presence and absence’ system. What I would therefore argue is that at 
this stage what Morgan was hoping to do was establish a research programme working with 
both systems as compliments, so that he hoped to be able both to determine structure through 
the study of chromosomes and function through analysis of factor contributions to trait 
development. This desire endured throughout the rest of Morgan’s lifetime and would later 
coalesce into his 1926 distinction between transmission and developmental genetics. Whilst 
Amundson has cited this moment as signalling the cleavage of heredity from development, it 
must be emphasised that Morgan did not see these two fields as ontologically distinct, rather 
that they dealt with the same phenomenon but from different perspectives.612 One reason why
Morgan’s continued belief in complementarity has been overlooked in favour of viewing him
as the great demarcator is that it is often difficult to disentangle his particular contribution 
from that of collaborators such as Sturtevant, Calvin Bridges and H.J. Muller who, lacking a 
background in embryology, did tend to see ontogeny as a distinct realm from heredity. A 
further contributing factor to the flawed idea that Morgan drew a firm line between 
development and genetics after 1910 has been the tendency to point to his incorporation of 
aspects of Wilhelm Johannsen’s genotype-phenotype distinction into the chromosome theory 
heredity. But Amundson argues that this is based on the erroneous interpretation of 
611 Nils Roll-Hansen, ‘Drosophila Genetics: A Reductionist Research Program’, Journal of the History of 
Biology, Vol. 11, No. 1, 1978, p. 182.
612 Ron Amundson, The Changing Role of the Embryo in Evolutionary Thought: Roots of Evo-Devo, 
Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 151. 
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Johannsen’s distinction as referring to individual organisms when in fact it was a 
phenomenalist interpretation of patterns of variation and heredity at a populational level. The 
genotype for Johannsen referred to the uniform germinal material shared by all members of a 
‘pure line’, the phenotype to the variation in morphological character expressed within the 
pure line as a consequence of development under slightly differing circumstances. 
Johannsen’s dichotomy therefore had more in common with the later concept of a ‘norm of 
reaction’ resulting from gene-environment interactions than it did with the later use of the 
genotype-phenotype distinction to represent a definitive demarcation between heredity and 
development.613 Nevertheless, given how the genotype-phenotype dichotomy was later 
interpreted and also the fact that Morgan did little to encourage any of his students to take up 
developmental studies, it is perhaps not surprising that this initial distinction of 
complementary fields would come to serve as a significant obstacle to the development of a 
unified understanding the role of genes in heredity, ontogeny and evolution. 
Figure 3 - Source: Raphael Falk, Genetic Analysis: A History of Genetic Thinking, Cambridge University Press,
2009, p. 232.
Morgan’s choice to end use of a ‘presence and absence’ style system in his group’s genetics 
research was ultimately due to practical concerns about intractability and a subsequent 
willingness to adopt instrumental methods to gain results. As has been noted by Amundson 
and Falk, Morgan was well aware of the developmental complexities involved in the 
production of traits by genes and had continued to attempt to map these functional aspects of 
genes onto their structure in the early years of the Mendelian chromosomal heredity research 
programme. This culminated in his attempt to introduce a new nomenclature in 1912 to 
account for the interactions of genes in ontogeny. His example was the heredity and 
development of wings, specifically the wild type trait and the mutant traits rudimentary, 
613 Ibid., 2005, p. 153. 
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miniature and rudimentary-miniature (see Figure 3). Using a version of ‘presence and 
absence’, Morgan gives the gene for miniature the symbol M and that for rudimentary as R. 
Miniature wings occurred in cases when M was present and R absent and was represented as 
rM; rudimentary occurred in the reverse case and was represented as Rm. The wild type trait, 
which Morgan knew to occur only when both R and M were present, was represented as RM.
The wild type trait was thus shown to be a compound character requiring the presence of 
more than one gene to develop. But importantly Morgan did not treat the two genes R and M 
as sufficient for development. This was made clear by the case of rudimentary-miniature, 
represented as rm, i.e. as an absence of both genes. Morgan mused that:
“It may seem, on first thought, that no wings at all should appear with M and R 
absent; but such an interpretation would rest on a false conception, as I take it, of 
Mendelian factors; for, the absence of R and of M does not mean that all factors for 
wing are lost – there may be hundreds of factors that enter into the production of 
wings – but only that when a certain factor, R, is lost from the complex, a miniature 
wing is produced by the remainder; and when the factor M is lost from the complex of
wing-factors, a rudimentary wing is produced by the remainder. When both R and M 
are absent the remaining factors are still capable of forming as much of the wing as is 
shown by the rudimentary-miniature wing”.
It is notable that here Morgan has utilised Bateson’s concept of the residue (rechristened the 
‘residuum’) but has reconceptualised it as referring to the totality of other genes in their 
developmental role in the production of the organism, as opposed to Bateson’s original 
conception of it as referring to an underlying invariant base responsible for the consistent 
organisation of factors within a species lineage. What is emphasised in this model is that the 
developmental production of traits is best conceptualised as the result of the contribution of 
the whole genome as opposed to single genes, or for that matter even small groups of genes. 
Whilst individual genes are difference-making in that their deletion results in a change in trait
production, a gene nonetheless cannot be said to produce the trait as its own contribution to 
development only matters in the context of the contributions of all other genes. In this model 
there are, as Falk surmises “no genes for traits”.614 It is the organism and its development 
614 Raphael Falk, Genetic Analysis: A History of Genetic Thinking, Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp. 231-
233.
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which is central to this model of heredity and development, not genes. And, as in Bateson’s 
version of the ‘presence and absence’ system, the wild type continues to hold an ontological 
privilege over genes in that it is presented as the developmental endpoint attained when all 
genes active in the ‘normal body’ are ‘present’. The wild type at this stage in the Morgan 
group’s conceptualisation of heredity and development is thus yet to disintegrate into its 
constituent genes. It is not merely a reference norm based on an ascribed ‘typical’ laboratory 
lineage but rather a biological norm grounded in the teleological process of development.  
What a contrast is seen a mere two years later in the presentation of genetic contributions to 
development in The Mechanism of Mendelian Heredity! Discussing the case of eye colour, 
which by this time was known to be affected by at least twenty-five different genes at 
different loci, it is stated that in the case of a mutation such as pink eye colour that “we may 
say that a particular factor (p) is the cause of pink”. What has changed here? How is it that a 
single factor is now being credited for the production of a trait when it was acknowledged by 
Morgan a mere two years previously that it is the genome as a whole which is responsible for 
trait production, not any individual factor? The answer is quite simple: Morgan’s views on 
heredity and development have not undergone an overnight conversion to genetic atomism. 
Rather what has happened is that a different idea of causation is being employed here than in 
1913’s interactionist model of factor contributions to trait development, Morgan et al 
commenting that “we use cause here in the sense in which science always uses this 
expression, namely, to mean that a particular system differs from another system only in one 
special factor”. This represents a move from an interactionist developmental account of the 
gene to a difference-making account which Schwartz calls the ‘differential concept of the 
gene’.615 This move from a more holistic methodology to an instrumental atomism can also 
be understood in terms of Griffiths and Sterelny’s distinction between ‘actual sequence 
explanations’ and ‘robust process explanations’; whereas the former style of explanation 
seeks to explore the nuances of causal history, the latter style is based on “reveal[ing] the 
insensitivity of a particular outcome to some feature of its actual history”.616 
615 Ron Amundson, The Changing Role of the Embryo in Evolutionary Thought: Roots of Evo-Devo, 
Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 149.
616 Kim Sterelny and Paul E. Griffiths, Sex and Death: An Introduction to Philosophy of Biology, The 
University of Chicago Press, 1999, p. 84.
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Several factors make clear why Morgan and his colleagues chose to move to this differential 
interpretation of gene action. Firstly, the ‘presence and absence’ nomenclature was limited in 
its utility to the interaction of two factors, being, in Morgan’s words, “not sufficiently elastic”
to incorporate more – after all, how does one understand ‘absent’ if it can stand for two 
distinct mutant traits that are recessive to the wild type – the terminology does not allow for 
two different kinds of absence!617 Furthermore, the system was impractical as every time a 
new mutation was discovered it required that the terms be changed. As an example, Falk 
considers what would occur if a third mutation, ‘vestigial’ (Vg) were incorporated into the 
1913 ‘presence and absence’ model: “specifying the effect of Vg… would imply profound 
rephrasing of the reference to all three genes. The three single-mutation phenotypes should be
now described as miniature-rudimentary for the M R vg genotype, rudimentary-vestigial for 
the m R Vg genotype, and miniature-vestigial for the M r Vg genotype. The specification of 
any other gene of the developmental residuum would demand further revision of the 
description of all the previous genes involved”.618 The ‘presence and absence’ system could 
therefore not be sustained given a desire to establish a standardised and consistent 
terminology for genetics. The perceived inability of the ‘presence and absence’ model to 
adequately deal with interactions between more than two factors was finally made intolerable
for the Morgan group thanks to the relentless and ongoing ‘flood’ of mutants that had begun 
appearing in their ‘fly room’ from the winter of 1911-2 onwards.619 
As has been emphasised by Falk, the new language of genetics was not neutral but was 
rather, whatever Morgan’s intentions, a de facto genocentric nomenclature. In moving from 
an actual sequence style of explanation as used in interactionist ‘presence and absence’ 
models to the style of robust process explanation developed in the differential concept of the 
gene, a significant background assumption was made in order to produce the insensitive 
background against which difference-making gene action could occur. Whereas previously 
the residuum had been openly acknowledged as actively contributing to all trait development,
in the differential account of gene action it is treated as a constant backdrop against which 
gene action may be measured. Whilst the Morgan group all knew and acknowledged that the 
617 Thomas Hunt Morgan, ‘Factors and Unit Characters in Mendelian Inheritance’, The American Naturalist, 
Vol. XLVII, No. 553, 1913, p. 12.  
618 Raphael Falk, Genetic Analysis: A History of Genetic Thinking, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 233. 
619 Robert E. Kohler, Lords of the Fly: Drosophila Genetics and the Experimental Life, The University of 
Chicago Press, 1994, p. 61. 
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residuum was causally active, by treating it as a contextual constant and the gene as the 
foregrounded actant they effectively transferred much of the perceived causal power of the 
residuum to the gene. The 1913 model had kept in view the residuum and emphasised the 
minute nature of individual factor contributions to development. By pushing the residuum 
into the background and treating it as a constant, the visibility of individual gene action was 
magnified but at the cost of granting genes illusory autonomy as ‘atoms’ of heredity and 
uncontextualised power as difference makers. 
One especially notable effect of this instrumental obviation of issues of interaction was that 
dominance was once more treated as an intrinsic property of dominating genes. Morgan and 
his collaborators were conscientious of being interpreted as suggesting a one-to-one relation 
between genes and traits, so insisted that what was being considered a property was the 
capacity of a gene to produce its primary product, e.g. an enzyme, and not the trait, the many-
many relations between gene products involved in ontogeny being not the prerogative of 
transmission geneticists to study but rather that of developmental geneticists. But 
nonetheless, they continued to treat the relation between genes and traits as if it were one-to-
one in that the differential account’s analysis of gene action in effect treated all other 
contributing factors in development as ceteris paribus conditions. Moreover, whereas the 
‘presence and absence’ model had offered an attempted explanation of dominance, the 
Morgan school of structural genetics in effect parcelled off explanations of function for other 
researchers to investigate. The physiology of dominance was left unexplained; an assumption
of dominance as a relatively simplistic and unitary phenomenon took its place in most models
of heredity, variation and evolution based on classical genetics research. This, for example, 
allowed the population geneticist Ronald Fisher to propose in 1928 a selectionist explanation 
of dominance whereby “Assuming that all heterozygotes were originally intermediate, there 
would be a tendency for those to survive whose gene complex reacts in the most favorable 
manner with any new mutation. Thus if the effects of a gene were disadvantageous they 
would become increasingly recessive, while if beneficial they would shift towards complete 
dominance, owing to the selection of those heterozygotes in which they were most markedly 
developed”. This hypothesis was not grounded in any knowledge of physiology but rather in 
the Morgan group’s discovery of multiple alleles, which Fisher theorised selection could act 
on so as to ensure that only the allele which produced the fittest phenotype would 
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predominate at any one locus, so that advantageous genes would become dominant and 
disadvantageous genes recessive.620 The prevalence of dominant wild type traits was therefore
explained as a product of selection in nature. This had the correlative effect of offering 
theoretical support for the representative quality of lab wild types, as so long as their traits 
did not look or behave differently from those of wild individuals and were dominant but not 
inherently disadvantageous, they could be considered as reliable instances of traits 
predominant in nature. Research done utilising strains with such traits could therefore be 
extrapolated to nature with less difficulty on the basis of such assumptions. 
But note that Fisher’s theory did not offer a decent explanation for why dominant mutations 
that would be inherently disadvantageous in nature, e.g. dominant whiteness, polydactyly, 
some hereditary diseases, were able to become dominant given that if their heterozygotes had
started off as intermediary, why should they become even more disadvantageous? By 
contrast, Bateson’s ‘presence and absence’ model was able to explain the dominant effect of 
these mutations in terms of the interaction of factor products. This was perhaps a clue that the
causes of dominance are not physiologically simple, or in fact unitary. As Falk observes, 
dominance “turned out to be one of the more troublesome cases [of concepts from classical 
genetics] that evaded reduction to molecular terms”. Indeed, since the molecular turn the 
dominance concept has in fact fragmented based on the variety of different allelic phenomena
that produce dominance-like relations between phenotypes, with a corresponding variety of 
new categories arising, e.g. haploinsufficiency, ectopic mRNA expression, constitutive 
protein activity, toxic protein, dominant negative, pseudodominant. Given these 
circumstances, it is little surprise to see something of a return to a Batesonian style ‘presence 
and absence’ model based on assumptions about the ‘normal body’, namely Andrew Wilkie’s
definition of dominance: “The most likely effects of a random gene mutation are that it will 
either be neutral (normal phenotype) or inactivating. If the latter, the question is whether the 
inactivation would be clinically manifest in the heterozygote… or only in the homozygote”.621
The assumption that dominance was a physiologically simple and unitary mechanism, on 
which Fisher’s theory and its corollary support for the representativeness of lab wild types 
was based, has thus proven ultimately false.  
620 Raphael Falk, ‘The rise and fall of dominance’, Biology and Philosophy, Vol. 16, 2001, p. 299-304.
621 Ibid., pp. 313-318; & Andrew O.M. Wilkie, ‘The Molecular Basis of Genetic Dominance’, Journal of 
Medical Genetics, Vol. 31, 1994, pp. 89-98.
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The model of heredity, variation and evolution presented in the Morgan group’s 1915 
Mechanism of Mendelian Heredity was one which acted to magnify the gene at the expense 
of the organism and foregrounded single gene action at the expense of multi-gene interaction.
The wild type was not only pushed into the background but was also fundamentally 
undermined. Whereas in Morgan’s 1913 ‘presence and absence’ model the wild type was 
shown to be the production of all genes and the product of none individually, the 
foregrounding of genes over genomes, organism and environment had the effect of attributing
the power to produce wild type characteristics to individual genes, the ‘wild type alleles’. The
portrayal of wild type alleles as producing wild type traits both denied the inherent gene-to-
gene and gene-to-environment interactivity that was central to trait development. 
Troublesome questions regarding the process of ontogeny and the influence of genomic and 
environmental context were in this way circumvented – as Amundson observes, what 
mattered in this new system was that “correlations can be traced between the end products of 
ontogeny in successive generations”, whereas the actual process of development itself was 
black-boxed.622 The wild type was thus no longer grounded, as it had been in the ‘presence 
and absence’ system, in its being related to the biological norms apparent in the development 
of the ‘normal body’ (though the equation between the two was still widely assumed). It was 
instead grounded in the ‘typical’ phenotype, which was assumed to be correlated with a 
typical genotype. This typical phenotype was furthermore treated as decomposable as 
opposed to being thought greater than the sum of its parts. For when genes are epistemically 
privileged as difference-makers, the ontological picture that emerges from such research is of 
the phenotype as but the sum of individual gene actions.623 The wild type thus decomposes 
into the wild type alleles of the typical genotype. This idea of wild type as decomposable into
genes I call the compositional notion of wild type, and it is the conception of wild type that 
predominated in the transmission genetics of the Morgan group and those they influenced. 
622 Ron Amundson, The Changing Role of the Embryo in Evolutionary Thought: Roots of Evo-Devo, 
Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 150.
623 Ken Waters has commented that “The fact that classical geneticists routinely constructed experimental 
situations so that the difference principle would apply undermines the notion that they naively believed that 
each of the phenotypic characters they studied were preformed in single genes or even gene complexes”. 
Whilst he is certainly right that Morgan et al were not naïve in their thinking and practice, this nonetheless 
does not get away from the fact that the change of perspective inherent in the move to genocentric language 
greatly influenced popular and scientific perceptions of the relationship between genes and organisms to the 
extent that reductionist interpretations of organisms as composites of gene-produced traits became more 
commonplace. For Waters' comments, see: C. Kenneth Waters, 'Causes That Make a Difference', The 
Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 104, No. 11, 2007, pp. 558. 
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Conclusion – The Place of the Wild Type in Model Organism Systems in
Classical Genetics
What was a ‘typical phenotype’ in the Morgan group’s model system? In my introduction, I 
mentioned Little's 1921 ‘Report of the Committee on Genetic form and Nomenclature’, 
which had concluded that “In most animals and plants it is convenient to settle on a standard 
type, preferably the wild type, when this is known”.624 Morgan had initially selected 
Drosophila as a 'wild' species and would have developed some understanding of its natural 
variability. He would therefore have been able see that over the years the flies he and his 
students were utilising as wild types gradually became more uniform. Adopting a differential 
concept of the gene allowed 'wild type' to be assigned on to traits on a token basis as opposed 
to on a more holistic assessment, and therefore offered a means of getting around the 
differences between lab wild types and really-wild types. Nonetheless, the label 'wild type' 
could not be applied arbitrarily, and the idea of a 'real wild type' found in nature still served 
as something of a guiding model for research, as indicated by the 1921 report. 
To explain why a natural standard still remained important in the lab, I borrow a distinction 
Christopher Di Tiresi makes between ‘reference standards’ and 'natural standards'. Both kinds
of standards can be used as tools by acting as constants around which to model, measure and 
manipulate variation. Reference standards are chosen by convention, whereas natural 
standards are selected from nature, but this is not, I argue, an exclusive relationship.625 Rather,
when the choice of reference standards is overly arbitrary in scientific knowledge production,
their utility as epistemic tools can be seriously compromised, for if a laboratory standard has 
no relevant commonalities or analogies with any target entities or phenomena outside in 
nature, knowledge produced using it can only circulate between laboratories and cannot be 
properly extrapolated to the natural world. Such laboratory objects are artefacts and their 
epistemic meaningfulness is largely restricted to within human-designed artificial worlds. But
genetics did not aim merely to study artefacts; it aimed to study patterns of heredity in the lab
which could be extrapolated to the wild in order to explain natural phenomena, especially 
relating to evolution. Consequently, the wild type in classical genetics was required to play a 
dual role as both reference standard against which variation may be measured and natural 
624 C.C. Little, ‘Report of the Committee on Genetic form and Nomenclature’, The American Naturalist, Vol. 
55, No. 637, 1921, p. 176.
625 Christopher Di Teresi, ‘Taming Variation: Typological Thinking and Scientific Practice in Developmental 
Biology’, Thesis (PhD): University of Chicago, 2010, pp. 16-17.
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standard so as to enable knowledge produced in the lab to be extrapolated to individuals and 
species living wild under the conditions of the struggle for existence. 
Now it is true that wild types were in some ways eminently suited to this role as hybrid 
standards. As Evelyn Fox Keller observes, model organisms are “not artifactually constructed
but selected from nature’s very own workshop”, i.e. they are organisms, not machines, and no
matter what alterations are imposed on them by human interventions, these are wholly 
insignificant compared to the changes wrought on them by nature across evolutionary history.
Because of this core naturalness, Keller thinks, model organisms can act much like political 
representatives for their species and for nature in the lab.626 Wild types, as ostensible stand-
ins for the 'normal' form of the species in nature, would ideally be exemplary such 
representatives, and I believe constituted the component of classical genetics model organism
systems which was designated principle responsibility for this role of representing the natural
in the lab. However, as shall be seen, there were many ways in which  the laboratory strains 
called ‘wild type’ were in actual fact not very wild or typical. I shall now briefly deal with 
some of the problems this caused. 
Even before the Morgan group carried out substantial ‘debugging’ (Kohler), breeding out so 
called ‘C factors’ and other modifiers that impeded crossing over so as to ensure their linkage
maps accurately represented genetic distance, it was the convention in genetics to use heavily
inbred ‘pure lines’. Morgan and his colleagues did not hold to the view, like de Vries, that in 
doing so they were extracting the ‘elementary species’ out of their natural admixture – their 
interpretation of the nature of evolutionary variation was more fine-grained than that and 
became even more so with the discovery of multiple allelism, which showed that dominance 
could hide far more variation in nature than previously suspected. Morgan and his 
‘drosophilists’ were therefore perfectly aware that their standard flies were deliberately 
“constructed from stocks that produced recombination data conforming most closely with 
Mendelian theory” (Kohler) and that the “bricolage” chromosomes of these ‘wild types’ were
derived from several original stocks which had been further inbred to ‘debug’ them. 
Similarly, the standardised environment of the genetics labs was very different from that of 
nature, resulting in a distinct ecology. The Morgan group’s Drosophila flies, normally active 
626 Evelyn Fox Keller, Making Sense of Life: Explaining Biological Development with Models, Metaphors, and
Machines, Harvard University Press, 2002, pp. 51-52. 
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only at dawn and dusk, became active around the clock like their caretakers.627 If we recall 
the earlier discussion in this thesis of definitions of domestication, with an organism being 
removed from nature’s struggle for existence, taken indoors, being supplied with abundant 
nutriment and having its reproduction controlled being four key factors, then these 
Drosophila ‘wild types’ must surely have counted among the most domesticated creatures to 
have yet existed on the planet! 
These ‘normal’ lab conditions furthermore were not always the ‘normal’ conditions for the 
development of some of the very mutant traits that standardisation was supposed to expose by
making visible their difference. The Morgan group found this out for themselves in the case 
of mutations such as ‘abnormal abdomen’, which varied from fully expressed to 
indistinguishable from wild-type according to whether reared on moist or dry food. In such 
cases Morgan et al assert that “Where [the] environment [required for the mutation’s 
expression] is not the normal one, its discovery is an essential element of the experiment”.628 
But the fact was that such mutation were usually only discovered by accident, such as, in the 
case of ‘abnormal abdomen’, when food was ‘improperly’ administered and allowed to 
become wet. This implied that there could be a good deal of hidden variation that was not 
visible in the ‘normal’ conditions of the lab. Moreover, cases like this where mutations 
appeared as wild type phenotypically would be used later in the 1930s by Richard 
Goldschmidt to argue that the structuralist research programme’s basis in assuming inferable 
correlations between fully developed phenotypes and underlying genotypes was flawed and 
its findings could only be rescued by once more introducing a physiological perspective that 
incorporated the role of development and environmental conditions. Goldschmidt dubbed 
mutants which produced wild type phenotypes under certain environmental conditions 
‘genocopies’, and furthermore also named a parallel category, ‘phenocopies’, these being 
phenotypes which were “produced experimentally from the Wild-type form… and cop[y] or 
[duplicate] the appearance of a mutant (or combination of mutants)”.629 The distinction 
between wild types and mutants, Goldschmidt and other functionalist critics argued, was a 
laboratory artefact not applicable across all of nature’s varying environments.
627 Robert E. Kohler, Lords of the Fly: Drosophila Genetics and the Experimental Life, The University of 
Chicago Press, 1994, pp. 65-67, 39-41 & 53.
628 Thomas Hunt Morgan, Alfred H. Sturtevant, Hermann J. Muller, & Calvin B. Bridges, The Mechanism of 
Mendelian Inheritance, Henry Holt and Company, 1922, p. 38.
629 Richard Goldschmidt, Physiological Genetics, New York and London: MacGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.,
1938, p. 4.
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It was not only the artifice of laboratory conditions which was open to criticism, for there 
were also those who would question whether the kind of breeding experiments done in 
genetics had any true correlate in nature, and therefore whether the data they produced could 
truly be extrapolated to evolutionary phenomena in the wild. “If we are ever able to discover 
what part hybridization plays in evolution”, the mouse geneticist Maud Slye remarked in 
1915, “it is immeasurably more valuable to find out the behaviour of natural species rather 
than of forms created in the laboratory under more or less artificial conditions, and which are 
never found outside the laboratory”. Specifically, she insisted it to be “still open to question 
whether the wild house mouse (Mus musculus) inevitably furnishes actual ‘homozygotes’ 
which will stand every test of the theoretical ‘homozygote’”, i.e. whether actual wild types 
ever approached the artificial uniformity of character found in ‘wild type’ lab strains. To 
avert this issue, she insisted on corroborating results attained using “artificial laboratory” 
strains by repeating crosses using “wild housemice”.630 Slye here was targeting the 
experimental techniques of fellow mouse geneticist C.C. Little but her critique may be 
considered representative of a form of anti-reductionist scepticism that equally applied to the 
work of the Morgan group. 
That Morgan was fully aware of the “artificial and unnatural conditions” typical of the 
laboratory environment and of the contrived character of experimental technique and 
procedure is clearly demonstrated by his defence of such practices in his immediate follow-
up to the Mechanism of Mendelian Inheritance, 1916’s A Critique of the Theory of Evolution.
Responding to criticisms that the results of his experiments do not provide reliable evidence 
for the actual operation of evolution “in the "open", nature "at large" or to "wild" types”, 
Morgan asserts that, if those rejecting the results obtained from the breeding pen, the seed 
pan, the flower pot and the milk bottle are to be consistent, “this same objection should be 
extended to the use of the spectroscope in the study of the evolution of the stars, to the use of 
the test tube and the balance by the chemist, of the galvanometer by the physicist. All these 
are unnatural instruments used to torture Nature's secrets from her”.631 Morgan’s 
instrumentalism is thus once again displayed here. Wild types, the insinuation is, may be 
genetically and ecologically quite removed from their truly wild counterparts, ‘normal’ in 
630 Maud Slye, ‘A Reply to Dr Little’, Science, Vol. 42, No. 1077, 1915, 246-247.
631 Thomas Hunt Morgan, A Critique of the Theory of Evolution, Princeton University Press, 1916, pp. 84-85.
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only a broad sense, but it is necessary to work with such often artefactual tools if controlled 
and verifiable data is to be produced. Nature must be treated unnaturally if it is to be studied, 
and to forego such means would render biology a non-science.
If wild types are instrumental tools, but tools nonetheless which are not wholly artificial due 
to their lengthy preceding natural history, how is it that they represent nature in the lab? A 
sceptic might suggest that we have here another case of the conventionalisation of 'natural' 
practices described by Gooday with reference to 19th century microscopy in Chapter 6.632 But 
I believe that there is some element of representation here that goes beyond mere convention. 
In particular, I will argue that the major means by which wild types stand in for nature is 
through their retention of natural properties and processes. I here again invoke Leonelli's 
concept of ‘material abstracting’ (see also Chapter 6), the process by which nature and 
natural entities entering the lab are stripped of many of their initial found qualities to improve
their tractability in the lab but by continuing to retain the remainder of their found qualities 
may consequently be “taken to be representative of a [broader] set of phenomena”. Wild 
types on this view, by retaining natural properties, may be taken as representative of their 
species with regard to phenomena relating to retained natural properties, and so long as they 
are handled in such a manner as to prevent the production of obstructive artefacts (Leonelli's 
'performative skills').633 This importance of underlying homologies between lab reference 
standard and target systems in nature has similarly been recognised by Schaffner, who 
remarks that “Such prototypes of necessity need to be representative – to connect 
analogically to other prototypes – if they are to do their job(s) as surrogates”.634
 
The conditions for what is necessary for a wild type to be a stand-in for nature also determine
what kinds of experimental artefacts are acceptable and which not. In other words, in any 
experimental system there will be aspects of the assemblage which are negotiable (and can 
therefore be modified to increase tractability, etc.) and others which are non-negotiable, and 
when a system is intended to produce knowledge that can be extrapolated to particular target 
systems in nature, these limitations on negotiation will be shaped by the need to maintain 
632 Graeme Gooday, ‘'Nature' in the Laboratory: Domestication and Discipline with the Microscope in 
Victorian Life Science’, The British Journal for the History of Science, Vol. 24, No. 3, 1991, p. 341.
633 Sabina Leonelli, ‘Performing Abstraction: Two Ways of Modelling Arabidopsis thaliana’, Biology and 
Philosophy, Vol. 23, 2008, pp. 523-524.
634 Kenneth F. Schaffner, 'Model Organisms and Behavioral Genetics: A Rejoinder ', Philosophy of Science, 
Vol. 65, No. 2, 1998, pp. 278-279.
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relations of homology or analogy between lab and nature. In the case of lab wild types, I 
suggest it was the wild type alleles which represented the retained natural properties that 
allowed for them to be considered representative of genetic phenomena in nature, and that 
retaining at least some level of assumed isomorphic mapping of the lab wild type genome 
onto actual wild type genomes was what was considered as fundamentally non-negotiable if 
the knowledge produced using these wild types was to be considered valid. Major means of 
determining whether a phenotype was ‘wild type’ included comparison with existing ‘wild 
type’ lineages, comparison, when possible, with actual wild flies and taxonomic descriptions 
of the normal characteristics of the species Drosophila melanogaster, though the flies used in
the Morgan lab were initially known as Drosophila ampelophila, the original description of 
which is credited to Loew in his 1861 Centuria Secunda (Dipt. Amer. Sept. indigena), no. 99, 
page 101.635 Alongside these phenotypic methods, individuals could also be crossed with 
other wild types and known mutant lineages to see if they produced expected Mendelian 
ratios in crosses. So long as it was felt that no non-negotiable properties had been tampered 
with, the wild type could act as a bridge between the lab and nature, one of Star and 
Griesemer’s ‘boundary objects’.
That geneticists believed their lab ‘wild types’ to be appropriate representatives of nature can 
be seen in claims of substitutability between lab wild types and wild types in nature. For 
example, William E. Castle in 1905 stated that the same range of Mendelian mouse coat 
colour phenotypes found in the lab can be produced by crossing a purebred albino with “a 
wild house-mouse of the kind every barn contains”, so long as the latter is “properly 
selected”.636 This assumption also worked the other way round, as can be seen in Morgan’s 
1910 assertion that ‘wild’ flies merely need to be of unrelated stock, not necessarily 
undomesticated, in order for crosses with mutant strains to produce Mendelian ratios.637 
Whilst this can be seen as an instance of Morgan’s instrumentalism, it is also I think 
reflective of a fundamental belief that the domestic-wild distinction does not matter so long 
as a lab lineage has a genome that resembles those typically found in nature enough that the 
same kind of desired results are produced. Claims of substitutability may, I remark, be 
635 G.J. Bowles, ‘The Pickled Fruit Fly – Drosophila ampelophila Loew.’, The Canadian Entomologist, Vol. 
XIV, No. 6, 1882, p. 102.
636 William E. Castle, Heredity in Relation to Evolution and Animal Breeding, D. Appleton and Company, 
1911, p. 83.
637 Thomas Hunt Morgan, ‘Sex Limited Inheritance in Drosophila’, Science, New Series, Vol. 32, No. 812, 
1910, p. 121.
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considered instances of believed strong metonymy between lab and nature, where the 
representative quality of wild types is thought to be based on shared properties (i.e. 
homologies) that allow one individual to be exchanged for another, as opposed to a weak 
metonymy where the relation between representer and represented is only one of analogy. 
This metonymy between lab and nature is not, it has been insisted by sociologists of science 
of a constructivist persuasion, a natural arrangement but one built up and maintained over 
time through the gathering of allegiances and the demonstration of epistemic and 
interventional power. Even where shared properties allow for strong metonymy, there is need
for alignment between lab and nature to allow for effective representation. As Bruno Latour 
observes “If there are identities between actants [e.g. lab wild types and their natural 
counterparts], this is because they have been constructed at great expense. If there are 
equivalences, this is because they have been built out of bits and pieces with much toil and 
sweat, and because they are maintained by force”.638 Steven Shapin has similarly discussed 
the relation between lab and natural objects as based on the establishment of equivalences 
where the lab object is in a relation of “standing for” the natural. In his favoured example, the
behaviour of mercury-in-glass was incorporated into the set-up of Blaise Pascal’s Puy-de-
Dôme experiment of 1648 to stand in for the weight of the atmosphere. In a similar fashion, 
inbred lab strains were incorporated into genetic experimental set-ups to stand in for the 
typical form of the species found in nature. But this aligning of lab and nature via metonymic 
intermediaries such as wild types remained secure, Shapin argued, only so long as it 
maintained social acceptance as credible – “scientific claims – only provided they achieve 
credibility – act as a shorthand for the natural world”.639 This need for credibility was one of 
the reasons why the wild type, as was pointed out by the Committee of 1921, must preferably
have some relation to natural standards and cannot just be an arbitrary reference standard. But
it also became a serious problem when reasons were brought forward to suppose that lab wild
types were not properly representing typical variation in nature. 
638 Bruno Latour, The Pasteurization of France, Alan Sheridan and John Law (Trans.), Harvard University 
Press, 1988, p. 162.
639 Steven Shapin, Never Pure: Historical Studies of Science as if It Was Produced by People with Bodies, 
Situated in Time, Space, Culture, and Society, and Struggling for Credibility and Authority, John Hopkins 
University Press, 2010, pp. 22-23.
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The major challenge to the validity of lab wild types as representatives for nature came with 
the establishment of Theodosius Dobzhansky’s evolutionary genetics. Dobzhansky was one 
of the later members of the Morgan group of fruit fly geneticists. Utilising Theophilus 
Painter’s 1934 discovery that salivary chromosomal banding patterns correlated with existing
linkage maps, Dobzhansky began to study chromosomes of wild individuals of Drosophila 
pseudoobscura, a relation of the melanogaster species which the Morgan group had first 
domesticated. Dobzhansky observed that certain features widely present in nature were 
absent in the lab. In particular he noted the absence in lab wild types of inverted 
chromosomes. Further investigation turned up that these were the so-called ‘C-factors’ that 
Sturtevant and Bridges had in the mid-1910s so vigorously bred out of the lab strains on 
account of their suppressing crossing over. Dobzhansky, wondering at this difference 
between lab and field types, theorised that these ‘C-factors’ might have an evolutionary 
advantage in preventing beneficial gene clusters from being broken up in crossing over. A 
feature of natural populations that better enabled their survival in the struggle for existence 
had been bred out for the human purposes of mapping chromosomes.640 Had Sturtevant and 
Bridges unknowingly negotiated away a non-negotiable with regards to retaining the 
naturalness of their lab wild type lineages? Did, and should, they care? Dobzhansky thought 
they should, but this was hardly his most alarming attack on the lab lineage-based method 
used by the Morgan school, for a second observation far more fundamentally undermined the 
claimed representativeness of lab wild types as instances of nature. Dobzhansky found much 
higher variation in chromosome banding patterns than anticipated even given his own less 
restrictive expectations of natural variation. This made him doubt that a standard strain in a 
lab could ever be properly representative of typical variation in nature, for his own findings 
suggested natural variation was not uniformly distributed. He thus observed that “The ability 
of the gene complexes… [in] chromosomes of wild Drosophila pseudoobscura to produce, 
through recombination, a great variety of new gene complexes disrupts the notion of ‘normal’
or ‘wild type’ chromosome, genotype, or phenotype”.641 He subsequently would declare the 
wild type concept ‘refuted’ and invalidated, asserting that it was representative of a form of 
“typological thinking, the roots of which go down to the Platonic philosophy, [and] is 
640 Raphael Falk, Genetic Analysis: A History of Genetic Thinking, Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp. 112-
113 & 161-163.
641 Theodosius Dobzhansky, ‘Genetics of natural populations. XIII. Recombination and variability in 
populations of Drosophila pseudoobscura’, Genetics, Vol. 31, No. 3, 1946, p. 287.
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basically anti-evolutionistic”.642 But despite his claims that the wild type concept could only 
exist “because of the reluctance of the human mind to abandon the idea of a finite number of 
static prototypes underlying the unmanageable… multiformity of the living nature”, he 
nevertheless admitted that “it is… [in non-polymorphic species] convenient for descriptive 
purposes to contrast mutant or aberrant individuals or strains with normal or wild type 
ones”.643 
Dobzhansky thus, despite his critique, admits that ‘wild type’ strains can be utilised as a 
reference standard, and so perform their key role as controls for variance, and moreover that 
the validity of their use is circumscribed by natural facts, e.g. polymorphisms are a natural 
fact presenting a problem, implying that some ‘wild types’ can be more natural than others 
and thus that some can be better used in model organism systems to represent nature. And so,
given their long-standing utility and necessity as part of model organism systems in much of 
genetics, as emphasised by Ankeny’s description (see Introduction) of them as the “first step 
in the underlying strategy [of classical genetics]”, it is not surprising that wild types have 
survived into the present day. Whatever their future, they have played a key role as a 
boundary object bridging the lab and nature. That they are open to critique on grounds of the 
artefactuality and lack of correlation with actual patterns of variation in nature is an inevitable
result of their having to adapt to a role with dual demands in opposing directions. Richard 
Levins has argued in a 1966 paper that models in population biology must be based on trade-
offs between competing demands of generality, realism and precision, qualities contributing 
to understanding, predicting and modifying nature respectively, models which combine all 
three qualities being difficult to fruitfully develop.644 Whilst here Levins is talking about 
mathematical models, I will argue that his insights on trade-offs equally apply to the case of 
wild type and its dual role as control for variance inside the lab and representative of the 
nature outside. The trade-offs I am interested in here are somewhat different from Levins 
given that the case here is one of relations of metonymy between wild organisms and 
laboratory strains, modelling a concrete phenomenon with concrete entities rather than at an 
642 A. R. Cordeiro and Theodosius Dobzhansky, ‘Combining Ability of Certain Chromosomes in Drosophila 
Willistoni and Invalidation of the "Wild-Type" Concept’, The American Naturalist, Vol. 88, No. 839, 1954, 
pp. 83.
643 Theodosius Dobzhansky, ‘Genetics of natural populations. XIII. Recombination and variability in 
populations of Drosophila pseudoobscura’, Genetics, Vol. 31, No. 3, 1946, p. 287.
644 Richard Levins, ‘The Strategy of Model Building in Population Biology’, The American Scientist, Vol. 54, 
No. 4, 1966, pp. 422-3. 
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abstract mathematical level. In place of realism, precision and generality, I therefore suggest 
the related but distinct concreteness, tractability and representativeness (for 
'representativeness', I assume a preference for homology based on shared properties over 
analogy based on similitude and symbolic relations, i.e. for strong over weak metonymy). I 
have already implied that concreteness has not traditionally been a problem for wild types. 
Representativeness and tractability, by contrast, have been in consistent tension. To make 
organisms more tractable to the needs of the genetics lab, they are rendered less 
representative of their species and of nature (i.e. they become less homologous, decreasing 
the legitimacy of claims of strong metonymy). But if they are not representative enough of 
nature, the knowledge derived through their experimental use cannot leave the walls of the 
laboratory and be applied to nature, which, after all was the original aim of genetic 
experiments, namely to elucidate the role of heredity and variation in the evolutionary 
process. Determining what can and what cannot be sacrificed to tractability, what is 
negotiable and what is non-negotiable, have thus been central to the use of wild types in 
classical genetics and beyond, for the very credibility of knowledge created in laboratories as 
applicable to nature rests on this very basis, that there are commonalities between nature and 
the lab, boundary objects bridging this divide. 
In this thesis I have sought to show how the wild type concept first arose out of assumptions 
of difference between variation in nature and domestication, how it was that it became able to
move from nature into the lab, and once in the lab how it has played a central role in the 
development and success of genetics. I have sought to discuss some of the epistemic, political
and cultural influences which contributed to the establishment of a knowledge regime of 
scientific domestication in early modern Europe, and to illustrate how this allowed the 
opening up of the epistemic space within which the wild type concept would crystallise. I 
have also shown how the wild type crossed the threshold into the laboratory, concept 
following organism across the boundary. Once within the experimental systems of genetics, 
the wild type became an epistemic object pursued by researchers seeking to determine the 
true units of nature through experimental purifications and recombinations. I have then 
shown how reductionist interpretations of wild type eventually overcame more holistic 
understandings, in the process disintegrating the wild type as epistemic thing into its 
component genes, what I term the compositional notion of wild type. But the wild type 
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survived as a technical object, in the form of lab lineages, which continued to play an 
essential role within the model organism systems of classical genetics as representational 
stand-ins for nature, enabling knowledge produced in the laboratory to be more easily 
extrapolated to wild nature beyond. I believe that in writing this thesis I have helped provide 
wild type with a previously unrecognised history, one which is moreover part of the larger 
history of research strategies of scientific domestication. It is my hope that I have made a 
contribution to understanding the long-term cultural context of the strange efforts of early 20th
century geneticists to bring exemplars of the wild into conditions of hyper-domestication. I 
moreover believe my narrative offers a good case-study for how scientific work can be highly
epistemically productive despite many of the assumptions grounding its practices being 
fundamentally flawed or false (as was the case, for instance, with many of the beliefs that 
early 20th century geneticists utilised to legitimate bringing 'wild types' into the laboratory). I 
have further shown that the science of the domestic and wild has therefore not been 
cumulative in its production of knowledge but has instead been dominated by dialectical 
interactions at both the theoretical and material level between social economies and natural 
economies, and between human investigators and the nature they seek to understand, control 
and/or make useful. This interaction has not been a simple one-way domination of wild 
nature by human domestication strategies, as might be expected given the power over nature 
we traditionally ascribe scientists in the lab, but has rather been one characterised by 
negotiation, reflexivity, symbiosis and the co-construction of scientific knowledge. Finally, I 
believe I have shown that where the line between domestic and wild is drawn in life science 
research is non-obvious but that such demarcations have non-trivial repercussions in terms of 
designating what is a 'natural' (i.e. wild) behaviour or constitution, how resistant such 
wildness is to intervention, and therefore what strategies for knowledge production are 
acceptably naturalistic and henceforth scientific. The case of 'wild type' has helped us explore
how historical changes in the demarcation of this boundary have both been produced and 
have been productive of new forms of knowledge production, and moreover shown that many
disputes within the life sciences have centred on where this boundary should be drawn. 
Having established its role in the history of the life sciences, it is a logical step that one of my
future projects will be to extend analysis to the role of the domestic-wild divide to 
contemporary scientific research. I hope therefore that this thesis will be the starting point for 
a more extensive future research programme.
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